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Introduction
A new report in support of the european strategy for 
growth and jobs…
This Communication presents ﬁ  ndings and messages 
from the Commission’s European Competitiveness 
Report 2006  1.
The Competitiveness Report focuses mainly on ana-
lysing issues related to developments of productiv-
ity, as a key indicator for competitiveness over the 
long term. Competitiveness here is understood to 
mean a sustained rise in the standards of living of 
a nation or region and a level of involuntary unem-
ployment as low as possible. At the level of an 
industrial sector, competitiveness is understood as 
maintaining and improving its position in the glo-
bal market.
With the relaunched Lisbon Strategy for Growth 
and Jobs distinguishing between macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and employment challenges, the 
Competitiveness Report has been redesigned to 
contribute to a solid analytical underpinning of the 
microeconomic pillar of Lisbon strategy. From this 
also ﬂ  ows that the analysis of issues in this report 
has been brought closer to the policy agenda.
The present Communication does not aim at con-
cluding with concrete proposals or an action plan. 
Its ambition is to support decision making by putting 
forward a number of policy relevant ﬁ  ndings  and 
recommendations resulting from economic analysis.
After a review of recent developments concerning 
growth, productivity and employment in Europe, the 
Report addresses various aspects relating to three of the 
four priority actions of the reform agenda that the Spring 
European Council of 2006 put forward: knowledge and 
1   Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2006) 1467, 14.11.2006: European 
Competitiveness Report 2006.
innovation, unlocking the business potential and towards 
an efﬁ  cient and integrated energy policy. Four chapters 
deal with, successively, the liberalisation of European 
energy markets, the Regulatory environment in the con-
text of the Strategy for Growth and jobs, the ﬁ  nancing of 
innovation, the concept of “Lead Markets” in innovation 
policy. In addition, the Report examines the competitive 
position of two high technology European industrial sec-
tors, the production of Information and Communication 
Technology goods and services and the pharmaceutical 
industry. Finally, a statistical annex presents indicators of 
competitiveness at sectoral level.
Overall competitiveness 
performance
Encouraging signs that the disappointing perform-
ance in improving competitiveness over the past 
years is being addressed…
In the past decade, GDP per capita growth in the EU-
25 has been lower than in the US and the growth 
rate of real GDP, labour productivity and total factor 
productivity in the European Union have been slow-
ing down or remained stagnant during the 1990-
2004 period. These trends have structural features 
and this awareness, shared among European policy 
makers, demands adequate policy responses. In 2000, 
the European Council agreed in Lisbon to re-launch 
European competitiveness. In 2005, the Lisbon strat-
egy was revamped, with increased focus on policies 
aimed at delivering growth as well as more and better 
employment. In fact, the key areas of the “Growth 
and Jobs” strategy are concerned, among others, with 
boosting productivity growth by investing in Research 
& Development, improving European infrastructure, 
enhancing human capital and promoting competi-
tion. This would contribute to better take advantage 
of globalisation. This strategy is also to be seen in 
the wider context of the sustainable development 
requirement that present needs have to be met with-
Economic reforms and competitiveness: 
key messages from the European 
Competitiveness Report 2006
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out compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.
A ﬁ   rst encouraging sign is the tendency towards 
higher employment rates in many EU Member 
States. This is to some extent the result of labour 
market reforms enacted in past years. Nevertheless, 
employment rates in most countries remain below 
the Lisbon targets.
However, the recent progress in employment rates in 
the EU came along with only small increases in labour 
productivity. This disappointing performance of EU 
labour productivity growth can be explained by both 
weak investment and by an overall slow total factor 
productivity growth rate. Total factor productivity 
growth remains low since the slowdown in the mid 
nineties. This demonstrates the need not to delay any 
further the reforms in line with the priorities agreed 
in the Strategy for Jobs and Growth. Productivity 
gains stemming from re-organization and realloca-
tion of production, from improved labour skills, from 
the introduction of new products and processes, in 
particular through ICT, would contribute to increased 
investment demand and further progress in labour 
productivity in terms of capital deepening.
More recent developments point to an accelera-
tion of economic growth for the EU, from 1.7% in 
2005 to 2.8% in 2006. This would be the best EU-25 
growth performance since 2000 and is accompanied 
by higher employment and productivity growth and 
a reduction of unemployment. The rise of oil prices 
has clearly had a negative, if limited, impact on Euro-
pean growth. Model simulations help quantify the 
effects of energy price variations in the long term 
and illustrate their wide variety over different coun-
tries and sectors. In spite of the increase of energy 
prices this year, the EU economy is clearly recovering 
very robustly. Together with the new governance of 
the partnership for Growth and Jobs, this provides a 
unique opportunity to vigorously pursue the neces-
sary structural reforms.
Drivers of competitiveness
Energy market liberalisation: strong response to incen-
tives makes careful policy design ever more necessary…
The European energy markets have been going 
through a process of liberalisation since the early 
1990s. The Report presents an assessment of some 
of the effects of liberalising the European electricity 
and gas markets and discusses issues arising from lib-
eralisation in general, including experiences outside 
the EU.
The ﬁ  ndings suggest that the introduction of com-
petition has generally resulted in more cost-efﬁ  cient 
operations with part of the beneﬁ  ts accruing to the 
consumers. However, electricity and gas wholesale 
markets have turned out to be particularly vulnerable 
to market power resulting from both legacy indus-
try structure and the speciﬁ  c characteristics of these 
markets. Incumbents continue to have a strong grip 
on production, imports and key infrastructure. Efﬁ  -
cient regulators, in particular, are needed to address 
this concern. Competition on retail markets is yet to 
function properly in the majority of cases. This said, 
the energy Directives provide for universal and pub-
lic service obligations as well as speciﬁ  c consumer 
protection rules.
Regarding R&D, evidence on effects on innovation 
indicates that, following liberalisation, a shift occurs in 
the composition of R&D efforts: the innovation focus 
of the companies moves away from (public-interest) 
technology innovation towards cost-reducing tech-
nologies and consumer services. While aggregate 
R&D spending appears to have diminished, the focus   
increased. As a result, additional policy measures 
may be necessary to encourage fundamental energy 
research to recover its pre-liberalisation situation.
Both theory and evidence indicate that in liberalised 
markets, prices may ﬂ  uctuate more in the short run 
and demand may need to adjust more often than 
before liberalisation to available capacity. While these 
price ﬂ  uctuations are sometimes viewed as undesira-
ble, the larger role of demand in clearing the markets 
is consistent with an increase in long-run efﬁ  ciency. 
Another issue is that inadequate market design may 
lead to inefﬁ  ciently low investments  2. This is espe-
cially the case if prices fail to reﬂ  ect the real value 
of energy, resulting in lower rates of return or when 
inadequate unbundling leads network operators to 
favour their afﬁ  liate supply businesses. In regulated 
markets (i.e. infrastructure), devising mechanisms 
to foster efﬁ   cient investments is necessary, espe-
cially where (cross-border) transport capacity is 
concerned. Factors such as complicated procedures 
imposed by public authorities may also contribute to 
lower investment. Insufﬁ  cient investment in power 
generation risks resulting in electricity shortages and 
power cuts.
Findings from economic analysis included in the 
Report indicate that policy responses should ﬁ  rstly 
focus on clear allocation of rights and responsibili-
ties of market players, especially during periods of 
scarcity. In addition, the promotion of more liquid 
wholesale markets, especially for forward contracts, 
will assist consumers in insuring against price ﬂ  uc-
tuations. Efﬁ   cient markets require a higher degree 
2   ‘Market design’ covers several components: wholesale markets, retail 
markets, fuel markets, capacity markets, congestion management mech-
anisms, balancing mechanisms.
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of transparency; a mechanism at EU level to better 
monitor demand and supply patterns on EU energy 
markets, identifying likely shortfalls in infrastructure, 
supply and storage would contribute to enhancing 
transparency on security of energy supply issues 
within the EU.
Finally, according to both theoretical as well as empir-
ical results, the impacts of liberalisation of the elec-
tricity markets on the environment are ambiguous. 
While reduction of prices would increase consump-
tion of energy, increased fuel efﬁ  ciency and shifts in 
technology mix, caused by increased competition, 
can reduce emissions  3. In general, liberalisation and 
environmental objectives are compatible. Liberalisa-
tion can also strengthen the effect of market based 
environmental instruments, such as the European 
Emission Trading Scheme.
Regulatory environment: a very broad adherence to 
the principles of better regulation in spite of unequal 
commitments…
The improvement of the business environment 
through applying measures fostering entrepreneur-
ship and through application of Better Regulation 
rules is today a shared goal within the European 
Union. The diffusion of Better Regulation instruments 
is therefore a clearly stated priority of the Strategy for 
Jobs and Growth. It is thus a very positive develop-
ment that the National Reform Programmes (NRPs) 
that the Member States adopted in 2005 reﬂ  ect the 
will to reform regulatory practices. These reforms are 
very complementary to the Better Regulation Initiative 
launched at Community level, which comprises a sim-
pliﬁ  cation programme for existing legislation, system-
atic impact assessments for new legislation, improved 
stakeholder consultation, as well as the measurement 
and reduction of administrative burdens. Work on set-
ting quantitative targets for the reduction of adminis-
trative burdens is also under way.
Isolating the effects of regulation on the economy is 
fraught with difﬁ  culty. Nevertheless, the – still lim-
ited – economic literature in this area provides evi-
dence that regulation can have signiﬁ  cant positive 
or negative (if poorly designed) effects on economic 
performance and innovation. The Competitiveness 
Report analyses the multitude of measures which are 
being proposed in the NRPs and elsewhere across all 
EU-25 Member States in the area of Better Regula-
tion. While these measures vary considerably in terms 
of their time-horizon, depth, degree of institutionali-
sation and likely effectiveness, most Member States 
do envisage one or more high-proﬁ  le activities in this 
area. In addition, Member States present measures 
with visible short-term beneﬁ   cial effects, such as 
3  The latter effect is sensitive to the country-speciﬁ  c initial conditions.
one-stop shops for business registration. The NRPs 
and developments since their publication last year 
therefore represent a clear step in the right direction 
for the EU regulatory environment. The large differ-
ences observed between the measures proposed by 
individual Member States often reﬂ  ect the fact that 
Member States are at different points in the develop-
ment of a Better Regulation system.
It is noteworthy in this context that having a Better 
Regulation system in place does not necessarily lead 
to substantially less regulation. Among those seven 
Member States which have been broadly categorised 
on the basis of existing indicators as having relatively 
restrictive regulatory environments, as deﬁ  ned by the 
OECD, two present a set of measures in their NRPs 
spanning all or almost all elements of the Better Reg-
ulation agenda, and that most others take measures 
in at least two areas. This said, a number of the eight 
Member States listed among those with less restric-
tive regulatory environments are also found among 
those countries with measures in all or almost all ele-
ments of the Better Regulation agenda.
An increasing number of countries (18) are imple-
menting, or plan to implement, their own Impact 
Assessment (IA) systems, mirroring what is already 
taking place in the Commission and in a small 
number of Member States. This should help ensure 
a higher quality of future regulation with regard 
to issues of importance for national and European 
competitiveness. Progress so far, however, has been 
somewhat slow and one should bear in mind that 
the beneﬁ  ts of implementing an IA system take a few 
years to materialise. Moreover, there are concerns 
that in a number of cases resource constraints may 
be a serious obstacle. Unless this issue of resource 
redeployment is overcome, new legislation might 
be deprived of the quality improvement that results 
from IAs that systematically assess economic, social 
and environmental impacts as part of an integrated 
process.
Establishing a fully ﬂ   edged and integrated Better 
Regulation system should be the medium to long-
term objective of all Member States. Clearly, urgent 
action is needed to lay the foundations for the sys-
tem. Doing so in a sustained fashion will help provide 
better conditions for entrepreneurship, reductions in 
administrative burdens – which are particularly high 
in some sectors – and in barriers to market entry and 
contribute to increased competition, more innova-
tions and ultimately higher economic growth. The 
general process of Better Regulation is still in its early 
stages and its ultimate success will be inﬂ  uenced by 
many factors that cannot easily be accounted for. 
The earnestness with which existing proposals will 
be implemented will also play an important role.
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This analysis suggests that progress has already been 
made across the EU and that all Member States are 
taking action regarding Better Regulation, and the 
business environment more generally, but that real 
challenges remain. Naturally, for countries with less 
emphasis on Better Regulation policies up to now, 
both the urgency of and the potential beneﬁ  ts associ-
ated with pushing ahead more strongly with the Bet-
ter Regulation agenda are greater than for countries 
that have already attained a more advanced stage. 
Those Member States in a less positive starting posi-
tion should make greater efforts towards establishing 
fully ﬂ  edged Better Regulation systems.
Financing of innovation receives the attention that it 
deserves, some policy gaps remain…
The Report focuses ﬁ  rst on particular ﬁ  nance-related 
problems of innovation and the appropriate policy tools 
to deal with them. Public support can come in various 
forms: direct measures such as grants and loans, indi-
rect measures such as guarantees or ﬁ  scal incentives for 
R&D, and risk capital measures. The Report discusses 
good practice of government support, as supported 
by economic theory, and presents policy relevant con-
clusions. These conclusions are then complemented 
by reviewing the innovation ﬁ  nancing measures that 
Member States put forward in the National Reform 
Programmes issued in October 2005.
Over the last years, an increasing number of coun-
tries have been using ﬁ  scal incentives for encourag-
ing R&D and, in many countries, beneﬁ  ts provided 
by R&D tax provisions have been increased. The 
National Reform Programmes that Member States 
issued in October 2005 conﬁ  rm this trend. They also 
reﬂ  ect the growing importance for public authori-
ties of having a robust venture capital industry, by 
reporting ongoing; stepped up or new actions in 
almost all Member States, with a special focus on 
early stage investments. A notable group of coun-
tries announce actions also for business angels. This 
said, little attention is paid, overall, to facilitating the 
cross-border mobility of venture capital. The same 
applies to debt ﬁ  nancing of innovative projects, with 
only a small number of Member States announcing 
measures to this respect.
The broad variety of schemes and instruments, as well 
as the frequently stated intention to overhaul and 
restructure them indicate that a lot of experimentation 
is going on. There is clearly scope for mutual learning 
and exchange of best practice, which would be much 
easier if evaluations of existing measures were more fre-
quent, more systematic and more comparable. Also, 
sometimes a wide variety of instruments exists within 
one country, making necessary more systematic efforts 
to inform potential users but also to make existing 
instruments simpler and more accessible.
In conclusion, it would appear that more efforts should 
be directed towards facilitating the provision of cross-
border venture capital and the debt ﬁ  nancing of inno-
vative projects. The provision of early stage risk capital 
is being addressed in many countries; however, this 
clearly remains an area where more should be done. 
Also, evaluation and simpliﬁ  cation of existing schemes 
should be carried out more systematically and mutual 
policy learning should continue.
It must be clear, though, that if these efforts are nec-
essary, they are certainly not sufﬁ   cient for achiev-
ing the more general objective of transforming the 
European economy into a more dynamic and knowl-
edge-based one. Apart from setting up comprehen-
sive research, development and innovation policies, 
this will take also implementing those reforms that 
will tone up economic activity in general, particularly 
in the areas of business environment, competition, 
external trade, education and labour markets.
The lead market approach can contribute to innova-
tion policies capable of anticipating global needs…
The Report undertook a literature review of the lead 
market approach, a useful concept to better under-
stand the factors behind the global success of inno-
vations and new technologies, especially in the case 
of competing innovation designs.
While the lead markets approach is primarily relevant 
for ﬁ  rms, it can also help governments to design a 
more effective technology policy with respect to 
facilitating the potential global success of compa-
nies’ innovation activities. For this purpose, some 
generic criteria for designing various parts of inno-
vation policy (from funding programmes and pub-
lic procurement to regulation and standard setting) 
can be applied: incorporation of global market needs 
and preferences of customers from abroad, transfer-
ring domestic market preferences abroad, putting 
emphasis on lowering costs of production, allowing 
competition among different innovation designs, 
and addressing global trends (though the latter is 
highly demanding since it is difﬁ   cult to identify a 
particular change as being a global trend).
It is thus a critical point for any policy that attempts 
to support the emergence of a lead market to antici-
pate global markets, develop an innovation design 
that responds to these upcoming global needs and 
introduce cost advantages high enough to persuade 
other countries to follow, without interfering with 
competitive forces.
In order to make the lead markets concept opera-
tional at European level, the Commission has pro-
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posed in its recent Communication on Innovation  4 
to, ﬁ  rstly consult stakeholders, in particular Technol-
ogy Platforms and the Europe INNOVA Innovation 
Panels, to identify possible areas where a combina-
tion of supply and demand side policies may help 
the emergence of innovation-friendly markets and, 
secondly, to launch pilot lead markets initiatives in 
the most promising areas in 2007. Based on this 
experience, the Commission will prepare a compre-
hensive lead markets strategy.
Competitiveness in sectors
In addition to reviewing economic reform (energy 
liberalisation, regulatory environment) and poli-
cies to improve innovative performance, the Report 
examined the competitive position of two impor-
tant, fast growing and high technology sectors, the 
industry producing Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) goods and services and the phar-
maceutical industry.
ICT industries need more R&D and policies that make 
change easier…
Concerning ICT, the Report concludes that the EU 
has comparative advantages in differentiated goods 
of higher quality, commanding higher prices. The 
increased trade in intermediate goods, which is 
largely intra-ﬁ  rm trade, indicates that some of the 
imports are used as intermediate products for more 
complex ﬁ  nished goods of higher value.
Globalisation has multiplied the possibilities to frag-
ment the production process and locate the produc-
tion of components according to the comparative 
advantages of the different locations. As a conse-
quence, chip design is made in Europe while mass 
production of chips takes place in South-East Asia; 
software development is carried out in European 
software labs while the coding of software is done 
in India. Proximity to the customers of specialised 
products such as customised software is yet another 
argument for location in the EU. The evidence sug-
gests that knowledge-intensive production, product 
development and strategic R&D are still located in 
Europe while labour-intensive production of mature 
standardised goods has been located to Asia. How-
ever, increasing R&D investments in China and India 
may challenge this situation in the future.
This said, ICT producers in the new Member States 
have shown that it is still possible to be competitive 
in EU with low-cost and scale-intensive production 
such as insulated wire, radio and TV receivers and 
4   Commission Communication COM(2006) 502, 13.9.2006/ Putting 
knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation strategy for the EU.
other consumer electronics, as well as computers. 
It is however unlikely that this kind of production is 
competitive in the longer run. It is therefore neces-
sary to further strengthen the links between systems 
of innovation within Europe in order to reap the full 
potential of the relatively high skilled labour force in 
EU-10.
EU is specialised particularly in the production of 
communication services as well as in IT services and 
software production. For ICT manufacturing, EU 
comparative advantages are found in the produc-
tion of scientiﬁ   c instruments, electronic products 
and telecommunications equipment of high quality. 
The answer to the challenge from low-cost produc-
ers lies in further climbing up the quality ladder and 
a fast ﬂ  ow of new innovative products satisfying the 
growing demand for advanced goods and services. 
Achieving this objective will be easier if the right sec-
tor-speciﬁ  c and more general microeconomic poli-
cies are in place.
In comparison with other sectors, the EU ICT sec-
tor is R&D intensive. However, given the lags already 
existing vis-à-vis its main competitors, further raising 
its R&D investments will be crucial for its future com-
petitiveness. This is not so much a necessity for the 
larger EU enterprises of the sector as for smaller ones 
and start ups. This points to the existence of a more 
systemic weakness in generating – and ﬁ  nancing – 
research in small innovative ﬁ  rms which cannot be 
addressed by sector speciﬁ  c measures alone; it rather 
necessitates the horizontal policy responses reviewed 
in relation with the ﬁ  nancing of innovation. Also, this 
is clearly a sector where the lead markets concept is 
relevant when considering speciﬁ  c policies.
In sum, ICT markets can move very fast and inno-
vation is a primary factor for longer term competi-
tiveness. Besides the sector speciﬁ  c policy conditions 
that may facilitate the further development of the 
sector, the more general business environment and, 
especially, market regulation and the innovation sys-
tem are of primary importance in making adaptation 
to change easier.
Pharmaceuticals: systemic weaknesses restrain a 
growing industry…
In terms of production and employment Europe’s 
pharmaceutical sector is growing, as well as its share 
in global exports. This good performance is partially 
due to a delocalisation of US production in Europe 
but also to an increase of its cost competitiveness.
Nevertheless, the overall picture gives rise to con-
cern. The European pharmaceutical industry has a 
considerable gap vis-à-vis the US in labour productiv-
ity, much larger than in overall manufacturing. Pro-
ductivity growth in the US was mostly the outcome 
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of capital deepening, while the most important com-
ponent in Europe was total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. Capital deepening in Europe increased at a 
modest rate.
Since 2000, the US has consolidated its central role 
as a locus of innovation in pharmaceuticals. US ﬁ  rms 
hold the majority of biopharmaceutical patents, and 
this dominance continues to expand. Also, US ﬁ  rms 
play a pivotal role in the global division of innovative 
labour in pharmaceuticals, as shown by their shares 
of co-invented patents at international level. These 
trends are conﬁ   rmed by data on patent citations. 
The internal structure of the US national innovation 
system is a powerful source of competitive advantage 
and industrial leadership. In particular, the biotech 
sector plays a vital role in integrating explorations of 
new research opportunities with clinical and market 
development.
The US market for pharmaceuticals is both more con-
centrated and more volatile than markets in Europe. 
In other words, the higher concentration of the US 
market does not mean that it is less competitive. On 
the contrary, the US market is highly contestable; 
product turnover is much more frequent than in the 
EU and Japan; and competition from generic produc-
ers is substantial. US market behaviour is consistent 
with that of a market characterized by Schumpet-
erian competition, where innovators can gain tem-
porary quasi-monopoly proﬁ  ts, which in turn spur 
innovation efforts by competitors that quickly leads 
to more innovative products and a high turnover of 
market shares. Dynamic competition is less evident 
in the EU as a whole, and especially in certain conti-
nental European countries.
Europe is lagging behind the US in its ability to gen-
erate, organise, and sustain innovation processes 
and productivity growth in pharmaceuticals. Moreo-
ver, a disproportionate share of pharmaceutical R&D 
is performed in the US, with negative consequences 
in terms of both high value-added employment and 
complementary investments in clinical research.
Cost policies on behalf of European Social Security 
institutions can explain to a certain extent the differ-
ent dynamics characterising the EU pharmaceutical 
industry vis-à-vis the US. However, these cannot be 
fully explained by sector-speciﬁ  c factors. They are also 
the consequence of Europe’s relative lack of dynamism 
in reforming its labour and capital markets, education 
systems, public spending, and regimes of market regu-
lation. This is, for example, illustrated by the relative 
lack of dynamism of young technology-dedicated 
ﬁ  rms in generating and developing R&D projects.
Given the shortcomings in European competitiveness 
attributed at least partially to the distortions created 
by existing pricing and reimbursement policies, the 
Commission has taken the initiative to address some 
of the pressing issues by creating the Pharmaceutical 
Forum. Established in June 2005, the Forum brings 
together for the ﬁ  rst time senior decision makers in 
Member States, industry and other stakeholders. 
Based on previous work, the G10 Medicines process, 
it will take forward the three topics “Information to 
Patients, Relative Effectiveness of Medicines and Pric-
ing/Reimbursement”.
In particular the two latter issues have been the 
source of market distortions in the Single Market for 
pharmaceuticals in the EU since different national 
pricing/reimbursement decisions and the diverg-
ing requirements to measure relative effectiveness 
have had undesired consequences on other Mem-
bers States with different systems and have often 
caused unforeseen ramiﬁ  cations for the EU market 
as a whole.
The objective of the Forum is to ﬁ  nd a way forward 
which will strike a balance between the public health 
objective of patients’ access to new medicines at 
affordable costs and the need to create a predictable 
environment for business with economic rewards for 
innovators. Finding the right balance and creating an 
environment conducive to innovation will foster the 
competitiveness of the industry. Based on the delib-
erations in this framework, concrete actions will have 
to follow at EU and particularly at Member States’ 
level in order to regenerate Europe as a world centre 
of pharmaceutical innovation.
Synthesis
Improving the competitiveness of European econo-
mies is a long term and multifaceted endeavour. The 
European Competitiveness Report 2006 reviewed a 
number of reforms targeting framework conditions 
(access to innovation ﬁ  nance, better regulation) and 
a particularly important input market, energy. It also 
identiﬁ  ed the contribution that the concept of lead 
markets could have in designing more anticipatory 
innovation policies. In addition, it discussed recent 
trends and challenges regarding the competitive-
ness of two growing, high technology sectors, the 
ICT and the pharmaceutical industries.
In line with its mission in support of the microeconomic 
pillar of the Lisbon strategy, the Report documented 
areas where additional efforts may be necessary, for 
example, in the case of energy market reforms, as 
concerns consumer beneﬁ   ts from efﬁ  ciency  gains 
and efﬁ  cient regulators, investment in long term fun-
damental research and infrastructure, reliability and 
environmental effects. In the area of business environ-
ment, the Report suggests that all Member States are 
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taking some action regarding Better Regulation, and 
the business environment more generally, but that 
those Member States in a less positive starting posi-
tion should make greater efforts towards establishing 
fully ﬂ  edged Better Regulation systems.
In relation with Innovation policy, the Report pointed 
to the need for supporting early stage venture capital 
and making cross-border venture capital operations 
easier and highlighted the relative lack of attention 
to facilitating the ﬁ   nancing of innovation through 
loans. In addition, it identiﬁ  ed the factors that would 
help design a lead market oriented innovation policy, 
i.e. incorporation of global market needs and prefer-
ences of customers from abroad, transferring domes-
tic market preferences abroad, putting emphasis on 
lowering costs of production, allowing competition 
among different innovation designs, and addressing 
global trends.
The ICT producing industries and the pharmaceutical 
industry have little in common, other than being both 
high technology sectors. Trends in the ﬁ  rst are driven 
mainly by technology while in pharmaceuticals health 
cost policies play an important role. Yet, some weak-
nesses, as a marked deﬁ  cit in R&D intensity and the 
relative lack of young innovative ﬁ  rms are the same. 
It is also clear that beyond sector-speciﬁ  c measures – 
which are necessary and are pursued in speciﬁ  c fora – 
their competitiveness would improve substantially by 
the more horizontal reforms prioritised in the Lisbon 
agenda, such as those regarding innovation ﬁ  nance, 
the overall business environment, research, education 
and the functioning of the labour markets.
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction
This is the ninth edition of the Commission’s Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report since the 1994 Indus-
try Council Resolution that established its basis. Com-
petitiveness in this Report is understood to mean a 
sustained rise in the standards of living of a nation or 
region and as low a level of involuntary unemploy-
ment. Maintaining and improving its position in the 
global market is the main competitiveness criterion 
at the level of an industrial sector.
Over the last years, the Report has focused on analysis of 
the determinant factors of productivity developments, 
as the most reliable indicator for competitiveness over 
the longer term and connected issues, such as the likely 
impact of enlargement and the role of the public sector 
in the competitiveness of European economies.
The present Report continues in the same direction 
but, in the same time, marks a new beginning. Conti-
nuity as concerns its ambition to approach the issues 
from the point of view of economic theory and empir-
ical research and its objective to contribute to policy 
making by discussing analytically the likely outcomes 
of the various policy options. A new start in its ambi-
tion to support much more directly than before the 
Lisbon process by focusing on the microeconomic 
issues of the Strategy for Jobs and Growth.
Thus, the Report addresses various aspects relating 
to three of the four priority actions of the reform 
agenda that the Spring European Council of 2006 
put forward: knowledge and innovation, unlocking 
the business potential and towards an efﬁ  cient and 
integrated energy policy. In addition, the Report 
examines the competitive position of two high 
technology European industrial sectors, the pro-
duction of Information and Communication Tech-
nology goods and services and the pharmaceutical 
industry.
The Report is structured as follows: a ﬁ  rst chapter 
reviews recent developments concerning growth; 
productivity and employment in Europe. Follow-
ing chapters deal with, successively, the liberalisa-
tion of European energy markets, the Regulatory 
environment in the context of the Strategy for 
Growth and jobs, the ﬁ  nancing of innovation, the 
concept of “Lead Markets” in innovation policy, 
the competitiveness of the ICT sector and the 
competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Finally, a statistical annex presents indicators of 
competitiveness at sectoral level. This structure of 
thematic and sector speciﬁ  c chapters, followed by 
a statistical annex should continue in future ver-
sions of the Report.
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Chapter 2:
Economic growth and standards of living
2.1. Introduction
A popular view sees countries competing among each 
other in the same way as enterprises are competing 
for a market of a given size. But comparing com-
petition between countries with competition among 
enterprises is misleading. Losing market shares to 
other countries is not necessarily synonymous of 
losing competitiveness. Indicators such as the trade 
balance recording a deﬁ  cit are often invoked as sug-
gestions that a country is losing competitiveness. 
However, a surplus may be a sign of weakness (such 
as when the economy is not growing) and a deﬁ  cit a 
sign of strength (such as when the economy imports 
international capital to ﬁ  nance domestic investment 
opportunities).
A widely accepted deﬁ  nition of country competitive-
ness refers to the ability of an economy to provide, 
on a sustainable basis, its population with high and 
rising standards of living and employment for those 
willing to work. This is the approach we follow in this 
chapter: competitiveness describes the overall eco-
nomic performance of a nation. The objective is to 
provide an aggregate picture of recent trends in the 
EU-25 and to describe main differences among the 
Member States.
In the past decade GDP per capita (taken as a meas-
ure of the standards of living) in the EU-25 has been 
lagging behind that of the US and the growth rate 
of real GDP, labour productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity in the European Union have been slowing 
down or remained stagnant during the 1990-2005 
period. It is by now clear that these trends have 
structural features and this awareness, shared among 
European policy makers, dictates that adequate pol-
icy responses are needed. In 2000, the European 
Council agreed in Lisbon to re-launch European 
competitiveness. In 2005, the Lisbon strategy was 
revamped, with increased focus on policies aimed at 
delivering growth and employment.
Clearly the rise of oil prices in 2005 and 2006 has had 
a negative impact, though limited, in the EU growth 
performance. In order to put into perspective the cur-
rent debate over effects of the fast rising of oil prices 
since 2003, the chapter also includes a simulation of 
the impact on the EU of alternative oil price shocks.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews 
evidence on GDP per capita and GDP growth. Sec-
tion  3 analyses the supply determinants of GDP 
growth, distinguishing between the contribution 
of factors affecting employment and the supply of 
labour and of those having an impact on labour pro-
ductivity, Section 4 concludes.
2.2.  GDP per capita and 
GDP growth
Between the mid 1990s and up to 2000, the growth 
of EU-25 GDP per capita accelerated and remained 
at a good pace (annual average growth rate of 3%). 
The deceleration witnessed after 2000 seemed to 
start reversing in 2003, although 2005 turned out to 
be rather disappointing.
Table 2.1 (last column) illustrates the standards of 
living across individual Member States, the EU-25 
and the US. With the exception of Luxembourg, 
where GDP per capita is more than twice as high 
as the EU average, living standards in the EU-25 
range from 50% of the EU average (Latvia) to 139% 
(Ireland). Four Member States have a GDP per capita 
level below 60% of the EU-25 average.
Over the period 1990-2005, differences in devel-
opments in GDP per capita were mainly driven by 
GDP growth, the contribution from population 
growth being of a secondary importance. As Table 
2.1 shows GDP in the EU grew less fast than in 
the US both during the slow-growth period in the 
ﬁ  rst half of the 90s and during the high-growth, 
“new economy” years of the second half of the 
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decade. In the 2000-2005 period, growth again 
slowed down considerably in most EU Member 
States. Many of the new Member States however 
continued to register strong growth rates exceed-
ing 7% annual averages in the three Baltic States. 
Encouraging recent data point to an acceleration of 
economic growth in the EU from 1.7% in 2005 to 
2.7% in 2006.  5
5  See European Commission, Interim Forecast, September 2006.
Overall, the growth pattern in Europe follows quite 
closely the convergence hypothesis according to 
which countries with relatively low levels of per capita 
GDP grow more rapidly. Graph 2.1 plots the average 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita from 1990 to 
2005 against the initial level of GDP per capita in 1990 
for each the 25 Member States, the EU-25 and US. 
Even in this relatively short time period, there is a clear 
negative relation between the initial level of GDP per 
capita and its growth rate since 1990: countries that 
lagged behind in 1990 have typically grown faster.
Table 2.1: Real GDP Growth & real GDP per capita in PPS (EU25=100)
Average annual GDP growth 2005
GDP per 
capita 1990 – 
1995 (*)
1995 – 
2000 
2000 – 
2005 
2005
Austria   2.2  2.9  1.5  2.0   123
Belgium   1.6  2.7  1.5  1.1   115
Cyprus   5.3  3.8  3.2  3.8   81
Czech Republic  -1.0  1.5  3.6  6.1   73
Denmark   2.3  2.9  1.4  3.0   124
Estonia  1.4  5.6  8.3   10.5   60
Finland  -0.8  4.8  2.5  2.9   119
France   1.2  2.8  1.5  1.2   111
Germany  2.2  2.0  0.6  0.9   108
Greece   1.2  3.4  4.4  3.7   83
Hungary  0.4  4.0  4.2  4.2   61
Ireland  4.7   10.4   5.2   5.5   139
Italy   1.3  1.9  0.6  0.0   106
Latvia  -11.8   5.4   8.1  10.2   50
Lithuania   -10.3  4.2  7.6  7.6   53
Luxembourg   4.0  6.1  3.3  4.0   235
Malta  5.3  4.5  0.3  2.2   72
Netherlands   2.1  4.0  1.2  1.5   120
Poland   2.2  5.4  3.0  3.2   51
Portugal   1.7  4.1  0.6  0.4   75
Slovakia  6.4  3.7  4.6  6.0   56
Slovenia  -0.6  4.4  3.4  4.0   80
Spain   1.5  4.1  3.2  3.5   94
Sweden   0.7  3.2  2.2  2.7   122
United Kingdom   1.7  3.2  2.4  1.9   115
EU-25  1.7  3.0  1.8  1.8   100
US   2.5  4.1  2.4  3.2   152
(*)   Hungary, Malta ‘91-‘95; Slovakia ’92-’95; Estonia ’93-’95; Germany, EU-25 backward extrapolations of respectively 
West-Germany, EU-15.
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
The GDP growth reported was obtained in spite of 
strong increases in oil prices in 2005 and 2006. How-
ever, persistently high oil prices could trigger poten-
tial second-round effects in wage and price-setting 
behaviour, which pushes up inﬂ  ation and as a conse-
quence dampens Europe’s potential economic per-
formance. Evidence on the macroeconomic effects 
of oil price ﬂ  uctuation on economic performance is 
ample. During the surge in crude oil prices in 1999, 
for example, household savings rates declined by 
more than 2 percentage points in the Euro area, 
directly impacting investment behaviour and hence 
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Graph 2.1: Real GDP per capita growth (1990–2005) versus real GDP per capita in 1990 (*)
(*) Germany, Hungary, Malta ’91; Slovakia ’92; Estonia ’93.
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
LT
LV
CZ
PT
EE
IE
SK
PL
HU
MT
SL
CY
EL
ES
EU-25
UK
SE
AT
DK
BE
DE FR
IT
FI
NL US
LU
R2=0.1581
initial (1990) GDP per capita
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
5
 
G
D
P
 
p
c
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
economic performance during this period (cf. Euro-
pean Commission 2004, Graph 19).
But why should oil prices remain high? For a disrup-
tion in global oil supply by 7% an OECD (2004) study 
estimates an increase of international oil prices by 
20-25%. But security of supply and associated price 
premiums are not only determined by production, 
but also by the demand side. Over the decade 1995-
2004, China and India accounted for more than 30% 
of the incremental demand in crude oil (OECD 2004). 
Given their continuously high economic growth the 
two countries are likely to demonstrate further incre-
mental demand for crude oil in the future, hence con-
tributing to persistently high prices for crude oil.
As we have observed crude oil prices to increase 
throughout 2006 from 60US$/barrel to about 80US$/
barrel in a rather erratic manner and to plunge back 
to 60US$ within only two months, the debate about 
the impact of such rapid and radical price changes 
remains highly topical. In order to contribute to the 
quantiﬁ  cation of the potential effects of changing oil 
prices on the EU economy, we provide an analysis of 
two alternative oil price scenarios, which is presented 
in Box 1 below.
Box 1: Changes in energy prices and EU economics performances
The relative price of energy vis-à-vis other commodities is an important determinant for economic per-
formance and the growth of GDP. This is particular true for international crude oil prices, but also for the 
prices of other primary energy sources. Over the past two decades, crude oil prices show substantially 
larger volatility than other commodity prices (OECD 2004), which reﬂ  ects the frequent disruptions in 
global oil supply. Such disruptions may occur through adverse weather conditions (hurricanes), techni-
cal interruptions (leaks, ﬁ  res), sabotage, and geo-political risks.
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Using the WorldScan  6 model (Lejour et al, 2006), we estimate the effects of an increase in average EU 
import prices for crude oil of 10% (approx. 6.5 US$/barrel) and their decline of 22% (approx. 
14.0 US$/barrel) respectively.  7 While the ﬁ  rst scenario reﬂ  ects continuously high energy prices, the 
second scenario mimics the possible return from the currently high oil price levels to more moderate 
levels, a medium-term prediction of many analysts.
Graph 1
Changes in some macro indicators for the EU-25 in 2020
(% change from the baseline in 2020)
The economy-wide effects of both scenarios for the EU-25 are presented in Graph 1.  8 If the average 
import prices for crude oil increase by 10% in 2006 (and persistently remain at such higher levels until 
2020), real GDP for the EU-25 is 0.75% lower as compared to the baseline (business-as-usual) scenario 
in 2020.  9 Individual Member States are affected quite differently depending on their respective sectoral 
structure, the energy intensity of their production processes, and their dependency on energy imports 
(see Graph 2). The drop in GDP, which is caused by a decline in real wages that is due to the lower 
average productivity in the economy, corresponds to a decline in national income of the same magni-
tude. While ﬁ  nal private consumption is in line with the change in GDP, the change in domestic capital 
stocks is more moderate reﬂ  ecting their sluggishness even over medium-term periods. Since the EU is 
a net importer of energy, higher international energy prices translate to a relatively larger increase in 
aggregate import than export prices for the EU-25 area and hence a slight decline in Europe’s terms of 
trade vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
6   WorldScan is a global (recursive) dynamic computable general equilibrium model that has been developed at The CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (www.cpb.nl).
7   The approximation of the changes in average EU import prices for crude oil are implemented as follows: we mimic a reduction (increase) in global 
energy supply of 3.2% (7.1%) through a 10% decline (27% increase) in total factor productivity levels in the energy production sectors for all 
regions. Assuming a 40% share of crude oil in the international energy mix the changes in global energy supply and price could be interpreted as 
an 8% (18%) reduction (increase) in global oil supply and a corresponding price increase (decrease) of about 10% (22%). The decrease of 22% in 
the second scenario would correspond to a decline in import prices for crude oil from 65 US$/barrel to 51 US$/barrel. For further details on model 
and scenarios refer to Wobst (2006).
8   Given that WorldScan is a simulation model these results have to be interpreted as mere approximations. However, the magnitude of the results is in 
line with several other studies applying the EC ECFIN QUEST model, the OECD interlink, and the NiGEM model as summarized by the ECB (2004). 
The study by the European Commission (2004) using the QUEST model suggests potentially lower impacts, which can be attributed to the lower 
initial oil prices in 2003/04 and to the second round general equilibrium effects captured in WorldScan.
9  All changes reported are annual effects and not accumulative effects over the entire simulation period.
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Graph 2
Changes in GDP across EU economies in 2020
(% change from the baseline in 2020 for “High prices” scenario)
Note: BL combines Belgium and Luxembourg; RE combines the Baltic Member States, Malta and Cyprus
The effects vary across sectors and countries as illustrated in Graph 3 for the changes in production of low-
tech manufacturing across European economies in 2020 as compared to the baseline. Most obviously, the 
relative changes in the low-tech sector output differ substantially at individual country level. In part, this 
reﬂ  ects country-differences in total energy intensity of production and dependency on energy imports. 
More importantly, it also reﬂ  ects differences in the relative energy-intensities across sectors (by country), 
which not only cause different relative adjustments, but may also cause different directions of adjustment.
Graph 3
Changes in production of low-tech manufacturing across EU economies in 2020
(% change from the baseline in 2020 for the “High prices” scenario)
Note: BL combines Belgium and Luxembourg; RE combines the Baltic Member States, Malta and Cyprus
The second scenario approximates the impacts of a permanent decline in average EU-25 import prices 
for crude oil by 22% as compared to the price levels for 2006-20 in the baseline. The economic gains 
from such persistently lower energy prices would be substantial, accounting for a 1.6% increase of GDP 
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in 2020 vis-à-vis the baseline. The mechanisms at work are the same as explained above just taking 
effect into the opposite direction. Apart from the favourable conditions for most net energy import-
ing European economies the marginal improvement of the terms of trade allow for some additional 
beneﬁ  ts. Consequently, the relative changes are even slightly larger than twice the changes of the ﬁ  rst 
scenario.
Due to its relatively high energy demand and its dependency on energy imports, the European economy 
undoubtedly is going to suffer measurably under prevailing high energy prices and potential further 
increases herein. However, the economic losses can be dampened through structural adjustment and 
technology innovation that aim at increasing energy efﬁ  ciency of production processes. In this respect, 
the current analysis does not capture the full potential beneﬁ  ts, because it does not consider technologi-
cal change through (endogenous) R&D investment beyond the steady technological progress deﬁ  ned 
in the baseline. In particular, it does not consider the substitution from current technologies generating 
conventional energy sources to innovative technologies generating alternative energy sources such as, 
for example, second generation biofuels.
2.3. Growth  determinants
Output per capita growth can be broken down into 
employment growth and labour productivity growth. 
The ﬁ  rst captures the contribution to output arising 
from growing labour inputs available for production. 
The latter summarizes the contribution to GDP growth 
related to additional capital inputs, enhanced quality 
of labour inputs and technological progress.  10
2.3.1. Employment
Employment rate in the EU-25 fell in the ﬁ  rst half of 
the nineties. This was followed by a rapid increase 
until 2001; since then, the employment rate has 
remained nearly unchanged at 65% of the 15-64 year 
old population.  11 Clearly, progress towards the EU 
Lisbon target of a 70% employment rate by 2010 
has been slow and signiﬁ  cant efforts will need to be 
made for this objective to be reached. 
Although some Member States recorded an increase 
in employment growth in 2000-2005 (see Table 2.2), 
for the EU-25 as a whole the employment growth 
in this period declined to 0.6%, or half of that in 
the late 1990s. In 2000-2005, total employment 
declined slightly in Germany (which has an employ-
ment rate signiﬁ  cantly above the EU-25 average), and 
steeply in Poland (which currently posts the lowest 
employment rate in the EU-25). Luxembourg, Spain 
and Ireland recorded strong employment growth, 
exceeding 2.5% at annual level, although also these 
10   More speciﬁ  cally, GDP per capita can be decomposed into labour pro-
ductivity times employment rate times a demographic factor (which con-
tribution we do not analyze here given that its contribution is of second-
ary importance).
11   Although the employment rate has increased only slightly since 2001, the 
rate did not decline during then period of economic slowdown of 2001-
2003, unlike in the US, demonstrating the resilience of the EU labour 
market to the slowdown.
countries experienced a deceleration of employment 
growth in comparison to the late 1990s.
The employment rate in the EU-25 is some 7 per-
centage points lower than in the US, this difference 
explaining a great deal of the persisting gap in the 
level of GDP per capita between the two economies. 
But to assess fully the contribution of employment to 
GDP growth, data on employment rates need to be 
complemented by information on average working 
hours per worker. This information is relevant espe-
cially for the comparison of the EU with the US as 
that Europeans work now fewer hours than Ameri-
cans. In the 1970s the number of hours worked per 
employee in the then EU-5 was around the same 
as in the US, but since then the number of hours 
worked has fallen in both the US and the EU-15, with 
a steeper reduction in Europe. Shorter working weeks 
and longer holidays seem to explain the trend.
2.3.2. Labour  productivity
Labour productivity (GDP over total employment) 
in the EU showed a rapid convergence towards the 
higher US productivity level until 1995. Since then a 
marked divergence emerged, despite an annual aver-
age labour productivity growth in Europe of around 
2% for the period 1995-2000 and 1.3% afterwards. 
Latest available data suggest that labour productivity 
accelerated in the ﬁ  rst semester of 2006 (on a year 
to year basis the annual growth rate in the second 
quarter of 2006 was 1.7% for the EU25).
Table 2.3 presents the labour productivity growth rates 
by Member State. Most of the new Member States – in 
particular the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary and Slo-
vakia – as well as Greece and Ireland recorded strong 
labour productivity growth rates in the period 2000-
2005. Conversely, productivity growth was weak in 
Malta, Luxembourg, Italy,   Portugal and Spain.
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Table 2.2: Employment growth and 2005 Employment rate
Average annual employment growth 2005
Employment 
rate 1990 – 
1995 (*)
1995 – 
2000 
2000 – 
2005 
2005
Austria  0.2  1.0  0.2  0.3   74
Belgium  0.1  1.1  0.5  0.9   61
Cyprus   :  1.3  1.5  3.2   65
Czech Republic   :   -0.8  0.1  1.6   69
Denmark   -0.1  1.0  0.1  0.7   78
Estonia   -5.3   -2.0  1.1  2.0   66
Finland   -3.7  2.3  0.9  1.3   69
France   -0.1  1.4  0.6  0.3   62
Germany  0.0   0.8  -0.2  -0.1   70
Greece  0.6  0.6  1.1  1.3   55
Hungary  -4.0  1.2  0.2  0.0   56
Ireland  1.7  5.7  2.9  4.6   69
Italy   -0.6  1.0  1.2  0.2   63
Latvia  -7.2  -0.5   1.6   1.5   65
Lithuania  -2.4  -1.1   1.1   1.4   64
Luxembourg  2.8  4.1  3.1  2.9   100
Malta   1.5  0.8  0.8  1.5   54
Netherlands  1.3  2.6  0.0  0.0   75
Poland   -0.9  -0.4  -0.6   2.3   53
Portugal   -0.6  1.9  0.4  0.0   71
Slovakia  0.2   -0.8  0.6  1.4   54
Slovenia   :   -0.4  0.6  0.3   66
Spain   -0.3  3.9  2.9  3.8   64
Sweden   -2.1  0.8  0.3  0.3   74
United Kingdom   -0.8  1.3  0.9  1.0   72
EU-25  -0.3  1.2  0.6  0.9   66
US  1.0  2.1  0.7  1.8   73
(*) Hungary, Poland ’92-’95; Slovakia ’94-’95; Germany, EU-25 backward extrapolations of respectively West-Germany, EU-15.
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
Note: “employment rate” means persons employed in all domestic industries as % of population 15 to 64 years.
Productivity per worker can be decomposed into 
productivity per hour and average working hours per 
worker. In fact, when labour productivity is measured 
by hours rather than by worker, a reduction of almost 
25% in the productivity gap between US and EU is 
observed. Since the short EU working hours do not 
apply for all member states -people in Central and 
Southern European countries tend to work longer 
hours- results change when comparing worker and 
hour productivity. Thus Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Sweden and Denmark where the average number 
of hours worked per year and per person employed 
is lower than the EU average, present higher hourly 
productivity while the reverse is true in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Greece. The last two columns 
in Table 2.3 present data on productivity per worker 
and per hour worked in 2005.
An ongoing debate concerns whether this difference 
in the supply of working hours is due to different 
preferences for leisure in the EU and the US, to dif-
ferent taxation systems, or to differences in labour 
market regulations (see Blanchard (2004) and Pres-
cott (2003), CPB (2006) contains a recent literature 
review).
2.3.3.  Capital deepening, total factor 
productivity
Developments in labour productivity may stem from 
changes in the per-employee capital stock, i.e. capi-
tal deepening, or by technological progress, as meas-
ured by growth in total factor productivity (TFP). 
Capital deepening is usually the prevalent source of 
labour productivity growth for middle income coun-
tries, the catching up process being characterized by 
relatively high investment rates and a capital/labour 
ratio approaching that of high income countries. 
Conversely, TFP growth is the dominant source of 
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Table 2.3: Growth of Labour Productivity per person employed & 2005 levels of real GDP 
per person employed (ppe) and real GDP per hour worked (phw)
Average annual labour productivity growth GDP 
phw
2005 1990 – 
1995 (*)
1995 – 
2000 
2000 – 
2005 
2005
GDP ppe
2005
Austria 2.0 2.2 1.0 0.7 120 108
Belgium 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.1 118 137
Cyprus : 2.4 1.6 0.5 76 71
Czech Republic : 2.7 2.4 4.4 62 56
Denmark 2.5 1.8 1.3 2.2 100 114
Estonia 6.5 8.2 6.5 8.3 53 45
Finland 3.1 2.4 1.5 1.6 107 110
France 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.9 117 116
Germany 2.9 2.2 1.6 1.6 117 116
Greece 0.7 2.8 3.3 2.3 92 78
Hungary 5.4 2.9 3.9 4.3 68 58
Ireland 2.9 3.7 2.2 0.9 122 132
Italy 2.1 1.1 0.0 0.4 107 102
Latvia -5.0 5.9 6.4 8.6 47 43
Lithuania -8.2 5.4 6.5 6.1 50 48
Luxembourg 1.2 1.9 0.2 1.0 145 161
Malta 3.8 3.8 -0.7 0.7 78 80
Netherlands 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.8 125 124
Poland 6.2 5.8 3.6 0.9 57 50
Portugal 2.3 2.2 0.3 0.3 66 68
Slovakia 5.6 4.5 4.0 4.6 60 59
Slovenia : 4.8 2.8 3.7 72 74
Spain 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 93 91
Sweden 2.9 2.4 1.9 2.4 105 116
United Kingdom 2.4 1.9 1.5 0.9 100 106
EU-25 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 100 100
US 1.3 2.0 2.2 1.8 137 129
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
labour productivity growth in high-income countries, 
whose potential growth is mainly driven by product 
and process innovations, reallocation and reorgani-
zation of production activities, and enhancement of 
factor quality. Recent analyses (e.g. European Com-
mission (2006)) show that for most EU-15 countries 
during the 2001-2004 period, TFP growth was the 
major contributor to output growth, while in the 
EU-10 countries the picture is mixed, with some of 
these new Member States having a stronger contri-
bution from capital accumulation.
In past decades, the capital/labour ratio in most EU 
countries has been growing faster than in the US. 
Graph 2.2 shows that an increasing capital/labour 
ratio in the EU-15 helped to catch up with the US 
until the mid nineties. Subsequently, capital deepen-
ing in the EU slowed down, while that in the US grew 
at a faster pace, especially during the period 2000-
2005. Changes in EU capital deepening are mostly 
related to changes in employment. Where capital 
deepening is most marked is where performance in 
terms of employment growth was weak, while the 
opposite is true where employment has grown. How-
ever, the decreasing trend of capital deepening in the 
EU is also related to a downward trend in gross ﬁ  xed 
capital formation. Gross ﬁ  xed capital formation con-
tributes, also, in explaining the EU - US differences in 
growth. There is consensus that the faster investment 
growth in the US was related with higher investment 
in enhancing productivity information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT), which manifested, inter-
alia, in more sustained dynamics of TFP growth.
Table 2.4 shows that all the EU-15 countries have 
exhibited a decline in the growth rate of their capi-
tal/labour ratios compared to the ﬁ   rst half of the 
1990s. As for the EU-10 countries, over the 2000-
2005 period capital deepening growth in these 
countries was on average higher than in the EU-15 
(see European Commission 2005) and in the US, but 
with declining growth rates.
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Graph 2.2: Capital Deepening
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
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Table 2.4: Capital Deepening growth rate (*) 1990 - 2005
1990 – 1995 1995 – 2000 2000 – 2005
Austria 1.1 0.8 0.7
Belgium 0.9 0.4 0.4
Denmark 0.4 0.3 0.6
Finland 1.4 -0.5 0.3
France 1.0 0.3 0.6
Germany 1.5 0.9 0.7
Greece 0.6 0.7 0.9
Ireland 0.3 -0.2 0.9
Italy 1.0 0.4 0.5
Luxembourg 0.6 0.2 0.8
Netherlands 0.4 0.0 0.8
Portugal 1.4 0.9 0.9
Spain 1.4 0.0 0.6
Sweden 2.0 0.7 0.8
United Kingdom 0.7 0.3 0.5
EU-25 1.1 0.4 0.6
US 0.4 0.4 0.9
(*) Average annual growth rates of the labour-capital substitution ratio (%), 2000 = 100. Germany ’91–’95.
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
Note: data for EU-25 are not available.
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The rate of growth of total factor productivity cor-
responds to what is also called “Solow residual” 
in growth accounting exercises. It measures the 
excess of the actual growth of output over the 
growth attributable to growth of labour and capi-
tal inputs. TFP incorporates the effects of changes 
in the degree of factor utilisation, in their qual-
ity, and in innovation and technological progress. 
One of the key factors enhancing TFP in recent 
years has been investment in new ICT capital 
goods which have a higher marginal product than 
others.
Graph 2.3 shows that during the ﬁ  rst half of the nine-
ties TFP growth in the EU was higher than in the US, 
while since then TFP growth has always been higher 
in the US. By historical standards, TFP growth in the 
EU was very low in the period 2000-2005.
Graph 2.3: Total Factor Productivity Growth
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
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Several explanations have been put forward to 
explain the disappointing TFP performance of the 
EU.12 First, it has been argued that EU countries have 
been less concerned by innovations in IT-producing 
sectors and less prone to beneﬁ   t and adopt such 
innovations in IT-using industries (e.g. Colecchia and 
Schreyer (2002)). Secondly, it has been emphasized 
that EU countries have been lagging behind espe-
cially in TFP growth in service industries, notably in 
the retail sector, due to stricter national regulations 
compared with the US (Van Ark (2002)). Third, the 
general point has been raised that the EU lags behind 
the US in terms of fundamental infrastructures and 
institutions for competing in innovative industries on 
a global scale (e.g. Sapir et al. (2003)).
12  See e.g. Sapir et al. (2003) and Blanchard (2004) for a general assessment.
Table 2.5 shows that the picture is quite differen-
tiated across the EU Member States. Nordic and 
Anglo-Saxon countries have in general TFP growth 
rates that are high on a global standard, higher than 
those of the US in some cases. At the opposite end, 
most South European countries (with the notable 
exception of Greece) performed poorly. A great deal 
of the sharp slowdown in EU TFP growth since 2000 
is related to slow TFP growth in several large euro-
area economies.
2.4 Concluding  remarks
During the period 1990-2005 the competitiveness 
performance of the EU-25 has been characterized 
by a slight acceleration of GDP growth accompanied 
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Table 2.5: Total Factor Productivity Growth 1990 – 2005 (average annual growth rate)
1990 – 1995 (*) 1995 – 2000 2000 – 2005
Austria 1.0 1.4 0.4
Belgium 0.6 1.1 0.5
Denmark 2.1 1.5 0.6
Finland 1.7 2.9 1.4
France 0.6 1.2 0.2
Germany 1.4 1.3 0.7
Greece 0.1 2.2 2.4
Ireland 2.6 4.6 1.4
Italy 1.1 0.7 -0.5
Luxembourg 0.6 1.7 -0.6
Netherlands 0.9 1.5 0.7
Portugal 0.8 1.3 -0.6
Spain 0.5 0.3 -0.1
Sweden 1.5 2.2 1.5
United Kingdom 1.7 1.6 1.0
EU-25 1.3 1.2 0.4
US 1.0 1.5 1.2
(*) Germany, EU-15 ‘91-’95
Source: Commission Services, AMECO.
Note: data for EU-25 are not available.
with stagnant productivity growth. Although recently 
there has been some progress in terms of increasing 
employment rates, the gains in labour productivity 
are sluggish. Both weak investment and slow total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth explain the weak 
performance of EU labour productivity growth.
Despite an increase in employment in many EU Mem-
ber States, the overall employment rate in the EU 
remains low. Regarding TFP growth, no visible sign 
of recovery is present since the slowdown started 
at mid nineties. In fact, TFP growth further deceler-
ated over the 2000-2005 period. Productivity gains 
stemming from re-organization and reallocation of 
production, from improved labour skills, from the 
introduction of new products and processes, would 
pave the way also for increased investment demand 
and further progress in labour productivity in terms 
of capital deepening.
These developments highlight the dual challenge fac-
ing Europe, i.e. raising employment rates and gen-
erating faster productivity growth at the same time. 
Yet both are necessary for sustaining standards of liv-
ing and social welfare over the medium to long term, 
especially with regards to a fast ageing population.
The policy response lies in the Strategy for Jobs and 
Growth. The paramount emphasis put on reforms 
improving the business environment and innovative 
capacity, on enhancing human capital and on mak-
ing labour markets more efﬁ  cient reﬂ  ect the focusing 
on improving the performance of European econo-
mies as concerns potential growth, productivity and 
employment. In following chapters, the Report will 
review three of these reforms, the liberalisation of 
energy markets, Better Regulation and in ﬁ  nancing 
innovation as well as developments in two growing 
sectors of the economy, the ICT and the pharmaceu-
tical industries.
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Chapter 3:
Liberalisation of European Energy Markets: 
challenges and policy options
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1.  Liberalising European energy markets
The European energy markets have been going 
through a process of liberalisation  13 since the early 
1990s in order to increase efﬁ  ciency of the supply 
of energy (e.g. EC, 2005). This liberalisation process 
of the electricity and natural gas market is managed 
through EU Directives, prescribing non-discriminatory 
regulated third-party access to the networks in order 
to accommodate entry by competitive suppliers, and 
open end user markets to competing suppliers.
According to the EU Directives on the liberalisation of 
the electricity and natural gas market, the management 
of both transmission and distribution networks has to 
be legally and functionally unbundled from commer-
cial activities by 2007. European countries have made 
progress in satisfying this requirement in particular in 
the case of transmission networks. Almost all countries 
have legally or fully (ownership) unbundled trans-
mission of both electricity and gas, although a few 
unbundled Transmission System Operators (TSOs) do 
not have an independent management (EC, 2006). 
Nevertheless, concerns exist about third-party access 
to the transmission infrastructure, in particular in the 
gas market where third-party shippers appear to be 
subject to more costly access procedures. Moreover, 
distribution system operators remain closely linked 
to the supply business of the incumbents in a large 
number of EU countries. Consequently, the current 
level of unbundling in electricity and natural gas mar-
kets is viewed as being insufﬁ  cient by regulators and 
many participants in these markets (EC, 2006). Dur-
ing 2006 the Commission lauched infringement cases 
against twenty Member States whose transposition of 
the Directives was considered to be insufﬁ  cient.
13   By ‘liberalisation’ is meant all measures changing the structure or rules 
on the energy markets, such as privatisation, vertical separation, merger 
control and (de)regulation.
In its preliminary report on the inquiry on the energy 
markets, the European Commission (EC, 2006) con-
cludes that the functioning of the gas and electricity 
markets is seriously hindered by a number of factors, 
i.e. horizontal concentration, vertical foreclosure (e.g. 
entrants having limited access to the infrastructure), 
lack of market integration at EU level (e.g. incum-
bents controlling import capacity), lack of transpar-
ency (e.g. insufﬁ  cient information on technical avail-
ability of interconnectors) and the still ill-developed 
price-formation process (e.g. prices not responding 
to changes in supply and demand).
Although the potentially adverse effects of concen-
trated markets are widely acknowledged, the EU Elec-
tricity Directives have not required horizontal separa-
tion of dominant producers and retailers to achieve 
less concentration in wholesale and retail markets. 
The electricity market has shown an ongoing proc-
ess of concentration, which may seriously limit effec-
tiveness of competition (Jamasb, et al., 2005).  14 For 
both the electricity and gas market, wholesale sup-
ply is often highly concentrated. For example, in all 
countries except the United Kingdom, incumbent 
natural gas ﬁ  rms control a large majority of imports 
as well as domestic production. Moreover, market 
opening is as yet not fully realised in all EU-coun-
tries. Currently, about 75% of the gas in the EU-15 
countries is consumed by end-users who are free to 
choose their gas suppliers (Eurostat, 2005).
The welfare effects of introducing competition in 
energy markets have been subject to signiﬁ  cant 
debate. As Joskow (2003) states, “replacing the hier-
archical governance arrangements with well func-
tioning decentralised market mechanisms is a very 
signiﬁ  cant technical challenge, about which even the 
best experts have disagreements”. The key challenge 
in electricity markets is to create an optimal design 
14   In many European countries, the share of the largest three generation 
ﬁ  rms is above 60%, while comparable ﬁ  gures exist for the retail market 
(Jamasb et al., 2005).
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of regulating institutions to ensure effective working 
of market mechanisms and to induce sufﬁ  cient long-
term investment in each segment of the markets.
In decentralised competitive electricity markets, 
price uncertainty could possibly lead to too low lev-
els of investment. In less competitive (oligopoly or 
monopoly) markets, control over prices reduces this 
uncertainty but results in allocative inefﬁ  ciencies and 
possibly also in too high levels of investment, for 
which consumers pay the price.
In his assessment of experiences in the United States, 
Joskow (2003) concludes that the liberalisation proc-
ess “has encountered more problems and proceeded 
less quickly than some had anticipated when the ﬁ  rst 
restructuring and competition programs were ﬁ  rst 
being implemented in the late 1990s”. In California, 
for instance, retail prices increased by 30 to 40% due to 
market design imperfections, market power problems 
and poor responses of federal and state authorities. On 
the other hand, liberalisation of electricity markets in 
the United States has also produced successes, such 
as substantial investments in new generating plants by 
merchant generating companies as well as lower elec-
tricity prices for the largest customers (Joskow, 2003).
The most appropriate structure of the electricity indus-
try is also still under debate, also because models which 
work well in some circumstances perform less well in 
other places (Newbery, 2002A). On some issues, 
however, theoretical and empirical evidence is quite 
straightforward. For instance, practice shows that own-
ership unbundling of the transmission system opera-
tion from competitive activities improves welfare.
In addition to the efﬁ  ciency considerations, the lib-
eralisation of the gas market has generated concerns 
about security of supply. IEA (2004A), for instance, 
states that the key question is “whether the (gas) mar-
ket itself will value security of supply and deliver timely 
signals and competitive incentives for investments to 
guarantee secure and reliable gas supply all the way 
to the ﬁ  nal consumer». Furthermore, the introduction 
of competition is also likely to impact on patterns of 
energy production as well as consumption and, hence, 
affects environmental outcomes. The direction of the 
net effect is not clear in advance as both price and 
substitution effects could emerge: both price and sub-
stitution effects. For instance, the opening of markets 
might encourage the supply from small-scale com-
bined-heat-power (CHP) power plants. This substitu-
tion effect would lead to a reduction in overall emis-
sions. On the other hand, the opening of markets may 
also lower prices and, hence, raise total emissions.
This chapter presents an assessment of the effects of 
liberalising the European electricity and gas markets, 
addressing the following questions:
What are the expected potential effects of liberalisa-
tion of energy markets in terms of efﬁ  ciency, security 
of supply and environment?
What are the policy challenges in addressing the per-
formance of energy markets and what other comple-
mentary measures might be needed to deliver Com-
munity competitiveness objectives?
The analysis of the effects on efﬁ  ciency as well as 
security of supply covers both the gas market and 
the electricity market. The environmental section is 
restricted to the electricity industry, given its rela-
tively high environmental impact compared to gas.
3.2. Liberalisation  and  efﬁ  ciency
3.2.1. Introduction
The liberalisation of the energy industry is largely 
motivated by expected efﬁ  ciency improvements. A 
more efﬁ  cient supply of energy contributes to the 
competitiveness of the European economy and, 
hence, increases welfare. In order to assess the 
effects on efﬁ  ciency, three efﬁ  ciency concepts have 
to be distinguished: productive, allocative as well as 
dynamic efﬁ  ciency.  15
In theory, the relationship between competition and 
productive efﬁ  ciency is at least non-negative (neutral 
or positive). Traditional theoretical models assume 
proﬁ  t-maximising and cost-minimising behaviour of 
ﬁ  rms, which implies that ﬁ  rms should be always pro-
ductively efﬁ  cient. Agency models  16, however, stress 
the effect of the competitive environment on ﬁ  rms’ 
incentives, concluding that competition increases 
productive efﬁ  ciency.
Liberalisation might also improve allocative efﬁ  ciency 
as price reductions will lead to a higher demand for 
services, hence, increasing the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus. Moreover, if consumer surplus 
is weighted higher than producer surplus, a lower 
price would result in even stronger improvements of 
total welfare.
The effect on dynamic efﬁ  ciency is complex. On the 
one side, ﬁ  rms need to have proﬁ  t in order to innovate 
(the Schumpeterian view); on the other side compet-
itive pressures may also create incentives to innovate 
in some areas. Moreover, competitive pressure is also 
a source of dynamic efﬁ  ciency to the extent that it 
leads inefﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms who do not catch up to exit the 
market, being replaced by more efﬁ  cient ﬁ  rms.
15  These concepts will be made more precise in the next subsections.
16   Agency models address situations of imperfect information, where tasks 
or decisions are delegated to an agent with an informational advantage 
which gives rise to a rent (hence the term agency models).
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This section ﬁ   rst gives a brief overview of empiri-
cal literature on the efﬁ  ciency effects of liberalising 
the energy sector. Afterwards, the focus is on policy 
options to improve the performance of the energy 
markets.
3.2.2.  Performance of energy markets 
in improving efﬁ  ciency
3.2.2.1. Productive  efﬁ  ciency
An economy achieves productive efﬁ  ciency  when 
it produces a given amount of output at minimum 
total costs. The empirical literature generally ﬁ  nds 
positive effects of liberalisation on productive efﬁ  -
ciency of generation plants, both in and outside the 
EU. Newbery et al. (1997) document beneﬁ  ts from 
privatisation and restructuring of the Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board (CEGB) in the UK. These 
beneﬁ  ts are achieved by shifting from inefﬁ  cient coal 
production supported by the government to a less 
costly technology,  17 resulting in a structural reduc-
tion of generation costs by about 5%.
Empirical studies by Bushnell et al. (2005) and 
by Fabrizio et al. (2006) for the US also show an 
improvement in the efﬁ  ciency of generation plants 
17   Strictly speaking, shift to another technology has also aspects of dynamic 
efﬁ  ciency improvement.
after the implementation of reforms. In the course of 
these reforms, some plants were divested and began 
to compete in the market, while some other (non-
divested) plants were subject to more stringent regu-
lation. According to Bushnell et al., both competition 
and incentive regulation of generating plants have 
lead to fuel efﬁ  ciency improvements (up to 2%). The 
authors argue that the change of incentives, but not 
the change of ownership itself, was the main driver 
of these improvements. Fabrizio et al. (2006) ﬁ  nd 
that competitive pressures reduce non-fuel operat-
ing expenses of electricity plants. In anticipation of 
increased competition, plant operators most affected 
by restructuring reduced their labour and non-fuel 
expenses per unit of output by 3-5% relative to other 
investor-owned plants, and by 6-12% relative to 
government and cooperatively owned plants which 
were not affected by the reforms. Also IEA (2005A) 
ﬁ  nds an increase in labour productivity in the energy 
industry as a result of reforms.
Besides fuel efﬁ  ciency and operational efﬁ  ciency, lib-
eralisation might affect the utilisation of production 
capacity. IEA (2005A) reports a 12% higher utilisa-
tion of generation capacity in New South Wales (Aus-
tralia) compared to the pre-liberalisation period. Also 
in Europe, the utilisation rate of generation capac-
ity increased over the past decades which might be 
partly the result of liberalisation (ﬁ  gure 3.1).
Graph 3.1: Utilisation of generation capacity in EU-15
Source: Eurostat. Utilisation is measured as the ratio between actual production and theoretical maximum production 
given the size of the generation capacity.
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In some circumstances, however market power 
might lead to inefﬁ  cient productive decisions, in the 
sense that production is not always undertaken by 
the least-cost units. This may happen when ﬁ  rms 
on both sides of the spot market (selling electricity 
as generator and buying it as retailer) gain market 
power. Kühn et al. (2004) ﬁ  nd for the Spanish market 
that although market power of large vertically inte-
grated sellers and buyers has had little effect on spot 
market prices, substantial productive inefﬁ  ciencies 
may have arisen from the exercise of bilateral mar-
ket power. However, this effect might be overstated. 
Mansur (2003), analysing the effect of vertical links 
among ﬁ  rms on market efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  rm conduct 
in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) elec-
tricity markets, emphasizes the effect of production 
constraints (such as start up costs). Accounting for 
these constraints, the author ﬁ  nds that the costs in 
the PJM markets were only 3.4% above the competi-
tive levels.
Productive efﬁ   ciency of energy transportation and 
distribution networks may increase as a result of the 
introduction of incentive regulation. Regulators in 
Europe often choose a price-cap mechanism, accord-
ing to which the prices should change by no more 
than RPI-X, where RPI represents a price index and 
X represents a productive efﬁ  ciency target.  18 Firms 
outperforming this target (with efﬁ  ciency increases 
above X) can keep the resulting increased proﬁ  t dur-
ing the regulatory period. The empirical literature 
shows that ﬁ   rms respond to regulatory incentives 
and reduce their costs. For the UK, there is evidence 
on cost reductions by the National Grid after adop-
tion of sliding scale incentive mechanism (see, e.g., 
Joskow, 2005).  19 Several other studies (Burns et al., 
1996, Tilley et al., 1999, and Domah et al., 2001) 
report cost reductions of UK distribution ﬁ  rms after 
the introduction of price-cap regulation, especially 
towards the end of the second regulation period 
(the end of the 90s). Both selling the golden shares – 
shares held by the government, giving it potentially 
large inﬂ  uence over the companies – by the British 
government in 1995 and stronger regulatory incen-
tives in the second regulatory period could be seen 
as drivers behind these productivity gains.
Hjalmarsson et al. (1992) ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant impact 
of ownership and economic organisation on produc-
tivity change of Swedish electricity retail and distri-
bution ﬁ  rms. However, they ﬁ  nd a substantial inﬂ  u-
ence of economies of density, as well as a relative 
increase in productivity in rural areas. These authors 
relate this to the mergers of small regional utilities, 
18   Sometimes CPI (Consumer Price Index) is used instead of RPI (Retail Price 
Index).
19   Under such a mechanism, the price that the regulated ﬁ  rm can charge is 
partially responsive to changes in realized casts and partially ﬁ  xed ex ante.
thereby implicitly implying the existence of econo-
mies of (regional) scale. In a reaction, Mork (1992) 
states that the lack of impact of ownership results 
from the fact that neither private nor the public utili-
ties are proﬁ  t maximising. In a later Swedish study, 
Kumbhakar et al. (1998) ﬁ  nd that privately owned 
ﬁ   rms in electricity retail and distribution are more 
efﬁ  cient than municipal companies. The difference 
in technical progress between public, private and 
mixed ﬁ  rms, however, appears to be small.
It has been argued that in retail, liberalisation has 
introduced new costs, such as loss of potential econ-
omies of scope between the network and retail activ-
ities. However, since retail cost is a small part of the 
overall cost, a large effect of these costs on overall 
productive efﬁ  ciency is unlikely. The conclusion from 
this evidence is that liberalisation of energy markets 
(such as change of regulation and ownership struc-
ture) improves ﬁ   rms’ productive efﬁ   ciency, if this 
process succeeds in changing ﬁ  rms’ incentives.
3.2.2.2. Allocative  efﬁ  ciency
An economy is allocatively efﬁ  cient when it produces 
the quantity of goods that maximises total welfare. 
This generally implies that prices equal marginal 
costs of production.  20 For the energy industry, which 
is capital intensive, this usually refers to long run 
marginal costs. Liberalisation is expected to lead to 
competitive pricing and, hence, to improved alloca-
tive efﬁ  ciency. In practice, however, the relationship 
between liberalisation and allocative efﬁ  ciency may 
be affected by the market situation. Market power 
of ﬁ   rms may lead to inefﬁ   cient outcomes. There-
fore, when evaluating the impact of liberalisation 
on allocative efﬁ  ciency, it is necessary to address the 
question whether market structure in the energy sec-
tor is adequate for delivering sufﬁ  cient competitive 
pressure.
Market power can be measured by the margin 
between price and the marginal cost of produc-
tion. However, in electricity markets market power 
can still be present even when the price equals the 
marginal cost of the most expensive producing unit 
since dominant companies might raise prices by 
withdrawing generators with lower marginal costs.
Borenstein et al. (2000) present an indicator of market 
power that reﬂ  ects the difference between the price 
and the marginal cost that would occur if all ﬁ  rms 
20   In the presence of scale economies (which is typically the case in energy 
markets were ﬁ  xed costs are very important) the price equal to marginal 
cost rule leads to negative proﬁ  ts. Ramsey pricing addresses the prob-
lem of social welfare maximisation pricing under a constraint on proﬁ  t. 
The solution of this problem requires that the price markup be inversely 
related to the price elasticity of demand. This pricing rule has been often 
applied to public utilities and in regulation of natural monopolies.
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behaved as price takers. According to their estimate 
for California, the average mark-up over the com-
petitive outcome was 15.7% in the period June 1998 
to September 1999. Mansur (2001) and Bushnell et 
al. (2002) provide similar analyses for the Pennsyl-
vania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) and New England 
electricity markets respectively, using somewhat dif-
ferent indicators that are based on the same idea. 
Comparing the results of these three studies over the 
period when they overlap (May to December 1999) 
controlling for the level of spare generation capacity 
at the various demand level Bushnell et al. conclude 
that “the performance of the two eastern markets 
was comparable, and that both were more competi-
tive than California at all but the highest capacity 
ratios”.  21 Hence, market power can be present even 
in a fairly unconcentrated electricity market.
There is also some evidence on the allocative efﬁ  -
ciency effects of reforms in the UK. Newbery et al. 
(1997) conclude that the productive efﬁ  ciency gains 
achieved by privatisation and restructuring of the 
electricity industry mainly went to producers, not 
to customers. However, according to a comment by 
Littlechild (2006), one should take into account that 
the prices would probably have gone up under state 
monopoly (regulated by rate-of-return regulation). 
In this view, the beneﬁ  ts of reforms in the UK were 
actually shared between consumers and producers.
However, as competition in the European wholesale 
market is currently seriously hindered by lack of mar-
ket integration and by horizontal concentration (EC, 
2006), European energy markets do not perform as 
well as they could in terms of allocative efﬁ  ciency.
In transmission and distribution, allocative efﬁ  ciency 
effects are likely positive. Most networks are subject 
to regulated Third-Party Access (TPA). Not only does 
regulatory pressure encourage ﬁ  rms to operate more 
efﬁ  ciently, it also leads to more efﬁ  cient pricing of 
services, and hence to closer to optimal use of the 
network by the ﬁ  rms and customers. Customers in 
many countries (such as UK, the Netherlands, and 
Norway) beneﬁ   ted from the price decreases that 
were forced by the X-factors set by regulators. For 
example, in the Netherlands, only for electricity the 
X factors saved the consumers 1.1 billion euros over 
2001-2006 (Haffner at al., 2005).
In retail, liberalisation generally increases allocative 
efﬁ  ciency in the large consumer segment, but the 
effect in the small consumer segment is ambiguous. 
Large industrial users face lower prices than small 
21   Capacity ratio is the ratio of residual demand over capacity. Given that 
electricity is not storable market power is intertemporal. Since capac-
ity is constrained, market power is larger in high-demand periods. For 
example, Müsgens (2004) ﬁ  nds signiﬁ  cant market power in the German 
electricity market, mainly exhibited during peak periods.
users  22 for three reasons: their stronger buyer posi-
tion, less ﬂ   uctuating demand, and lower network 
cost, since these users are often connected at a 
higher network level, e.g. to transmission networks. 
Empirical work by Steiner (2001) (for earlier years of 
reforms) presents evidence that liberalisation is asso-
ciated with a reduction of industrial user prices in 
the EU.
The effect of liberalisation on retail prices is less 
straightforward for small users. Joskow and Tirole 
(2004) stress the problems for retail competition 
associated with the absence of real-time pricing for 
small users. This is currently dealt with via load proﬁ  l-
ing but there is some evidence that the lack of a real-
time price signal for smaller users creates additional 
volatility, for instance in the UK market in 2005-06 
where winter peaks in demand leading to wholesale 
price volatility were created by households paying a 
ﬂ  at price for gas for the whole year.
When assessing market performance, an impor-
tant issue is what would be the alternative to retail 
competition. Littlechild (2006) discusses two policy 
options that seem to be the most reasonable alter-
natives: regulation by benchmarking and tender-
ing. He stresses that both alternatives require a 
large involvement of the regulator, which is costly. 
Besides, benchmarking is not always feasible because 
of the insufﬁ   cient number of benchmarks. In the 
case of tendering (applied in some states in the US), 
the regulator has to determine the terms of tender-
ing, but it is unlikely that the regulator knows more 
about consumer preferences and is able to make 
a better choice for consumers that the consumers 
themselves. So, both alternative policies are unlikely 
to outperform competition. This conclusion is much 
stronger if we account for the welfare increase from 
product innovations in retail (stressed by Littlechild, 
2005; see also next section), especially those pro-
moting energy-efﬁ  cient technologies (addressed in 
Directive 2006/32/EC  23).
The overall picture here is that the allocative efﬁ  -
ciency beneﬁ  ts of liberalisation of European energy 
markets may have been limited due to imperfect 
competition on the energy markets up to now. If the 
reforms succeed to adequately improve competition 
on these markets, allocative efﬁ  ciency beneﬁ  ts could 
be signiﬁ  cant. In networks, however, regulation has 
generated allocative beneﬁ  ts by imposing more efﬁ  -
cient prices.
22   For example, across member states, current electricity prices for large 
industrial users are 40-55 euros per MWh, while 60-150 euros per MWh 
for small consumers (EC, 2006).
23   Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2006 on energy end-use efﬁ  ciency and energy services and repeal-
ing Council Directive 93/76/EEC.
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3.2.2.3. Dynamic  efﬁ  ciency
Dynamic efﬁ  ciency relates to the extent to which proc-
ess and product innovation occurs. The relationship 
between liberalisation and dynamic efﬁ  ciency is not 
straightforward. Competition might stimulate as well 
as dampen incentives to innovate, and is also likely to 
change the type of research and development.  24
Evidence on private R&D expenses, which is often 
used as a measure for innovations  25, in liberalised 
energy industries suggests that the overall effect of 
market reforms on private innovation activity is nega-
tive. R&D activities in the electricity industry in many 
countries have declined over the past decades (e.g. 
Eurelectric, 2003; Hattori, 2006; IEA, 2005C; Jamasb 
et al., 2005; Sanyal et al., 2005). In the Japanese elec-
tricity industry, for instance, the R&D intensity, i.e. 
the ratio between R&D expenditures and total sales, 
declined somewhat since the mid 1990s when the 
process of liberalisation started (see graph 3.2). We 
should note that R&D expenditure may have been 
either inefﬁ  ciently high or ill-directed before liberali-
sation, when it was carried out by regulated public 
utilities, which did not necessarily act as proﬁ  t-max-
24   See Aghion et al. (2004) who ﬁ  nd an inverted U shaped relationship 
between competition and innovation in manufacturing, suggesting that 
intermediate levels of market concentration are likely to lead to more 
innovation than the extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly. 
The reasoning behind this result is that some market power is required 
to be able to reap the beneﬁ  ts from innovation (this argument relies on 
imperfect intellectual property markets, leading to imperfect appropri-
ability of research results), while too much market power can deter inno-
vation by dampening incentives to stay ahead of competitors.
25   Clearly, not all innovation results from R&D and this is particularly true for 
process innovation.
imisers. A lower level of R&D expenditures might be 
closer to optimal and is therefore not necessarily an 
indication of a lower level of dynamic efﬁ  ciency.
Jamasb et al. (2005) conclude that vertical as well as 
horizontal unbundling  26 of the industry negatively 
affects R&D spending and technology adoption. This 
negative relationship follows from the fact that the 
size of a ﬁ  rm is an important factor behind innova-
tion. Uncertainty created by the introduction of com-
petition is also seen as a factor reducing the level of 
innovation. Regarding the effect of ownership, these 
authors conclude that privatisation shifts the focus of 
research towards applied and commercial projects. 
The overall conclusion of Jamasb et al. (2005) is that 
“competitive electricity markets will deliver sub-opti-
mal amounts of R&D input and output”. According to 
these authors, the lower emphasis on proﬁ  ts of public 
utilities before liberalisation, as well as the larger scale 
of companies, would have allowed for the positive 
externalities associated with knowledge spillovers. 
These authors also argue that the introduction of 
competition dampens incentives to conduct funda-
mental research, thereby requiring additional policy 
measures to encourage fundamental energy research 
if the pre-liberalisation situation is to be restored.
This conclusion is challenged by the results of other 
authors. In their analysis of the relationship between 
26   Vertical unbundling is a vertical separation of the companies operating 
in different segments of the industry production chain, and horizontal 
unbundling is a separation of companies operating in one segment of the 
industry production chain.
Graph 3.2: R&D Expenditure and R&D intensity in Japanese Electricity Industry
Source: Hattori (2006)
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liberalisation and R&D in the US electricity indus-
try, Sanyal et al. (2005) ﬁ   nd mixed results. They 
conclude that even if the uncertainties in the face 
of anticipated restructuring and deregulation have 
adversely affected R&D activities by energy utilities, 
once these have occurred, a higher level of deregula-
tion and competition positively affect R&D. A higher 
likelihood of changing the structure of the industry 
probably creates uncertainty about future beneﬁ  ts 
of investments and, hence, reduces the incentive to 
invest in R&D. When a higher level of competition 
has been reached, R&D might be encouraged by 
the prospects of using new technologies to achieve 
competitive advantages. Liberalisation might also 
affect the composition of R&D. Hattori (2006) ﬁ  nds 
for the Japanese electricity industry a shift in the R&D 
mix towards cost-reducing technologies while R&D 
in joint research programmes for public-interest 
technologies seems to be reduced. In the latter pro-
grammes, research is directed at technologies such 
as clean-coal generation, fuel cell power generation 
and power-system technologies to address the fur-
ther development of generation techniques using 
combined cycle power and renewable energy. The 
author notes, however, that the decline in public-
interest research may be a result of R&D activities 
having been genuinely ill-directed before liberalisa-
tion.
A shift of R&D towards efﬁ  ciency-enhancing technol-
ogies due to liberalisation is conﬁ  rmed by Markard 
et al. (2006). These authors ﬁ  nd a move from tech-
nology-oriented innovation towards market-oriented 
innovation. The latter includes both cost-reducing 
activities and innovations directed at new products 
for consumers. In general, they conclude that liber-
alisation increases the variety of innovations paths. 
This picture of the impact of liberalisation on R&D is 
also described by Eurelectric (2003).
Hence, liberalisation of the electricity industry does 
affect the innovation process. R&D seems to be 
more directed at technologies contributing to cost 
reductions in the short term. Conversely, company 
funding for more basic research has been reduced 
in several countries, but it is still an open question 
whether this is the result of termination of inefﬁ  cient 
R&D activities or whether it indicates a market failure 
which calls for additional government intervention 
compared to the pre-liberalisation situation.
Liberalisation and the ambition to create a single 
energy market have not been mirrored by a similar 
effort to better structure energy related research, 
where one can witness a large fragmentation of 
Member States’ activities. A better coordination of 
Member States’ energy research efforts between 
themselves and with the Research Framework Pro-
gramme could ultimately improve the efﬁ  ciency of 
energy research funding.
Besides evidence on R&D expenses, there is also evi-
dence on product innovations in retail. Littlechild 
(2005) stresses the effect of competition on product 
innovation in retail businesses. From the experience 
of the Nordic electricity market, Littlechild concludes 
that retail competition stimulates the development 
of new value-added services to customers, such as 
offering new terms of contracts, ﬁ  xed-price contracts 
of different duration and spot-price related contracts. 
In addition, Littlechild (2006) lists numerous recently 
emerged products, such as energy efﬁ  ciency pack-
ages, duel fuel contracts, various discounts (e.g. for 
self-reading meters, for prepayment meters), green 
tariffs, etc. The recent European Energy Services 
Directive (2006/32/EC) stresses the positive role of 
product innovation in retail for the development of 
more efﬁ  cient energy services.
3.2.3.  A review of measures used to improve 
market efﬁ  ciency
3.2.3.1. Introduction
Policy options to improve efﬁ  ciency of the energy 
supply industry concern measures to improve com-
petition in the markets and to encourage optimal 
use and expansion of network capacity. These meas-
ures can be divided into structural (i.e. affecting 
the industry structure) and behavioural measures. 
Although structural measures are often more effec-
tive for competition, they also involve higher cost. 
We discuss below some of these policies.
3.2.3.2.  Unbundling, merger control, divesture 
and privatisation
A key component of the liberalisation of energy mar-
kets has been the vertical unbundling of networks 
from production and supply, in order to ensure 
efﬁ   cient pricing of network transportation services 
and to create a level playing ﬁ  eld for power genera-
tors and suppliers, including entrants. The latest EU 
directives require legal unbundling (by 2007) of the 
networks but, given the importance of independ-
ent functioning of transmission networks for good 
market facilitation, several EU countries have fully 
unbundled these networks from commercial busi-
nesses. The net beneﬁ  ts of ownership unbundling of 
transmission from production and retail are widely 
acknowledged (see e.g. Joskow, 2003A, and Jamasb 
et al., 2005). In contrast, in the distribution indus-
try less experience has been developed. In New 
Zealand, for instance, separation of network activi-
ties from retail and generation was followed by an 
increase in competition and a decrease in wholesale 
prices. However, some of this improvement came 
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from improved switching possibilities and splitting 
of the dominant incumbent. Despite a clear theoreti-
cal argument regarding the adverse effect of a high 
concentration in the industry on the performance 
of ﬁ  rms, empirical evidence on the effect of merger 
control is scarce because of the unclear counterfac-
tual: what would be the market development if a 
merger actually takes place? Especially in emerging 
markets, the consequences of a wrongly approved 
merger can be large. Therefore, some economists 
plea for more proactive policy in such markets, 
emphasising the relevance of strengthening merger 
control (see e.g. Canoy et al., 2003). The key issue 
here is that of the relevant market. At the moment, 
energy markets in Europe are still largely segmented, 
which underlines the importance of getting the mar-
ket structure right at the national level. At the same 
time, several important market players are becoming 
active in many countries. Hence, merger control at 
the EU level becomes important too, especially in the 
light of more integration of the EU markets and more 
interconnections.
The studies on the US show that the performance 
of generation plants improves after restructuring 
because of the improvement of the incentive struc-
ture, which is achieved by privatisation and the 
change of regulation in divested generation plants. 
Although such divestitures are effective, they may 
involve high cost or be infeasible in practice for polit-
ical reasons. Especially with the trend towards more 
integration of the EU market, some countries are 
afraid to split their energy companies as they may 
be taken over by large foreign utilities. In these con-
ditions, political lobby groups push towards creat-
ing national champions. Behavioural measures (dis-
cussed hereafter) have also been used to mitigate 
market power.
3.2.3.3.  Virtual Power Plants, long-term contracts 
and site availability
An alternative to actual divestiture to remedy market 
power in the wholesale market is virtual divestiture in 
the form of a Virtual Power Plant (VPP). VPPs reduce 
the scope for strategic behaviour in the market by 
reducing the amount of the generation capacity over 
which the dominant producers have discretion in bid-
ding. They can be physical or ﬁ  nancial. A physical VPP 
is a contract to deliver electricity (against some ﬁ  xed 
price); a ﬁ  nancial VPP is a contract on price which 
works similarly to a usual insurance contract. Willems 
(2006) argues that the type of the virtual divestiture 
is unimportant in the case of monopoly, but it does 
matter in oligopoly markets. This is because a physi-
cal VPP involves the delegation of production deci-
sions by the dominant generator, while a ﬁ  nancial 
VPP does not. Hence, in the oligopoly setting, the 
spot market is more competitive with a physical VPP 
divestiture that with a ﬁ  nancial VPP divestiture.
Practical applications of VPPs can be found in several 
EU countries (such as Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark 
and Czech Republic). For example, in accordance 
with the agreement between the EC and Electricité 
De France (EDF), the company had to make avail-
able access to 6000 MW of generation capacity in 
France available (in exchange for the approval from 
the EC to acquire a further interest in the German 
electricity utility EnBW in 2001), which is partly done 
through VPPs and partly through Power Purchase 
Agreements.
Long-term forward contracts decrease both the pos-
sibility for a dominant producer to exercise market 
power and the gains from doing so. Examples are 
the so-called vesting contracts that have been used 
in the US and UK when their electricity industries 
were restructured. Many economists (e.g., Newbery, 
2002, Wolak, 2001, Bushnell, 2004) emphasise the 
importance of long-term contracting for stability 
of electricity markets. For example, Wolak (2001) 
stresses the necessity of “sufﬁ  cient forward market 
commitment for ﬁ  xed-price wholesale electricity to 
cover retail obligations.”
However, long-term forward contracts may create 
problems for entrants, as they may decrease the 
liquidity on the market. Another problem arises in 
particular in gas markets, where the incumbent large 
producers/traders have bought a large number of 
such contracts, increasing their market power.
Incumbent producers often also own or control many 
of the suitable sites for new generation plants, ena-
bling them to foreclose the market for new entrants. 
Options to improve site availability are enforced 
(negotiated) release of sites, requirements to auc-
tion vacant sites and revising the licensing agree-
ment to limit the scope for capacity expansion by 
the dominant player. This would limit the scope for 
incumbent ﬁ  rms to engage in strategic behaviour to 
control the number of market players.
3.2.3.4. Efﬁ  cient allocation and extension 
of transmission capacity
Optimal use of the European transmission grid 
involves sending efﬁ  cient price signals to both gen-
erators and energy users. Since power ﬂ  ows along 
different transmission lines are interrelated, individ-
ual lines cannot be viewed (and priced) in isolation. 
Coordination among TSOs can enhance efﬁ  ciency of 
TSO decisions in the EU context. Also, harmonisation 
of regulation is essential for efﬁ  ciency of the future 
integrated European market. In order to achieve this 
goal a greater consistency is needed in actions of 
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national regulators in different countries (High Level 
Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environ-
ment, 2006). A necessary condition for this is that 
the regulators have similar powers to promote the 
market development and to adopt efﬁ  ciency-increas-
ing policies, as well as policies enhancing security of 
supply.
With respect to the allocation of network capacity, 
non-market mechanisms are often replaced by mar-
ket mechanisms, such as explicit auctions.  27 These 
mechanisms are supposed to deliver efﬁ  cient capac-
ity allocation, though in practice this is still not always 
the case due to inconsistent trading rules on either 
side of the border. Efﬁ  ciency would imply that in the 
presence of a price difference between two regions, 
all transport capacity available between these regions 
is fully utilised (as a result of arbitrage). Frequently, 
however, one observes unutilised capacity in the 
presence of large price differences between neigh-
bouring countries. This may result from illiquidity of 
markets, uncertainty in scheduling ﬂ  ows on a day-
ahead basis, or the existence of market power.
Theoretically, the problem of assigning transmission 
capacity in an efﬁ  cient way, including capacity taken 
up by the loop ﬂ  ows,  28 can be solved in a competi-
tive market by so-called locational marginal pricing 
(or nodal pricing). This assigns a different generation 
price to each ‘node’ in the transmission system. Such 
systems of locational marginal prices are in opera-
tion in some regions in the US. However, appropri-
ate determination of locational prices is only feasi-
ble in a centralised system where power markets in 
the system are centrally cleared, which is a long way 
from the European system based mostly on bilateral, 
decentralised markets that operate in the different 
countries.
One approach currently actively pursued is market 
coupling. In this set-up, instead of auctioning inter-
connection capacity on individual borders to individ-
ual market participants, the allocation of transmission 
capacity on all borders in one region is jointly carried 
out, on the basis of the bids for supply and demand 
of energy on the power exchanges in the regions 
involved. In this way, energy markets and transmis-
sion markets are simultaneously cleared, taking into 
account the relations between ﬂ  ows on the different 
borders.  29 Issues in gas transmission markets are to 
some extent similar to those in electricity transmis-
27   This is a requirement in the EU due to Regulation 1228/03.
28   Electricity power ﬂ  ows according to the path of least resistance. However, 
electric transactions are scheduled from one speciﬁ  c location to another 
without regard to the actual ﬂ  ow of energy. Loop ﬂ  ow refers to power 
ﬂ  ow along an unintended path that loops away from the most direct 
geographic path or contract path.
29   This is sometimes referred to as zonal pricing, similar to locational mar-
ginal pricing but on the basis of zones consisting of Member States, 
rather than individual nodes in the network.
sion. The key difference is that gas wholesale mar-
kets are currently much less developed than electric-
ity markets in Europe. Access rights to cross-border 
gas transmission connections are largely allocated 
in long-term contracts, leaving little room for mar-
ket-based allocation of short-term capacity. Further-
more, short-term wholesale markets for gas in most 
countries are still in their infancy. Given the longer 
distances between gas production regions (often 
outside Europe) and consumers and the associated 
larger speciﬁ  c investments, there may be a greater 
need for long-term contracting, making market-
based allocation of short-run capacity more difﬁ  cult.
In the long run, efﬁ  ciency of the transmission market 
involves efﬁ  cient investment in transmission capac-
ity expansion. Major policy issues arise with respect 
to accommodation of transit ﬂ  ows and extension of 
interconnection capacity.
The ﬁ  rst issue involves the remuneration of transit 
ﬂ  ows: expansion of capacity for transporting power 
ﬂ  ows between two regions usually not only involves 
investment by the two regions’ transmission system 
operators themselves, but also expansion of capacity 
in grids that are used for transit ﬂ  ows. The incen-
tive for capacity investment by the operators of these 
transit grids depends on the ways in which such tran-
sit ﬂ  ows are remunerated.
A second issue is to what extent investment in new 
interconnections may be carried out by independent 
‘merchant’ parties, and if this occurs, whether these 
merchant operators should be subject to regulation. 
The trade-off here may be between market failure, 
leading to potential underinvestment by private 
investors, and regulatory failure, leading to overin-
vestment by regulated transmission investors.
3.2.3.5. Enhancing  end-use  efﬁ  ciency
In addition to policies directed at the efﬁ  ciency of the 
energy production, transportation and supply, poli-
cies stimulating the efﬁ  cient use of energy by con-
sumers can contribute to European competitiveness 
as well. Retail competition might play an important 
role in moving towards energy-efﬁ  cient technologies 
on the consumer side. The recent European Energy 
Services Directive stresses this positive role of prod-
uct innovation in retail for energy end-use efﬁ  ciency. 
It requires Member States to create the conditions 
for a market for energy services in order to improve 
the implementation of energy-efﬁ  ciency  measures 
by ﬁ  nal consumers.
In a competitive retail market it is likely that retailers 
extend their activities to end-user services contribut-
ing to a more efﬁ  cient use of energy by reducing 
the costs of implementing energy-saving measures. 
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Environmental policy measures raising the price 
of energy, such as the European emissions trading 
scheme, can have a signiﬁ  cant effect on energy use 
(see further on this issue in section 4).
3.3. Liberalisation  and  security 
of supply
3.3.1. Introduction
In the pre-liberalisation era, investments in electric-
ity and gas sectors were centrally coordinated. Secu-
rity of supply was generally the responsibility of the 
incumbent vertically integrated monopolist incor-
porating engineering reliability standards in its deci-
sions on capacity investments. The concept of sup-
ply security was chieﬂ  y that “all customers should be 
able to consume as much electricity as they want at 
a constant price at any given time” (Bushnell, 2005). 
As a result, the pre-liberalisation energy industry was 
characterised by a high level of overcapacity where 
costs could be passed on to consumers. Moreover, 
the role of the demand side in achieving supply-
demand balance was hardly recognised. Liberalisa-
tion has led to a shift of investment risk from consum-
ers to the investors themselves, creating incentives 
to increase efﬁ  ciency. In addition, liberalisation gives 
stronger incentives to consumers to respond to sup-
ply shortages.
A consequence of the abolition of the supply monop-
oly is that the responsibility for supply security is no 
longer explicitly assigned to an identiﬁ  able  party. 
Rather, in the liberalised environment the market 
mechanism is relied upon to generate optimal invest-
ment. The question, therefore, is to what extent the 
security of supply is compromised by the decen-
tralised management of energy supply. In order to 
address this question, it is important to note that two 
different perspectives on ‘security of supply’ can be 
distinguished.
Some view security of supply as guaranteeing a sta-
ble supply of energy at an ‘affordable’ price, no mat-
ter what the circumstances are (see e.g. EC, 2000).
The North-American Electricity Reliability Council 
(NERC) deﬁ  nes adequacy as “the ability of the sys-
tem to supply the aggregate electric power and 
energy requirements of the consumers at all times”, 
and security as “the ability of the system to with-
stand sudden disturbances” (Meade, 2006).
The 2005 Directive on Security of Supply (2005/89/
EC) deﬁ   nes: “security of electricity supply means 
the ability of an electricity system to supply ﬁ  nal 
customers with electricity, (...) the satisfaction of 
foreseeable demands of consumers to use electric-
ity without the need to enforce measures to reduce 
consumption”. This deﬁ   nition implies that supply 
and demand should not be artiﬁ  cially made equal 
through “enforcement” measures such as rota cuts 
and brownouts, but through a normal response to 
market conditions by producers and consumers. 
Similarly the deﬁ  nition recognises that some distur-
bances are not foreseeable and that the system can-
not be 100% reliable 100% of the time.
Some of these deﬁ   nitions are close to pre-liberali-
sation goals as they take demanded volumes as an 
exogenous factor.  30 From a purely economic point 
of view, however, the concept of security of supply 
should be related to the efﬁ  ciency of the provision of 
electricity or gas to consumers. Markets will always 
show variations in supply and demand, and, hence, 
in prices.
These differing deﬁ   nitions indicate that there are 
sometimes conﬂ   icting policy goals. From an eco-
nomic welfare point of view supplying all demand is 
bound to be inefﬁ  cient, and prices will have to ﬂ  uc-
tuate to clear the markets. However in some cases 
the extreme movements in prices could be viewed as 
politically unacceptable.  31 The remainder of this sec-
tion looks at supply security from both perspectives.
3.3.2.  Performance of energy markets 
in delivering stable and secure supply
3.3.2.1.  Volatility of prices
Liberalisation of markets leads to decentralisation of 
operational and investment decisions, coordinated 
through the price-formation process. Comparison 
of prices (or marginal value derived from consuming 
energy) with short-run marginal costs of supplying 
to the market informs market participants in making 
these strategic decisions. In the days of the vertically 
integrated monopolists supplying to consumers in 
a centralised fashion, such short-term price signals 
were not required, and consumers typically faced 
average prices for energy (which for gas were usu-
ally indexed to oil price ﬂ  uctuations). Liberalisation 
resulted in more volatile wholesale short-run prices, 
which were effectively hidden under the centralised 
regime. Typically, however, prices for ﬁ  nal consum-
ers are based on longer term wholesale markets, 
typically for one year forward contracts, hiding the 
effect of day to day variations.
30   Although the EC Directive (2005) also stresses the importance of “remov-
ing barriers that prevent the use of interruptible contracts” and “encour-
agement of the adoption of real-time demand management technolo-
gies”.
31   Moreover, as Joskow et al. (2006) point out, in an efﬁ  cient market price 
insensitive consumers’ demand may have to be involuntarily curtailed.
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Compared to other commodities, the volatility of 
short-run prices of electricity and gas in a liberalised 
environment is large. As examples of the volatility in 
energy markets, ﬁ  gure 3.3 plots the daily spot prices 
for the Dutch APX electricity market as well as the UK 
gas market spot prices NBP. While overall volatility 
of prices is noticeable, the short-lived price spikes to 
values which may exceed normal prices by tenfold 
are particularly visible.
The volatility of prices results from the particular 
characteristics of electricity and gas, in particular the 
inelasticity of both demand and supply in the short 
term. These in turn are related to the difﬁ  culty of 
storing electricity and the high costs of storing gas, 
respectively, as well as to the strict capacity limit of 
production and transmission capacities. The high 
investment costs of production equipment discour-
ages companies to keep large amounts of spare 
capacity available, which leads to congestion on 
infrastructure in times of high demand, and there-
fore to rising spot prices.
The volatility of short term prices need not be wor-
rying for consumers if they can sufﬁ  ciently contract 
their electricity and gas in longer term contracts. The 
extent to which longer-term contracts are available 
differs according to the maturity and liquidity of 
markets. IEA (2005A) notes that in the mature Nor-
dic market, traded volumes of longer-term contracts 
equal over four times annual consumption.  32 The 
ﬁ  nancial market for electricity contracts has grown 
to over eight time’s total consumption over the ﬁ  rst 
decade of liberalised markets. Also in the US Pennsyl-
vania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market, liquidity of 
the over-the-counter (OTC) market is growing fast. 
Even in slightly less mature markets in Northwest 
Europe (e.g. in the UK and Scandinavia), contract 
prices for 2 to 3 years in advance are quoted and 
traded (IEA, 2005A).
Also liberalised retail markets seem to be able to pro-
vide for longer term contracts to smaller consumers. 
Littlechild (2006) documents the wealth of contract 
structures that evolved, partially in response to price 
increases due to drought, in the Nordic market. Sim-
ilarly, in the liberalised Dutch retail electricity and gas 
markets, offers for two or three year ﬁ  xed price con-
tracts have become more common.
While short-term volatility may be less of an issue, 
volatility on the longer term may be looked upon less 
favourably. Some argue that liberalisation may lead to 
longer-run price or investment ﬂ  uctuations, which may 
result in higher contract prices. A case in point might be 
the current longer-term price rises in the UK gas mar-
32  The German EEX market has also a very high level of liquidity.
Graph 3.3: Daily spot prices at UK gas market (NBP) and Dutch electricity market (APX)
Source: Datastream.
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ket, where faster than anticipated decline of indigenous 
production resulted in a sequence of several winters 
with tight supply-demand conditions (see Graph 3.4).
The UK system so far has been able to withstand this 
above-mentioned shock in terms of balancing sup-
ply and demand, as a result of price signals and a 
signiﬁ   cant demand response. Before liberalisation, 
such conditions were less likely to happen as risks of 
over-investment were not only borne by the investor, 
but also by the consumer (who would pay a higher 
average price) as well as, where subsidisation was 
involved, also by the tax-payer. As a result, the larger 
margin of spare capacity (to be on the safe side) in 
the pre-liberalisation period tended to dampen such 
price ﬂ  uctuations at the cost of higher average prices 
over the longer term.
The long-run average energy price ﬂ  uctuations are 
comparable in magnitude to those in other com-
modity markets (e.g. oil, metals). A major difference 
with these markets is that electricity and, to a smaller 
extent, gas prices are of a more local nature: as a con-
sequence of infrastructure capacity constraints, glo-
bal arbitrage of prices cannot occur (see e.g. Graph 
3.4 for differences between UK and US prices). Aver-
age price conditions across various local markets may 
diverge more signiﬁ  cantly than in other commodity 
markets, creating larger ﬂ  uctuations in relative com-
petitiveness between regions, and potentially reduc-
ing liquidity of forward markets. These international 
price differences are likely to decrease as the gas 
market becomes more global. Consumers may deal 
with long-run price ﬂ  uctuations through long-term 
ﬁ  xed price contracts. However, the market for such 
longer term contracts (of many years’ duration) fea-
tures limited liquidity.
3.3.2.2.  Balancing supply and demand
Shortages may occur in gas and power markets as 
a consequence of inadequacy of generation capac-
ity, inefﬁ  cient use of energy, outages in the transmis-
sion system, or local problems in distribution grids. 
One may furthermore distinguish between involun-
tary curtailments of consumers on the one hand and 
voluntary demand responses to price signals on the 
other.
Real physical shortages  33 have always been mainly 
restricted to problems in system management or dis-
tribution grids, and have not in general been caused 
by insufﬁ   cient production capacity. A well-known 
33   In power markets, these would either be uncontrolled black-outs or con-
trolled rotating black-outs or brown-outs (voltage reductions below nor-
mal operational limits) or forced interruption of industrial users.
Graph 3.4: Gas prices in US (Henry Hub) and UK (NBP), monthly average, 2000 – 2008, 
spot market prices until December 2005 / forward prices from January 2006 onward
Source: Datastream, European Spot Gas Markets (various issues).
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exception might be the Californian power crisis, 
where indeed consumers did experience (controlled) 
forced disconnections. Even here, as explained in 
Bushnell (2004), this appeared not so much a conse-
quence of insufﬁ  cient capacity, but rather of insolv-
ability of the utility ﬁ  rms.
On the demand side of the market, on the other 
hand, responses to high energy prices (such as clos-
ing of production activities in other sectors of the 
economy have been more widespread: liberalised 
markets do generate market prices where consum-
ers decide to reduce their energy use. In the UK gas 
market, for instance, demand response over the high 
priced winter 05/06 was signiﬁ  cant. Regulator Ofgem 
estimated this as up to 10% of total gas consump-
tion; the majority of this came about by electricity 
producers switching to other fuels. Energy intensive 
ﬁ   rms (e.g. in the ceramics and paper industries) 
shut down during large parts of winter. Also in the 
US, higher gas prices have led to the de-location of 
some of the more energy intensive consumers (e.g. 
fertilizer production, see Fertilizer Institute, 2005). 
In the Norwegian market, in the 2002-2003 Winter, 
price spikes emerged, provoking signiﬁ  cant demand 
response, even from domestic consumers, who were 
generally on short-term contracts and were therefore 
soon confronted with the price rise. As a result the 
market coped remarkably well in preserving supply-
demand balance (Bye, 2003; see graph 3.5).
Apart from actual experience of incidents where eco-
nomic shortages appeared, one may also investigate 
whether risks of supply shortages have increased 
since liberalisation. One indicator of this is the evo-
lution of spare electricity generation capacity after 
liberalisation. Declining capacity margins make the 
system more susceptible to incidental supply short-
age. In the EU-15, the growth in electricity demand 
over the last two decades has slightly outpaced 
growth in capacity: average utilisation of capacity 
increased by 7% (see also Graph 3.1). Focussing on 
individual technologies, it appears that the average 
spare capacity margin 34 on nuclear and conventional 
capacity has decreased (with utilisation rates increas-
ing by over 10% for each) (Eurostat). When looking 
at the last 5 years, this trend is even more apparent.
However, the lower margins of spare capacity in 
EU-15 have to be viewed in the perspective of 
increased power trade among countries. In addition, 
allocation of rights to use interconnection capac-
ity has become more ﬂ  exible and swifter response 
of power ﬂ  ows to short-run local supply or demand 
34   Deﬁ  ned as the ratio of available capacity from these technologies and 
annual output.
Graph 3.5: Effect of Norwegian 2002-2003 price spike (red line) on electricity consumption 
by the boiler market
Source: Bye (2003)
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changes is now possible. As a result, with better 
pooling of national spare capacity margins (diversi-
ﬁ  cation), similar levels of security may be attained 
with lower spare capacity margins. It is also generally 
acknowledged that the level of spare capacity typi-
cal of the pre-liberalisation period was inefﬁ  ciently 
high and often one of the key motivations for market 
opening in the ﬁ  rst place.
Another indicator of risks of supply shocks is the level 
of diversiﬁ  cation of supplies. More diversity of sup-
plies leads to pooling of risks of interruption of sup-
plies from individual sources. If alternatives are equally 
reliable  35, and shocks are uncorrelated, diversiﬁ  cation 
will lead to lower aggregate risk. In electricity genera-
tion, one often looks at diversity of technology and 
fuel. Gas-fuelled production, and wind energy have 
grown signiﬁ  cantly, at the expense of nuclear and, 
mostly, coal (see Graph 3.6). Given the tradition-
ally high shares of the latter two fuels, diversiﬁ  cation 
seems to have increased. This is indeed conﬁ  rmed by 
analysis of diversity indices in the UK (see Grubb et 
al., 2006), but may differ across countries.
In gas, diversiﬁ   cation is often associated with geo-
graphic sources of gas. Currently, imports of gas into 
Europe come predominantly from Russia, Algeria and 
Norway (IEA, 2004A). As indigenous European pro-
duction will decline over the next decade, the reliance 
on imports will only increase. Risks can be related both 
35   Risks of different technologies do obviously differ in practice. Gas, for 
instance, is generally viewed to be more vulnerable to political risk.
to (political and technical) production risks and to 
transit and facility risks, which may increase as transit 
routes become longer. The importance (and risk) of 
dependence on speciﬁ  c facilities is exempliﬁ  ed by the 
1998 Longford incident in Victoria, Australia, where 
domestic and business consumers’ supplies were cut 
during two weeks, in the wake of an explosion at the 
Longford gas processing plant. All supplies depended 
on this plant (NERA, 2002). Such dependence of large 
volumes of gas on single pieces of infrastructure is not 
uncommon (and often indeed motivated by cost efﬁ  -
ciencies). For example, for the UK, NERA (2002) and 
Stern (2003) point to the importance of the Bacton 
gas terminal in delivering gas to the country. Expe-
rience in recent winters demonstrates the sensitivity 
of the British gas market to the unavailability of the 
Rough storage facility, which accounts for some 80% 
of UK storage capacity.
It is not obvious whether liberalisation leads to more 
or less diversiﬁ   cation. Generation portfolios in the 
traditional systems may have been biased towards 
some technologies (e.g. as a result of coal subsidisa-
tion in the UK before liberalisation), while liberalised 
markets may focus on different technologies. The 
Longford incident in Australia was attributed to the 
monopolistic status of the gas sector.
3.3.2.3.  Reliability of networks
The reliability of the electricity system is intimately 
connected with security of the transmission system. 
Graph 3.6: Contribution of various technologies to total generation
Source: Eurostat.
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Indeed, all major power failures of recent years did 
not originate from inadequacy of generation capac-
ity, but were a consequence of failures of system 
operations. System operators are in charge of bal-
ancing electricity demand and supply over the net-
work. Failure to do so results, ﬁ  rstly, in overloaded 
transmission lines, and soon afterwards, in loss of 
equipment that may send the system into a cascade 
of failing components and loss of power over large 
areas. Well known examples are the 2003 black-outs 
in the Eastern US and Canada, leaving 50 million 
people disconnected for up to 4 days, and in Italy, 
leaving citizens without power for a day.
IEA (2005B) provides some evidence indicating that 
the frequency and extent of (smaller) North-Ameri-
can outages may have increased since the early 90s. 
Secondly, IEA also notes that larger blackouts occur 
mostly when systems operate close to their security 
limits. EU-15 cross-border trade volume has increased 
by 4% per annum over the last decade, compared to 
a 2% increase in generation (Eurostat). As a result 
of liberalisation and increased trade, many intercon-
nections between European countries are congested 
a large part of the time (UCTE, 2005).
Another reason for strain on transmission capac-
ity may be the higher share of intermittent genera-
tion (in particular, wind) in Europe. The more erratic 
supply patterns resulting from these energy sources 
cause larger short-turn variation in transmission ﬂ  ows 
across European networks, and hence place greater 
strains on reliability. A near-incident jeopardizing sta-
bility of the Belgian power grid as a result of German 
wind production is an example of this (UCTE, 2005).
The impact of liberalisation on the distribution sec-
tor is mainly through stronger requirements on 
unbundling and regulation in the member states. A 
stronger focus on efﬁ  ciency as a result of increased 
regulatory incentives might impact on distribution 
grid quality, though much depends on the form of 
regulation. Figures on outages in the UK grid do not 
show signiﬁ  cant increases of distribution disruptions, 
while outages as a result of planned maintenance 
have decreased (see CPB, 2004).
3.3.3.  Performance of energy markets 
in delivering an efﬁ  cient level of supply
From a welfare economic point of view, the ques-
tion of an optimum level of supply security can be 
rephrased as whether the market succeeds in achiev-
ing efﬁ  cient balancing of supply and demand in the 
short run, and efﬁ  cient levels of investment in the 
long run. Efﬁ  ciency requires that prices ﬂ  uctuate to 
reﬂ   ect changing supply and demand conditions. 
This may lead to substantial price variations over 
time. The high prices in peak periods are required 
to recover the investments. In these periods, further-
more, demand responds to the high price levels, as 
energy users reduce their consumption of energy. 
Security of supply interpreted in terms of short- and 
long-run efﬁ  ciency may therefore be at odds with 
some of the concepts of supply security analysed 
above.
Since security of supply is itself costly, the optimal 
cost-beneﬁ  t evaluation may well involve lower lev-
els of supply security than were enforced by central 
planners in the past or is currently imposed through 
public-service obligations. In this approach, policy 
measures are called for when markets may fail to 
achieve a given level of security.
An evident reason for intervention in energy mar-
kets hinges on the fact that small consumers are 
not aware of (real-time) electricity prices and many 
consumers do not have the opportunity to react to 
short-lived price rises by reducing their demand. The 
potential failure to balance the system as a result of 
such demand rigidities might lead to system col-
lapse, imposing an externality on all users. System 
security is therefore a public good. In practice, the 
adopted solution to this failure is that responsibil-
ity for balancing the system and making decisions 
on curtailing consumption is assigned to a system 
operator. In fact, the Transmission System Operators 
have to procure expensive idle reserve capacity for 
peaks. This decision is taken, not by the market but 
set out in regulations, standards etc., therefore liber-
alisation has no direct effect here.
Uncertainty over peak prices is sometimes mentioned 
as an impediment to efﬁ  cient levels of investments 
on the grounds that producers would not invest if 
they perceive the revenues to be too risky. However 
it can also be argued that companies invest in order 
to avoid the risk of having to purchasing energy for 
their needs from these volatile markets.
Market failures may occur if prices in periods of price 
spikes do not adequately reﬂ  ect the value of energy. 
This may result from ill-designed real-time (balanc-
ing) markets, or balancing mechanisms, but also for 
instance from (investors’ anticipation of) interven-
tions by governments or system operators in miti-
gating temporary price rises (e.g. Bushnell, 2005). As 
Joskow (2005) points out, especially under scarcity 
conditions, prices will be extremely sensitive to the 
system operator’s discretionary actions.
Incompleteness of markets can also result in sub-opti-
mal behaviour. If markets, in particular for long-term 
contracts, are not sufﬁ  ciently liquid, optimal transac-
tions may fail to take place. Reasons for insufﬁ  cient 
long-term contracting may arise from transaction 
costs, but also from inadequate design of retail mar-
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kets. If consumers favour contracting with ﬁ  nancially 
unreliable retailers since they are not exposed to the 
imbalance costs in the event of the retailer’s bank-
ruptcy  36, insufﬁ  cient contracting may result (Bush-
nell, 2005).
Do markets deliver suboptimal diversity? Again, 
when risks of certain sources or technologies trans-
late into adequate price risk exposure to those con-
tracting from these sources, market parties internal-
ise those risks. An exception might occur if supply 
interruptions are exploited to achieve political goals. 
In addition, there is an obvious public good aspect 
involved in trade relations and international frame-
works of property rights: foreign policy affects costs 
and risks of international supplies.
As to technology choice, there is, ﬁ  nally, a clear envi-
ronmental externality. Neuhoff et al. (2005) argue 
that in the presence of market power, base load 
plants (i.e. the low marginal cost plants producing 
cross all hours of the day) or intermittent generation 
beneﬁ  t less from exercise of market power than peak 
plants. The equilibrium mix of technologies may 
therefore be distorted under market power.
Regarding transmission and distribution, optimal reg-
ulation should incorporate incentives for internalising 
reliability of the grids. A difﬁ  culty in transmission grid 
regulation in particular is that local grids’ security is 
intimately connected to operations in adjacent grids 
(that will typically be regulated by different regula-
tors). This creates moral hazard where operators can 
shift responsibilities to adjacent operators (see e.g. 
Glachant et al., 2004). In addition, beneﬁ  ts of invest-
ments spill over to other operators, and are sensitive 
to (imperfect) compensation mechanisms for transit 
ﬂ  ows.
3.3.4. Policy  discussion
3.3.4.1.  Allocation of rights and responsibilities
Crucial to efﬁ   cient functioning of markets is clar-
ity over rights and responsibilities. Firstly, both in 
electricity and gas markets, given the public-good 
character of system security the system has to be 
managed by an operator having the responsibil-
ity for keeping system balance. Under the balanc-
ing regime, market parties generally have rights to 
execute (balanced) transactions, but are charged 
for imbalances between input into the system, and 
off take from the system. The design of the balanc-
ing arrangements is critical in appropriately making 
market parties internalise the consequences of their 
decisions. In particular, efﬁ  ciency requires that real-
36   However this risk is reduced since suppliers have to provide large ﬁ  nancial 
guarantees to the TSO.
time prices reﬂ  ect real-time value of electricity or gas, 
in order to give adequate incentives to participants 
to contribute to supply security. Transparency on 
system operator disconnection policy in case of real-
time shortage, as well as pricing behaviour under 
these conditions, can signal that system operators 
will allow prices to reﬂ  ect scarcity, and that govern-
ments will refrain from interfering in the market in 
these events, thus providing assurance to investors. 
The need for clear allocation of rights and responsi-
bility is recognised in EU Law through the gas and 
electricity security of supply Directives.
3.3.4.2.  Price and capacity regulation of wholesale 
markets
In some electricity markets, high prices reﬂ  ecting 
scarcity are either not acceptable or a policy of non-
intervention cannot be credibly committed to. Some 
governments have therefore capped wholesale or 
balancing prices at some maximum level. However, 
to keep the same incentives for investment, this 
often requires compensation of investors in the form 
of capacity payments (subsidies to generators related 
to installed or available generation capacity) or some 
form of capacity credits (where consumers have a 
regulatory obligation to contract with generators for 
having capacity available, which created a market for 
capacity separate from the market for energy). This 
dual structure with capacity markets and capped 
energy markets has been chosen in many regions in 
the United States.
Price caps are less common in Europe as there are 
several disadvantages including the necessity for 
detailed regulation and central planning of required 
capacity, as well as the muted incentives on market 
participants for providing system security in times 
of stress  37 (see e.g. Hogan, 2005). Although price 
caps are sometimes advocated as a device for mar-
ket power mitigation, experience suggests that mar-
ket power is often shifted to the capacity market 
instead as argued by Bushnell (2005) and Joskow et 
al. (2006).
Insofar as inadequate contracting (and inability of 
consumers to hedge against price volatility) is the 
cause of concern, measures may be taken to improve 
liquidity of contract markets. This may require regu-
lation with regard to market transparency and regu-
latory endorsement of market places. Participation of 
retail ﬁ  rms in the long-term contract market may be 
encouraged, on the one hand, by avoiding regula-
tion that provides consumers with opportunities to 
terminate supply contracts and switch to low (regu-
37   It might also, in integrated systems, give perverse incentives to lean on 
the system and export power to regions not affected by the cap.
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lated) default rates in times of high prices.38 On the 
other hand, it also potentially requires regulation of 
retail ﬁ  rms to hedge their price risks. More draconian 
measures would be to force long-term (option) con-
tracts on consumers (see e.g. Hogan, 2005), although 
Littlechild (2006) demonstrates that absence of such 
regulation may result in desired outcomes as well. 
Other measures may be to allow industrial consum-
ers to collectively negotiate long-term contracts with 
producers, as e.g. occurs in France (Ministère de 
l’Economie, 2005) and the Netherlands (Electrabel 
Nieuwsbrief, 2005).
3.3.4.3.  Encouraging liquidity of markets
Liquid spot and forward markets lower transaction 
costs and entry barriers for new players, and may 
hence contribute to reduction of market power. Gov-
ernment support, in terms of market transparency, 
may contribute to market liquidity. Liquid markets 
can also help solving potential hold-up problems 
in investments. As Honoré et al. (2004) point out, 
unlike many other multi-billion dollar projects in the 
gas sector, the Ormen Lange pipeline to the UK is 
not backed by long-term contracts, as liquid spot 
and forward markets reduce the volume risk.
3.3.4.4.  Regulation of energy mix
In the electricity market, environmental (emissions) 
regulations tend to increase generation diversity (see 
Grubb et al. 2006) for projections of diversity in the 
UK under low carbon objectives). As interconnection 
increases diversity, existing policy goals setting mini-
mum bounds on interconnection capacity may be 
beneﬁ  cial. However, setting minimum bounds likely 
results in suboptimal investments, as the presence 
of information asymmetry makes it difﬁ  cult for the 
regulator to determine the optimal level. Improving 
regulation on congestion management and invest-
ment would be preferable.
In the gas market, diversity is probably more impor-
tant, in particular concerning geopolitical sources 
of gas. Restricting shares of imports from individual 
countries may be difﬁ  cult to enforce in liquid mar-
kets (except by limiting pipeline capacity). The costs 
of such constraints would depend on the substitut-
ing supplies. In the long-run, this would presumably 
be increased imports of liqueﬁ  ed natural gas (LNG), 
shipped from diverse locations. Foreign policies 
could try and control geopolitical risks (CIEP, 2004) 
and reduction of transaction costs for other sources 
38   If retailers are barred from writing binding long-term contracts with con-
sumers (e.g. because regulation stipulates that consumers may switch to 
competing retailers at all times without a penalty, or at an administrative 
penalty that does not reﬂ  ect the market value of the long-term contract), 
retailers will not be inclined to sell such long-term ﬁ  xed price contracts.
of gas (e.g. through coordination of sitting permits 
for transmission infrastructure) could be considered.
3.3.4.5.  Investment in strategic stocks
The government could also intervene in markets by 
investing in electricity generation or gas storage. The 
major risk here is crowding out: private investors 
may decrease their investment by a similar amount 
of capacity, depending on the deployment criteria 
of the strategic reserves. If only used under contin-
gencies, voluntary disconnection of consumers may 
well be a less costly alternative. Also, IEA (2004A) 
notes that gas stocks are much more costly than oil 
reserves.  39
3.3.4.6.  Optimal regulation of grids and system 
operators
The natural monopoly of transmission system opera-
tion and investment evidently requires regulation. In 
contrast to regulation of distribution grids, analysis of, 
and experience with regulation of transmission sys-
tems is still underdeveloped. A notable example that 
is often considered to be successful is the UK, where 
the independent system operator is regulated using a 
mix of cost of service and proﬁ  t sharing mechanisms 
based on performance metrics, including indicators 
for quality (Joskow, 2005). Giving adequate incen-
tives for inter-TSO transmission investment is a more 
difﬁ  cult issue, however. Increasing transparency to 
stakeholders of system characteristics and computa-
tion of available capacities may be a useful step.
Vertical integration with generation is likely to create 
distorted incentives as system operators’ decisions 
may have an important impact on generator proﬁ  t-
ability. Joskow (2005) argues that ownership unbun-
dling is optimal.
Minimum quality standards are widely used by regu-
lators to protect customers from quality decreases 
below a certain level. In particular for distribution 
networks, such a standard may require that the com-
pany has to pay a ﬁ  ne or may even loose its licence for 
violating this standard. Minimum quality standards 
are used, for example, in the UK (Ofgem, 2003).
Although minimum quality standards are effective in 
preventing the drop of quality below a certain level, 
they do not reward companies for the provision of 
a higher quality or for achieving a better price-to-
quality ratio. There have been regulatory attempts 
to introduce these incentives by adjusting regulated 
tariffs with change in consumer interruption cost 
(e.g., in Norway and the Netherlands, see Langset 
39   See also cost-beneﬁ  t analyses in De Joode et al. (2004) and Mulder et al. 
(2005).
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et al., 2001, and DTe 2002). By doing so, the regula-
tor balances cost-reducing incentives with incentives 
for a better price-to-quality ratio.
3.4. Liberalisation  and 
environment
3.4.1. Introduction
Electricity generation is a major source of environ-
mental pollution. Emissions from burning fossil 
fuels to produce electricity contribute substantially 
to urban ozone and other air pollution, acid depo-
sition, regional haze and visibility problems as well 
as the build up of greenhouse gas concentration in 
the earth’s atmosphere. These environmental effects 
result from environmental externalities arising from 
a well known market failure due to a divergence 
between market prices and social costs associated 
with the production of energy. Clearly the extent of 
these distortions depends on the energy inputs. The 
consequences of such environmental pollution are 
human health problems, damages of ecosystems, 
crops, and building material, amenity losses, and 
global warming (cf. European Commission, 2003).
Against this background it is important to know how 
increased competition in the European electricity 
markets is likely to affect the size of the environmen-
tal impact. The answer to this question is not obvious 
because restructuring can affect the environmental 
performance of electricity generation in many differ-
ent ways, some leading to increases of air pollution 
and global warming and some leading to decreases. 
The effect depends on four key factors: how liberali-
sation affects electricity consumption, how it affects 
fuel efﬁ  ciency, how it changes the mix of technology 
to produce electricity, and how liberalisation affects 
voluntary environmental initiatives and the perform-
ance of environmental regulation. This section ﬁ  rst 
discusses these issues based on theoretical literature 
(Brennan et al., 2002). Afterwards, some empirical 
ﬁ  ndings are presented both from inside and outside 
the EU and the results of a game theoretic model on 
the EU electricity market are outlined.
Beforehand, it is important to note that in principle 
liberalisation does not lead to any change in total 
CO2 emissions because they are capped by the Euro-
pean Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). If the 
emission cap is ﬁ  xed and liberalisation facilitates fuel 
efﬁ  ciency and clean technologies, this will only lead 
to more available allowances that could be sold to 
other sectors also covered by the EU ETS. It is, how-
ever, possible that liberalisation results in a higher 
level of electricity consumption with equal CO2 emis-
sions (see 4.3).
3.4.2.  Effects of liberalisation on environment
3.4.2.1. Electricity  consumption
A primary motivation for more competition in the 
electricity market is the expectation that it will lead 
to increased market efﬁ  ciency leading to lower elec-
tricity prices. If prices fall, the consumption of elec-
tricity and emissions from electricity generation 
can be expected to increase, though not by a large 
amount since electricity demand tends to be inelas-
tic. Whether and how much electricity prices fall as a 
result of liberalisation depends on a number of fac-
tors. If, for instance, the new market is very competi-
tive and therefore leads to more efﬁ  cient production 
and more purchase options for all classes of consum-
ers, this can result in signiﬁ   cantly lower electricity 
prices. In the short term, prices may also fall because 
overcapacities that have been produced by regula-
tion and subsidies may be abolished. Conversely, if 
the regulated utility is a low cost supplier relative to 
its neighbours, prices in this area can actually increase 
under competition. Prices may also be higher than 
they would have been under regulation due to merg-
ers and strategic behaviour of the electricity suppli-
ers, as is described in section 2 (see also Haas et al., 
2000). Thus, liberalisation has to be accompanied by 
a strong enforcement of antitrust laws.
Liberalisation could also lead to greater use of real-
time pricing of electricity, leading to higher prices 
during periods of peak electricity demand and lower 
prices during off-peak periods, increasing market efﬁ  -
ciency. Consumers may decide to shift their electric-
ity consuming activities to off-peak periods. As the 
baseload units in power generation rely on coal in 
many countries and produce more emissions than the 
peak units, the shift from peak to baseload could lead 
to higher emissions. In single countries that have a 
high share of nuclear power in the baseload genera-
tion such as France, the shift could lead to lower emis-
sions. In these cases other problems like nuclear waste 
disposal or reactor accidents may become severer.
3.4.2.2. Fuel  efﬁ  ciency
Rate of return regulation, which was the leading reg-
ulation in the old days of electricity generation, was 
meant to cover generators’ costs of production plus 
some ﬁ  xed capital rent. This did not enhance invest-
ments into innovative energy efﬁ  cient power plants. 
By contrast, after liberalisation, electricity generators 
economise on fuel use, as is seen in section 2, for 
example by improving their degree of energy cycle 
efﬁ   ciency, because they have stronger incentives 
to reduce production costs. This is likely to lead to 
reductions in primary energy use and emissions per 
produced kWh.
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3.4.2.3.  Mix of generation technologies
Liberalisation can have different effects on the devel-
opment of nuclear generation, coal-ﬁ  red and gas-ﬁ  red 
generation as well as generation based on renewable 
energy sources. For each technology the effect can be 
theoretically either positive or negative. For example 
more competition may on the one hand lead to an 
increased use of relatively cheap coal-ﬁ  red generators. 
On the other hand, some older coal plants will require 
capital investments to extend their lives and the costs of 
these investments might not be recoverable in a com-
petitive market. Increasing the output of these older 
plants will additionally increase their maintenance costs, 
potentially making them unproﬁ  table and thus mark-
ing them for replacement by more efﬁ  cient plants. The 
chances of renewables may be affected if, as expected, 
increased competition leads to lower electricity prices 
and no other instruments to promote renewables are 
in place. Conversely, liberalisation creates greater pos-
sibilities for differentiating purchase options that can 
provide a boost to renewables. Incumbents as well as 
new operators offer service packages featuring green 
electricity for which consumers are willing to pay a pre-
mium above the market price of conventional power 
(see also the section on dynamic efﬁ  ciency).
In general, whether a certain technology penetrates 
the European electricity markets faster than it would 
have in the absence of liberalisation is an open ques-
tion, for several reasons. Competitive markets are 
riskier for investors, so that the capital costs will be 
higher than under regulation and tend to yield lower 
levels of investment in new generation plants. Uncer-
tainty about future developments of environmental 
regulation, available locations for new plants, primary 
energy prices, or costs of the required equipment may 
have investment-reducing effects as well (IEA, 2003).
3.4.2.4.  Voluntary initiatives and environmental 
regulation
More competition in the electricity market changes 
the attitude of utilities regarding electricity conser-
vation programs that help to slow the growth of 
electricity consumption (IEA, 2004B). To the extent 
that these programs are actually effective in reduc-
ing electricity demand, eliminating them would 
result in higher emission levels. Liberalisation of U.S. 
electricity for instance has contributed to the demise 
of many utility-sponsored conservation programs  40. 
40   “DSM programs have traditionally been used by electric utilities to assist cus-
tomers in reducing their energy use and/or demand. The prime motivation 
for these programs has been to reduce the investment needed for new power 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. Impetus for implementing 
these programs frequently came from regulators, and costs for these programs 
are generally recovered from rate payers. However, in a more competitive utility 
market, experience in countries where retail competition is allowed indicates 
that price becomes paramount, and many utilities and large industrial custom-
ers view DSM programs as a cost they are unwilling to pay.”(ACE3, 1996).
Voluntary commitments to reduce emissions are also 
less likely to be forthcoming in a more competitive 
market where electricity generators have a stronger 
incentive to keep costs low.
Greater competition may, at the same time, improve 
the generators’ willingness to comply with some 
environmental regulations, provided that monitor-
ing is effective and thus, complying doesn’t create 
competitive disadvantages. In a more deregulated 
market, generators are more concerned about mini-
mising costs, so that the incentives to install low cost 
abatement techniques or to switch to cleaner fuels 
due to taxes or emissions trading are stronger. The 
advantage of market based policies relative to com-
mand-and-control methods is greater in competitive 
than in regulated electricity markets. Market based 
policies are therefore seen as being more consistent 
with liberalisation.
3.4.2.5. Empirical  evidence
As the process of liberalisation in many countries is 
still ongoing, the existing literature does not provide 
a comprehensive research on all effects. The follow-
ing ﬁ  ndings, however, present some impacts of lib-
eralisation which have been observed so far. Pearson 
(2000) shows that liberalisation of the U.K. electricity 
market in 1989 was associated with a rapid decrease 
of both total emission of several key pollutants as 
well as emissions per unit of electricity generated. 
The main reason for this development was that coal 
was to a large extent replaced by gas. The author 
argues that this encouraged the then government 
to take a more proactive environmental stance than 
they would have otherwise done.
Several studies analyse the effects of the market liber-
alisation on energy efﬁ  ciency and use of renewables 
in the U.K. They conclude that liberalisation coupled 
with other policies helps to enhance energy efﬁ  ciency 
but is in itself insufﬁ  cient (e.g. Eyre, 2000; Wohlge-
muth, 2000). This result is conﬁ  rmed by the develop-
ment of the demand for green electricity after liberal-
isation of the German electricity market. Only 1.2% 
of the electricity consumers switched from conven-
tional to green electricity due to higher prices and 
switching costs. Though this might have been due to 
wider problems with switching, this result suggests 
that the diffusion of renewable energy technologies 
may have to rely on additional promotion measures 
(Börner, 2002). Filippini et al. (2002) explore the 
consequences of the implementation of the proposal 
to deregulate the Swiss hydropower sector. They 
conclude that in the short run only a few producers 
would have ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties to cover operational 
costs and that the majority of the ﬁ  rms would not 
reduce or shut down their activities. The prospects in 
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the long run would depend crucially on the long run 
market price and on the capability of the producers 
to innovate.
Eikeland (1998) compares the impacts of liberalisa-
tion of electricity markets on the environment in the 
U.K. and Norway. The short-term effects were dif-
ferent due to different initial situations. Compared 
to the environmental improvement after liberalisa-
tion in the U.K. due to an intensiﬁ  ed use of natu-
ral gas instead of coal, the impacts in Norway have 
been more complex. In Norway, nearly all electricity 
had historically been generated by hydro. Shortly 
after the reform in 1990, a temporary stop in new 
development of hydro projects occurred, leading to 
short-term environmental improvements, because 
the abolition of politically set prices and the area 
franchise system revealed excessive supply capacity. 
More fundamental changes came because the reform 
led to increased power trade between Norway, Swe-
den, Finland, and Denmark, coupling the Norwegian 
hydro-based electricity systems with thermal-based 
systems relying on coal, gas, and nuclear power. 
Whether or not the trade has led to a net decrease 
in environmental damages in the whole area is not 
clear. With respect to the long-term environmental 
impacts, the patterns seem to have been quite similar 
in both countries. The new electricity legislation allo-
cated the responsibility for environmental challenges 
to the state (regulator), industry, and consumers.
Focussing on the climate change problem, Eikeland 
(1998) ascertains that after liberalisation regula-
tors and industries had lower incentives to promote 
energy efﬁ  ciency and renewables due to other over-
riding interests. Consumers were still relatively pas-
sive. He emphasised however, that the Swedish 
example of labelling green electricity led to a mas-
sive demand for green electricity, pushing the lib-
eralised market towards an improved environmental 
performance.
Fabrizio et al. (2006) examine whether liberalisation 
of the U.S. electricity market has increased the pro-
ductive efﬁ  ciency on the plant level. They ﬁ  nd that 
investor-owned utility (IOU) plants in restructuring 
regimes reduced their labour and non-fuel operating 
costs by 3 to 5% relative to IOU plants in states that 
did not restructure their electricity market. The utilities 
in the restructuring regimes have therefore a greater 
potential to reduce electricity prices which could in 
principle lead to a high level of electricity consump-
tion. The authors also ﬁ  nd little evidence of increases 
in fuel efﬁ  ciency relative to plants in regulated mar-
kets, although the power of this test is limited due 
to a lack of data. Another US study, Bushnell et al. 
(2005), ﬁ  nds that fuel efﬁ  ciency of divested plants 
improved by about 2%. Similar, though somewhat 
smaller, improvements were also observed at utility-
owned plants in states that imposed more stringent 
regulation during the same time period.
Ringel (2003) takes a closer look at the ﬁ  rst trends of 
the European electricity markets after liberalisation. 
The author states that the liberalisation does not only 
imply opportunities but also risks for the creation of a 
sustainable power sector. Many risks are due to mar-
ket distortions caused by the delay in forming a fully 
functional single European market. In the short term, 
market liberalisation may create more risks than 
opportunities to the extent that lower end-user elec-
tricity prices increase the cost disadvantage of renew-
able energies and combined heat and power (CHP) 
plants. In the long run however, the efﬁ  ciency gains 
of the sector and the appearance of new actors, such 
as new energy service suppliers, are likely to bring 
forth the opportunities and foster a transformation 
towards a sustainable electricity sector.
Kemfert et al. (2003) apply a game theoretic model 
to study the strategic behaviour of energy suppliers 
and their impacts on the environmental situation 
in the liberalised European electricity market. The 
effects on environment are ambiguous. Liberalisa-
tion leads, on the one hand, to an application of low 
cost technologies which are generally more dam-
aging. On the other hand, in the Nordic countries 
that have an initially high share of renewable energy 
production technology, the share of environmentally 
friendly technologies is further increased.
3.4.2.6. Conclusion
According to both theoretical as well as empirical 
results, the impacts of liberalisation of the electric-
ity markets on the environment are ambiguous. The 
overall effect on the environment consists of the 
various effects that liberalisation has on electricity 
consumption, mix of technologies, fuel efﬁ  ciency, 
and the effectiveness of environmental regula-
tions. According to the theoretical literature the sin-
gle effects can be either positive or negative. The 
case studies of the UK and Norway show that the 
impacts also crucially depend on the initial situation 
in a country before liberalisation. The initial situa-
tions differ with regard to natural resources and geo-
graphical conditions, technological know-how, and 
requirements of the existing environmental regula-
tion. Furthermore, the degree of market opening 
and the adjustment of environmental policy meas-
ures are crucial. For these reasons the impacts of lib-
eralisation on the environment will differ across the 
Member States. Anyway, liberalisation is generally 
not opposed to environmental objectives and can 
strengthen the effect of market based environmen-
tal instruments.
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3.4.3.  Effects of the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme on Competition
3.4.3.1. Introduction
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
is by far the most important environmental policy 
measure affecting the European electricity market. It 
was launched at the beginning of 2005 to control 
CO2 emissions of the power generation and heavy 
industry. The aim of emissions trading is to con-
tribute to meeting the emissions reduction targets 
at least costs. The cap-and-trade mechanism makes 
sure that the emitters which reduce emissions are 
those for whom it is cheapest to do. The comment 
in the previous subsection on the positive interaction 
between market based regulation and liberalisation 
holds true for the EU ETS in particular. In a liberalised 
market ﬁ  rms minimise their costs including costs of 
CO2 emissions. Comparing allowance price and mar-
ginal abatement costs a ﬁ  rm decides either to reduce 
emissions or to buy allowances. The market mecha-
nism of the EU ETS therefore achieves the efﬁ  cient 
distribution of emission allowances at least informa-
tion requirements for the regulator, i.e. the regulator 
needs not to know the marginal abatement costs of 
the emitters.
According to the present rules, the initial allocation 
of allowance lies with the Member States with the 
European Commission having to assess and approve 
the plans against a set of criteria in the ETS directive. 
The discussion in this paper focuses on ﬁ  ve design 
issues that affect the efﬁ  ciency and effectiveness of 
the EU ETS and which have received considerable 
attention in the recent past (e.g. High Level Group 
on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment 
2006):
–  Free allocation and insufﬁ  cient competition;
–  Allocation rules for new entrants and closures;
–  Multi-period nature of allocation (updating);
– Non-harmonised  allocation;
–   ETS as part of a comprehensive policy mix (Hybrid 
allocation).
This section presents a short analysis of the conse-
quences of these features. As the EU ETS has been 
started very recently the analysis is mainly based on 
the results of analytic and numerical simulation mod-
els but also contains a limited number of empirical 
results.
3.4.3.2.  Free allocation and insufﬁ  cient competition
The power companies like other participants have to 
reduce emissions and receive most of the emission 
allowances for free. Nevertheless facing a market 
price of permits constitutes opportunity costs for the 
ﬁ  rms. Opportunity costs are part of marginal costs 
so that passing on the emission opportunity costs is 
generally in line with economic theory. Given that 
electricity markets are still mainly regional, not fully 
liberalised with a rather inelastic demand, the power 
sector is able to pass on a relatively large share of the 
opportunity costs. Indeed, empirical and simulation 
model estimates for Germany and the Netherlands 
indicate that the share of CO2 costs which passed 
on to consumers ranges from 60 to 100% depend-
ing on market and technology speciﬁ  c factors. Other 
sectors that also participate in the EU ETS do not 
have the possibility to pass on a similar share of the 
costs due to international competition. Depending 
on the input structure of the companies, they do 
not only face CO2 costs but also higher production 
costs due to higher electricity prices. Many electricity 
intensive industries, such as the aluminium industry 
that compete internationally with their goods are 
put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis industries 
from countries without comparable CO2 control. 
More competition in the power sector could help to 
mitigate these distortions, though the disadvantage 
of internationally competing industries will to some 
extent persist  41.
Independent from passing on CO2 costs, the prob-
lem of additional proﬁ   ts would be mitigated, if 
allowances were, at least partly, auctioned. Litera-
ture indicates that auctioning would lead to higher 
overall efﬁ  ciency regarding the optimal level of out-
put and emissions (cf. Böhringer and Lange, 2005). 
Furthermore, auctioning provides the possibility of 
generating revenues which could be used to reduce 
distortive taxes and create welfare gains (ref. Smith 
and Ross, 2002). Given that one aim of the EU ETS 
is the reduction of energy demand the rise of gross 
energy prices is unavoidable  42. Without special pro-
visions for internationally competing and particularly 
energy intensive companies higher energy prices 
lead to competitive distortions and carbon leakages 
because generally companies in competing markets 
are not subject to similar policies. Auctioning, how-
ever, provides an instrument to allow for the redistri-
bution of additional proﬁ  ts to households and to cut 
existing energy taxes, if governments are willing to 
implement such redistribution.
3.4.3.3.  Allocation rules for new entrants and closures
The EU ETS tends to increase the costs of entry for 
high carbon generators and therefore limits the 
number of potential competitors seeking to enter the 
41   Various factors may inﬂ  uence the competitiveness of these sectors, such 
as the availability of natural resources.
42   Other policy measures than the ETS, aiming at comparable reductions 
of CO2 emissions, would be less cost-effective and would have higher 
economic effects.
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market. For this reason, most Member States reserve 
allowances for new entrants and thereby, facilitate 
competition. The promotion of competition, how-
ever, may come at a cost. If the allocation depends 
on technology used in the energy sector, i.e. carbon 
intensive technologies receive relatively more allow-
ances, the choice for new power plants will be dis-
torted away from CO2 efﬁ  cient plants towards more 
CO2 intensive technologies. Although the overall 
emissions are capped the technology mix will then 
be inefﬁ  cient. This effect would be mitigated at the 
margin if companies with permits sell them on to 
new, more efﬁ  cient companies, or become more efﬁ  -
cient themselves. In order to create efﬁ  cient invest-
ment incentives the allocation should be based on 
output independent from technology. An alternative 
would be to auction allowances. More investments 
in CO2 efﬁ  cient technologies tends to lower allow-
ance prices because less allowances are needed for 
the same level of electricity output.
With regard to closure, when allowances are allo-
cated to incumbent generators, in some Member 
States it is required that the power station operates a 
minimum number of hours or produces a minimum 
number of MWh per year. An operator then will run 
the power station even if the marginal production 
costs exceed the wholesale price, as long as the loss 
is less then the value of his allowances. As a result, 
old and unproﬁ  table power stations that otherwise 
might have been replaced by new build power plants 
could stay online (Neuhoff et al. 2005). The allow-
ance price tends to be higher because these opera-
tors keep the allowances instead of closing down and 
selling the allowances. As both rules for newcomers 
and closures vary, the incentives for new entrants 
and operators of old and unproﬁ  table power stations 
also vary between Member States. More harmonisa-
tion of rules across the EU is necessary, notably for 
new entrants and closure, including the possibility 
for using a benchmarking approach.
3.4.3.4.  Multi-period nature of allocation (updating)
The allocation of allowances is presently largely based 
on historical emissions and follows a sequential proc-
ess. Allocation plans are decided on for one trading 
period at a time with repeated negotiations about 
the allocation for the following periods. It is therefore 
likely that present emissions have an impact on the 
negotiations and therefore on future allocations. A 
grandfathering scheme of this type is likely to lead to 
dynamic inefﬁ  ciencies. If electricity generators antici-
pate that their present behaviour affects future allow-
ance allocations, the CO2 efﬁ  ciency incentives of the 
EU ETS will be reduced because any improvement 
may reduce future allocations. Analytical and simula-
tion models show that this strategic behaviour results 
in higher CO2 prices compared to one-off allocation 
(Neuhoff et al. 2006; Böhringer and Lange, 2003). 
A ﬁ  xed reference date could avoid strategic behav-
iour because present day emission decisions would 
not affect future allowance allocations. Hhowever, 
this one-off allocation may appear problematic as it 
would ignore the intermediate technological change. 
Another possibility is to base allowance allocation 
on output or benchmarks. Output based allocation 
is independent from emissions and technology and 
would therefore avoid strategic behaviours and also 
create efﬁ   cient investment incentives. Benchmarks 
compare existing technologies and deﬁ  ne speciﬁ  ed 
emissions levels (standards) for each technology. 
They could also help to avoid strategic behaviour 
but could lead to false investment incentives because 
they are not independent from technology, i.e. CO2 
intensive technologies may be favoured (see 4.3.3.). 
Due to technological innovations benchmarking has 
to be repeated regularly.
3.4.3.5. Non-harmonised  allocation
The amount of national emission allowances is 
decided by the Member States subject to approval 
by the European Commission. They are, however, 
required to be on the pathway to their reduction 
targets from the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement, but have discretion over what 
share of their overall emissions reduction they plan 
to achieve in the EU ETS sectors, in the non-partici-
pating sectors, or through the ﬂ  exible mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Guidance has been provided 
by the European Commission. However, the Member 
States have discretion in allocating allowances to the 
participating sectors. As there is no harmonisation 
across countries, there is a real risk that differences in 
the assignment of free allowances to ﬁ  rms could dis-
tort competition. Böhringer and Lange (2004) show 
that it is in general impossible to obtain efﬁ  cient CO2 
reductions when requiring 100% free allocation of 
allowances  and non-discrimination of similar ﬁ  rms 
across countries. They propose a continuous increase 
of the auctioned ratio to promote harmonisation and 
efﬁ  ciency in the longer run, leading the EU ETS to 
unfold its strength.
3.4.3.6.  ETS as part of a comprehensive policy mix 
(Hybrid allocation)
The EU ETS covers almost half of all EU CO2 emissions 
of which two-thirds are from power generation. The 
CO2 emissions of the sectors not covered by the EU 
ETS are to be controlled by complementary policy 
measures. If the reduction targets from the Kyoto 
Protocol and the EU Burden Sharing Agreement are 
supposed to be reached mainly by national reduc-
tion efforts and not by using the international Kyoto 
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mechanisms, the allocation of allowances to the EU 
ETS sectors also determines the reduction obligation 
for the non-participating sectors. That is, a gener-
ous allocation to the energy intensive EU ETS sectors 
implies high reduction efforts for the other sectors 
and vice versa. Such a shift of the reduction burden 
can lead to substantial excess costs compared to a 
comprehensive emissions trading system covering all 
segments of the economy (Böhringer et al., 2005). 
Low carbon technology will, therefore, be less used 
and developed if efforts are concentrated in these 
sectors.
3.4.3.7. Conclusion
The analysis of the EU ETS allocation mechanisms 
shows that various provisions could create distor-
tions of competition in the electricity market. This 
includes distortions between different participants, 
between participating and non-participating sec-
tors within one country as well as between Member 
States. These issues are not being addressed in the 
context of the review of the EU ETS.
The EU ETS co-exists with the liberalisation process. 
The impacts on the electricity sector and the envi-
ronment are therefore a result of their interaction. 
At this stage, the overall effect cannot be quantiﬁ  ed 
There is, however, consensus that market-based reg-
ulations are clearly more compatible with a liberal-
ised environment.
3.5. Summary  and  Conclusions
The European electricity and gas markets have been 
going through a process of liberalisation since the 
early 1990s. This process is changing the sector 
from a regulated structure of, predominantly, pub-
licly owned monopolists controlling the entire sup-
ply chain, into a market where private and public 
generators and retailers compete on a regulated and 
unbundled system of transport infrastructure.
The change of incentives, resulting either from the 
introduction of competition or from more stringent 
regulation, has generally resulted in more cost-efﬁ  -
cient operation. Although the reduced costs have to 
some extent been passed on to consumers, market 
behaviour raises concerns. Wholesale markets have 
turned out to be particularly vulnerable to market 
power, as a consequence of both legacy industry 
structure and the speciﬁ  c characteristics of electricity 
and gas. The viability of competition on retail mar-
kets, which relies on the willingness of smaller con-
sumers to switch providers, is in most markets yet to 
be proved.
Evidence on effects on innovation indicates that a 
shift occurs in composition of R&D efforts: the com-
panies’ innovation focus moves away from technol-
ogy innovation towards cost-reducing technologies 
and consumer services. While aggregate private 
spending appears to have diminished, the focus 
on efﬁ   ciency-improving innovation seems to have 
increased. As a result, additional policy measures 
may be necessary to encourage fundamental energy 
research if the pre-liberalisation situation is to be 
restored.
Some policy responses that have been discussed usu-
ally centre on mechanisms to increase competition 
(e.g. through imposing requirements on dominant 
players). Full unbundling in transmission might be 
further encouraged as the resulting net beneﬁ  ts are 
widely acknowledged. Merger control at the EU level 
becomes all the more important as a more inte-
grated EU market becomes the relevant market. Vir-
tual Power Plants and long-term forward contracts 
can reduce the scope for strategic behaviour in the 
market. It is also argued that conditions for the com-
patibility of the latter with competition policy have 
to be clariﬁ  ed.
Also designs of mechanisms for cross-border trade 
have scope for improvement in order to better reap 
the beneﬁ   ts of integration of markets. Enhanced 
cooperation among TSOs and harmonisation of reg-
ulation should be further encouraged. In particular, 
current steps towards ‘market coupling’, a mecha-
nism which allows for more efﬁ   cient utilisation of 
available transport capacity between countries, may 
lead to improved gains from electricity trade. In this 
set-up, instead of auctioning interconnection capac-
ity on individual borders to individual market partici-
pants, the allocation of transmission capacity on all 
borders in one region is jointly carried out, on the 
basis of the bids for supply and demand of energy 
on the power exchanges in the regions involved. In 
this way, energy markets and transmission markets 
are simultaneously cleared, taking into account the 
relations between ﬂ  ows on the different borders.
In assessing the effects of liberalisation on security of 
supply, care should be taken in deﬁ  ning the concept. 
A deﬁ  nition of security of supply that takes demand 
as exogenous has very different implications than a 
deﬁ  nition based on a competitive market whereby 
prices are allowed to move so as to ensure a balance 
between supply and demand. Both theory and evi-
dence indicate that in liberalised markets, short-run 
prices are more volatile and reduction of demand to 
clear the market becomes of more importance than 
before liberalisation. While these effects are some-
times viewed as undesirable from the ﬁ  rst perspec-
tive, the larger role of demand in clearing the markets 
is consistent with an increase in long-run efﬁ  ciency.
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Market failures leading to insufﬁ  cient  investment, 
can result from ineffective market design (or from 
the anticipation of intervention in prices under scar-
city conditions), under which market prices fail to 
reﬂ  ect the real value of energy. In regulated markets, 
devising mechanisms to foster efﬁ  cient investments 
may be challenging, especially where (cross-border) 
transport capacity is concerned.
A very important issue is the need for clear allocation 
of rights and responsibilities of market players, espe-
cially during periods of scarcity. This may require reg-
ulation on market transparency. Further promoting 
the development of liquid markets where consumers 
can insure against price ﬂ  uctuations is a necessary 
component of any policy for security of supply and 
this is stressed in Community legislation. In addition, 
a mechanism at EU level to better monitor demand 
and supply patterns on EU energy markets, identify-
ing likely shortfalls in infrastructure, supply and stor-
age would contribute to enhancing transparency on 
security of energy supply issues within the EU.
The impact of liberalisation on the environment is 
ambiguous. While reduction of prices would increase 
consumption of energy, increased fuel efﬁ  ciency and 
shifts in technology mix, caused by increased compe-
tition, can reduce emissions. The latter effect is sensi-
tive to the country-speciﬁ  c initial conditions and much 
would depend on what other policies are in place.
Liberalisation will strengthen the effects of market 
based environmental policy instruments. One major 
market based instrument is the European Emission 
Trading Scheme. The evidence indicates that liberali-
sation has resulted in stronger incentives for market 
actors to increase their operational efﬁ  ciency. These 
efﬁ  ciency gains, however, risk not always being passed 
on to consumers as a result of market power. If mar-
ket design in energy markets  43 conﬂ  icts with policy 
goals, either because of design ﬂ  aws or because of 
objectives that are incompatible with efﬁ  ciency, the 
stronger response to incentives will lead to a higher 
risk of undesirable outcomes. A sustainable energy 
market must therefore design mechanisms that can 
provide long-term price signals encouraging the right 
production and transmission expansion investments 
necessary to meet reliability standards.
References
American Council for an Energy-Efﬁ  ciency Economy 
(ACE3), Partnerships: A Path for the Design of Utility/
Industrial Energy Efﬁ  ciency Programs, 1996.
43   ‘Market design’ covers several components: wholesale markets, retail 
markets, fuel markets, capacity markets, congestion management mech-
anisms, balancing mechanisms.
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and F. Wolak, Diagnosing 
market power in California’s deregulated wholesale 
electricity market, PWP-064, University of California 
Energy Institute, US, 2000.
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, On the Design of Opti-
mal Grandfathering Schemes for Emission Allow-
ances, ZEW Discussion Paper 03-08, 2003.
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, Mission Impossible!? On 
the Harmonisation of National Allocation Plans under 
the EU Emissions Trading Directive, ZEW Discussion 
Paper 04-15, 2004.
Böhringer, C. and A. Lange, Economic Implications 
of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allow-
ances Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107 (3), 
2005.
Böhringer, C., T. Hoffmann, A. Lange, A. Löschel, 
and U. Moslener, Assessing Emission Regulation in 
Europe: An Interactive Simulation Approach, The 
Energy Journal 26 (4), 2005.
Börner, K., 2002, Die Folgen der Strommarktliberali-
sierung für regenerative Energiequellen, Wirtschafts-
dienst 2002, 1.
Brennan, T. J., K. L. Palmer, and S. A. Martinez, Alter-
nating Currents – Electricity Markets and Public Pol-
icy, Washington DC, 2002.
Burns, P. en T. Weyman-Jones, Cost Functions and 
Cost Efﬁ  ciency in Electricity Distribution: A Stochastic 
Frontier Approach, in: Bulletin of Economic Research, 
Blackwell Publishing, 48(1), 41-64, 1996.
Bushnell, J., California’s Electricity Crisis: a Market 
Apart?, Energy Policy, 2004, 32, 1045-1052.
Bushnell, J., Electricity Resource Adequacy: Matching 
Policies and Goals, CSEM WP 146, 2005.
Bushnell, J. and C. Saravia, An empirical assessment 
of the competitiveness of the New England electric-
ity markets, CSEM WP-101, University of California 
Energy Institute, US, 2002.
Bushnell, J. and C. Wolfram, Ownership Change, 
Incentives and Plant Efﬁ   ciency: The Divestiture of 
U.S. Electric Generation Plants, SCEM WP 140, US, 
2005.
Bye, T., 2003, A Nordic Energy Market under Stress, 
Economic Survey 4, 2003.
Canoy, M. and D. Newbery, Fusie Controle Voldoet 
Niet bij Elektriciteit, Het Financieele Dagblad 18 
January 2003.
CPB, Better safe than sorry?, CPB Document 73, 
December 2004.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:54 16/03/07   9:06:3955
Chapter 3 — Liberalisation of European Energy Markets: challenges and policy options
Joode J. de, D. Kingma, M.G. Lijesen, M. Mulder, and 
V. Shestalova, Energy policies and risks on energy 
markets; a cost-beneﬁ  t analysis, CPB Special Publica-
tion 51, The Hague, 2004
Domah P. en M. Pollitt, The Restructuring and 
Privatisation of Electricity Distribution and Supply 
Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Ben-
eﬁ  t Analysis, Fiscal Studies, 22(1), 107-146, 2001.
DTe, Yardstick Competition, Regional Electricity Net-
work Companies, Second Regulation Period, Infor-
mation and Consultation Document, 2002.
Eikeland P. O., Electricity market liberalisation and 
environmental performance: Norway and the U.K., 
Energy Policy, 26 (12), 917-927, 1998.
Electrabel Nieuwsbrief, “Brinkhorst: Van Duyne 
boekt vooruitgang in gesprekken met stroomprodu-
centen”, Nieuwsbrief E-ditie Grootzakelijk 45, 2005.
Eurelectric, R&D in EURELECTRIC Countries; over-
view of R&D organisation, 2002 update, January, 
2003.
European Commission, Green Paper: Towards a 
European strategy for the security of energy supply, 
Brussels, 29.11.2000, COM(2000) 769 ﬁ  nal, 2000.
European Commission, External Costs, Research 
results on socio-environmental damages due to elec-
tricity and transport, Brussels, 2003.
European Commission, Evaluation of the Perform-
ance of Network Industries Providing Services of 
General Economic Interest, SEC(2005)1781, 2005.
European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry, sector 
inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas 
and electricity markets, preliminary report, February, 
2006.
Eurostat, Competition indicators in the gas market 
of the European Union, Statistics in Focus, 08/2005, 
2005.
Eurostat, European electricity market indicators of 
the liberalisation process 2004-2005, Statistics in 
Focus, 6/2006, 2006.
Fabrizio, K., N. Rose, C. Wolfram, Does Competition 
Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory 
Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efﬁ  ciency, 
working paper, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/
wolfram/Papers/frw.041306.pdf, 2006.
Eyre, N., Retail Market Liberalisation and Energy Efﬁ  -
ciency: A Golden Age or a False Dawn?, in: MacK-
erron G. and P. Pearson (Eds.), The International 
Energy Experience – Markets, Regulation and the 
Environment, 2000.
Fertilizer Institute,, Testimony of Ford B. West, Presi-
dent, The Fertilizer Institute Before the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Interior and Related Agencies Sub-
committee Regarding The High Price of Natural 
Gas and its Impact on the U.S. Fertilizer Industry, 
October 2005.
Filippini, M., S. Banﬁ  , and C. Luchsinger, Deregula-
tion of the Swiss Electricity Industry: Implication for 
the Hydropower Sector, CEPE Working Paper Nr. 13, 
2002.
Glachant, J-M. and V. Pignon, Nordic Electricity 
Congestion’s Arrangement as a Model for Europe: 
Physical Constraints or Operators’ Opportunity, DAE 
Working paper WP313, 2003.
Grubb, M. and K. Neuhoff, Allocation and Competi-
tiveness in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Policy 
Overview, CWPE 0645 and EPRG 0622, 2006.
Grubb, M., L. Butler and G. Sinden, Diversity and 
Security in UK Electricity Generation: The Inﬂ  uence 
of Low Carbon Objectives, CWPE 511, 2006.
Haas, R., H. Auer, C. Huber, and W. Orasch, How 
will Electricity Prices in Deregulated Markets Develop 
in the Long Run? Arguments why there won’t be 
any really Cheap Electricity, in: MacKerron G. and P. 
Pearson (Eds.), 2000, The International Energy Expe-
rience – Markets, Regulation and the Environment, 
2000.
Haffner, R.C.G. en P. Meulmeester,, Evaluatie van 
de regulering van het elektriciteitsnetwerk, ESB, 
90(4472), 430-433 2005.
Hattori, T., Liberalization and R&D in Japanese elec-
tricity industry - an initial observation of patent data, 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 
Japan, 2006.
High Level Group on Competitiveness, energy and 
the environment, Functioning of the energy market, 
access to energy , energy. First report, June 2006.
Hjalmarsson, L and A. Veiderpass, Efﬁ  ciency  and 
Ownership in Swedish electricity retail distribution, 
Journal of productivity analysis, 3, 7-23, 1992.
Hogan, W., On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market 
Design for Resource Adequacy, 2005.
Honoré A and J. Stern, Large Scale Investments in 
Liberalised Gas Markets: The Case of UK, Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies, 2004.
International Energy Agency (IEA), Power Generation 
Investment in Electricity Markets, 2003.
International Energy Agency (IEA), Natural Gas Infor-
mation. Paris, 2004A.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:55 16/03/07   9:06:4056
European competitiveness report 2006
IEA, DSM-spotlight: the newsletter of the IEA 
Demand-Side Management programme, August 
2004B.
International Energy Agency (IEA), Lessons from Lib-
eralised Electricity Markets, Paris, 2005A.
International Energy Agency (IEA), Learning from the 
Blackouts, Paris, 2005B.
International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Policies in 
IEA Countries, 2005 Review, Paris, 2005C.
Jamasb, T. and M. Pollitt, Deregulation and R&D in 
network industries: the case of the electricity indus-
try, CWPE 0533 and EPRG 02, 2005.
Joskow, P., The difﬁ   cult transition to competitive 
electricity markets in the U.S., The Cambridge-MIT 
Institute, CMI-Working Paper 28, 2003.
Joskow, P., Patterns of Transmission Investment, 
Electricity Infrastructure Investment Workshop, CRE, 
Paris, March 2005.
Joskow, P., and J. Tirole, Retail Electricity Competi-
tion, mimeo, MIT and IDEI, 2004.
Joskow, P. and J. Tirole, Reliability and Competitive 
Electricity Markets, forthcoming in RAND Journal of 
Economics, 2006.
Kemfert, C., W. Lise, and R. Östling, The European 
Electricity Market – Does Liberalisation Bring Cheaper 
and Greener Electricity?, University of Oldenburg, 
2003.
Kumbhakar, S. C. and L. Hjalmarsson, Relative per-
formance of public and private ownership under 
yardstick competition: electricity retail distribution, 
European Economic Review, 42 (1), 97-122, 1998.
Kühn K.-U. and M.Machado, Bilateral market power 
and vertical integration in the Spanisch electricity 
spot market, CEMFI WP-0414, Madrid, Spain, 2004.
Langset, T., Trengereid, F., Samdal, K. and J. Heggset, 
Quality Dependent Revenues - Incentive Regulation 
of Quality of Supply, NVE, Norway, 2001.
Littlechild, S., Competition and Contracts in the 
Nordic electricity markets, CWPE 0550 and EPRG 06, 
2005.
Littlechild, S., Beyond regulation, CWPE 0616 and 
EPRG 0516, 2006.
Mansur, E.T., Pricing behaviour in the initial sum-
mer of the restructured wholesale electricity market, 
PWP-083, University of California Energy Institute, 
US, 2001.
Mansur, E.T, Vertical Integration in restructured elec-
triity markets: measuring market efﬁ  ciency and ﬁ  rm 
conduct, WP 32, Yale School of Management, US., 
2003.
Markard, J. and B. Truffer, Innovation processes in 
large technical systems: Market liberalization as a 
driver for radical change, Research Policy, 2006.
Meade, R., Electricity Investment and Security of 
Supply in Liberalized Electricity Systems, The Euro-
pean Power Supply Industry, Forthcoming, 2006.
Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Indus-
trie, Thierry Breton et François Loos prennent acte de 
l’avis du Conseil de la Concurrence sur le dispositif 
de consortium pour les électrointensifs, Communi-
qué de presse 06/12/2005.
Mork, K. A., Productivity in Swedish Electricity Retail 
Distribution: Comment, Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 94(0), pages S207-09, Supplement, 1992.
Müsgens, F., Market Power in the German Whole-
sale Electricity Market, EWI WP 04.03, University of 
Cologne, Germany, 2004.
Mulder, M., V. Shestalova and M. Lijesen, Vertical 
separation of the energy-distribution industry: An 
assessment of several options for unbundling, CPB 
Document 84, The Netherlands, 2005.
NERA, Security in Gas and Electricity Markets, Report 
for Department of Trade and Industry, October 
2002.
Neuhoff, K., M. Grubb, and K. Keats, Impact of the 
Allowance Allocation on Prices and Efﬁ  ciency, CWPE 
0552 and EPRG 08, 2005.
Neuhoff, K., K. Keats Martinez, and M. Sato, Alloca-
tion, Incentives and Distortions: The Impact of the 
EU ETS Emissions Allowance Allocations to the Elec-
tricity Sector, CWPE 0642 and EPRG 0618, 2006.
Neuhoff, K. and P. Twomey, Market Power and 
Technological Bias: The Case of Electricity Genera-
tion, EPRG working paper 01, August 2005.
Newbery, D. en M. Pollitt, The Restructuring and Pri-
vatisation of the CEGB – Was It Worth It?, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 45(3), 269-303, 1997.
Newbery, D.M, Issues and Options for Restructur-
ing Electricity Supply Industries, University of Cam-
bridge, CMI Working Paper 01, 2002A.
Newbery, D.M., Regulatory Challenges to European 
Electricity Liberalisation, University of Cambridge, 
CMI Working Paper 12, 2002B.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:56 16/03/07   9:06:4057
Chapter 3 — Liberalisation of European Energy Markets: challenges and policy options
Ofgem, 2001/2002 Electricity distribution and qual-
ity of supply report, 2003.
Pearson, P., Electricity Liberalisation, Air Pollution 
and Environmental Policy in the U.K., in: MacKerron 
G. and P. Pearson (Eds.), The International Energy 
Experience – Markets, Regulation and the Environ-
ment, 2000.
Pomp, M., Shestalova, V. and L. Rangel, Switch on 
the competition: causes, consequences and policy 
implications of consumer switching costs, CPB Docu-
ment 97, 2005.
Ringel, Marc, The Common European Market for 
Energy and the Environment: Towards a Sustainable 
Electricity Provision? Chemnitz Working Paper 55, 
1-23, 2003.
Sanyal, P. and L.R. Cohen, Deregulation, restruc-
turing and changing R&D paradigms in the US 
electric utility industry, Brandeis University/Univer-
sity of Southern California Law School, February, 
2005.
Smith, A. and M. Ross, Allowance Allocation, who 
Wins and Loses Under a Carbon Dioxide Control Pro-
gram? Study of Charles River Associates, 2002.
Speck, S., Liberalisation of the Electricity Market and 
Environmental Policy Issues: Synergy or Controversy, 
Research Symposium European Electricity Markets, 
The Hague, 2003.
Steiner, F., Regulation, Industry Structure and Per-
formance in the Electricity Supply Industry, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, nr. 238, 
OECD Publishing, 2001.
Tilley, B. and T. Weyman-Jones,,Productivity Growth 
and Efﬁ   ciency Change in Electricity Distribution, 
working paper 1999.
UCTE, System Adequacy Retrospect 2004, 2005.
Willems, B., Virtual Divestitures, Will They Make A 
Difference? Cournot Competition, Option Markets 
and Efﬁ  ciency, CSEM WP 150, Berkeley, US, 2006.
Wolak, F., Designing a Competitive Wholesale Elec-
tricity Market That Beneﬁ  ts  Consumers,  working 
paper, ftp://zia.stanford.edu/pub/papers/hoover.
paper.pdf, 2001.
Wohlgemuth, N., Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁ  -
ciency in Liberalized European Electricity Markets, 
Eur. Env. 10, 1-11, 2000.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:57 16/03/07   9:06:40am612950Int.indd   Sec1:58 16/03/07   9:06:4059
Chapter 4:
The Regulatory Environment in the Context 
of the Strategy for Growth and Jobs
4.1. Introduction
Better Regulation is a key contributor towards 
achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Agenda of 
higher economic growth and more and better jobs. 
By removing unnecessary costs and obstacles, Better 
Regulation allows businesses to focus on their pro-
ductive activities, to adapt to market changes and 
to innovate, thus enhancing aggregate productivity 
and competitiveness.
Box 1: Deﬁ  nition of Better Regulation
Better Regulation is the outcome of a comprehensive approach to reforming existing regulatory man-
agement practices on the basis of three building blocks: policies, institutions and tools (such as impact 
assessments on new legislative proposals and simpliﬁ  cation of existing regulatory framework). Better 
Regulation aims to ensure that existing and future legislation is of a high quality, i.e. it is concise, 
straightforward, used only when necessary and the burdens it imposes are proportionate to their aim.
The focus of this chapter is on product market regu-
lation and its impact on the competitiveness of the 
Member States. One should, however, bear in mind 
that there are also regulations in other areas, most 
notably in labour and ﬁ  nancial/capital  markets, 
which can have a signiﬁ  cant impact on economic 
performance.
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical eco-
nomic literature on the effects of product market 
regulation on economic performance. The regulatory 
measures as announced in the National Reform Pro-
grammes (NRPs) and progress that has been made 
since are assessed against the current situation in the 
Member States and with regard to their adequacy. 
While the systematic measurement of administra-
tive costs of regulation has so far only been done 
in a small number of Member States, an assessment 
is made of the likely combined impact on GDP of 
achieving a concrete reduction target across the EU.
The next section of the chapter explores the channels 
through which product market regulation can affect 
economic performance. The focus is largely on how 
regulations can impact on the underlying causes of 
productivity. The section includes a review of empiri-
cal evidence regarding the impact of product market 
reforms on productivity and employment. Section 
three of this chapter provides an assessment of the 
quality of the current regulatory environment in EU 
Member States. Section four considers the country-
speciﬁ  c plans for improving the regulatory environ-
ment as outlined in Member States’ NRPs and actions 
that have been taken since. A tentative assessment 
of their likely impact on competitiveness is also pro-
vided. Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Product  market  reforms  44 
and economic performance: 
theory and evidence
Part of the EUs response to a changing and more 
integrated global economy, with more intense com-
44   “Product market reforms are microeconomic reforms that aim to improve 
the framework conditions in which business operate”. They include: the 
opening of markets by reducing tariffs or barriers to entry; the reduction of 
publicinvolvement in the economy and generally by creating a more busi-
ness-friendly environment. See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁ  nance/pub-
lications/european_economy/the_eu_economy_review2004_en.htm or 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁ  nance/publications/economic_papers/
2004/ecp218en.pdf
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petitive pressures, rests on remaining competitive at 
the top end, or high value added range, of markets 
and on increasing productivity growth. The latter is 
particularly important for long-term economic per-
formance, which is to a large extent determined by 
an economy’s ability to increase output per worker 
(or per hour worked). Productivity growth allows 
economic growth to continue when other sources, 
e.g. increasing labour market participation, have 
been exhausted. Because an increase in productive 
efﬁ  ciency results in lower unit costs (provided costs 
of inputs do not rise), any improvement in produc-
tivity over that achieved by competitors represents a 
gain in price competitiveness. Bad or excessive regu-
lation is likely to drag down economic growth and 
macroeconomic performance, more generally, by 
impacting on one or more of the major productivity 
determinants such as competition, R&D and inno-
vation, the development of human capital, technol-
ogy, the allocation of resources within the ﬁ  rm or 
entrepreneurial dynamism.
As mentioned above, regulations can be found in 
labour, capital and product markets. The emphasis 
in this chapter is predominantly on product market 
regulations, which includes legal and other require-
ments for staring a business; licences and permits; 
and rules for trade and investment.
Regulations have an important positive role to play 
in market economies. They are generally used to ful-
ﬁ  l legitimate policy goals regarding environmental, 
consumer or health protection, and for dealing with 
social equity concerns. Moreover, economic theory 
suggests that regulations should tackle externalities 
and correct other market failures such as informa-
tion asymmetries, low levels of competition or public 
goods.
By dealing with market failures regulations can posi-
tively inﬂ  uence the sources of productivity growth. 
For instance, regulations can be used to boost con-
sumer conﬁ   dence by specifying certain standards 
that products must have. Without product speci-
ﬁ   cations that ensure, for example, product safety 
(e.g. children’s toys) consumers might ﬁ  nd  it 
extremely difﬁ  cult to tell whether a product is of a 
sufﬁ  cient quality, and therefore safe to use. This infor-
mation problem could lead to higher search costs 
for consumers, make it more difﬁ  cult for new market 
entrants to signal the quality of their products and 
reduce competition, thus increasing the opportunity 
for rent-seeking of established incumbents and the 
risk of higher prices for consumers.
Establishing standards can also prevent market 
fragmentation. In sectors that are fast moving and 
experience the introduction of new products, such 
as ICT, standards contribute to ensuring adequate 
market size, a key incentive for R&D and innovation 
to take place. Patents provide another key incen-
tive for innovations by ensuring that the returns of a 
newly developed product or an invention go to the 
person or business that has developed it. This is nec-
essary, for a given period of time, to allow for early 
stage investments to be recouped and to ensure an 
adequate rate of return on new products.
Finally, it should not be forgotten tat the EU Single 
Market was created with the use of regulations. It 
is also a very good illustration of how regulations 
can open markets, challenge monopolies and foster 
competition.
Bearing in mind these positive contributions regula-
tions can make to competition, innovation or entre-
preneurial activity, all of which are amongst the main 
drivers of productivity, the following paragraphs give 
an overview of the detrimental effects unnecessarily 
stringent levels of regulation can have on economic 
performance and employment. Indeed, while regu-
lations should aim to serve a clearly deﬁ  ned purpose, 
such as fostering competition or increasing economic 
welfare, they also have the potential to do harm if 
not devised and implemented carefully and updated 
when necessary.
When examining the economic effects of regula-
tion a distinction can be made between the direct 
effects on the allocation of resources through inﬂ  u-
encing the use of inputs and the volume and price of 
outputs, and the effects that are due to changes in 
production technology (for surveys, see Grifﬁ  th and 
Harrison (2004) or Schiantarelli (2005)). If prices are 
regulated in an industry that used to be considered 
a natural monopoly, such as the utilities or trains, 
ﬁ   rms are often constrained with regard to price 
competition and may instead compete on things 
such as quality of service. Although there are good 
reasons for having some form of price regulations, 
particularly in the initial phases of utility deregula-
tion in order to improve efﬁ  ciency (e.g. RPI-X) and to 
prevent market domination, unnecessary use of this 
type of regulation has implications for investment 
decisions and for the internal allocation of resources. 
Extensive use of such interventionist forms of regula-
tion on an economy-wide scale can disable the price 
mechanism as a signal for allocating resources and 
result in an inefﬁ  cient overall allocation of economic 
resources.
In cases in which regulations unnecessarily hinder 
market entry, e.g. due to administrative burdens on 
start ups or licence and permit systems that lead to 
access costs for market entrants, either monetary or 
in terms of time spent, the threat to incumbent ﬁ  rms 
from new entrants is reduced. This can change their 
price-setting behaviour and production decisions. 
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Furthermore, inefﬁ  cient regulation can add costs to 
the operations of existing companies by, for example, 
making understanding and complying with existing 
laws unnecessarily difﬁ  cult, so that ﬁ  rms spend valu-
able time fulﬁ  lling their legal obligations when that 
time could be more purposefully dedicated to core 
business activities.
Another channel through which regulation can affect 
productivity and competitiveness is via its impact on 
production technology and on the ability of ﬁ  rms 
to develop and market new products. This can be 
done, for instance, by interfering directly with the 
choice of technology instead of targeting its possible 
undesired outcomes.
4.2.1. Empirical  ﬁ  ndings
Empirical research generally supports the notion that 
improving regulation has positive effects on eco-
nomic performance  45. Box 2 presents in a summary 
fashion the main ﬁ  ndings from a number of papers 
focusing on product market reform.
45    Empirically there are a number of difﬁ  culties in studying the effects of regula-
tion, both in terms of measurement and methodological issues. Depending 
on whether regulation overall or some speciﬁ  c measure is studied, an index 
can be constructed or events such as changes in regulatory regimes can be 
used to provide natural experiments. Different countries and industries usu-
ally have numerous unobservable or at least immeasurable characteristics 
that may have signiﬁ  cant effect on the outcomes but cannot be controlled for 
in empirical studies. This presents a considerable challenge to producing evi-
dence on the effects of regulation. As regulation often impacts economic per-
formance through its effects on competition, measurements of competition 
are also often needed, but cannot fully capture the effects of competition. 
Measurements such as the Lerner index (the ratio of the difference between 
price and marginal cost and the price) or mark-ups have been employed for 
this purpose. The total welfare effects of regulation are difﬁ  cult to quantify as 
the externalities, or the true utility that individuals derive from goods, cannot 
be measured precisely. In contrast, the productive capacity and efﬁ  ciency of 
the economy can be measured by various measures of productivity. However, 
it is not generally possible to measure separately the effects of regulation on 
the different forms of efﬁ  ciency or productive capacity which were discussed 
above. Finally, increases in employment (and reductions in unemployment) 
are also signiﬁ  cant measures of success of economic reforms as one of the 
main aims of European economic policies is to reduce unemployment rates 
and one of the main goals of the Lisbon agenda is to create jobs in Europe.
Box 2: Effects of product market reforms (PMR): ﬁ  ndings from empirical research
PMR reducing levels of regulation
Salgado 2002
Product market reforms in OECD countries over the period 1985–1995 contributed to:
–   an increase of 0.2 – 0.3 percentage points in total factor productivity growth in the long run, while 
being weak in the short run
European Commission 2003
Moving to US levels of regulation as measured by the Fraser index would lead to:
–   a labour productivity growth rate increase of 0.15 percentage points in the long run
Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005
Regulatory reforms aligning the overall regulatory stance with that of the most liberal OECD country 
could induce
–   An increase the annual rate of MFP growth in continental EU by between 0.4 and 1.1% over 10 years. 
PMR facilitating ﬁ  rm entry
Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003
Reducing barriers to entry in some European countries towards the OECD average:
–   Entry liberalisation in service would boost annual multi-factor productivity growth in the overall busi-
ness sector by about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points in certain countries.
–   Indirect effects would boost manufacturing-wide annual productivity growth by 0.1 to 0.2 percent-
age points in certain European countries, most notably Germany, France, Italy and Greece.
Cincera & Galgau 2005
Product market reforms increasing the current ﬁ  rm entry rate by one percent lead to
–  A contemporaneous increase in labour productivity by 0.60%.
–  An increase in employment growth of 2.67%.
Cincera (2004)
Reforms aiming at facilitating the entry and exit of ﬁ  rms lead to:
–   A 1% increase in the entry rate leads to a contemporary increase in output, employment and labour 
productivity growth rate of 2.2%, 2.7% and 0.6% respectively
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Product market regulation can also inﬂ  uence R&D 
and innovation. Bassanini and Ernst (2002) investi-
gate the effect of the OECD indicators of product 
market regulation (see section three of this paper) on 
industry R&D intensity. Their cross-country evidence 
suggests that product market reforms improving the 
regulatory environment could have positive effects 
on innovation. They also conclude that labour mar-
ket regulation could have a positive effect on innova-
tion.
Grifﬁ   ths, Harrison, Simpson (2006) study the pro-
competitive impact of product market reforms on 
innovation in the EU and ﬁ  nd that generally more 
competition increases R&D investment. However, 
their ﬁ  ndings also suggest that competition seems to 
increase mainly innovative activities of incumbents 
rather than that of new entrants. Their data consists 
of country-industry level observations of economic 
performance.
Moreover, regulation of product markets has implica-
tions for investment behaviour and thus the amount 
of capital available, even if ﬁ  nancial markets them-
selves are unregulated. Alesina et al (2005) point out 
that there are various channels through which regu-
lation can affect investment: it changes the mark-up 
on prices and the costs of expanding capacity, it can 
impact on the rate of return and it can inﬂ  uence 
ownership.
Internal Commission research suggests that there is a 
signiﬁ  cant negative relationship between per capita 
GDP growth and levels of product market regulation 
as captured by the OECDs product market regula-
tion indicator, when controlling for other relevant 
variables.  46
The OECD has carried out several studies on the links 
between regulation and productivity, employment 
and economic growth. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003, 
2005A) analyse the possible links between product 
market regulation and total factor productivity growth 
in the OECD area over the past two decades. This 
was a period during which the differences in prod-
46    The regression analysis estimates the impact on per capita GDP growth of 
changes in the aggregate OECD PMR indicator. The analysis controls for 
other relevant variables such as human capital, physical capital, and for catch-
ing up effects. Human capital is proxied by the average years of schooling in 
2000 and physical capital by the investment-labour intensity. The catching 
up effect is controlled for by the GDP per capita level in the initial year. All 
these variables (except human capital) displayed the expected sign and were 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. All variables are in logs except the PMR indicator.
–   A 1% increase in exit rate reduces output growth rate of 0.8% (one year lag), while increases labour 
productivity growth by 0.7% (2-year lag) Reduction
Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005B
Product market reforms that would reduce the level of state control and entry barriers to entry to the 
best OECD practice would
–   Increase long-term employment rates by between 1.3 and 2.5 percentage points (lower-bound esti-
mate).
PMR enhancing competition
Dierx et al. 2004
Product markets reform aiming at increasing competition would lead to:
–   A GDP increase (relative to its baseline level) of about 2% in the medium run (acceleration of output 
growth by almost a quarter of a percentage point annually over a period of 7 to 8 years).
IMF 2003
Competition-friendly product market reforms reducing the price-mark-up in the euro area by 10 per-
centage points would produce:
–  A long term increase in the GDP level in the euro area of 4.3%.
Bayoumi et al. 2004
Product market reforms reducing the price mark-up in the euro area to US levels:
–  A GDP level increase in the euro area of 8.6% (relative to its baseline level) in the long run.
Reduction in administrative costs
Tang and Verveij 2004
A reduction of 25% in administrative burdens in the EU would lead to:
–  A real GDP level increase of 1% in the short run
–  A real GDP level increase of 1.4% in the long run.
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uct market regulation between European countries 
widened for some time  47 despite market integration, 
EC competition policies and monetary union. Their 
results indicate that lower barriers to trade and com-
petition in less regulated countries have increased the 
level and rate of growth of productivity by stimulat-
ing business investment and promoting innovation 
and technological catch-up. The regulation indica-
tors used include OECD indicators of product mar-
ket regulation and some other sectoral indicators of 
which longer times series are available. They ﬁ  nd that 
the overall indicator of barriers to entrepreneurship, 
however, does not seem to be a signiﬁ  cant explana-
tory variable for total factor productivity growth.
A more recent paper (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005B) 
analyses the effects of regulation on employment 
in OECD countries and takes into account labour 
market institutions and their interaction with prod-
uct market regulation. They use indicators of overall 
product market regulation constructed from secto-
ral indicators, on gas, electricity, post, telecoms and 
various transport industries. More speciﬁ  cally,  the 
stringency of regulation concerning barriers to entry, 
public ownership, vertical integration, market struc-
ture and price controls is assessed. They conclude 
that the employment-curbing effects of excessive 
product market regulation are magniﬁ  ed by labour 
market institutions that provide insiders with strong 
bargaining power.
Grifﬁ  th and Harrison (2004) examine the effects of 
product market reforms on rents or mark-ups, as well 
as the effect of rents on employment, investment, 
labour productivity and R&D in a panel of European 
countries. They ﬁ  nd that higher levels of employment 
and investment are associated with greater compe-
tition, especially in the service sector. The reforms 
Grifﬁ  ths and Harrison focus on include changes to 
public procurement policies, privatizations, legal and 
administrative barriers to entry, barriers to trade and 
regulation and liberalisation of network industries. 
Grifﬁ   th, Harrison and Macartney (2006) provide 
stronger evidence for OECD countries that regula-
tory reform increases employment and real wages.
Cincera and Galgau (2005) study the effect of prod-
uct market reforms on ﬁ  rm entry and exit and the 
effect of entry and exit rates on macroeconomic per-
formance. They ﬁ  nd that the ease of starting a new 
business has a signiﬁ  cant effect on entry and exit but 
they do not ﬁ  nd any impact resulting from changes 
in time spent with government bureaucracy. Entry 
and exit rates themselves on the other hand have 
positive effects on labour productivity, while effects 
47   See also Section 4.3 below which shows that between 1998 and 2003 
there was a notable degree of convergence in product market reform 
indicators between Member States.
on output growth, employment and R&D were 
mixed.
Internal European Commission work has come to 
similar conclusions. The next graph shows the nega-
tive relationship between GDP per capita and the 
aggregate indicator “starting a business” from the 
World Bank Doing Business database. Results not 
reported here show that after controlling for relevant 
variables -human capital, physical capital, and R&D 
intensity- estimation results seem to indicate that if 
the average level of regulation as measured by the 
indicator improves by 10%, GDP per capita could 
increase by over half a percentage point.
4.2.2.  The case of administrative costs
Administrative costs are deﬁ  ned as the costs incurred 
by enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authori-
ties and citizens in meeting legal obligations to 
provide information on their action or production, 
either to public authorities or to private parties. They 
are different from compliance costs stemming from 
the intrinsic requirements of the legislation, such as 
investments in safer production processes or acquisi-
tion of less polluting technologies.
Kox (2005) presents estimates of the administra-
tive costs that occur to the private sector as a direct 
result of compliance with regulation requirements as 
a result of national and EU level legislation, such as 
the time and effort in ﬁ  lling in forms. The estimated 
administrative costs relative to GDP are presented in 
Table 4.1.
Gelauff and Lejour (2005)  48 calculated that a 25% 
reduction of the administrative burden could even-
tually lead to an increase in the level of GDP of up 
to 1.5%. Internal Commission calculations (2006) 
based on the same methodology (but slightly differ-
ent assumptions) produce a similar result and suggest 
that a 25% decrease in the administrative burden in 
EU-25 could raise GDP by 1.3% in the long run (or 
EUR 150bn). These predicted increases in GDP are 
increases in the level of GDP, meaning that once the 
reduction is achieved the overall GDP ﬁ  gure for the 
EU 25 will be up to 1.5% higher than if the reduc-
tion had not taken place. This gain is permanent 
insofar as if the administrative burden remains at the 
lower (75%) level, GDP will stay higher. However, 
the reduction does not affect the long-run growth 
rate of GDP. The potential GDP gains, in comparison 
to baseline GDP, are presented in Graph 4.2. They 
range from 0.5% in the UK and Sweden to 2.6% in 
Hungary, reﬂ  ecting i.a. differences in the initial level 
of administrative costs.
48   Gelauff, G.M.M. and A.M. Lejour (2005). Five Lisbon highlights: The economic 
impact of reaching these targets. CPB Document 104. CPB, The Hague.
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Table 4.1. Administrative costs by Member State
Administrative cost share in GDP (in %) (1)
Austria 4.6
Belgium/Luxembourg (2) 2.8
Czech Republic 3.3
Germany 3.7
Denmark 1.9
Spain 4.6
Finland 1.5
France 3.7
Greece 6.8
Hungary 6.8
Ireland 2.4
Italy 4.6
Netherlands 3.7
Poland 5.0
Portugal 4.6
Baltic states, Malta and Cyprus (2) 6.8
Slovakia 4.6
Slovenia 4.1
Sweden 1.5
United Kingdom 1.5
EU 25 (2) 3.5
(1)     Based on Kox (2005): Intra-EU differences in regulation-caused administrative burden for companies. 
CPB Memorandum 136. CPB, The Hague.
(2)   Combined together. EU-25 ﬁ  gures are GDP-weighted averages.
Graph 4.1: The Ease of Starting a Business and Per Capita GDP
Note: GDP per capita is measured in 1000 Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). The Starting a Business indicator com-
prises the following sub-indicators from the World Bank “Doing Business” database: number of procedures, number 
of days, costs, and minimum capital requirement. The sample includes 31 countries for the period 2003-2005: 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Austria, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, United States, and Japan.
Source: Internal Commission work based on “Doing Business” World Bank database.
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In calculating this GDP increase it is assumed that one 
can achieve a 25% reduction of the administrative 
burden without affecting the beneﬁ  ts side of report-
ing requirements. Reducing double or triple reporting 
requirements by making better use of information tech-
nology or cutting obsolete reporting requirements that 
are of no use for further analysis or information gather-
ing are examples of this kind. It is further assumed that 
by reducing the administrative burden employees have 
more time available that they will spend on productive 
activities, thus increasing labour efﬁ  ciency.
Using the Commission calculations, if administrative 
costs are gradually reduced over a ﬁ  ve year period, for 
example beginning in 2007, the level of GDP will be 
1.1% higher by 2011. As more labour becomes avail-
able for productive activities, capital will have to adjust 
accordingly. By 2016 the capital accumulation process 
needed for matching the additional productive labour 
activities is completed, adding a further 0.2% to the 
level of GDP. Thus, according to these calculations 
GDP will be 1.3% higher in 2016 than it would be 
without the administrative cost reduction of 25%.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the evidence 
also shows that positive economic effects of any 
reforms may be dependent on labour market institu-
tions and on supporting microeconomic policies such 
as those relating to education and training provision. 
At the ﬁ  rm level, skill shortages have been seen to be 
signiﬁ  cant in hindering ﬁ  rms’ performance (Stevens, 
2005). This has been particularly pertinent in the 
absorption of technology, where complementary 
assets, including skilled labour and R&D, are seen 
as key facilitating inputs (Kneller and Stevens, 2005; 
Forth and Mason, 2005).
4.2.3. Summary
This section showed that economic research has 
identiﬁ  ed several channels through which regulation 
affects economic growth and employment – the two 
main economic objectives of the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy. In the long run, economic growth is largely 
determined by productivity growth, and this section 
showed how regulations can have a positive as well 
as a negative impact on its underlying causes. Empir-
ical evidence was cited showing that often where BR 
means more light touch regulation, one can expect 
a real improvement on productivity, growth and 
employment. Work carried out by the services of the 
Commission conﬁ  rms earlier analysis regarding the 
expected effects of a 25% reduction of administra-
tive costs on TFP and GDP levels.
4.3. An  Assessment 
of the current Regulatory 
Environment in the EU
It is useful to relate any assessment of policy trends in 
EU Member States (see section 4.4) to the prevailing 
regulatory environment. However, such an analysis is 
complicated by the multitude of features that make 
up the regulatory environment and by the difﬁ  culty 
Graph 4.2: Cumulative GDP effects by 2025 of a 25% reduction in administrative costs
Note: Based on Worldscan simulations, cumulative difference in % to the baseline in 2025.
Source: DG ENTR and CPB 2006.
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of constructing, and hence the dearth of, indicators 
that depict the quality of the regulatory environment. 
Indicators measuring product market regulations exist 
but some of the most comprehensive and rigorously 
constructed indicators do not cover all EU Member 
States. Others are based on survey data and have a 
degree of subjectivity that may render them less use-
ful for cross-country comparisons. This section looks 
at several indicators that relate to the regulatory envi-
ronment in EU Member States, including indicators of 
the general regulatory environment, survey data of the 
business environment as well as speciﬁ  c data on the 
ease of starting a business. The indicators used here 
are produced by the OECD, the World Bank (WB), 
the Fraser Institute, and the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) (see Box 3).
Box 3: Indicators of regulatory intensity and the ease of doing business
The OECD has established indicators on product market regulation for 191 of the 25 current EU Mem-
ber States (Conway et al 2005). The indicator values are mainly collected on the basis of question-
naires completed by the countries themselves. The questions are constructed so as to produce objective 
answers, for example, by asking whether a certain policy is in place, rather than trying to establish often 
subjective assessments of their quality. The indicators have a multi-level structure where aggregate indi-
ces are constructed from sub-indices by using weights derived from principal component analysis.
For the purposes of this chapter we have drawn mainly on the OECD higher level indicator Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship and particularly its component index on Regulatory and Administrative Capacity, which 
in turn is divided into Communication and Simpliﬁ  cation of Rules and Procedures, Licenses and Permits, as 
well as Administrative Burdens on Start-Ups (see Annex Table 4.1 for the structure of the questionnaire 
and 4.2 for the values of EU Member States concerning administrative burdens on start-up businesses). 
We have also taken into account the OECD headline indicator for product market regulation (see 
Graph 4.3).
The Fraser Institute publishes indicators of economic freedom for every country in the world (Gwartney 
and Lawson 2005). Their indicators on administrative burden and bureaucracy on business activities can 
be used to proxy the regulatory environment. They are derived from the World Economic Forum Global 
competitiveness report (see Annex table 4.3 for the indicators used here). These indicators measure the 
quality of regulation as opposed to the total regulatory burden, and are based on questionnaires distrib-
uted to company executives. They therefore contain a considerable degree of subjective judgement and 
do show considerable variability over time. For each indicator, a higher score indicates a less restrictive 
regulatory environment.
The third source of information on the regulatory environment are the World Bank’s (WB) “Doing Busi-
ness” indicators relating to regulation and business conditions, which form part of a wider assessment 
of competitiveness (Annex Tables 4.4 and 4.5). These aim to provide an objective approach similar to 
that of the OECD survey but are not validated by the governments concerned. The data is obtained 
from local partners in the country concerned, based on standardised business cases. This means that, for 
example, in the case of administrative burdens on start ups, the size, the ownership and the number of 
employees of a company are pre-deﬁ  ned. Also, the “Doing Business” indicators are based on evidence 
collected exclusively in a country’s most populous city. This method provides comparable data across 
countries; however, a case thus deﬁ  ned may not be representative of regulatory practices in a given 
country (see www.doingbusiness.org for methodological details). While keeping in mind their limita-
tions, the World Bank indicators for the difﬁ  culty of doing business can still serve as a useful proxy for 
the quality of the overall regulatory environment.
This section also incorporates two survey-based indicators on the intensity of regulation and the ease 
of doing business produced by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD Year-
book 2006). These indicators are produced on the basis of questionnaires sent to business executives 
to obtain their opinion on “government efﬁ  ciency”. The responses underlying the regulation intensity 
index provide a numerical evaluation where a value of zero corresponds to regulation strongly restrain-
ing the ability of companies to compete and a value of ten corresponds to no such restraining effects. 
Similarly, the absence of ease of doing business corresponds to a value of zero, whereas the opposite 
evaluation corresponds to a value of 10 (see Annex Table 4.6).
1  Not covering Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
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The OECD indicators on product market regulation 
provide an illustration of broad recent trends in the 
overall restrictiveness of the regulatory environment 
in the EU (see Graph 4.3). The broadest indicator 
for product market regulation, the OECD’s PMR 
headline index, shows that all of the 19 EU Mem-
ber States, for which this index is produced, have 
lowered the level of regulation between 1998 and 
2003, on average by about 29%. A similar trend 
emerges for the component index measuring the 
level of regulation related to inward-oriented poli-
cies only, where regulation levels declined by about 
25%. Apart from a general declining trend over that 
ﬁ  ve-year interval, there is also a notable degree of 
convergence, as Member States with more restrictive 
regulatory environments in 1998 by and large made 
signiﬁ  cantly greater progress than those which had 
already enjoyed a relatively less restrictive environ-
ment. There are however exceptions to this pattern 
of easing the overall restrictiveness at both ends of 
the spectrum of starting conditions.
The survey-based evidence provided by the Fraser Insti-
tute indicator relating to conditions for new businesses 
(see Graph 4.4 and column 1 in Annex Table  4.3) 
shows a trend between 2000 and 2003 that is different 
from the positive development captured by the OECD 
indicators. This is likely to reﬂ  ect the higher subjectiv-
ity entailed in the index, which may lead to the busi-
ness sentiment and the business cycle inﬂ  uencing the 
individual values, an explanation further supported by 
the relatively high degree of volatility over time. The 
picture is mixed with regard to the other two Fraser 
Institute indicators on time spent with government 
bureaucracy and on start ups (see Annex Table 4.3). 
These indicators are available for most EU Member 
States since 1995. The start-up indicator shows a clear 
improvement between 1995 and 2000, while register-
ing a deterioration in many countries in 2003, which 
more than offset the earlier improvement on the 1995 
level. A similar picture also emerges for the indicator 
on time spent with government bureaucracy. The sub-
jective nature of the indicator could also be a factor 
behind its comparatively narrow range of values.
The survey-based IMD indicators on the ease of doing 
business and regulatory intensity include additional 
elements allowing a cross-country comparison (see 
Graph 4.5). The OECD product market regulation 
indicator has also been used to group Member States 
with different starting positions regarding their regula-
tory environment. One can differentiate one group of 
countries, which are found in most sets of indicators 
to display a low degree of restrictiveness in their regu-
latory environment, from another group, where the 
regulatory environment is generally found to be rather 
restrictive. Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2003) have 
grouped the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, 
Hungary and Spain to have a relatively restrictive reg-
ulatory environment, whereas Denmark, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom are part of the group with a less 
restrictive regulatory environment. The third group 
Graph 4.3: Levels of product market regulation in EU Member States
Source: OECD product market regulation indicator.
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Graph 4.4: Administrative conditions for new businesses – Fraser Institute
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005) 
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Graph 4.5: IMD Indicator: Regulatory Intensity
Source: IMD Yearbook 2006. 
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of countries comprises all remaining Member States 
which are characterised by regulatory environments 
with a degree of restrictiveness that lies somewhere in 
the middle of the other two.
As the OECD indicators do not cover the entire EU 
membership, we have produced a grouping by taking 
into account the set of indicators presented in Box 3. 
While arriving at country rankings is not a straight-
forward exercise, given the differences in the indica-
tors, one can still establish the two broad groupings 
of countries which are found in all or almost all indi-
cators to display a high vs. low level of regulation or 
level of administrative and start-up costs. The group of 
countries with less restrictive regulatory environments 
would include Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ire-
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land, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK, while 
the group of countries with a more restrictive regu-
latory environment comprises the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Spain. All 
other EU Member countries would fall into the group 
displaying a degree of restrictiveness in the regulatory 
environment in-between these two groups.
Thus, while there is a widely acknowledged need in all 
EU-25 for measures to further improve the regulatory 
environment, there are some countries that stand to 
beneﬁ  t more from their implementation, given their 
more restrictive regulatory environments as a starting 
point. Section 2 of this chapter established the potential 
negative impacts on entrepreneurship, competition, 
innovation, productivity and ultimately competitive-
ness and economic growth that excessively burden-
some regulation may lead to. This section tried to give 
an overview of where Member States stand regard-
ing their regulatory environments of product markets 
based on the best available indicators. The following 
section will take a look at recent policy trends and com-
mitments made by Member States in their NRPs.
4.4. Policy  action
The importance of improving the business environ-
ment through the application of Better Regulation 
measures has generally been recognised by Member 
States and at the EU-level.  49 At Community level, the 
Better Regulation system comprises systematic impact 
assessments for new legislation, improved stakeholder 
consultation, the screening of pending legislative pro-
posals and a simpliﬁ   cation programme for existing 
legislation, which includes the reduction of adminis-
trative costs. Work on setting targets for the reduction 
of administrative costs is under way.  50 Some Member 
States have already put in place their own fully devel-
oped Better Regulation systems, while others are in the 
process of doing so. The measures envisaged by Mem-
ber States, both regarding Better Regulation as well as 
the business environment more generally (see Annex 
Tables 4.7 and 4.7 respectively), should ideally target 
existing problem areas of their current regulatory envi-
ronments as broadly sketched out in section 3. Mem-
ber States with relatively restrictive regulatory environ-
ments as identiﬁ  ed above stand to reap the greatest 
beneﬁ  ts when applying the tools of Better Regulation. 
However, given that such improvements need to be 
sustained and guarded against backsliding, the insti-
tutional setup and the implementation of Better Reg-
ulation policies require continuous attention even in 
those countries that already have made considerable 
achievements in the area of Better regulation.
49   Reference to Commission APR and 2006 Spring European Council con-
clusions.
50  See subsectionon administrative costs below.
This section gives an overview of the measures in the 
area of Better Regulation and those related to it (e.g. e-
government, one-stop shops) at the EU level and in the 
Member States. Based on the ﬁ  ndings of section 3, it 
provides a tentative assessment of the likely adequacy of 
a full implementation of these envisaged reforms. The 
analysis of this section is based on last year’s National 
Reform Programmes, the Spring European Council con-
clusions of March 2006, which contain commitments 
regarding the regulatory environment additional to 
those made in the NRPs  51, on information available to 
the Commission from the ongoing regulatory dialogue 
with Member States and on replies to questionnaires 
such as that on the Indicators of Regulatory Quality 
to which the majority of MS responded with detailed 
information. However, some Member States’ reform 
efforts may not be captured in what follows, especially 
if they are not stated explicitly as part of their BR strat-
egy. It must be noted also that the National Progress 
Reports on the state of NRP implementation presented 
in October 2006 could not be taken into account at the 
time of preparing this report.
4.4.1. Simpliﬁ  cation of existing legislation
Simpliﬁ  cation involves the screening of legislation with 
a view to making it more transparent and clear and 
preventing it from becoming obsolete or unnecessarily 
burdensome. In its October 2005 strategy for the sim-
pliﬁ  cation of the regulatory environment, the Commis-
sion developed a methodology for streamlining and 
modernizing the Community acquis and presented a 
simpliﬁ  cation rolling programme of around 100 initia-
tives, covering more than 220 basic legal acts, which 
will be repealed, codiﬁ  ed, recast or reviewed over the 
next three years. Approximately half of the 100 initia-
tives will be adopted by the end of this year.
Towards the end of 2006, the Commission plans to 
adopt a progress report on Simpliﬁ  cation and Codi-
ﬁ   cation which will take stock of the progress that 
has been achieved since implementing the October 
2005 simpliﬁ   cation strategy (as requested by the 
Council), identify problems and propose remedial 
actions. Furthermore, the simpliﬁ   cation rolling pro-
gramme will be updated and further additional sim-
pliﬁ  cation initiatives will be identiﬁ  ed on the basis of 
contributions received from stakeholders, as part of 
the previous exercise, and input collected during the 
preparatory process of the CLWP 2007. The docu-
ment will also address the roles and responsibilities 
of Member States, the Council and the European 
Parliament in order to ensure that their efforts are 
complementary. 
51   Foreseen is the creation of one-stop shops for setting up a company, a 
reduction in the time taken for registering a business to less than one 
week by end-2007, a lowering of start-up fees, and the setup of a single 
contact point for hiring the ﬁ  rst employee.
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At Member State level, systematic simpliﬁ  cation pro-
grammes are already in place in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, while their intro-
duction is planned by Estonia, and was recently 
introduced in Portugal (Annex Table 4.7). A number 
of Member States that do not have an explicit sim-
pliﬁ  cation programme in place nevertheless simplify 
the stock of existing legislation on an ad-hoc basis 
(Annex Table 4.7). The kinds of legislation targeted 
in simpliﬁ  cation measures cover taxation, reporting 
requirements, ﬁ   scal measures, business start-ups, 
insolvency rules and consumer protection.
In the UK, the Legislative & Regulatory Reform Bill will 
be enacted in autumn 2006 to facilitate the removal 
of or amendments to unnecessary regulations. The UK 
is also a prime example of consulting systematically 
with stakeholders for adjusting the regulatory frame-
work. France passed two simpliﬁ   cation laws focus-
ing on modernising public administration in 2003 
and 2004. In Slovenia, the Removal of Administrative 
Obstacles Programme is currently being implemented 
and the Government has set up the Council for an 
Economy-Friendly Administration which will act as an 
‘anti-bureaucratic ﬁ  lter’. Slovenia will also introduce a 
system of strategic planning and managerial tools in 
the public administration. Latvia is implementing an 
Action Plan for the Improvement of the Business Envi-
ronment (2005-2008). In the Slovak Republic a com-
prehensive review of barriers to business identifying 
inefﬁ  cient processes is to be completed in 2006. Malta 
has set up a Better Regulation Unit, which will regularly 
monitor bureaucratic procedures and submit regular 
reports on how these procedures can be simpliﬁ  ed.
In addition, various other initiatives aimed at improving 
the business environment are underway in all EU Mem-
ber States. They include plain language programmes, 
e-Government activities and the introduction of one-
stop shops (see Annex Table 4.8). Although these ini-
tiatives can produce signiﬁ  cant improvements in the 
short term, they may be less effective in the long-term 
in the absence of a full simpliﬁ  cation programme.
The introduction of one-stop shops for business reg-
istration is a stated commitment of the 2006 Spring 
European Council conclusions. The use of the one-
stop information points is envisaged in 17 NRPs 
(AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, NL, 
PL, PT, SI, UK). By merging counters from different 
departments and promoting multi-task reception 
resources, business in general, and especially SMEs 
should beneﬁ  t. In France, SMEs stand to beneﬁ  t in 
particular from plans to introduce a one-stop tax sys-
tem for SMEs. It is noteworthy that while every coun-
try seems to either already have one-stop-shops for 
obtaining information about requirements regarding 
licences and permits in place or plans to introduce 
them, a much smaller number of countries proposes 
to include one-stop-shops for issuing licenses and 
permits. That particular service seems to be only avail-
able in AT, FI, FR, EL, HU, IT, LU, PL, PT, SK, SP, SE.
Many NRPs consider the development and improve-
ment of Electronic Government systems as an 
essential element for improving communication with 
the public and the business community and for sim-
plifying bureaucratic procedures (EL, ES, FI, IT, SI). E-
Government services are believed to have the added 
beneﬁ  t of improving the efﬁ  ciency and transparency 
of public administration. Finland, although a country 
that has already made most of public services available 
online, now aims to improve further the use of elec-
tronic data transfer between government services. ES, 
DK, LU and SI have the objective to set up e-govern-
ment portals for public administration. In Denmark 
there is web portal where businesses can obtain all 
sorts of forms that are needed for reporting to public 
authorities (virk.dk). In Luxembourg, electronic assist-
ance for companies in the industrial sector is being 
promoted. Portugal, which was identiﬁ  ed as having a 
relatively restrictive regulatory environment, plans to 
create a Joint Knowledge Network for collecting and 
disseminating information on administrative modern-
ization initiatives. Portugal also emphasizes the use of 
one stop shops in various areas. The UK Government 
has set up a new on-line portal where businesses and 
other stakeholders can submit proposals for simpliﬁ  -
cation to which the government will respond within 
90 working days. Italy aims to standardize the most 
important national public contact points for citizens 
and companies. Germany wants to undertake the 
largest e-government initiative in Europe this year by 
making all national, Internet-capable services avail-
able online. Several other countries (EL, IT, IE, LU, 
PT, SE, SK) intend to introduce a National System of 
Electronic public procurement (e-procurement) that 
will improve transparency and efﬁ  ciency by making 
it possible for companies to to bid electronically for 
contracts. Cyprus wants to increase the overall aware-
ness of the need for a well-designed and proportion-
ate regulatory framework, while in Hungary, “plain 
language” programmes aim to make legislation more 
accessible. Belgium intends to provide tailor-made 
information to companies, especially for business start-
ups, recognising that past measures for promoting 
entrepreneurship may not always have been offered 
or communicated in a ‘business-friendly” manner. 
Moreover, Belgium has made signiﬁ  cant progress in 
simplifying administrative requirements for citizens 
and business alike by cutting bureaucracy (reducing 
the Kafka index – www.kafka.be).
As shown in section 3, the administrative costs associ-
ated with start-ups vary widely across the EU. Bel-
gium, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia 
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and Latvia were amongst the countries that scored rel-
atively poorly on administrative costs, particularly with 
regard to start-ups. Most of these countries present 
concrete reforms in their NRPs to address this situa-
tion. These include measures facilitating company reg-
istration, such as single contact points, amendments 
to the commercial codes and electronic tools. Portugal 
aims for company registration within one hour.
Several countries highlight in their NRPs the need 
to simplify businesses’ relations with tax adminis-
tration in order to reduce associated costs. Swe-
den aims to reduce such costs by 20% by 2010. The 
Czech Republic, which was identiﬁ  ed by some of the 
indicators presented in Section 3 as having a rela-
tively restrictive regulatory environment in 2005, is 
now taking action to modernise its tax administration 
to minimise the burden on taxpayers by increasing 
in capacity and performance of tax controls as well 
as e-communication between the administration and 
taxpayers. The implementation of electronic tax pay-
ments is planned in Germany and the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands the new e-tax measures follow 
reforms in 2000 which already led to a reduction of 
taxation payment costs for companies and private 
households. Estonia and Ireland are creating simpli-
ﬁ  ed tax schemes for VAT. In the case of Ireland meas-
ures in this area will also reduce administrative costs 
for cross border trades. In Poland the procedures for 
business tax inspections have been streamlined and 
their duration has been reduced. While administra-
tive costs associated with taxation are already low in 
France, the country placed a great focus on simplify-
ing the tax system in its NRP, with the creation of the 
Large Business Directorate with a one-stop window 
for 24500 businesses, the gradual implementation of 
a one-stop tax contact system for SMEs, by improving 
the ﬁ  ling of tax returns and online payment options.
4.4.2. Measurement  and  reduction 
of administrative costs
As seen, regulations generally seek to achieve the 
delivery of objectives such as those relating to health 
and safety, consumer protection or the environment 
or to ensure the smooth operation of labour markets 
or tax system. However, as well as delivering beneﬁ  ts, 
they involve costs, some of which might be immate-
rial to their primary purpose. The reduction of such 
costs is an explicit objective for the majority of EU 
Member States and for the European Commission. 
The Commission will launch a large measurement 
study in 2007, to be preceded by a pilot project in 
2006. The results of the latter, which will be reported 
in the November Better Regulation Communication 
package, will determine the Commission’s action plan 
for reducing administrative costs (to be published in 
early 2007). In order to identify which policy areas 
should be a priority in the measurement and reduc-
tion of administrative requirements, the pilot project 
uses national measurements as a starting point. The 
project will draw extensively on the results of the four 
Member States that, at this stage, have already carried 
out their baseline measurement (the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Denmark).
Most Member States use or plan to use the Standard 
Cost Model (SCM) when analysing or measuring the 
baseline of their administrative costs (AT, BE, CZ, DK, 
EE, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LT, NL, PL, PT, SE and UK). 
Four Member States have so far ofﬁ  cially adopted 
concrete percentage targets to reduce their admin-
istrative costs (AT, CZ, DK, NL, SE) and another two 
are planning to do so (DE, UK)) Some of the efforts 
identiﬁ   ed to support this exercise are mentioned 
above and relate to e-government, one-stop shops 
and central registration ofﬁ  ces, all of which should 
simplify registration and administrative procedures 
for businesses and citizens alike.
4.4.3.  Impact Assessments of new legislation
While simpliﬁ  cation initiatives and the reduction of the 
administrative costs aim to improve the stock of exist-
ing legislation, Impact Assessments (IA) try to ensure 
that new legislation complies with the objectives of 
the Better Regulation agenda. The European Com-
mission has recognised the importance of integrated 
impact assessments for a number of years. It pub-
lished a revised set of IA guidelines in 2005 to further 
strengthen the way in which competitiveness aspects 
are taken into account while also reemphasising its 
commitment to taking full account of all economic, 
social and environmental impacts in order to analyse 
and be aware of synergies and trade-offs across these 
three pillars. Impact assessments allow policy mak-
ers to become aware of and to devise provisions for 
easing or mitigating potentially negative effects on 
groups that are particularly affected, e.g. SMEs. Earlier 
this year a speciﬁ  c methodology for assessing admin-
istrative burden was added to the guidelines. Since 
2003 more than 160 IAs have been completed and an 
extensive evaluation study by external consultants on 
the Commission’s IA system is currently ongoing. Its 
results will be available in early 2007.
Most Member States emphasise the importance 
of policy decisions being supported by some form 
of impact analysis but it is still only a minority of 
Member States that systematically assess all relevant 
impacts of their legislative proposals (AT, DK, DE, IE, 
NL, UK), while some other ones do so only partially 
or informally (BE, FI, FR, IT, LU, PT, SE). Although 
consultation of stakeholders becomes more and 
more an integral part of the impact assessment pro-
cedure, there is still signiﬁ   cant room for improve-
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ment when it comes to the involvement of all rele-
vant stakeholders at an early stage, the use of various 
consultation methods and transparent procedures. 
At the moment, a minority of Member States have 
mandatory consultation processes in place (AT, DK, 
EE, FI, DE, IE, LT, PL, SI, SE, UK), albeit not all of them 
ensure that minimum consultation standards are 
applied across the board. 
It should be noted that the existence of a formal 
requirement to carry out impact assessments has 
not proved to be a guarantee of impact assessment 
practice. On the other hand, impact assessment 
guidelines facilitate the introduction of an impact 
assessment system. Their implementation and 
enforcement differs widely across the EU-25, with 
some Member States, most notably the UK but also 
NL and IE, showing a better alignment of theory with 
practice. A number of Member States do not seem to 
have any guidelines nor are there any plans for mak-
ing it obligatory to support new legislative proposals 
by IAs, while others have guidelines which in practice 
lack enforcement.
In the UK the guidelines for conducting regulatory IA 
were updated and strengthened already in 2004 and 
2005 to address enforcement, compliance, and mon-
itoring of new regulations, as well as their impact on 
public services. This has also brought the UK more 
in line with the Commission’s integrated approach 
by now stipulating explicitly that economic, social 
and environmental impacts have to be taken into 
account. The UK’s regulatory impact assessment 
(RIA) system is supported by an institutional set-up in 
which the Cabinet Ofﬁ  ce coordinates impact assess-
ments across the government. In addition, the Better 
Regulation Executive and the National Audit Ofﬁ  ce 
fulﬁ   l the function of independent monitoring and 
evaluation of the UK government’s Better Regulation 
and RIA record.
While the UK has the most advanced IA system in the 
EU, a number of other Member States are in the proc-
ess of developing their own. In the Czech Republic 
for example, the introduction of impact assessments 
will take place via a pilot study in 2005 and 2006. 
From 2007 there will be an obligation for ministries 
and other central state administration bodies to carry 
out impact assessments for all draft acts. Malta is also 
planning to carry out RIA, but at present, these are 
carried out on an ad hoc basis by individual Minis-
tries/Government institutions.
In Finland, a three-year programme has been 
launched in 2005 to support the assessment of the 
impacts of draft legislation on business. In Denmark, 
the compulsory assessment will be done by ana-
lysing the administrative implications of all bills on 
enterprises through business panels.
Cyprus and Estonia acknowledge that they currently 
do not have the expertise required for systematic 
impact assessments of economic, social and environ-
mental consequences of regulations and administra-
tive costs and take ﬁ  rst steps to address this. However, 
the Cypriot NRP contains measures to raise aware-
ness in the public sector, the business community 
and the House of Representatives of the importance 
of systematic impact assessments and measuring 
administrative costs, and of the related institutional 
framework and administrative capacity. In the case 
of Estonia, an ex-ante analysis of the impacts of legis-
lation is to be developed in the medium term, start-
ing with developing and testing a methodology by 
conducting ﬁ  eld-related analysis.
4.4.4. Conclusions
A multitude of measures are being proposed in the 
NRPs and implemented across all EU-25 Member 
States to improve the regulatory and business envi-
ronment through impact assessments, simpliﬁ  cation 
of existing legislation, and the reduction of adminis-
trative costs. While these measures vary considerably 
in terms of their time-horizon, depth, degree of insti-
tutionalisation and likely effectiveness, most Member 
States do envisage one or more high-proﬁ  le activities 
in the area of Better Regulation. In addition, Member 
States present measures with signiﬁ  cant short-term 
effects on the business environment, such as one-
stop shops.
The large differences observed between the meas-
ures proposed by individual Member States may be 
reﬂ   ection of the different stages of Better Regula-
tion implementation. Creating a fully ﬂ  edged  and 
integrated Better Regulation system requires wide-
spread awareness on the part of government agen-
cies as well as businesses, considerable administra-
tive resources, and a continuous feedback through 
monitoring and evaluation. Instituting a complete 
Better Regulation system will therefore require differ-
ent types of actions, depending on a Member State’s 
starting point in the process. Those who are already 
advanced should continue to further improve their 
regulatory environments by using all BR tools while 
Member States at the beginning of the process may 
wish to raise awareness as an appropriate and neces-
sary ﬁ  rst step.
Naturally, for countries displaying a more restrictive 
regulatory environment, both the urgency of and 
the potential beneﬁ  ts associated with pushing ahead 
more strongly with the Better Regulation agenda in 
terms of the objectives of the Growth and Jobs Strat-
egy are greater than for countries that have already 
attained an advanced stage. It is noteworthy in this 
context that among those Member States (Czech 
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Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain) which were broadly categorised in section 
3 as having relatively restrictive regulatory environ-
ments, most have implemented simpliﬁ  cation meas-
ures on an ad hoc basis, such as one-stop shops and 
e-government, but do not sufﬁ  ciently recognise the 
importance of stakeholder consultation. At the same 
time, a number of Member States which were listed 
among those with less restrictive regulatory environ-
ments (Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) 
are also found among those countries with measures 
in all or almost all elements of the Better Regulation 
agenda.
Annex Table 4.7 also shows that an increasing 
number of countries are implementing their own 
Impact Assessment systems, mirroring what is already 
taking place in the Commission and in a number of 
Member States. This should help ensure a higher 
quality of future regulation with regard to issues of 
importance for national and European competitive-
ness. There are however cases where resource con-
straints may impede and perhaps even prevent the 
implementation of systematic IAs with likely adverse 
consequences. Due to the long-term importance 
of IA systems there is some reason for concern that 
unless these resource issues are overcome, new leg-
islation might be deprived of valuable information 
which could impede its quality.
4.5. Summary  and  Conclusions
This chapter began by taking a look at the transmis-
sion mechanisms through which Better Regulation 
measures can positively inﬂ  uence  competitiveness, 
growth and employment. It was argued that there 
is theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest 
that Better Regulation initiatives impact positively 
on the drivers of productivity such as innovation, 
competition, entrepreneurship, skills and invest-
ment. Increases in productivity mean that more is 
produced with the same amount of inputs, or that 
the same is produced with less input. Both represent 
a gain in efﬁ  ciency and should lead to an increase 
in the competitiveness of EU products on the world 
market and higher economic growth.
Section 2 a showed that economic research has 
identiﬁ  ed several channels through which regulation 
affects economic growth and employment – the two 
main economic objectives of the Growth and Jobs 
Strategy. In the long run, economic growth is largely 
determined by productivity growth, and this section 
showed how regulations can have a positive as well 
as a negative impact on its underlying causes. Empiri-
cal evidence was cited showing that often where Bet-
ter Regulation means more light touch regulation, 
one can expect a real improvement on productivity, 
growth and employment.
Section 3 provided an attempt of assessing the cur-
rent regulatory environments of the EU-25 by draw-
ing on available indicators. The imperfections and 
limits of assessing the regulatory environments based 
on these indicators, as well as their usefulness in 
terms of allowing for a broad categorisation of where 
MS stood were pointed out. Countries were grouped 
into three different categories: least restrictive, most 
restrictive and an intermediate category.
Section 4 looked at what MS proposed to do in their 
2005 National Reform Programmes, complemented 
by information available to the Commission from 
other sources on the current state of play. It found 
that all MS have made commitments to establishing 
a better regulatory environment. Facilitating com-
munication by expanding e-government services, 
one-stop-shops and plain language programmes 
are mentioned by the majority of MS in their NRPs 
and are being implemented, also by those Member 
States which were identiﬁ   ed in Section 2 as hav-
ing more restrictive regulatory environments. The 
absence of concrete simpliﬁ  cation plans in some MS 
gives reason for some concern. Simpliﬁ  cation is tar-
geted at the existing stock of legislation and as such 
is backward looking. A systematic approach in the 
form of a plan or programme would signal the seri-
ousness of intentions in this regard by, for example, 
publicly stating budget and resource allocations and 
would allow for greater outside scrutiny of the ongo-
ing efforts.
The reduction of the administrative burden is clearly 
a priority for a number of MS and gaining momen-
tum across the EU. This is encouraging as it also 
reﬂ  ects what is happening at the EU level. Several 
countries have announced reduction targets. The 
European Council of June 2006 has stated that it 
should be possible to set similar targets at EU level 
and invited the Commission to make appropriate 
proposals by early 2007 in time for the next Spring 
European Council. It should also be noted that a 
small number of countries, most notably the UK, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic 
have already carried out baseline measurements and 
that the Commission is currently engaged in carrying 
out a pilot project with a view to identifying policy 
areas where beneﬁ  ts can be reaped quickly. Further 
work in the coming year will be targeted inter alia 
at MS for laying the groundwork, such as baseline 
measurements, for achieving reduction targets. As 
this is an area where the full beneﬁ  ts can only mate-
rialise if the EU and MS levels cooperate, there are 
ample grounds for believing that real progress is 
already under way.
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Systematic Impact Assessments are currently carried 
out in only a small minority of MS. While many coun-
tries stress the importance of IAs and have made 
some form of commitment to IAs, it is often unclear 
what sort of legislation will beneﬁ  t from compulsory 
IAs, what the resource provisions are and how a sup-
portive and conducive institutional set-up is going 
to be established. As IAs deal with new legislative 
proposals they are key to ensuring better regulatory 
environments for the future, any failure to establish 
systematic IAs as a fundamental part of law-making 
is likely to have a detrimental effect on the regula-
tory environment in the long run. Concerns about a 
lack of resources are a serious concern as they could 
impede the improvement of regulatory environ-
ments even when there is a genuine political desire 
and commitment to act. It is essential that resource 
constraints are overcome by, for example, propor-
tionality tests that target existing limited resources to 
where proposals are likely to have signiﬁ  cant impacts 
on the economy, the environment or in the social 
sphere.
It is encouraging to note that more and more coun-
tries are beginning to use IAs, albeit for now often 
in a non-systematic way, assessing some impact but 
not all or on an ad hoc basis. Some countries are in 
the process of conducting pilot phases with the aim 
of spreading out the use of IAs more widely on com-
pletion of their pilots. All in all, there is undoubtedly 
progress and more and more MS are beginning to 
use IAs in their national law-making processes. How-
ever, as it takes time to establish not only the culture 
of using IAs to inform new legislation, but also to 
acquire the skills base needed for producing them, it 
is likely that the real beneﬁ  ts are only going to mate-
rialise in a few years time.
In conclusion, it can be said that the commitments 
made in the NRPs by all MS and the progress that 
has already been made across the EU are encour-
aging but real challenges remain. Establishing a 
fully ﬂ   edged Better Regulation system should be 
the medium to long-term objective of all Member 
States. Doing so in a sustained fashion will help pro-
vide better conditions for entrepreneurship, reduc-
tions in administrative costs and in barriers to mar-
ket entry. Especially those Member States in a less 
positive starting position should make greater efforts 
to make progress towards establishing fully ﬂ  edged 
Better Regulation systems in view of the beneﬁ  ts that 
can be expected.
An attempt at predicting, perhaps in quantitative 
terms, what the combined impact on the EU’s com-
petitiveness, jobs and economic growth will be is 
premature at this stage. Most of the real beneﬁ  ts 
are likely to be felt only in the long-term. The gen-
eral process of Better Regulation is still in its early 
stages and its ultimate success will be inﬂ  uenced 
by many factors that cannot easily be accounted 
for. Much depends also on regulatory reform in the 
labour markets, which will have a strong impact on 
the economy. The rigor with which existing propos-
als will be implemented will also play an important 
role. Moreover, any resource constraints, which are 
likely to affect some countries more than others, will 
inﬂ  uence the ﬁ  nal outcome. It is worth noting at this 
stage that MS and the Commission have recognised 
the need for action, are responding and thereby 
laying the foundation for better regulatory environ-
ments in the EU in the future. This provides a positive 
contribution to the long term prospects of the EU’s 
competitiveness.
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Annex Table 4.1: OECD Product Market Regulation questionnaire: questions touching upon 
the quality of regulation
Source/Question number Text of the question
Indicator: Use of command and control regulation 
Q 2.1.5
Are regulators required to assess alternative policy instruments (regu-
latory and non-regulatory before adopting a new regulation?
Q 2.1.6
Has guidance been issued on using alternatives to traditional regula-
tion?
Indicator: Licenses and permits system 
Q 2.1.8
Is the “silence is consent” rule (i.e. that licenses are issued automati-
cally if the licensing ofﬁ  ce has not acted by the end of the statutory 
response period) used at all?
Q 2.1.9
Are there single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for getting infor-
mation on notiﬁ  cations and licenses?
Q 2.1.10
Are there single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for issuing or 
accepting notiﬁ  cations and licenses?
Indicator: Communication and simpliﬁ  cation of rules and procedures 
Q 2.1.2
Are there systematic procedures for making regulations known and 
accessible to affected parties?
Q 2.1.3
Is there a general policy requiring «plain language drafting of regula-
tion?
Q 2.1.4
Do affected parties have the right to appeal against adverse enforce-
ment decisions in individual cases?
Q 2.2.2
Are there any inquiry points where affected or interested foreign par-
ties can get information on the operation and enforcement of regula-
tions?
Q 2.1.1
Does government policy impose speciﬁ  c requirements in relation to 
transparency/freedom of information government wide?
Q 2.1.11
Does the national government (all ministries and agencies) keep a 
complete count of the number of permits and licenses required?
Q 2.1.7
Is there an explicit programme to reduce the administrative burdens 
imposed by government on enterprises and/or citizens?
Q 2.1.12
Is there a programme underway to review and reduce the number of 
licenses and permits required by the national government?
Indicator: administrative burdens for corporations 
Q3.1.2a+Q3.1.2b
How many mandatory procedures would an entrepreneur have to 
complete to register a public limited company (pre-registration + reg-
istration)?
Q3.1.5
How many different public and private bodies would an entrepreneur 
need to contact to register a public limited company (pre-registration 
+ registration)?
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Q3.1.3
How many working days would it typically take an entrepreneur reg-
istering a public limited company to complete all mandatory proce-
dures (pre-registration + registration)?
Q3.1.4
How much would it typically cost an entrepreneur registering a public 
limited company to complete all mandatory procedures (pre-registra-
tion + registration)?
Indicator: administrative burdens for sole proprietor ﬁ  rms 
Q3.1.2a+Q3.1.2b
How many mandatory procedures would an entrepreneur have to 
complete to register an individual enterprise (pre-registration + reg-
istration)?
Q3.1.5
How many different public and private bodies would an entrepreneur 
need to contact to register an individual enterprise (pre-registration 
+ registration)?
Q3.1.3
How many working days would it typically take an entrepreneur regis-
tering an individual enterprise to complete all mandatory procedures 
(pre-registration + registration)?
Q3.1.4
How much it would typically cost an entrepreneur registering an indi-
vidual enterprise to complete all mandatory procedures (pre-registra-
tion + registration)?
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Annex Table 4.2: Responses to OECD product market regulation questionnaire questions 
on administrative burdens on start ups – corporations
How many 
mandatory 
procedures would 
an entrepreneur 
have to complete 
to register a public 
limited company 
(pre-registration 
+ registration)?
How many 
different public and 
private bodies would 
an entrepreneur 
need to contact to 
register a public 
limited company 
(pre-registration 
+ registration)?
How many working 
days would it 
typically take an 
entrepreneur 
registering a public 
limited company 
to complete all 
mandatory 
procedures 
(pre-registration 
+ registration)?
How much would 
it typically cost 
an entrepreneur 
registering a public 
limited company 
to complete all 
mandatory 
procedures 
(pre-registration 
+ registration)?
AT 25 8 6 2232
BE 13 6 32 130
CZ 24 9 64 345
DE 13 6 30 1330
DK 10 2 18 0
EL 12 5 26 2400
ES 23 7 25 2090
FI 13 3 30 252
FR 22 6 29 290
HU 16 7 34 789
IE 9 2 16 71
IT 18 8 7 1750
LU 19 7 30 1175
NL 13 4 42 935
PL 28 6 90
PT 8 6 11 605
SE 11 3 25 186
SK 15 8 15 722
UK 93 8 4 0
Source: Conway et al (2005).
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Annex Table 4.3: Fraser Institute/World Economic Forum indicators of ease of starting business and 
time with government bureaucracy
Country
5Cii Administrative 
conditions and new 
businesses: administrative 
procedures are an 
important obstacle 
to starting a new business
5Ciii Time with 
government bureaucracy: 
senior management spends 
a substantial amount 
of time dealing with 
government bureaucracy
5Civ Starting a new 
business: starting a new 
business is generally easy
AT 5.5 6.0 5.5
BE 2.2 6.3 4.5
CY 4.7 6.5 6.5
CZ 2.8 6.3 3.8
DE 4.7 6.3 5.2
DK 3.3 6.5 6.2
EE 5.5 6.0 7.5
EL 2.8 5.5 3.7
ES 3.3 6.3 4.2
FI 5.8 6.3 7.7
FR 2.0 7.8 4.5
HU 2.8 8.3 6.7
IE 4.8 7.3 6.0
IT 1.7 7.3 3.8
LT 3.3 5.0 4.2
LU 4.3 6.5 7.0
LV 3.3 5.8 5.3
MT 2.7 6.0 5.2
NL 3.3 6.0 6.2
PL 2.0 5.5 3.8
PT 3.2 5.0 4.3
SE 5.0 6.5 7.3
SI 3.0 5.5 5.5
SK 2.8 6.8 6.0
UK 4.2 6.5 7.7
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005).
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Annex Table 4.4: The World bank indicators of ease of starting business and dealing with licences
Country Year
Starting a Business Dealing with Licenses
Proce-
dures 
(number)
Time 
(days)
Cost
(% of 
income 
per 
capita)
Min. 
capital (% 
of income 
per 
capita)
Proce-
dures
(number)
Time 
(days)
Cost
(% of 
income 
per 
capita)
AVERAGE 2005     7.4 27.5   8.9   46.0 15.9 191.0   81.5
AT 2005 9 29   5.7   61.5 14 195   81.6
BE 2005 4 34 11.1   13.5 15 184   64.1
CZ 2005 10 40   9.5   39 31 245   16.1
DE 2005 9 24   4.7   47.6 11 165   82.8
DK 2005 3   5   0   47   7   70   71.3
EE 2005 6 35   6.2   41.4 12 116   41.4
EL 2005 15 38 24.6 121.4 17 176   71.9
ES 2005 10 47 16.5   15.7 12 277   77.1
FI 2005 3 14   1.2   28 17   56   76.2
FR 2005 7   8   1.2     0 10 185   78.3
HU 2005 6 38 22.4   79.6 25 213 279.1
IE 2005 4 24   5.3     0 10 181   23.6
IT 2005 9 13 15.7   10.8 17 284 147.3
LT 2005 8 26   3.3   57.3 14 151   17.5
LV 2005 5 16   4.2   31.8 21 160   43.9
NL 2005 7 11 13   64.6 18 184 142.7
PL 2005 10 31 22.2 220.1 25 322   83.1
PT 2005 11 54 13.4   39.4 20 327   57.7
SE 2005 3 16   0.7   35   8 116 119.6
SI 2005 9 60 10.1   17 14 207 128.7
SK 2005 9 25   5.1   41 13 272   18
UK 2005 6 18   0.7     0 19 115   70.2
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org.
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Annex Table 4.5: World Bank indicators on administrative burden relating to registering property, 
paying taxes and trading across borders, 2005
Registering property Paying taxes Trading across borders
Procedures 
(number)
Time 
(days)
Cost 
(% of 
property 
value)
Payments 
(number)
Time 
(hours)
Documents 
for export 
(number)
Signatures 
for export 
(number)
Time for 
export 
(days)
Documents 
for import 
(number)
Signatures 
for import 
(number)
Time for 
import 
(days)
AVERAGE   4.9   69.6   4.5 20.5 265.3 5.7 4 14.9   7.4   4.8 17.3
AT   3   32   4.5 20 272 4 2   8   5   3   9
BE   7 132 12.8 10 160 5 2   7   6   2   9
CZ   4 123   3 14 930 5 3 20   8   4 22
DE   4   41   4.1 32 105 4 1   6   4   1   6
DK   6   42   0.6 18 135 3 2   5   3   1   5
EE   4   65   0.5 11 104 5 2 12   5   5 14
EL 12   23 13.7 32 204 7 6 29 11   9 34
ES   3   25   7.2   7   56 4 3   9   5   3 10
FI   3   14   4 19    .. 4 3   7   3   1   7
FR   9 183   6.5 29   72 7 3 22 13   3 23
HU   4    78 11 24 304 6 4 23 10   5 24
IE   5   38 10.3   8   76 5 5 14   4   5 15
IT   8   27   0.9 20 360 8 5 28 16 10 38
LT   3     3   0.8 13 162 5 5   6 12   4 17
LV   9   54   2 39 320 9 6 18 13   7 21
NL   2     2   6.2 22 700 5 3   7   4   1   8
PL   6 197   1.6 43 175 6 5 19   7   8 26
PT   5   83   7.4   7 328 6 4 18   7   5 18
SE   1     2   3   5 122 4 1   6   3   1   6
SI   6 391   2 29 272 9 7 20 11   9 24
SK   3   17   0.1 31 344 9 8 20   8 10 21
UK   2   21   4.1   8    .. 5 5 16   4   5 16
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org.
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Annex Table 4.6: IMD Survey Indicators
  Regulation Intensity Ease of Doing Business
Austria 6.87 7.19
Belgium 4.25 5.61
Czech Republic 6.29 5
Denmark 7.46 8.11
Estonia 6.93 7.52
Finland 7.48 7.8
France 3.68 4.52
Germany 3.98 5.43
Greece 5.03 4.15
Hungary 5.63 6.08
Ireland 6.43 8.04
Italy 4.14 3.91
Luxembourg 5.43 6.69
Netherlands 4.76 7.08
Poland 1.75 2.33
Portugal 4.95 4.76
Slovakia 5.78 5.6
Slovenia 4.12 2.62
Spain 4.26 5.76
Sweden 5.62 6.21
United Kingdom 4.09 6.61
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2006
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Annex Table 4.7: Better Regulation actions in Member States1
Explicit 
Better 
Regulation 
strategy
Existence of 
institutional 
structure 
dedicated 
to Better 
Regulation 
Impact 
assessments 
Consultation 
of stakeholders
Simpliﬁ  cation 
Administrative 
costs 
Austria Yes Yes
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts
Obligatory 
consultation, 
guidelines exist
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: SCM Measurements: Planned baseline 
measurement to begin end 2006. Reduction target: 
25% by 2010
Belgium  Yes
Partial 
(Administra-
tive simpliﬁ  -
cation) 
Obligatory Kafka test on 
administrative burdens. 
Number of completed 
Kafka tests recorded 
Not obligatory, 
guidelines exist 
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM. Measurements: Ad hoc.
Reduction target: At federal level, nearly 130 laws & 
regulations were abolished or simpliﬁ  ed, reducing 
admin costs for enterprises by 25% in comparison 
with 2003=drop of 1.7 billion EUR
Cyprus  No No No Not obligatory No No
Czech 
Rep. 
Planned Yes
Ongoing pilot phase 
Planned: Obligatory 
assessment of all rel-
evant impacts. Guide-
lines exist and are to be 
revised
Not obligatory
Planned: 
Guidelines
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: SCM Measurements: In house baseline 
measurement
Reduction target: Planned to be adopted by the govt 
by end 2007, at least 20% 
Denmark
Yes, mainly 
admin. cost 
related
Yes
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts
Obligatory 
consultation, 
guidelines exist
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Completed baseline with a 25% target. 
Planned 2nd round of measurements for an update 
to be completed in January 2007
Reduction target: Burden has been reduced 
by 5.1% since 2001 (deadline 2010)
1  For the deﬁ  nition of indicators, please see explanatory notes below the table.
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Explicit 
Better 
Regulation 
strategy
Existence of 
institutional 
structure 
dedicated 
to Better 
Regulation 
Impact 
assessments 
Consultation 
of stakeholders
Simpliﬁ  cation 
Administrative 
costs 
Estonia
Yes. Planned 
Action Plan in 
2007
No
Obligatory assessment 
but no structured moni-
toring system exists
Obligatory 
consultation
Planned 
simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM
Measurements: Two pilot projects on VAT and wages 
were completed. Planned two new measurements in 
transport and implementation of structural funds
Finland Yes
Partial 
(Impact 
Assessments)
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts 
but not enforced. 
Uniﬁ  cation of existing 
guidelines and improve-
ments of enforcement 
under work
Obligatory 
consultation
No
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Ongoing pilot on VAT. 
France Yes Yes Some impacts assessed
Not obligatory 
but guidelines 
exist
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Partial measurements on selected legislation 
Germany
Yes, mainly 
admin. cost 
related 
Partial 
(Reducing 
bureaucracy)
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts
Obligatory 
consultation,
guidelines exist
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM
Measurements: Is about to launch 
a large measurement of legislation.
Target will be set 2007
Greece Yes No No Not obligatory No No
Hungary No
Partial 
(Deregula-
tion)
Obligatory to assess 
impacts but not 
enforced 
Not obligatory
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: SCM Measurements: Ongoing sectoral 
measurements (VAT, EU funds). 
Ireland Yes Yes
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts. 
Guidelines exist. 
Number of completed 
IAs recorded
Obligatory 
consultation, 
guidelines exist
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Focus on reducing admin burdens through simpli-
ﬁ  cation measures and e-government programme. 
Established a Business Regulation Forum which is 
conducting 2 pilot measurements to examine SCM 
methodology
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Explicit 
Better 
Regulation 
strategy
Existence of 
institutional 
structure 
dedicated 
to Better 
Regulation 
Impact 
assessments 
Consultation 
of stakeholders
Simpliﬁ  cation 
Administrative 
costs 
Italy Yes Yes Yes
Obligatory 
consultation for 
all simpliﬁ  cation 
or better 
regulation 
measures; not 
obligatory in 
the other cases
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Ongoing sectoral measurements 
Latvia  No No
Obligatory to assess 
impacts but not 
enforced
Not obligatory
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: Planned SCM
Lithua-
nia
Planned Planned
Obligatory guidelines 
exist but lack of system-
atic impact assessment
Obligatory 
consultation
No Methodology:  SCM 
Luxem-
bourg
No
Partial (Sim-
pliﬁ  cation/
Administra-
tive costs)
Impact assessment 
sheets exist
Not obligatory
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: Planned SCM
Malta Yes No No Not obligatory No No 
Nether-
lands
Yes
Partial 
(Administra-
tive costs) 
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts. 
Guidelines exist. 
Number of completed 
IAs recorded
Planned obliga-
tory consulta-
tion
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM Measurements: Baseline 
measurement carried out. Planned update of baseline. 
Reduction target: 12% of cost reduction out of 25% 
target already achieved (deadline 2007)
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Explicit 
Better 
Regulation 
strategy
Existence of 
institutional 
structure 
dedicated 
to Better 
Regulation 
Impact 
assessments 
Consultation 
of stakeholders
Simpliﬁ  cation 
Administrative 
costs 
Poland  Yes Yes
Obligatory to assess 
impacts but not 
enforced. Planned: IA 
guidelines 
Obligatory 
consultation but 
not enforced. 
Guidelines exist. 
Ad-hoc 
simpliﬁ  cation 
measures
Methodology: SCM Measurements: Planned baseline 
measurement should start in 2008 at the latest 
Portugal Yes Yes 
Assessment of 
administrative burden 
only
Guidelines 
drafted but 
not yet 
implemented
Newly 
introduced 
simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM
Slovakia No No
Obligatory to assess 
impacts but not 
enforced. No 
guidelines available. 
Planned: Improvement 
of the IA system 
Not obligatory No No
Slovenia Yes
No. 
Planned: An 
inter-minis-
terial group
Planned
Obligatory 
consultation
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
No
Spain Yes Yes Guidelines exist  Not obligatory No No
Sweden No No
Guidelines exist. Some 
impacts assessed. 
Planned: improvement 
of the IA system
Obligatory 
consultation but 
not enforced
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Ongoing baseline measurement carried out 
with a step by step approach. 
Reduction target: Sectoral targets set
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Explicit 
Better 
Regulation 
strategy
Existence of 
institutional 
structure 
dedicated 
to Better 
Regulation 
Impact 
assessments 
Consultation 
of stakeholders
Simpliﬁ  cation 
Administrative 
costs 
UK Yes Yes
Obligatory assessment 
of all relevant impacts. 
Number of completed 
IAs recorded
Obligatory 
consultation
Simpliﬁ  cation 
programme
Methodology: SCM Measurements: 
Baseline measurement carried out. Targets planned
Source: Member States and Commission Services (information available to the Commission on 13 October 2006)Explanatory notes to the indicators used:
BR strategy
This column looks at whether an explicit comprehensive and intermeshed Better Regulation strategy or programme, encompassing all main Better Regulation tools is in place. It is compiled on the 
basis of whether a clear political commitment for regulatory reform establishing speciﬁ  c objectives, timetables and frameworks for implementation exists. Such a programme should encompass 
all levels of government and all policy areas, establish principles of good regulation, provide institutional structures for effective coordination, clarify responsibilities for assuring regulatory quality, 
create monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and ensure capacity to implement them.
Institutional structure dedicated to Better Regulation
This column assesses whether there is an institutional structure dedicated to implementing Better Regulation strategy. While its status, composition or size may vary according to the various 
institutional backgrounds in Member States, it should exercise such powers and have at its disposal sufﬁ  cient resources so as to be able to implement and enforce Better Regulation strategy in its 
entirety and across the board. 
Impact assessments
A functioning impact assessment system is characterised by combined sectoral effort in analysing economic, social and environmental impacts of a legislative proposal, considering alternatives to 
regulation if appropriate. Impact assessments are systematically carried out according to given principles and are subject to monitoring and quality check.
Consultation of stakeholders
Systematic consultation of stakeholders is based on clear, consistent and transparent consultation rules allowing for extensive stakeholder input throughout the regulatory process. It ensures that 
minimum consultation standards are applied across the board and consultation results are made public, which allows consulting all affected and potentially interested stakeholders in an account-
able and transparent way.
Simpliﬁ  cation
Simpliﬁ  cation programme or plan, unlike ad-hoc simpliﬁ  cation measures, establishes criteria for a systematic and continuous assessment of the existing legislation, preventing it from becoming 
obsolete, unnecessarily burdensome and costly for business, citizens and public administrations
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Annex Table 4.8: Measure in the 2005 NRPs to improve the business environment
Country Improving registering / permits / licences One stop shops
AT Not mentioned Yes
BE
Use a central Crossroads Banks of Enterprises, 
which will reduce time needed to start 
business from 56 to 3 days.
Yes
CY Not mentioned Not mentioned
CZ
Facilitate incorporation to Commercial regis-
ter, solve “double registration” problem.
Creating a system of central registration 
ofﬁ  ces.
DE
Permits replaced by announcements or max 
period with default effect (Lander level).
Yes
DK Registration property digitalised. Information shops.
EE
Electronic tools for establishing companies 
(2008).
Yes
EL
Simplify licensing process for commercial 
business.
Yes, transforming Citizen’s service centre info 
integrated transaction centre.
ES
Yes, to reduce requirements for presentation 
of documents.
Yes
FI
Yes, by discarding license and registration 
systems for private business.
Business Information System (2001) allow 
business registration in one form.
FR
Yes, by discarding license and registration 
systems for private businesses.
Yes, shortly also one-stop tax contact system.
HU Yes, “notice period” to be introduced. Single counter systems for better information.
IE Not mentioned Not mentioned
IT
Reform “tacit assent” and “start of activity 
notiﬁ  cation”.
Strengthen “single counters”.
LT Not mentioned Not mentioned
LU
Yes, computerisation of business set-up 
procedures.
Not mentioned
LV
Improving Enterprise Register; Joint 
registration system of real estate transactions.
Not mentioned
MT Not mentioned Not mentioned
NL Permit procedure more ﬂ  exible. Yes
PL
From 2007 single registration application will 
be submitted electronically time waiting for 
entry into register shortened.
Yes
PT
Simpliﬁ  cation of notaries and registry acts, 
cutting red tape, on-line registration through 
internet revise license concession.
Yes, development of the “Company in one 
hour project”.
SK Not mentioned Not mentioned
SI Yes, establishing of central registers
It was introduced for sole trade sector from 
2007 also to enterprises.
SE Not mentioned
UK
Yes, based on greater sharing of data between 
regulators.
Yes
Source: DG Enterprise
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Chapter 5:
The Financing of Innovation
5.1. Introduction
Innovation requires the commitment of resources, 
which in turn need to be ﬁ   nanced. This chapter 
therefore focuses ﬁ   rst on particular ﬁ  nance-related 
problems of innovation and the appropriate policy 
tools to deal with them. Public support can come 
in various forms: direct measures such as grants and 
loans, ﬁ  scal incentives for R&D, and risk capital meas-
ures. This chapter discusses good practice of govern-
ment support, as supported by economic theory, 
and presents policy conclusions. These conclusions 
are then complemented by reviewing the innovation 
ﬁ  nancing measures that member states put forward 
in the National Reform Programmes issued in Octo-
ber 2005.
The decision to invest in innovation depends on two 
critical factors:
–   The incentives to commit resources for innova-
tion, and
–   The capacity to raise the necessary ﬁ  nancial 
means.
Economic policy attempts to intervene in the ﬁ  rms’ 
investment decisions because for both factors, the 
purely private allocation of resources suffers from 
certain deﬁ   ciencies (‘market failures’). This may 
cause private expenditures on innovation to be sub-
optimal from the view of the society as a whole. 
First, the limited appropriability of new knowledge 
frequently causes private returns to fall short of social 
returns and thus leads to under-investment in inno-
vation (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). Since this kind 
of market failure stems from distorted incentives, it 
applies irrespective of the actual ﬁ  nancing capacity 
of the ﬁ  rm. Second, under-investment occurs when 
problems of asymmetric information in the capital 
markets (for instance when a bank has less informa-
tion about the value of a certain project than the 
entrepreneur) undermine a ﬁ  rm’s capacity to raise 
external funds required for ﬁ  nancing its investment, 
even if its incentives were undistorted by external 
effects.
Analytically, both forms of market failure are inde-
pendent causes of under-investment. In practice, 
however, they frequently interact with and reinforce 
each other. This is the case, for example, when the full 
appropriation of returns from an innovation depends 
on ﬁ  rst-mover advantages. In the presence of asym-
metric information, an innovative start-up company 
may lack the necessary external funds to expand 
its operations rapidly enough and thereby keep 
competitors at a comfortable distance. Conversely, 
external investors may be reluctant to provide funds 
because of uncertainty about the entrepreneur’s 
ability to protect the returns from innovation against 
potential imitators.
The latest data from the Community Innovation 
Survey (European Commission, 2004A) put these 
problems in quantitative perspective. When asked 
about factors hampering innovation, 21% of all the 
ﬁ  rms in the sample argue that “innovation costs 
are too high,” 52 while 15% complain about “exces-
sive economic risks” and the “lack of appropriate 
sources of ﬁ  nance.” In all three variables, the shares 
are generally higher for enterprises with innovation 
activity than for those without (Table 5.1). There 
is surprisingly little variation between sectors. 
For both manufacturing and services, the num-
bers are almost equal (numbers are not reported 
in the table). One exception is the utilities sector 
(“electricity, gas, and water supply”), which is the 
least affected sector. Perhaps this can be explained 
by the fact that utilities are often considered to 
belong to the public domain. Conversely, business 
services face the biggest ﬁ  nance-related barriers to 
innovation – probably due to their larger depend-
ence on intangible assets, which makes it particu-
larly difﬁ  cult to access external sources of ﬁ  nance. 
52   For a meaningful interpretation, one might wish to add ‘relative to the 
expected returns’.
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Interestingly, a breakdown by ﬁ   rm size reveals 
relatively few differences with respect to the ﬁ  rst 
two variables. Both small and large ﬁ  rms  per-
ceive the ‘high cost of innovation’ and ‘excessive 
economic risks’ to be obstacles of almost equal 
importance. However, access to appropriate 
sources of ﬁ   nance is a bigger problem among 
small (16%) than among medium-sized enterprises 
(13%), with large ﬁ   rms being the least affected 
(10%). Credit market problems are more pertinent 
to small ﬁ  rms because they can for instance offer 
less collateral.
Focussing on enterprises with innovation activity in the 
period from 1998 to 2000 (Table 5.2), the study found 
that the overall share of ﬁ  rms that received public ﬁ  nan-
cial support is 29%, with a pronounced discrimination 
in favour of industry (35%) as compared to services 
(19%). The observation that the share of companies 
receiving public ﬁ  nancial support is higher for indus-
try applies similarly to local and regional authorities, 
national governments and the European Union. The 
only exceptions are the EUs fourth and ﬁ  fth Framework 
Programmes for RTD, which funded an equal share of 
ﬁ  rms in the services and the industrial sector.
Table 5.1: Finance-related hampering factors (share of ﬁ  rms considering 
them important, 1998 - 2000)
Innovation costs too 
high
Excessive perceived 
economic risks
Lack of appropriate 
sources of ﬁ  nance
Total 21 15 15
Enterprises with innovation activity 24 17 19
Enterprises without innovation activity 19 14 13
Small enterprises 21 16 16
Medium-sized enterprises 19 13 13
Large enterprises 21 18 10
Source: European Commission (2004A).
Table 5.2: Share of innovators with public ﬁ  nancial support
Total Industry Services
Proportion of enterprises with innovation activity that 
received ﬁ  nancial support, EU, 1998-2000
Received public ﬁ  nancial support 29 35 19
From local or regional authorities 15 17 11
From central government 15 18 9
From European Union 7 8 5
From EUs 4th or 5th Framework 
Programmes for RTD
444
Source: European Commission (2004A).
Note: More than one source of public support is possible.
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5.2. Under-investment  because 
of appropriability problems
5.2.1.  Missing markets for knowledge
The ﬁ  rst factor determining the decision to invest 
in innovation refers to the incentives to commit 
resources to innovation activities. Brieﬂ   y, the idea 
here is that under-investment in innovation origi-
nates from missing markets for knowledge, as pri-
vate returns to innovation reaped by the company 
are below the social returns for society at large. 
Being a public good, knowledge has two critical 
properties that seriously impair its commercial value 
(Geroski, 1995). First, knowledge remains in circula-
tion no matter how many people use it (‘non-rivalry’ 
of consumption). Second, as soon as knowledge is 
disclosed, it becomes difﬁ  cult to enforce any pay-
ment (‘non-excludability’). Consequently, many 
innovative ﬁ  rms face the following dilemma: How 
can they communicate the value of a new idea to 
a potential buyer without disclosing the idea itself? 
Innovative ﬁ   rms must therefore deliberately man-
age their knowledge ﬂ  ows in a way that maximises 
their private returns for a given innovation. Geroski 
(1995) lists a number of strategies for individual 
enterprises, among them use of intellectual property 
rights, secrecy, lead time and learning curve advan-
tages, or embodied knowledge (‘sell products, not 
ideas’).
Depending on the particular technological and 
market characteristics, some strategies will be 
more effective than others, but overall, an inno-
vative ﬁ   rm cannot expect to fully prevent the 
uncompensated diffusion of new knowledge. Fre-
quently, competitors, suppliers, or customers reap 
part of the beneﬁ  ts of an innovation, even though 
they may have contributed little or nothing to it. 
The adequate policy response can rely on various 
instruments. One direct means is the strengthen-
ing of the appropriability conditions through an 
effective system of intellectual property rights. 
Another policy instrument is the public provision 
of basic research with little or no immediate com-
mercial value, but the potential of creating posi-
tive externalities favouring industrial applications in 
the long run. This chapter is concerned with public 
interventions in the ﬁ  rms’ investment decisions by 
means of a ﬁ  nancial transfer changing the relative 
cost of innovation activities.
5.2.2.  The principles of ‘additionality’
The general objective of public ﬁ  nancial aid to inno-
vation is ‘output additionality’, which requires the 
generation of additional private and social returns 
through the subsidy. The overriding concern in 
policy design, however, is the question of leverage 
versus displacement effects, i.e. whether and how 
public subsidies affect private investments in inno-
vation. In that regard, the basic criterion is ‘input 
additionality’, which means that private expendi-
tures rise at least by an amount that is equal to 
the cost savings from the public subsidy. Positive 
leverage is achieved if private investments rise by 
more than the subsidy (for instance because the 
subsidy improves the bargaining power of the R&D 
department within an organisation, or because it 
is perceived as a quality signal by external inves-
tors in case of liquidity constraints). Conversely, if 
‘crowding-out’ occurs, the subsidies displace (part 
of the) private investments that ﬁ  rms would have 
undertaken anyway. The foregone opportunity to 
direct the public resources towards a better use 
with positive leverage constitutes the social cost of 
policy failure.  53
One must suspect that, in practice, these ‘windfall 
gains’ are quite common. First, public authorities are 
unlikely to deny their support precisely to the most 
promising innovation projects, which in turn are most 
likely to be undertaken anyway. David et al. (2000) 
mention two causes: (i) the pressures within public 
agencies for ‘high success rates’, and (ii) the pressure 
from vested interests, which generally increases with 
the size of prospective private pay-offs of an invest-
ment. Furthermore, even if public agencies had the 
power and will to deny the ﬁ  nancing of the most 
successful innovating companies, one must acknowl-
edge that in practice the principle of additionality 
remains extremely difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  ne and monitor at 
an operational level.
To reconcile theory with policy practice, one may 
derive some comfort from the consideration that 
even in the presence of ‘windfall gains’, where 
the public has little leverage on private expen-
ditures for innovation, public subsidies may well 
‘reward’ innovative companies for the positive 
externalities they generate. Alternatively, one may 
deﬁ  ne different success criteria for a policy, where 
the objectives go beyond that of increasing the 
money spent on innovation, but instead address a 
desired change of behaviour. A typical example of 
‘behavioural additionality’ is a grant that the ﬁ  rm 
receives depending on its participation in regional 
networks, cluster initiatives or some cooperation 
between science and business. The intention is to 
raise the social returns from investments in inno-
vation by altering the behaviour of private ﬁ  rms 
through the subsidy.
53   In addition to these micro-level effects, David et al. (2000) emphasise a 
macro-level displacement effect, which is due to the upward pressure on 
the prices for inputs to innovation, such as high-skilled R&D personnel.
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5.2.3. Empirical  trends
Public ﬁ   nancial support to private investments in 
innovation comes in either of two different forms:
–   The direct funding of a part of the targeted 
expenditures, or
–   Fiscal incentives allowing companies to reduce 
their tax payments.
Graph 5.1 demonstrates that individual countries 
choose very different combinations of the two 
policy tools. On the vertical axis, the share of busi-
ness expenditures on R&D funded by government 
is a relatively straightforward measure for the use 
of direct subsidies in innovation policy. Conversely, 
the OECD’s B-index has become the standard tool 
to assess the relative generosity of ﬁ  scal incentives 
for research and development.  54 The generosity of 
the tax treatment increases along the horizontal axis 
of Graph 5.1. Each line connects the position of a 
particular country with respect to the two measures 
indicated by small dots for the year 1991 and large 
dots for the latest year available, i.e. 2003 for the 
share of government ﬁ  nanced BERD and 2004 for 
the B-index. Following a convention by the OECD, 
one can distinguish four segments of countries with:
–   Strong direct funding and unfavourable tax treat-
ment: No country belonged to that quarter in 
2003/2004 and only a few were located there in 
1991 (e.g., Norway, the UK, and Italy);
–   Little direct funding and unfavourable tax treat-
ment: Interestingly, in 2003/2004, this particu-
larly low proﬁ   le of ﬁ   nancial support for R&D 
applied to some of the technologically most suc-
cessful European countries such as Finland and 
Sweden, where dynamic private expenditures 
appear to have outgrown the public subsidies for 
innovation;
–   Little direct funding and favourable tax treatment: 
This quarter is where the majority of countries 
moved during the 1990s and where we also ﬁ  nd 
the (unweighted) average of the EU-15;
–   Strong direct funding and favourable tax treatment: 
This section of the chart is comprised of countries 
such as Italy, Spain, Norway, France, UK and the 
USA, which are all characterised by relatively gen-
erous public support to R&D.
54   Warda (2001) deﬁ  nes the B-index as the ratio of the after-tax cost per unit 
of R&D expenditures to one minus the corporate income tax. The index 
takes the value 1 if all R&D expenditures are fully deductible in the current 
year; less than 1 when they are more than fully deductible; and greater 
than 1 in case the R&D expenditures are not fully deductible. An increasing 
index thus indicates a less generous tax treatment. The B-index is calcu-
lated with 90% current expenditures and 10% capital expenditures for all 
countries. The B-index does not discriminate between different deﬁ  nitions 
of innovation and according R&D expenditures, which may, however, seri-
ously affect the overall scope and impact of the ﬁ  scal incentives.
Despite the overall variety in the policy mix of indi-
vidual countries, we ﬁ  nd a general trend of decreas-
ing shares of government-ﬁ  nanced business expen-
ditures on R&D. The downward shift has been most 
pronounced in the United States (30% in 1981; 21% 
in 1991, and 10% in 2003) and in France (25%, 
22%, and 11%, respectively). Most other countries 
experienced a similar development. For the EU-15 
the respective shares declined from 19% in 1981 to 
about 13% in 1991 and ﬁ  nally 8% in the year 2003. 
For the EU-25 it declined from about 11% in 1995 to 
8% in 2003. While the tax treatment of R&D expen-
ditures became more generous during the same 
period, the relative importance of the two forms of 
innovation policies has thus dramatically shifted in 
favour of ﬁ  scal incentives and against direct funding 
instruments. This trend has the advantage that R&D 
support becomes more neutral with regard to tech-
nology area, although direct funding instruments 
will be the preferred strategy in case of areas with 
clearly identiﬁ  ed knowledge spillovers.
5.2.4. Direct  funding
The most important difference between ﬁ  scal incen-
tives and direct funding is that, by using direct funds, 
governments have more scope to make deliberate 
choices about which projects they want to support, 
whereas ﬁ  scal incentives generally leave that to the 
ﬁ  rms themselves. The higher degree of public inter-
vention in private decision-making is the price that 
direct funding schemes pay for the opportunity to 
better discriminate between projects. The potential 
pay-off is the higher leverage by targeting public 
resources more narrowly, for instance, by targeting 
projects with particularly high externalities. How-
ever, direct subsidies may also target other social 
objectives, such as the support of small and medium-
sized enterprises, start-up companies, regional cohe-
sion, or other public ‘missions’ in the sense of prior-
ity concerns of the society at large. The typical tools 
are either grants or public loans at low interest rates. 
Sometimes loans are conditionally reimbursable (i.e. 
repayable only if the innovation is successful). The 
criteria for the selection of applications can be very 
diverse, as are the intensities and standards of moni-
toring and governance. The competitive allocation 
through calls is certainly the most transparent pro-
cedure and therefore desirable, but not universally 
applied.
In contrast to ﬁ  scal incentives, which naturally apply 
only to those levels of political governance that are 
empowered to make their own tax laws, any local, 
regional, national, supranational or even non-govern-
mental  55 authority can in principle pay direct subsi-
55  Trade unions, alumni networks, charities, environmentalist groups, etc.
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dies.  56 Furthermore, innovation policy is a fairly cur-
rent issue (compared, for instance, to other ﬁ  elds such 
as industrial or competition policy). Parallel to the 
increasing awareness of the importance of innovation 
in the process of economic development, innovation 
policy has dramatically grown over the past decades, 
producing an ever-increasing number of agencies 
and initiatives, which have emerged in immediate 
response to newly perceived needs (Mowery, 1995). 
Consequently, there is a huge variety of programs 
providing direct funding of innovation activities.
To a certain degree, this diversity is also rooted in 
the heterogeneous nature of the sources of positive 
externalities of innovation as well as the variety of 
objectives and goals among different levels of gov-
ernance and political territories. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a growing concern about the fragmen-
tation of too many different programmes operating 
at sub-optimal levels. In many instances, the conse-
quence is a lack of transparency and coordination. 
The European Commission’s ‘TrendChart on Innova-
tion’ systematically collects and shares information 
on innovation policies in the EU member states, at 
the level of individual measures.
56   If permitted under European State aid rules and the relevant WTO provi-
sions. In line with the State Aid Action Plan, the Commission intends to 
adopt a new Community Framework for State aid for Research, Develop-
ment and Innovation before the end of 2006.
The major barrier for the attempted exchange of good 
practices in the area of direct ﬁ  nancial aid to innovation 
activities is the lack of harmonised standards and tools 
for the evaluation of the manifold programmes and ini-
tiatives. This makes it difﬁ  cult to compare their actual 
impact on private investment decisions and to derive 
principles of best practice. David et al. (2000) survey 
about 30 different evaluation studies, which primarily 
lead them to stress the diversity in the aims and scope 
of the programmes as well as the reported impacts. 
Referring to the criterion of ‘input additionality’, they 
draw the cautious but positive conclusion that “at this 
time, the econometric results obtained from careful 
studies at both the micro- and macro-levels tend to 
be running in favour of ﬁ  ndings of complementarity 
between public and private R&D investments” (David 
et al., 2000, p. 500). A similar conclusion is reached 
in an earlier edition of the European Competitiveness 
Report (European Commission, 2004B).57
5.2.5. Fiscal  incentives
Among ﬁ  scal incentives, several instruments can be 
distinguished. First, all OECD countries allow ﬁ  rms to 
directly deduct their current expenditures on R&D 
57   Speciﬁ   cally, the presented econometric results suggest that a 1 Euro 
increase of R&D subsidies will generate an increase in total private R&D 
spending of about 1.4 euro.
Graph 5.1: Direct vs. indirect subsidies – small dots indicate a country’s position in 1991, 
large dots in the latest year available (2003/ 2004)
Source: adapted and updated from OECD (2003A).
Note: (i) The B-index is deﬁ  ned as the income before tax needed to break even on one dollar of R&D outlay. 
See Warda (2001) for a detailed explanation. BERD means ‘business expenditures on research and development’.
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from their taxable income, and many countries have 
similar provisions, for instance, for current expen-
ditures on training or marketing activities. If one 
interprets these expenditures (as one should do) as 
investments in intangible assets generating income 
over a longer period, such provisions constitute a 
generous subsidy in form of accelerated deprecia-
tion. In addition to this immediate depreciation of 
current expenditures, a number of countries apply 
accelerated depreciation rules for R&D equipment; 
some countries even for buildings that are used 
for R&D.  58 Second, tax allowances offer ﬁ  rms  the 
opportunity to deduct an additional percentage of 
their expenditures on innovation from their tax base. 
Third, tax credits allow ﬁ  rms to deduct a certain per-
centage of the targeted expenditures directly from 
their tax liabilities.
Since ﬁ  scal subsidy schemes typically relate to cor-
porate income taxes, they can only raise the incen-
tives for proﬁ  table ﬁ  rms. They have no impact, for 
instance, on high-tech start-ups making little or no 
proﬁ  t because they have reinvested all their cash ﬂ  ow 
in order to grow fast and be among the ﬁ  rst movers 
in their respective market. As a fourth instrument to 
remedy this situation, one can directly pay an inno-
vation premium to those companies that have not 
earned a positive taxable income. One may also 
apply carry-forward or carry-backward rules, which 
allow carrying over the claim on certain beneﬁ  ts to 
a period where the ﬁ  rm is liable to pay taxes on its 
returns.
Finally, one may consider an alternative tax base, 
as in the case of the Netherlands, where an R&D 
rebate can be deducted from the employer’s part 
of the wage tax and social security contribution of 
R&D-related personnel. The ﬁ   scal incentives thus 
apply to companies of all legal forms (including self-
employed entrepreneurs) and directly link the cost 
reduction to the activities of the R&D department, 
which may effectively raise its bargaining power 
for the allocation of funds within the ﬁ  rm. In addi-
tion, this scheme offers special provisions for com-
panies younger than 5 years and favours small and 
medium-sized enterprises through a nonlinear rate 
that decreases with certain thresholds of ﬁ  rm turno-
ver and includes an upper limit on the total rebate.59 
The Dutch system has been repeatedly quoted as a 
best practice model (see, for example, Hutschenre-
iter, 2002). Interestingly, Belgium (wage tax exemp-
tion) and Spain (bonuses for social security contribu-
tions) have announced similar measures for research 
58  For further details, see OECD (2003A).
59   CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis has done several 
studies on the impact of the Dutch R&D support programme on innova-
tion activity. An overview can be found in Cornet et al. (2006). Empirical 
research suggests that one Euro spent by the government on this provi-
sion generates between 50 and 80 cents of additional R&D employment.
personnel in their National Reform Programmes (see 
section 4 below).
All these schemes implicitly assume that ﬁ  scal incen-
tives have the power to inﬂ  uence the private decision 
to invest in innovation. However, the actual lever-
age depends on the price elasticity of investments, 
i.e. the extent to which a reduction of the cost due 
to the subsidy induces ﬁ  rms to spend more on the 
targeted class of expenditures. Hall and Van Reenen 
(2000) survey a considerable number of empirical 
studies that apply different methods and data sources 
and consequently produce very diverse results. The 
majority of later estimates, however, are broadly in 
line with a macro-panel study by Bloom, Grifﬁ  th and 
Van Reenen (2002), who report that a 10% fall in the 
cost of R&D stimulates just over a 1% rise in the level 
of R&D in the short run, but about a 10% rise in the 
long run. In other words, ﬁ  scal incentives increase 
private expenditures on R&D by an amount that is 
equal to the loss in tax revenues. On average and 
in the long run, they therefore pass the basic crite-
rion of ‘input additionality’, i.e. the public resources 
spent for the tax incentives do not displace private 
expenditures but constitute additional investments 
in innovation.
The actual impact of tax incentives in a particular 
country can vary considerably, depending on the 
precise design of its ﬁ  scal scheme. One critical choice, 
for example, is between the level and the increment 
of the targeted expenditures. Incremental schemes 
only subsidise expenditures above (an average of) 
the previous years and thus aim to reduce windfall 
gains. The goal is to raise the leverage of additional 
investments per unit of public subsidy. However, 
incremental schemes also have the disadvantage of 
greater complexity, which may cause additional dis-
tortions (e.g., with respect to the timing of invest-
ments) and raise the cost for compliance as well as 
administration.
The Commission will present a Communication later 
in 2006 with detailed guidance for the design and 
evaluation of generally applicable tax incentives for 
R&D.
5.2.6.  Summary and policy conclusions
To summarise this subsection on incentive-related 
causes of under-investment in innovation, each of 
the two general policy tools has speciﬁ  c merits and 
weaknesses. The most important difference is that 
ﬁ  scal incentives leave the allocation of resources to 
the market, whereas in the case of direct subsidies, 
governments can be criticised for imposing their 
own priorities when selecting technologies and 
ﬁ  rms. Conversely, direct subsidies are the more ﬂ  ex-
ible instrument if policy deliberately aims to address 
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important social issues or clearly identiﬁ  ed externali-
ties (such as in case of health care, environmental 
protection, defence, etc.). In particular, direct meas-
ures can be better designed to target those areas 
where the gap between private and social returns 
is largest. In contrast, the majority of tax incentives 
depend on realised proﬁ  ts and thus tend to favour 
expenditures on innovations that are already close 
to the market. Additional spillovers might then be 
relatively weak as compared to more basic innova-
tions that may also need a longer time to produce 
proﬁ  ts. Moreover, it is often argued that direct sub-
sidies involve higher administrative costs for both 
government agencies and funded ﬁ  rms. One must 
also consider, however, that the higher administra-
tive costs arise because of the more careful selection 
and monitoring of projects, which again should raise 
the efﬁ  ciency of the public resources devoted to it.
The optimal combination of ﬁ   scal incentives and 
direct subsidies depends on the particular context, 
aims and priorities of national innovation policies. 
Even though a certain degree of harmonisation is 
desirable from the perspective of a European research 
area (i.e. to mitigate distortions in the international 
location of research activities), the diversity of sys-
tems among member states also offers an opportu-
nity to learn how effective these instruments are in 
practice. However, this opportunity is currently lost, 
since little systematic data is collected and the occa-
sional national evaluations of particular programs 
lack a comparable design and methodology (OECD, 
2003A). There is certainly scope for a more system-
atic and comparable approach to evaluations.
From the above considerations, one may draw the 
following general guidelines for ﬁ  nance-related poli-
cies directed at the externality-induced under-invest-
ment in innovation:
Fiscal incentives should generally be designed such 
that they raise the private willingness to invest in 
innovation without further targeting certain tech-
nologies, sectors, or types of ﬁ  rms. In other words, 
they should comply with the general aim of “neu-
trality” of the tax system. Direct funding will be the 
preferred strategy in case of technologies with clearly 
identiﬁ  ed and sizeable knowledge externalities.
–   A major challenge is to extend the ﬁ  scal incentives 
to innovative businesses with a longer-term view on 
proﬁ  ts. One tool is the direct payment of an inno-
vation premium for companies that do not make 
a proﬁ  t. Rebates on wage tax and social security 
contributions of R&D-related personnel also seem 
to be an attractive, and spreading, approach.
–   Even though some reﬁ  ned designs (e.g., the use 
of incremental expenditures) might raise the efﬁ  -
ciency of the public funds used, their beneﬁ  ts 
must be critically assessed against the additional 
cost for compliance and administration as well as 
unintended distortions.
–   The consolidation and streamlining of direct 
funding schemes should be a priority in order 
to increase the transparency and mutual coor-
dination of the major public players within the 
national and regional systems of innovation.
Since the gap between private and social returns is 
generally presumed to be largest for technological 
innovations as deﬁ  ned in the OECD’s Oslo Manual, 
ﬁ   nancial support schemes typically target private 
expenditures on research and development (with 
some discretion in terms of how generously R&D is 
deﬁ  ned). There remains the issue of non-technologi-
cal innovations  60, such as the introduction of new 
business practices, organisational models, etc. On 
one hand, and as long as there exists a clear cause 
of non-appropriability and positive spillovers, they 
could, in principle, be considered for public sup-
port but, on the other hand, difﬁ  culties would arise 
with respect to the precise deﬁ  nition of such inno-
vations and with the establishment of effective rules 
for governance and, in particular, the discrimination 
between potential beneﬁ  ciaries.
5.3. Under-investment  because 
of capital market imperfections
5.3.1. The  ﬁ  nancing gap
The overall function of capital markets in the proc-
ess of economic development is to channel ﬁ  nancial 
resources to their most proﬁ  table uses. Since invest-
ment decisions are based on expectations about 
future returns, they rely on incomplete information 
about future outcomes and thus involve uncertainty. 
The ﬁ   nancing decision is subject to two potential 
types of error. First, to ﬁ  nance projects that fail; and 
second, to deny ﬁ   nancing to projects that would 
have been proﬁ  table. In that situation, the accurate 
selection of the capital market depends on two criti-
cal factors:
– The  availability  of  information, and
–   The ability to interpret it properly, i.e. knowledge.
In the ideal state of perfect capital markets, all 
projects are purely funded on their own merits, i.e. 
independent, for example, of the size of a ﬁ  rm, the 
availability of collateral or a ﬁ   rm’s equity ratio. As 
60   Non technological innovations are covered by the latest version of the 
Oslo manual released by OECD and Eurostat.
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riskier projects have to pay higher interest, markets 
can clear in equilibrium. In practice, however, inter-
est rates are rarely used to discriminate between 
projects and businesses without sufﬁ  cient collateral 
can face credit constraints. The reason is the prob-
lem of asymmetric information between the investor 
and the entrepreneur, which can lead to two types 
of behavioural reactions:
– ‘  Adverse selection’ is a problem of the proper iden-
tiﬁ  cation of the quality of a project. The entrepre-
neur has better information about the expected 
cost and returns, but cannot credibly communi-
cate it to the investor, who has difﬁ  culties to dis-
criminate good projects from bad. The investor 
will then be reluctant to provide ﬁ  nance, or only 
at a higher interest rate.  61
–   ‘Moral hazard’ is an incentive problem, where the 
entrepreneurs may change their behaviour at the 
cost of the investor. Examples are the reduction of 
own effort, growth beyond a ﬁ  rm’s efﬁ  cient scale, 
or increases in the risk proﬁ  le of a project. When 
the costs of the required monitoring become too 
high, the investor prefers to deny the ﬁ  nancing 
even though the project might otherwise have 
been proﬁ  table.
Some enterprises are more affected by restricted 
access to external ﬁ  nance than others are. For small 
enterprises, transaction costs (e.g. the costs of a 
proper risk assessment) can be very high relative to 
the required volume of ﬁ  nance. Additional problems 
arise for young (start-up) companies, because they 
typically have a lack of accumulated cash ﬂ  ow and 
collateral und usually do not have a record of accom-
plishment that may help to establish a good reputa-
tion among creditors. Furthermore, investors must 
take into account the statistical fact that many young 
enterprises fail. Finally, the burden of being a small 
and new company is further aggravated if external 
funds to ﬁ  nance innovation are needed:
–   There is generally more uncertainty and asymme-
try of information since, for instance, the need 
of expert knowledge to assess a ﬁ  nancing project 
increases;
–   More speciﬁ   cally, adverse selection increases 
as entrepreneurs are more reluctant to disclose 
information due to the conﬁ  dential  nature  of 
innovation (fear of imitators);
–   Moral hazard may also increase because the 
investor can hardly distinguish between the lack 
of entrepreneurial effort or the inherent risk of an 
innovation project as causes for failure;
61  See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
–   Innovative ﬁ  rms tend to have few tangible assets 
that can be used as collateral. Instead, they rely 
more on intangible assets residing in an innova-
tive idea, such as highly qualiﬁ   ed (but equally 
mobile) personnel or the ‘present value of growth 
options’.
One must add, however, that companies regularly 
overcome these difﬁ  culties by continuously building 
up their leverage through accumulated cash ﬂ  ow 
and reputation, while ﬁ  nancial intermediaries apply 
their experience and expert knowledge to assess 
and monitor ﬁ  nancing projects. However, the lack 
of access to external ﬁ  nance is particularly prevalent 
when a highly innovative, small or medium-sized 
start-up company faces extraordinary growth oppor-
tunities. It is felt most urgently when an entrepreneur 
needs to expand rapidly in order to appropriate the 
returns from an innovation through the exploitation 
of ﬁ  rst mover advantages. What follows from these 
considerations is that the ‘ﬁ  nancing gap’ affects only 
a limited number of ﬁ  rms, but it is precisely those 
companies that bear the highest potential to drive 
economic development through radical innovations 
and technological change.
5.3.2.  Innovation and the stylised 
‘pecking order’ of corporate ﬁ  nance
The optimal/feasible capital structure typically 
changes over time with the increase of a ﬁ  rm’s age 
and size (Berger and Udell, 1998; Myers, 2001). Due 
to the high degree of informational opacity and the 
associated problems of asymmetric information, 
young and small start-up companies initially rely 
mostly on ‘insider funds’, which primarily include 
the business founders’ own savings and resources 
provided by their immediate social network of family 
members and friends. Other private individuals may 
invest as ‘business angels’, who typically have experi-
ence in running a business and may also support the 
new venture through their experience and network 
of commercial relationships. Moreover, a business 
angel’s involvement in the venture may signal to 
other market participants (including ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions) that the ﬁ  rm has a solid business plan.62
Access to intermediated funds increases as the ﬁ  rms 
grow and successfully build up reputation and tangi-
ble assets. With a growing number of options availa-
62   Inside knowledge about the market and immediate leverage through 
user-supplier relationships explain why trade credit is also an important 
non-intermediated source of ﬁ  nance during a ﬁ  rm’s early stages of devel-
opment. Other examples of ﬁ  nancing sources for very small businesses 
are personal credit cards, home equity loans (entrepreneurs take a mort-
gage on their home), and factoring (someone buys a business’ payables 
at a discount and collects the due bills instead). Such instruments indicate 
how desperate small business owners can become as their continued use 
drains a company’s operating margin and makes it almost impossible to 
accumulate assets (Lupke, 2004).
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ble, the conventional ‘pecking order hypothesis’ pos-
its that ﬁ  rms prefer (i) internal ﬁ  nance from own cash 
ﬂ  ow and retained earnings over external ﬁ  nance; and 
(ii) issue debt before equity in case that the internal 
funds are exhausted. Internal ﬁ  nance is clearly the 
cheapest source simply because it avoids governance 
problems from asymmetric information. Debt ﬁ  nance 
is generally preferred among the sources of external 
ﬁ  nance because of lower issuing costs and the entre-
preneur’s preference to keep ownership and control. 
In contrast, external equity is generally considered 
as a ﬁ  nancing source of last resort. Because of the 
high ﬁ  xed cost of raising equity on the stock market 
and in case of difﬁ  culties to communicate (or reluc-
tance to disclose) the value of its intangible assets, 
small and medium-sized enterprises typically turn to 
private equity and venture capital funds, while large 
companies tend to issue shares directly on the public 
market.
Empirical observations generally support the stylised 
pecking order hypothesis. For example, in a study of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the German 
machinery sector, Harhoff et al. (2001) report that 
more than two thirds of the expenditures on product 
innovations have been raised through internal ﬁ  nance 
(cash ﬂ   ow), followed by bank ﬁ   nance and public 
subsidies. Only few SMEs in the German machinery 
sector have used equity ﬁ  nance.  63 Among external 
sources, the bigger importance of debt versus equity 
ﬁ   nance seems to reﬂ   ect the general preference of 
owner-managers to preserve their independence 
and control of the company, the relatively tangible 
nature of assets in the machinery sector, and, more 
generally, the strength of relationship-based banking 
in Germany.
However, other studies focussing on highly innova-
tive companies draw a different picture. In particular, 
the relatively recent emergence of private equity and 
venture capital markets offers new opportunities and 
might even lead to a partially ‘reversed’ pecking order 
for high-tech companies. For example, Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen (2003) come to this conclusion. In their 
study of the capital structure of more than 750 Finn-
ish small and medium-sized enterprises, the princi-
pal owners are the single most important source of 
funds (29%), followed by trade credits (26% debt 
from “other institutions”) and equity from other 
shareholders as well as debt from ﬁ  nancial interme-
diaries (17% each). As technology-intensive sectors 
were oversampled, these numbers are not represent-
ative for the total economy. What makes this study 
particularly interesting, however, is the additional 
discrimination between innovative ﬁ  rms and others. 
By that comparison, the authors show that innova-
63   However, those who did made considerable use of it, covering on aver-
age 20% of the project cost.
tive companies generally exhibit a lower debt ratio 
and rely more on equity from the principal owner. 
Moreover, they ﬁ  nd that venture capital is the most 
important source of external equity for the ﬁ  rms with 
the highest R&D intensity, while business angels are 
the major external source of equity for SMEs with 
rather low innovative activity.
To present another example, Hogan and Hutson 
(2005) have studied the capital structure of Irish soft-
ware companies, where again self-ﬁ  nancing accounts 
for the largest portion of investments (50%), followed 
by venture capital (28%), private investors (11%), 
and government grants (7%). Bank loans (4%) were 
by far the smallest source of ﬁ  nance in the total sam-
ple (and played no role at all for start-up companies 
that are less than 2 years old). The authors conclude 
that the entrepreneurs in their sample were willing to 
forfeit independence and control in order to pursue 
innovation and maximise the value of their company 
(for potential future selling). This ﬁ  nding might be 
explained through the particularly intangible nature 
of assets in the software sector (lack of collateral), the 
study’s focus on new technology-based ﬁ  rms, and 
the existence of a relatively well-established private 
equity market in Ireland.
In short, while all studies uniformly point at the pre-
dominance of internal ﬁ  nance, the relative weight of 
external equity and debt appears to depend strongly 
on the degree of innovativeness of the activity con-
cerned. Since debt ﬁ   nance is usually secured by 
assets, it is rarely available for high-tech start-ups 
until they have a proven product on the market. The 
longer that may last, the more collateral and ﬁ  nancial 
rewards (interest, equity share) the ﬁ  rm has to offer 
to outside investors. Hall (2002, p. 45) therefore con-
cludes her survey of the literature, stating that “there 
is solid evidence that debt is a disfavoured source of 
ﬁ  nance for R&D investment.” This ﬁ  nally draws our 
attention towards private equity and venture capital, 
which speciﬁ   cally target enterprises that are most 
affected by these capital market imperfections.
5.3.3.  Private equity and venture capital
Private equity refers to external ﬁ  nance by informal 
as well as institutional investors, to enterprises not 
traded on a stock market. Business angels are typical 
informal investors focussing on the earliest stages of 
development, when the required input is still com-
paratively small and the contribution of a wealthy 
individual with particular business experience has 
considerable leverage. The ideal targets are innova-
tive companies, which provide the potential for fast 
growth and quick exit, for instance through the sale 
to a venture capital fund that enters at a later stage. 
Since business angels typically choose their invest-
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ments among informal connections and local net-
works, no reliable records exist about their ﬁ  nancial 
contribution. Other forms of private equity include, 
for instance, management buy-outs (MBOs) and 
management buy-ins (MBIs), which typically apply 
when established ﬁ  rms face some sort of crisis and 
need new capital to ﬁ  nance a radical restructuring of 
their operations.
Venture capital is a special form of institutional pri-
vate equity. Gompers and Lerner (1999, p. 146) 
deﬁ  ne it as “independent, professionally managed, 
dedicated pools of capital that focus on equity and 
equity-linked investments in privately held, high 
growth companies.” Again, innovative companies 
are an ideal target as they promise the best opportu-
nities for rapid growth and an accordingly proﬁ  table 
exit, for instance through an initial public offering 
(IPO) on the public equity markets. The typical busi-
ness model encompasses the following characteris-
tics:
–   An intense commitment in terms of the selection 
and monitoring of projects;
–   The focus on ﬁ  rms with high growth potential;
–   Instead of paying out dividends, cash ﬂ  ow  is 
entirely reinvested to raise the company value;
–   Investments are of limited duration and returns 
are earned by exit (disbursement).
Typically, when taking a stake into an enterprise, 
venture capital funds also bring into it crucial mana-
gerial skills and guidance. This input, together with 
their expertise in the markets and the technologies in 
which they invest, contribute towards reducing thee 
information asymmetries referred to above.
While business angels have already been in place to 
ﬁ  nance, for instance, merchant adventurers of early 
centuries, or new manufacturing plants during the 
times of the industrial revolution, formal venture 
capital represents a recent institutional innovation, 
with the foundation of the American Research and 
Development Corporation (ARD) marking its ofﬁ  cial 
birth in the year 1946. Having gone through differ-
ent phases of modest growth, extraordinary excite-
ment, as well as bust, the US venture capital market 
has developed into an experienced and highly pro-
fessional industry able to overcome part of the afore-
mentioned governance problems from asymmetric 
information through its intense commitment and a 
complex set of specialised contractual tools. 64 Due to 
its high experience and specialisation, the US market 
64   For example, Schuman et al (2001) give an impressive account of the 
process of standardisation and routinisation of contracts that originated 
from the dense community level networks of entrepreneurs, specialised 
law ﬁ  rms and venture capitalists in California’s Silicon Valley.
has been particularly successful in channelling ﬁ  nan-
cial resources to venture capital investments, which 
on average amounted to 0.15% of GDP in the years 
from 1999 to 2002 (OECD, 2003B).
The institutional innovation of venture capital has 
increasingly diffused to other countries. In Europe, 
venture capital markets have gradually evolved since 
the middle of the 80s. According to data from the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2006), 
institutional private equity and venture capital stayed 
at an extremely low level until the second half of the 
90s, when it ﬁ  nally took off for a rapid expansion 
until the high-tech bubble burst in the years 2000 
and 2001 (Graph 5.2). As new investments dropped 
sharply, fundraising has followed a modest pace until 
2004. During those years, the overriding concern 
was to prove to investors that the business model 
of private equity and venture capital can indeed 
outperform alternative uses of the funds raised (see, 
e.g., Dantas Machado and Raade, 2006), while the 
cumulated difference between the new funds raised 
and those invested within the same year indicated 
sufﬁ  cient liquidity in the market.  65
In 2005, total funds raised were about €72 bil-
lion, with 10,915 companies receiving new invest-
ments that amounted to €47 billion.  66 On average, 
the share of total private equity investments in GDP 
amounted to 0.42%.
Another characteristic is the large disparity in the 
development of the private equity markets between 
European countries. In 2005, the share of private 
equity investments in GDP ranged from 1.33% in 
the United Kingdom and 1.06% in Sweden, followed 
at a distance by Denmark (0.51%), the Netherlands 
(0.47%) or France (0.43%) and countries such as Aus-
tria (0.06%) and Hungary (0.05%), the Czech Repub-
lic (0.02%), and ﬁ  nally Greece or the Slovak Republic 
with less than 0.01% at the bottom end of the dis-
tribution. Similarly, if one turns to the net difference 
between the private equity managed and invested 
in a particular country (Graph 5.3), the United King-
dom outperforms all other European countries. From 
2001 to 2005, British funds managed approximately 
8 billion euros more private equity per year than had 
been invested in the UK by all European countries 
taken together.  67 Their private equity industries thus 
65   However, to avoid misinterpretations, one must take into account the 
considerable time lag between the commitment of funds and their actual 
investment. To give an example, a venture fund with a limited life span of 
ten years may invest the capital that was initially committed at its begin-
ning during the next ﬁ  ve or six years of operations.
66   European venture capital ﬁ  rms tend to make a large number of small 
investments, as opposed to the United States’ strategy of making fewer 
larger investments. This fragmentation of venture capital investments in 
Europe could lead to reduced proﬁ  tability of European venture capital; 
see also European Commission (2006).
67   Unfortunately, the data do not include private equity investments from 
non-European countries.
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helped to ﬁ  nance entrepreneurs in other countries 
with less developed markets, such as France, Italy, 
or Germany, all of which receive more private equity 
investments than are managed by the funds located 
in their own country.
It would be futile, however, to hope that this cross-
national ﬂ  ow of investments could fully compensate 
for the lack of a developed local market. The rea-
son is that the geographical spread of companies 
managing private equity is relatively restricted, pre-
cisely because of their intense commitment to the 
selection and monitoring of individual investments. 
Cross-border investments are therefore most likely to 
catch the ‘big ﬁ  sh’, many of them presumably later 
stage ﬁ  nancing, whereas smaller companies in the 
seed and start-up stages still depend on the available 
local expertise.
A closer look at the stage distribution of private 
equity investments in Europe reveals that during the 
period between 2001 and 2005, on average 63% of 
the total funds were invested in buyouts and other 
later stage investments (Graph 5.4), with the major-
ity going to the expansion stage and start-up com-
panies, while seed ﬁ  nancing received less than 1%. 
Since later stage ﬁ   nancing consumes much more 
resources per investment than the others do, their 
Graph 5.2: The evolution of European private equity and venture capital funds
Source: EVCA.
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overall share in terms of companies funded drops 
accordingly, whereas ﬁ   rms in the expansion stage 
are the largest single recipients of private equity, fol-
lowed by start-up companies.  68
Turning to divestments and comparing the ﬁ  ve-year 
averages for 1996 to 2000 with those for 2001 to 
2005, the boom and bust period has left its traces 
(Graph 5.5). The shares of write-offs and of the resid-
ual category ‘other means’ (that is mostly comprised 
of sales to other ﬁ  nancial institutions) have increased, 
68   Of similar interest, the overall share of high-tech investments is approxi-
mately 20% (ﬁ  ve-year average from 2001 to 2005). This number stems 
from the subjective judgement by the PE/VC managers in the annual 
EVCA surveys. In the aftermath of the bursting high-tech bubble, it brieﬂ  y 
dropped to 12.5% in 2002.
while at the same time, the shares of new public 
offerings and trade sales have decreased. However, 
by 2005, the divestment by write-off was only at 
4.7%, considerably below the share of exit by pub-
lic offerings with 8.9%. Divestment by other means 
amounted to 63.8%, while trade sales accounted for 
22.6%.
5.3.4.  Summary and policy conclusions
Like other investments, innovation activities are pre-
dominantly ﬁ   nanced by internal sources, i.e. from 
current cash ﬂ   ow and retained earnings. External 
ﬁ   nance is needed when investment opportuni-
ties are higher than a ﬁ  rm’s self-ﬁ  nancing capacity. 
Graph 5.4: Stage distribution of investments 2001-2005
Source: EVCA.
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Even then, large and established companies with a 
proven record of saleable products can easily turn 
to ﬁ  nancial intermediaries or public equity markets 
in case the scope of new investments exhausts their 
self-ﬁ  nancing capacity. The problem of a ‘ﬁ  nancing 
gap’ due to capital market imperfections is a speciﬁ  c 
concern of young and small enterprises, particularly 
those that pursue an innovation and try to expand 
fast for the timely appropriation of its returns. These 
ﬁ  rms are most likely to miss an investment opportu-
nity because of the lack of access to external ﬁ  nance 
if the following factors coincide:
–  great opportunity (i.e. ﬁ  nancing need), 
–   high risk for investors because of asymmetric 
information, and
–  a lack of own cash ﬂ  ow or collateral.
In short, while positive externalities constitute a gen-
eral rationale for public support, which is primarily 
conditioned on the merits of a particular project and 
not of the ﬁ  rm, the lack of access to ﬁ  nance calls for 
policies that speciﬁ  cally target a certain type of enter-
prise.  69 The central concern is to enable and foster 
the ‘deal ﬂ  ow’ from the early invention of novel ideas 
(for example, at a university lab) to business plans 
and their ﬁ  rst application in a start-up company, and, 
eventually, to the subsequent growth and expansion 
of a new high-tech enterprise.  70 The initial volume 
and quality of such innovation activities depends on 
a multitude of factors that have already been dis-
cussed in earlier sections of this report. Examples are 
the intellectual property regime, networking, tech-
nology transfer between science and business, public 
investments in human capital formation and public 
research, and many more. At this point, we focus on 
ﬁ  nance-related measures.
In earlier reports, both the European Commission 
(2003A) and the OECD (2003B) have listed par-
ticular policy recommendations, which should not 
be repeated here. The following assortment selects 
the major lines of recommendable actions from the 
ﬁ   nancing perspective, organised along the imagi-
nary ‘deal ﬂ  ow’ from new ideas to proﬁ  table business 
applications:
–   To begin at the earliest stages, public support 
should carry or share the cost of activities serv-
69   In popular discussions, it is sometimes argued that venture capital might 
be (come) a private sector alternative to public sector subsidies for R&D. 
The present discussion has clearly shown that this cannot be the case, since 
both address two very distinct sources of under-investment in innovation.
70   An interesting initiative to encourage science-industry interaction while 
addressing the two types of market failures (knowledge spillovers and 
capital market imperfections) in an appropriate fashion is the Small 
Business Innovation Development Act implemented in the US. The pro-
gramme provides pre-competitive ﬁ   nancing (i.e. grants) to take R&D 
from the proof of concept stage to prototype. Thereafter, private ﬁ  nanc-
ing should take over (see Canton et al. (2005) for an overview of this 
and other initiatives to promote knowledge transfer between science and 
industry).
ing to match nascent entrepreneurs, e.g. from 
academic research, with commercial investors. 
The reason is that the transaction costs of incuba-
tor schemes, technology transfer platforms and 
other  ‘bridging-mechanisms’ are unlikely to be 
fully covered by commercial interest alone.
–   On the investor side, business angels are particu-
larly important for the earliest stages in the deal 
ﬂ  ow of small-sized investments. To them, a similar 
argument for subsidies to cover (part of) the trans-
action costs for networking and mentoring activi-
ties applies. As informal investors, business angel 
networks typically operate at the local level, while 
interlinkages with institutional investors of pri-
vate equity and venture capital could be fostered 
through national or even European initiatives.
–   Business angel syndicates, which pool their invest-
ments or operate as ‘side funds’ of institutional 
investors, and venture capital funds should be 
equally eligible for eventual tax and regulatory 
advantages.
–   The direct provision of publicly ﬁ  nanced venture 
capital should exclusively address the gap in early 
stage ﬁ  nancing, and particularly focus on the area 
of seed investments, where private venture capital 
is extremely reluctant to enter. To avoid the fre-
quent move of public initiatives towards the same 
segments as the private sector, a clear policy ration-
ale and regular evaluations of compliance are nec-
essary. Otherwise, public funds might crowd out 
private capital and thus inhibit the development 
of a mature and self-supporting venture capital 
industry. Of particular relevance in this context are 
the recently adopted by the European Commission 
new Guidelines on State aid to promote Risk Capi-
tal (European Commission, 2006B).
–   The Commission’s Risk Capital Action Plan, 
adopted in 1998 and gradually implemented 
up to 2003, was launched with the objective of 
eliminating persistent regulatory and administra-
tive barriers, at Community and national levels, 
which may impede the creation of a truly single 
market in the risk capital area (European Commis-
sion, 2003B). Building on this, the Commission 
(Commission, 2006C) has recently announced a 
number of actions it will take to improve access to 
ﬁ  nance and invited the Member States to join it 
in promoting ﬁ  nance for innovative SMEs. Taken 
together such policies should allow the tripling of 
early stage venture capital investments by 2013.
–   As a resourceful fund of funds investor, the EIF 
(European Investment Fund) not only provides 
capital, but also uses its expertise and leverage 
to promote quality and professional standards 
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of investment practices in the funds it invests 
(‘behavioural additionality’). Funds with a clear 
focus on seed and start-up ﬁ  nancing should get 
preferential treatment.
–   The European Community has initiated a number 
of actions to provide risk ﬁ  nance at European level. 
Examples are the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Programme (CIP) and the Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility (RSFF). Also, to Joint European Resources 
for Micro to Medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) pro-
gramme provides a way to use structural funds 
to improve access to ﬁ  nance for small businesses 
(see European Commission, 2006).
As the regulatory environment differs substantially 
between European Member States, the following rec-
ommendations on the speciﬁ  c framework conditions 
for the ﬁ  nance of private equity and venture capital 
will be of varying relevance to different countries:
–   Quantitative restrictions on institutional investors 
(e.g. pension funds and insurance companies) 
should reﬂ  ect the ‘prudent’ investor rule as prac-
tised; for example, in the US (i.e. individual high-
risk investments can become acceptable within a 
diversiﬁ  ed portfolio).
–   The establishment of European standards for the 
regulation and taxation of private equity funds 
might foster tax transparency and ease cross bor-
der ﬂ  ows. National corporate and tax laws should 
adopt best practices from the most developed 
markets, for instance in the US and the UK, which 
obviate the double taxation of returns at the level 
of funds and investors. The beneﬁ  ts of mobility of 
venture capital have been clearly pointed out in 
a recent expert group report (European Commis-
sion 2006D). A main conclusion was that cross-
border investments would be far more signiﬁ  cant 
if funds did not encounter substantial administra-
tive burdens and restrictions into cross-border 
deals or capital raising.
Alternative to the public provision of equity funds, 
public loan or equity guarantee measures offer an 
insurance against the failure of particular invest-
ments. As they more immediately address the under-
lying risk of an investment as a principal source of 
the ﬁ   nancing gap, its potential leverage on pri-
vate investments is considerable. Loan guarantees 
are well established in most countries, but mostly 
designed as horizontal measures for SMEs with lit-
tle discrimination for the degree of innovation 
(European Commission, 2003A). Equity guarantees 
are a more recent development and either address 
individual investments or an equity funds portfolio. 
They are particularly favoured by countries that try to 
entice investors into venture capital markets that are 
little developed. However, guarantee schemes are 
afﬂ  icted by two major shortcomings: (i) the danger 
of increasing moral hazard by raising the risk proﬁ  le 
of an investment or reducing one’s effort to avert 
failure; and (ii) the problem of taking on the risk of 
investments that would have been undertaken any-
way (windfall gains). The following design principles 
help to mitigate them:
–   First, public guarantees, even if intended as a 
subsidy, should always require a risk premium 
that has to be paid by the investor because the 
fee helps to discriminate against investments that 
do not really need it.
–   Second, investors should be obliged to carry part 
of the risk (i.e. the guarantee covers less than 
100%) in order to maintain a minimum of indi-
vidual exposure to the consequences of failure.
5.4. Innovation  ﬁ  nancing 
measures in the National Reform 
Programmes
The integrated guidelines adopted by the Council 
for the period 2005-2008 invite member states to 
increase and improve investment in R&D, in particu-
lar by private business (guideline 7) and to facilitate 
all forms of innovation (guideline 8). Financing is 
addressed in guideline 7, more particularly, by the 
invitation to develop and make better use of incentives 
to leverage private R&D and in guideline 8 by the 
invitation to focus on better access to domestic and 
international ﬁ  nance. Broadly speaking, these policy 
recommendations address, respectively, the appro-
priability problems analysed in section 2 and to the 
capital market imperfections analysed in section 3.
Member states addressed these issues extensively, 
often – but not always – giving considerable detail 
as to the measures they plan to launch, either new 
or in order to reinforce existing schemes. All mem-
ber states refer to measures targeting at least one 
of the main modes of innovation ﬁ  nancing (grants, 
tax incentives and venture capital) with many cov-
ering all three of them (see Table 5.3). A review of 
the NRPs conﬁ  rms the empirical trends identiﬁ  ed in 
subsections 5.2.3 and 5.3.3 above.
Fiscal measures are indeed more preferred than 
direct grants when Member States announce new 
measures. Twelve members states announce meas-
ures in both grant and ﬁ  scal scheme areas while only 
Estonia ignores them both. In certain cases the grant 
schemes serve more general purposes than support-
ing private research and innovation, such as promot-
ing new investment in general, the modernisation of 
enterprises or their technological upgrade. In other 
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cases, they are rather narrowly deﬁ  ned, for instance 
targeting only collaborative projects.
There is considerable variation as concerns the way 
ﬁ  scal incentives are applied with all possible instru-
ments presented in section 5.2.5 above being used 
by at least one member state. Most new measures 
announce din this area are of a qualitative nature 
(reorganisation, simpliﬁ   cation) while for tax con-
cessions many countries announce reinforcement 
of existing schemes or studying the introduction of 
new ones. By looking at which member states do 
not use or plan to use tax incentives, there appears 
a clear differentiation between old and new member 
states. In the ﬁ  rst group one ﬁ  nds only Germany and 
Finland while in the second belong Cyprus, Latvia, 
Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The gen-
erally lower corporate taxation rates applying in new 
member states probably explain this difference.
Venture capital funds exist almost everywhere and 
the vast majority of member states refer to those in 
their NRPs. Here again, variation in the design of the 
measures is wide: establishment of new funds (e.g. 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Portugal), 
restructuration and reinforcement of existing ones 
(Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Swe-
den, UK), measures to improve the framework con-
ditions for further development of venture capital 
funds (Austria, UK) or the removal of unfavourable 
bias in the tax system against venture capital funds 
(Belgium, Finland). The provision of early stage 
ﬁ  nance (seed capital and investment in start ups) is 
addressed speciﬁ  cally in Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia. Six member 
states (Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Spain, Portu-
gal and the UK) announce measures targeting spe-
ciﬁ  cally Business Angels. In addition, France refers to 
the set up of a new segment of Euronext (Alternext) 
to facilitate the funding of innovative SMEs.
Financing innovation through credit institutions 
enjoys much less attention in the NRPs. Although 
measures to facilitate the access of SMEs to credit 
markets are much more common, only Germany, 
Italy and Spain include in their NRPs measures tar-
geting loans for research and innovation projects. 
This points to a possible gap in policies supporting 
innovation ﬁ  nancing since, as seen in section 5.3.2 
above, debt remains a channel that many entrepre-
neurs prefer over equity.
In spite of the existence of cross-border venture capi-
tal ﬂ  ows as documented in section 5.3.3 above, it is 
surprising that only Finland refers in its NRP to the 
need to facilitate foreign venture capital inﬂ  ows. This 
points to the existence of another possible policy 
gap, i.e. facilitating further the mobility of venture 
capital in Europe.
Finally, if the diversity of instruments is justiﬁ  ed by 
the diversity of local situations, the complexity of 
support schemes clearly can be a hindering factor 
for enterprises seeking support, especially for new 
and small ones. Many member states announce the 
overhaul of their support schemes and the restruc-
turation and modernisation of their venture capital 
industry. Others establish-or plan to establish- new 
funds and institutions, which will be added to exist-
ing ones. In many cases there seems to be a need for 
simpler schemes and more accessible instruments, 
as well as for ﬂ  anking measures to raise awareness 
and disseminate information to possible recipients. 
On the other hand, diversity may be a source of peer 
policy learning and exchange of good practices, as 
has been the case in the area of early stage equity 
ﬁ  nance (Commission 2005).
5.5. Summary  and  conclusions
Innovation ﬁ  nancing is an area where public inter-
vention is justiﬁ   ed by the existence of externali-
ties that affect incentives to innovate and ﬁ  nancial 
market imperfections that affect the channelling of 
resources to innovative projects. Public interven-
tion typically uses instruments from one or more of 
the following types of measures: direct grants, ﬁ  scal 
incentives and measures to strengthen the provision 
off venture capital.
Over the last years, there has been a shift in favour 
of ﬁ   scal incentives and against direct funding, in 
terms of policy development. The National reform 
Programmes that member states issued in October 
2005 conﬁ  rm this trend. They also reﬂ  ect the grow-
ing importance for public authorities of having a 
robust venture capital industry, by reporting ongo-
ing; stepped up or new actions in almost all mem-
ber states. A notable group of countries announce 
actions also for business angels. This said, little atten-
tion is paid, at least in the NRPs, to facilitating the 
mobility of venture capital. The same applies to debt 
ﬁ  nancing of innovative projects, with only a small 
number of member states announcing measures to 
this respect.
The broad variety of schemes and instruments, as 
well as the frequently stated intention to overhaul 
and restructure them indicate that a lot of experi-
mentation is going on. There is clearly scope for 
mutual learning and exchange of best practice, 
which would be much easier if evaluations of exist-
ing measures were more frequent, more systematic 
and more comparable. Also, sometimes a variety 
of instruments exists within national borders, mak-
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Table 5.3: Innovation Finance Measures in the 2005 National Reform Programmes
Country Grants Tax incentives Venture Capital Other
AT
Harmonisation of 
subsidy guidelines, 
consolidation of 
programmes, 
co-ordination of 
instruments
Tax concessions for 
contract research by 
SMEs.
Increased transparency 
and traceability of tax 
incentives.
Improvement of the 
framework conditions 
for venture-capital 
markets.
BE Not mentioned
Wage tax exemption 
for researchers.
Changes in corpo-
rate taxation so as to 
attenuate discrimination 
against venture capital 
and equity ﬁ  nancing.
CY
Funding of business-
science collaborative 
projects.
Grants for techno-
logical upgrading of 
SMEs.
Not mentioned Not mentioned
CZ
Grants to support 
business R&D and 
R&D collaboration 
of enterprises with 
public sector research 
institutions.
100 % reduction of 
R&D projects costs 
from the tax base. 
In preparation, a risk 
capital fund with State 
participation targeting 
SMEs, spin-offs and start 
ups.
Planned overhaul of 
framework conditions 
for Business Angels 
Networks.
DK Very limited.
150% deductions for 
R&D connected to 
public research 
institutions. Immediate 
deduction of research 
expenditures. Plans to 
grant three years of 
tax relief to innovative 
growth entrepreneurs 
from the time their 
enterprise starts 
generating a proﬁ  t and 
they become tax liable.
Not mentioned
DE
Many schemes aimed 
at SMEs, clusters and 
big .projects.
Not mentioned
New funding structure 
by the Federal Gov-
ernment to provide 
venture-capital funding 
for young technology 
companies.
Set up of the High Tech 
Start-up Fund.
Low-interest 
loans to SMEs to 
implement inno-
vative projects.
Big projects 
(Galileo, 
electronic health 
card, fuel-cell 
technology, 
transrapid 
maglev track
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Country Grants Tax incentives Venture Capital Other
EE Not mentioned Not mentioned
Development of a 
network of local 
business angels.
Creation of the Estonian 
Development Fund.
ES
Measures to reduce 
bureaucratic barriers 
and speed up access 
to subsidies.
Bonuses for social secu-
rity contributions for 
research personnel.
Modernisation of Risk 
Capital legislation, 
continuation of ﬁ  scal 
beneﬁ  ts. Development 
of a National Network 
of Business Angels. 
Creation of the Capital-
risk Fund of Funds to 
promote investment in 
projects at the seed and 
start-up stage.
Enlargement of 
the line of partic-
ipative loans to 
innovative, tech-
nology-based 
companies.
Systematic 
evaluation.
EL
Grants for invest-
ment and operational 
costs of collaborative 
research projects. 
Tax relief: 100% 
deduction of R&D 
expenditure from gross 
income and further 
50% deduction from 
net income.
Not mentioned
FI
Main instrument 
used. Public funds 
made available to 
increase annually by 
5-7% until 2010.
Projects ﬁ  nanced on 
a competitive basis.
There are no current 
plans to introduce 
tax concessions for 
investments in research 
and development.
Reform of venture 
capital funding for early 
stage business. Tax 
treatment of foreign 
venture capital invest-
ments revised. Opera-
tional and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions are being cre-
ated for the start-up of 
venture capital funds in 
service industries. New 
government investments 
in risk capital funds.
FR
Funds made available 
through a 
reorganised system 
of agencies. 
Tax (corporate, local, 
property and payroll) 
exemptions for young 
innovative business.
Reinforcement of 
research tax credit 
scheme.
Creation of a Business 
Angel status.
Modernisation of capital 
investment vehicles 
(venture capital mutual 
funds, venture capital 
companies, mutual 
funds for innovation, 
and local investment 
funds). Set-up of the 
new Alternext stock 
exchange. 
HU Not mentioned
200% tax allowance 
for R&D 
Modiﬁ  cation of the law on 
venture capital. Increased 
presence of venture and 
seed capital fund 
delivered by the state.
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Country Grants Tax incentives Venture Capital Other
IE
Variety of grants 
linked to various 
stages and aspects of 
innovation. 
Since 2004. 
The State has actively 
engaged to develop 
the venture capital 
sector for higher risk 
investments and takes 
equity stakes in 
technology start-ups 
and through the early 
stage growth of 
companies. Revision of 
the Seed and Venture 
Capital Fund Scheme.
IT
Various schemes, 
mainly targeting 
speciﬁ  c technologies.
Corporate income tax 
deductions, tax breaks 
for researchers 
returning to Italy, 
abolition of Italian 
regional production tax 
on innovation costs, 
limitation of IRPEF to 
10% of income. Grant 
of tax breaks for labour 
costs of staff involved 
in R&D.
Reﬁ  nancing and 
restructuration of the 
Technological 
Innovation Fund, and 
setting up a Fund for 
investment in risk 
capital of high-tech 
enterprises.
Reduced rate 
loans granted 
by the EIB in 
support of 
large-scale R&D 
projects.
LV
Support for the 
development of new 
products and 
technologies. Grants 
for concept and 
prototype 
developments 
of new products.
Not mentioned
Planned creation of risk 
capital funds for SMEs.
Provision of seed capital 
through incubators.
LT Not mentioned Not mentioned
Establishing venture 
capital funds is under 
consideration. 
LU
Better coordination 
of existing schemes.
Review of ﬁ  scal regime 
in favour of R&D 
investments and young 
innovative ﬁ  rms.
Not mentioned
MT Not mentioned
Progressive 
enhancement 
of existing tax 
incentives for r R&D.
Not mentioned
Introduction, of 
a loan guarantee 
scheme for start 
ups, particularly 
innovative ones.
NL
Target-oriented 
subsidies, innovation 
vouchers.
Reinforcement of the 
tax credit scheme for 
R&D. 
Improved access to 
venture capital for and 
emerging companies.
PL
Introduced by Act of 
29 July 2005.
Introduced by Act of 29 
July 2005.
Establishment of a 
National Capital Fund 
as a fund of venture 
capital funds.
Technological 
loans introduced 
by Act of 29 July 
2005.
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Country Grants Tax incentives Venture Capital Other
PT
Variety of schemes 
with different 
targets (innovative 
activities, 
modernisation, 
employment of 
researchers etc)
Reintroduction of tax 
beneﬁ  ts for business 
R&D.
Restructuration of the 
risk capital system 
in order to support 
launching of innovative 
projects. Drafting 
of a favourable legal 
framework for 
business angels and 
non-resident investors.
Subsidised loans 
as public 
support to 
research in 
companies.
SK
Not mentioned but 
intention to design a 
new comprehensive 
support scheme.
Not mentioned but 
intention to design a 
new comprehensive 
support scheme.
Consideration of 
creating a program of 
state participation in 
investments to private 
risk funds in order to 
lower risks. Modalities 
yet to be decided
SI
Main instrument in 
use. 
Planned: change tax 
policy and the system 
of ﬁ  nancing research 
activity to encourage 
cooperation between 
research and the 
business sector, the 
creation of spin-offs 
and the employment 
of researchers in the 
business sector.
Reinforcement of the 
Slovenian Enterprise 
Fund.
Support for the 
operation of risk capital 
funds and provision 
of start-up and seed 
capital.
SE Not mentioned
New tax credits for 
research in SMEs. 
Reorganisation and 
reform of the public 
providers of risk 
capital to strengthen 
and simplify access to 
early stage ﬁ  nance.
UK Not mentioned R&D tax credits 
Government intends to 
establish a new public 
company to deliver 
capital funds and loan 
guarantees.
Self-certiﬁ  cation for 
business angels.
Note: Please note that this table is not presenting an inventory of existing measures but only of those 
mentioned in the NRPs.
Source: DG Enterprise
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ing necessary more systematic efforts to inform but 
also to make existing instruments simpler and more 
accessible.
In conclusion, it would appear that more efforts 
should be directed towards facilitating the provi-
sion of cross-border venture capital and the debt 
ﬁ   nancing of innovative projects. The provision of 
early stage risk capital is being addressed in many 
countries; however, this clearly remains an area 
where more should be done. Also, evaluation and 
simpliﬁ  cation of existing schemes should be carried 
out more systematically and mutual policy learning 
should continue.
The measures at Community and Member State 
level referred to in sections 5.3.4 and 5.4 above bear 
testimony to the efforts made to address the market 
failures discussed earlier in the chapter, i.e. the exist-
ence of positive externalities in innovative activities 
and of speciﬁ  c barriers for young and small enter-
prises to ﬁ  nance them. It must be clear thought that 
if these efforts are necessary, they are certainly not 
sufﬁ  cient for achieving the more general objective 
of transforming the European economy into a more 
dynamic and knowledge-based one. Apart from set-
ting up comprehensive research, development and 
innovation policies, this will take implementing also 
those reforms that will tone up economic activity in 
general, particularly in the areas of business environ-
ment, competition, education and labour markets.
References
Arrow, K.J. (1962), “Economic Welfare and the Allo-
cation of Resources for Invention”, in: Nelson, R.R. 
(ed.), The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G.F. (1998), “The Econom-
ics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private 
Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth 
Cycle”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, 
pp. 613-673.
Bloom, N., Grifﬁ  th, R. and Van Reenen, J. (2002), 
“Do R&D Tax Credits Work? Evidence from a Panel 
of Countries 1979-97”, Journal of Public Economics, 
85 (1), pp. 1-31.
Canton, E., Lanser, D., Noailly, J., Rensman, R., and 
van de Ven, J. (2005), “Crossing Borders: When Sci-
ence Meets Industry”, CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis Document 98.
Cornet, M., Huizinga, F., Minne B., and Webbink, 
D. (2006), “Successful Knowledge Policies”, CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Memorandum 158.
Dantas Machado C. and Raade, K. (2006), Proﬁ  t-
ability of Venture Capital Investment in Europe and 
the United States, Economic Papers No. 245, Direc-
torate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
European Commission, Brussels.
David, P.A., Hall, B.H. and Toole, A.A. (2000), 
“Is Public R&D a Complement or Substitute for Pri-
vate R&D?” A Review of the Econometric Evidence, 
Research Policy, 29, pp. 497-529.
European Commission (2003A), Raising EU R&D 
Intensity. Improving the Effectiveness of the Mix 
of Public Support Mechanisms for Private Sector 
Research and Development, European Communities, 
Luxembourg.
European Commission (2003B), Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on Implementation of the Risk Capi-
tal Action Plan (RCAP), COM(2003) 654.
European Commission (2004A), Innovation in 
Europe. Data 1998-2001, European Communities, 
Luxembourg.
European Commission (2004B), European Com-
petitiveness Report 2004, European Communities, 
Luxembourg.
European Commission (2005), Best practices of pub-
lic support for early-stage equity ﬁ  nance, Final report 
of the expert group, September 2005.
European Commission (2006), Contribution from 
the Commission on innovation and ﬁ  nancial  mar-
kets in the context of globalisation and economic 
growth, Informal Meeting of the ECOFIN council, 
8-9 September 2006.
European Commission (2006B), Community Guide-
lines to promote Risk Capital Investments in small and 
medium sized enterprises, OJ C194 of 18.08.2006.
European Commission (2006C), Implementing the 
Community Lisbon Programme: Financing SME 
Growth – the European Way, Communication COM 
(2006) 349 ﬁ  nal of 29.6.2006.
European Commission (2006D), Developing Euro-
pean Private Equity, Report of the Alternative Invest-
ment Expert Group, June 2006.
EVCA (2006), Yearbook 2006, EVCA, Zaventem. 
Geroski, P. (1995), “Markets for Technology: Knowl-
edge, Innovation and Appropriability”, in: Stone-
man, P., Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 
and Technological Change, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
pp. 90-131.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:108 16/03/07   9:06:57109
Chapter 5 — The Financing of Innovation
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (1999), The Venture Capi-
tal Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Hall, B.H. (2002), “The Financing of Research and 
Development”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
18 (1), pp. 35-51.
Hall, B.H. and Van Reenen, J. (2000), “How Effective 
Are Fiscal Incentives for R&D?” A Review of the Evi-
dence, Research Policy, 29, pp. 449-469.
Harhoff, D., Licht G., Altmann G. and Kurz S. (2001), 
Innovationswege im Maschinenbau. Ergebnisse einer 
Befragung mittelständischer Unternehmen, hrsg. 
von Impuls-Stiftung für den Maschinenbau, den 
Anlagenbau und die Informationstechnik, Frankfurt 
am Main. 
Hogan, T. and Hutson, E. (2005), „Capital Struc-
ture in New Technology-Based Firms: Evidence from 
the Irish Software Sector“, Global Finance Journal, 
15 (3), pp. 369-387.
Hutschenreiter, G. (2002), „Tax Incentives for 
Research and Development“, Austrian Economic 
Quarterly 2, pp. 74-85.
Hyytinen, A.A. and Pajarinen, M. (2003), „Small 
Business Finance in Finland. A Descriptive Study“, in: 
Hyytinen, A.A. and Pajarinen, M., (eds), Financial Sys-
tems and Firm Performance. Theoretical and Empiri-
cal Perspectives, Taloustieto, Helsinki, pp. 203-248.
Hyytinen, A.A., Rouvinen, P., Toivanen, O. and Ylä-
Anttila, P. (2003), „Does Financial Development 
Matter for Innovation and Economic Growth? Impli-
cations for Public Policy“, in: Hyytinen, A.A. and 
Pajarinen, M., (eds.), Financial Systems and Firm 
Performance. Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 
Taloustieto, Helsinki, pp. 379-458.
Levin, R., Klevorick, A., Nelson, R. and Winter, 
S. (1987), „Appropriating the returns from industrial 
research and development“, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Vol. 3, pp. 783-820.
Lupke, D. (2004), „Entrepreneurship Financing in Dis-
tressed Urban Areas: North American Approaches“, 
in: OECD, Entrepreneurship. A Catalyst for Urban 
Regeneration, OECD, Paris, pp. 17-51.
Mowery, D. (1995), „The Practice of Technology 
Policy“, in: Stoneman, P., Handbook of the Econom-
ics of Innovation and Technological Change, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 513-557.
Myers, S.C. (2001), Capital Structure, Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 15, pp. 81-102.
Nelson R.R. (1959), „The Simple Economics of Basic 
Scientiﬁ   c Research“, Journal of Political Economy, 
49, pp. 297-306.
OECD (2003A), Tax Incentives for Research and 
Development: Trends and Issues, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2003B), Synthesis Report: Venture Capital 
Trends and Policies, OECD, Paris.
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. (1981), „Credit Rationing 
in Markets with Imperfect Information“, American 
Economic Review, 71 (3), pp. 383-410.
Suchman, M.C., Steward, D.J. and Westfall, C.A. 
(2001), „The Legal Environment of Entrepreneur-
ship: Observations on the Legitimation of Venture 
Finance in Silicon Valley“, in: Bird-Schoonhoven, 
C. and Romanelli, E., The Entrepreneurship Dynamic, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Warda, J. (2001), „Measuring the Value of R&D Tax 
Treatment in OECD Countries“, OECD STI Review 
No. 27.
Ylä-Anttila, P. and Palmberg, C. (2005), The speciﬁ  t-
ies of Finish industrial policy, paper presented at the 
WIFO Workshop on Industrial Policy, 7th and 8th of 
march, Vienna.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:109 16/03/07   9:06:57am612950Int.indd   Sec1:110 16/03/07   9:06:58111
Chapter 6:
The “Lead Markets” approach 
to innovation policy
6.1. Introduction
The early adoption of a speciﬁ  c innovation by the 
market seems to be a necessary condition for inter-
national competitiveness. A country that lags behind 
scientiﬁ  cally can often not only catch up but also get 
ahead of the innovator when the domestic market 
is more willing to adopt a new technology. It is not 
inventions but the ability to turn inventions into com-
mercially successful products that is a main determi-
nant of the international technology gap between 
the USA and Europe (OECD 1968, 17).  71
Time has shown, however, that even this conclu-
sion might not be the whole story. Many countries 
adopted innovations or new technologies for the 
ﬁ  rst time worldwide without any resultant competi-
tive advantage. If other countries do not follow using 
the same innovation design, or technological trajec-
tory, few exports result. In fact most innovations are 
still conﬁ  ned to local markets. Countries that are ﬁ  rst 
to adopt an internationally successful innovation are 
often denoted as lead markets in order to signify that 
these countries do not just happen to be the ﬁ  rst in 
line, but that they lead the international diffusion of 
innovation by triggering adoption of the new tech-
nology in other countries.
Up to now, the term ‘lead markets’ appears in the 
literature with varying meanings. In some cases, a 
lead market denotes the country where the innova-
tion was ﬁ  rst developed (e.g. Yip 1992, 43). Within 
multinational ﬁ  rms, a lead market sometimes refers 
to the country in which the subsidiary takes over 
responsibility as global coordinator of global market-
ing activities (Raffée and Kreutzer 1989, 50) or where 
a new product is ﬁ  rst introduced in the fashion of 
a test market approach (Schröder 1996, 183). Most 
authors, however, have the most basic deﬁ  nition of 
71   While and invention refers to a new idea, concept, design, etc., an inno-
vation is an invention that has been put into practice.
lead markets in common: the market where an inno-
vation is ﬁ  rst widely used that later becomes success-
ful internationally regardless of where that innova-
tion was invented. The latter deﬁ  nition will also be 
used in this chapter.
Recently, the notion of lead markets has been 
increasingly used in innovation policy both at the EU 
level (see e.g. the Aho report, Aho et al. 2006) and in 
some Member States (for Germany see e.g. the work-
shop of the German Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology, BMWi 2002). There are at least two 
motivations behind this growing attention.
First, putting emphasis on lead markets promises 
to bridge the gap between the generation of new 
technologies and market success of innovations. 
In particular, the concept may seem to offer some 
new approaches to link the results of basic scientiﬁ  c 
research with the market-oriented application of 
new technology, by identifying factors that would 
make innovation policies more anticipatory of global 
trends.
Secondly, being a lead market may generate a 
number of competitive advantages for the coun-
try (see Box 6.1): ﬁ  rms may proﬁ  t from increasing 
exports, foreign direct investment may be attracted, 
further research may be stimulated, or productivity 
gains may be realised earlier than in other countries. 
Ultimately, this may result in increasing employment 
and wealth.
In the remaining part of this chapter, three questions 
will be discussed:
–   How has the concept of lead markets evolved, 
how may it be demarcated vis-à-vis other estab-
lished concepts such as lead users and what are 
the constituting factors of a lead market?
–   Is there a case for policy intervention in favour of 
lead markets i.e. is there a market failure and how 
may government intervention be justiﬁ  ed?
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–   Through which mechanisms could governments’ 
inﬂ   uence the creation of lead markets, and 
which pitfalls and drawbacks may such a policy 
approach involve?
6.2.  The Concept of Lead Markets
6.2.1.  Market diffusion of innovations
In order to set the stage for our discussion of lead 
markets we ﬁ   rst want to look at the process of 
market acceptance or market diffusion of an inno-
vation. Every successful innovation introduced 
into the market needs some to time to reach satu-
ration, i.e. until all potential users have adopted it. 
First, there is regularly the introduction phase in 
which only a small fraction of the market adopts 
the innovation and in which it is not clear to mar-
ket participants whether the innovation is a suc-
cess or a failure. A successful innovation then 
reaches a take-off point where the growth rate 
of sales increases dramatically and the number of 
users grows rapidly.  72 The time between market 
introduction and take-off varies, but usually spans 
several years (Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003; 
Gort and Klepper 1982). Most diffusion curves of 
innovations follow an S-shaped curve, for which 
there are various mathematical speciﬁ  cations (for 
an overview see Mahajan and Bass 1990). When 
we compare the diffusion curves of one speciﬁ  c 
innovation in several countries, a more or less dis-
tinct time lag between the curves can regularly 
be observed. Graph 6.1 shows a stylised depiction 
of this lead-lag pattern. In reality the curves often 
show different shapes but this generally does 
not affect the lag in diffusion between countries 
(see Graph 6.2 for the diffusion of the internet). 
The lead market is the country where the diffu-
72   Rogers (1995) locates the take-off phase between 10-25% of all poten-
tial adopters. Ever since Griliches (1957), it has been commonplace to 
calculate the diffusion lag of a country as the number of years from the 
time when an innovation is ﬁ  rst adopted to the point when it reaches a 
10% penetration level in the country. Golder and Tellis (1997) in con-
trast deﬁ  ne the take-off when the sales growth rate reaches a certain 
threshold.
Box 6.1: Advantages of being a Lead Market
Being a lead market for an innovation can create tremendous advantages for the country in question. 
In almost all successful cases documented, local companies, both locally-owned and local afﬁ  liates of 
multinational ﬁ  rms, have become major players in the world market.
Often, ﬁ  rms from lead markets were initially not leaders in the respective technology but acquired 
the technological knowledge from abroad in the wake of the domestic market dynamics. High quality 
requirements and, essentially, a close interaction between market and production ensure that large 
manufacturing capabilities are kept domestically. As a result, exports from lead markets are substantial, 
leading in some cases to very high export shares. Lead markets are frequently stable over a long time 
period covering several generations of products and innovation steps or even technologies (cellular 
phones in the Nordic countries, cameras in Japan, computers in the US, wind energy in Denmark). 
Potential advantages of lead markets can be summarised as follows:
–   An initial technological lag is closed rapidly and even turned into a technological lead based on 
superior productivity or market intelligence. 
–   Firms in the lead market become global market leaders.
–   Exports are substantial.
–   International competitiveness is often sustainable over decades as successive generations of products 
are adopted earlier.
–   Lead markets are often characterised by a high degree of competition and lower prices for users.
–   Lead markets regulatory keep larger manufacturing capacities at home in order to guarantee supe-
rior quality and allow for quick responses to varying local markets trends.
–   Lead markets are attractive as an investment location for multinational ﬁ  rms which have to become 
insiders in the lead market. In particular, the inﬂ  ux of marketing and R&D functions ensure a large 
proportion of high skilled jobs.
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sion process of an innovation ﬁ  rst took off (Kalish, 
Mahajan and Muller 1995; Kotabe and Helsen 
1998). All other countries are lag markets.
This lead-lag market pattern or the lead market issue 
(without necessarily using this term) is discussed in 
different research ﬁ  elds: in marketing, in innovation 
economics, in R&D management and in international 
business. We identify four major strands of literature 
on lead markets:  73
(i)   Descriptive case studies on globally successful 
innovations,
73   The term lead market is also sometimes used in international ﬁ  nance to 
denote a country that leads currency or equity market trends. This ﬁ  eld, 
however, is not subject of this summary.
Graph 6.1: An international diffusion pattern of an innovation design
Source: ZEW.
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Graph 6.2: Diffusion of Internet in selected countries
Source: ITU.
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(ii)   Statistical analyses of the international diffusion 
of innovations from a marketing perspective,
(iii)   Studies on the market-linkage of R&D, and
(iv)   Analyses of competing technologies and loca-
tional advantages.
These four approaches will be reviewed next.
6.2.2.  Case studies on globally successful 
innovations
The question of why some countries have adopted 
an innovation earlier than other countries has been 
analysed in many in-depth case studies since the 
1960s. Often, the aim of such studies was to iden-
tify successful policy instruments for the acceleration 
of technology diffusion or to pinpoint weaknesses in 
the national innovation system. Most case studies 
explore the adoption of process technologies from 
country to country. One of the most studied tech-
nologies is the oxygen steel making process (Madd-
ala and Knight 1967; Poznanski 1983; Lynn 1982; 
Papajohn 1991). This case attracted much attention 
because the quick adoption of this new process in 
Japan was the foundation for the meteoric ascent of 
Japan as the leading steel making nation.
The employment of robots is another case where 
Japan has succeeded in creation a lead market 
(Flamm 1986; Mansﬁ  eld 1989; see Graph 6.3). The 
US has been leading the way in one of the most 
inﬂ  uential technologies of 20th century, semiconduc-
tors, which Tilton (1971) examined in an important 
in-depth case study. However, the conclusions of 
these studies are highly situational, and it is almost 
impossible to draw general conclusions from single 
case studies.
6.2.3.  Marketing studies on the international 
diffusion of innovations
Marketing scholars have attempted to ﬁ  nd statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant explanatory variables for the interna-
tional diffusion of innovations for a variety of prod-
uct categories, mainly household appliances (Takeda 
and Jain 1991; Gatignon, Eliashberg and Robertson 
1989; Kumar, Ganesh and Echambadi 1998; Tellis, 
Stremersch and Yin 2003). Such studies constitute a 
second strand of literature which attempts to explain 
international differences in the willingness of coun-
tries to adopt an innovation.
In the most comprehensive study covering 117 inno-
vation diffusion processes in European countries, Tel-
lis, Stremersch and Yin (2003) ﬁ  nd that countries are 
characterised by different average lag times between 
the introduction of an innovation and take-off. For 
instance, the lag times in the Nordic countries, Swit-
zerland and Germany are on average several years 
shorter than those in Southern Europe. Economic 
wealth is the most common signiﬁ  cant explanatory 
variable for country lag-times; an argument that goes 
back to Vernon’s international product life cycle. 
Graph 6.3: International adoption of robots in manufacturing 
Source: ITU.
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However, a lack of comparable data has led this strand 
of literature to focus on cultural dimensions. Among 
the cultural dimensions a low degree of uncertainty 
avoidance (Lynn and Gelb 1996; Steenkamp, ter 
Hofstede and Wedel 1999; Gatignon, Eliashberg and 
Robertson 1989; Yeniyurt and Townsend 2003) and 
a strong need of achievement (Tellis, Stremersch and 
Yin 2003) are consistently found to be signiﬁ  cantly 
associated with earlier adoption. Other factors that 
positively correlate with an earlier adoption of inno-
vations are educational attainment and the media 
intensity.
6.2.4.  Studies on the market-linkage of R&D
The third major strand of literature looks less at the 
adoption process and more at the generation of 
(radical) innovations (e.g. Jeannet 1986; Johannssen 
and Roehl 1994). In this perspective, lead markets 
are frontrunners of technical progress because they 
offer better opportunities to utilise new technolo-
gies. In lead markets, technical competencies meet 
with a clear need for new technological solutions (a 
‘need lead’, see Gerybadze 1998), i.e. a particular 
technology derives a higher beneﬁ  t for users than in 
other markets. For many new technologies, technol-
ogy cycles and need cycles often do not run parallel. 
A technology breakthrough supposedly happens if 
both come together in one location. Liquid crystal 
displays may serve as an example in this respect (see 
Box 6.2).
The new argument here is that market conditions in 
the lead market in a particular industry entice local 
companies to adopt the new technology. The impor-
tance of this local interaction between customers and 
innovators has been stressed since the 1980s most 
notably by Lundvall (1988), Fagerberg (1992) and 
the proponents of ‘national systems of innovation’ 
(see Nelson 1993). The market interaction hypoth-
esis re-emerged in studies in the 1990s that exam-
ined motives and strategies of international R&D 
activities of multinational ﬁ  rms (Gerybadze, Meyer-
Krahmer and Reger 1997). At that time more and 
more foreign R&D facilities were located in science 
parks and R&D-intensive industry agglomerations 
as a form of technology sourcing (DeMeyer 1993; 
Neven and Siotis 1996; Anand and Kogut 1997; Per-
rino and Tipping 1990). However, it became clear 
that the region that is scientiﬁ  cally most advanced 
could easily lose its advantage if the regional market 
is not receptive enough.
6.2.5. Competing  technologies 
and locational advantages
The fourth conceptual approach to lead markets 
emerged from studies on the management of multi-
national ﬁ  rms in a culturally and socio-economically 
diverse world market. Its main contribution is the 
introduction of the concept of competing technolo-
gies. For virtually all problems there are several tech-
nical solutions, innovations, and technologies on 
offer. Frequently, different countries prefer different 
technical solutions, depending on their speciﬁ  c mar-
ket conditions. All these innovations or “innovation 
designs” compete on the world market. Multina-
tional ﬁ  rms are the ﬁ  rst who perceive regionally vary-
Box 6.2: Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD)
Recently, a worldwide frenzy has broken out to substitute the century old cathode ray tube in TV sets 
with ﬂ  at screen technology. Japanese and Korean electronics ﬁ  rms are the main beneﬁ  ciaries of this 
boom. Yet, the technology was originally pioneered by US and European universities as well as electron-
ics and chemical companies which started an experimental use of liquid crystals and plasma for displays 
as early as the 1960s. Their market prospects remained bleak, and the technological lead moved to Japa-
nese companies which perceived a much more promising market (Beise 2006; Kawamoto 2002; Gery-
badze, Meyer-Krahmer and Reger 1997). There was a need for more sophisticated displays that could 
exhibit Japanese characters. This pushed the research towards larger displays resulting in active matrix 
technology. In Japan in the 1980s, LCDs were mass marketed in personal digital assistants (PDAs), video 
cameras and pocket TV sets. In contrast, a lack of civilian applications forced Western companies to 
resort to the military as a customer. Yet, military applications required such high quality standards and 
ruggedness that the LCD was quickly found to be inappropriate.
In the 1990s, the market shifted again. Laptops became more and more popular and Korean ﬁ  rms suc-
cessfully jumped on this bandwagon. A European company set out to become the number one LCD 
screen producer in a Korean joint venture. By the end of the 1990s, price reductions of LCDs enabled 
their use in TV sets. As more than 75% of world sales of ﬂ  at-screen TV sets went to the Japanese market 
in the years of the new millennium, Japanese manufacturers regained the lead in large LCD displays just 
before the market took off in the US and Europe.
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ing demand trends and are continuously struggling 
to reap global economies of scale by developing glo-
bally standardised products and processes. In their 
seminal work on multinational ﬁ   rms, Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1990) envision the ‘transnational’ ﬁ  rm that 
is able to tap into the innovation opportunities in for-
eign markets and commercialise these local innova-
tions worldwide. They cannot chase after every local 
innovation and thus have to carefully assess which 
innovations have the potential to become global suc-
cesses. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1990) use the term lead 
markets in the context of the ability of these markets 
to stimulate global innovations. Lead markets are 
“the markets that provide the stimuli for most global 
products and processes of a multinational company” 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1990, 243). More particularly, 
lead markets exist, they suggest, because “local inno-
vations in such markets become useful elsewhere as 
the environmental characteristics that stimulated 
such innovations diffuse to other locations” (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal 1990, 243).
This implies that early adoption of a new technol-
ogy does not sufﬁ   ce as a competitive advantage. 
In some cases countries adopt a very innovative 
technology early on but later lose out to a rivalling 
technology that was preferred and adopted world-
wide and gained global dominance. One example 
is the success and subsequent decline of the com-
mercial online service Minitel in France (Graph 6.4). 
Although the service was adopted earlier and more 
widely than the Internet in France, it lost the struggle 
to become the globally dominant design of a net-
work protocol to the latter.
The anticipation of a global environment by a local 
market has been suggested by Porter (1990) as well. 
In his seminal work on the competitive advantage of 
nations, Porter (1990) identiﬁ  ed the demand side as 
an important cornerstone of the competitive advan-
tage of a country besides supply factors. Porter sug-
gests the following main attributes of home demand 
advantage: the composition, the size and growth 
of home demand, and the mechanism by which a 
nation’s domestic preferences are transmitted to for-
eign markets. He identiﬁ  es situations where countries 
favour rather idiosyncratic innovations that cannot 
be successfully commercialised internationally. Por-
ter distinguishes between idiosyncratic demand and 
an “anticipatory” demand. The anticipatory demand 
gives a forecast of what will be needed worldwide in 
the future. 
A new twist to the lead market model is provided by 
Lehrer and Schlegelmilch (2006) who suggests that 
two different markets play a role in the emergence 
of globally successful innovations: the market that 
demands the highest performance, (third strand of 
literature), and the market that leads the adoption of 
Box 6.3: Lead markets versus lead users, pilot customers and pioneers
Lead markets are different from lead users, pilot customers or pioneers. While the concept of lead mar-
kets implies that an innovation has gained the affection of a whole market, denoted by a high or rapidly 
increasing penetration rate, the other concepts focus on the actors that are the ﬁ  rst to generate, adopt 
or use a particular innovation. Usually, pioneers are denoted as the companies that ﬁ  rst introduce an 
innovation into the market. Lead users and pilot customers (or launch customers) are the ﬁ  rst users of 
an innovation.
A model that is often associated with the lead market approach is the lead user concept of Eric von 
Hippel (1986). In some publications the terms lead markets and lead users are used as equivalents. There 
are two reasons for this. One is that lead users are sometimes erroneously confused with launch custom-
ers, that is, the ﬁ  rst customers for an innovation. The other reason is to underline the amalgamation of 
innovators and users in lead markets. In its original form, however, the term lead users refers to compa-
nies that innovate in order to use the innovations themselves instead of selling them, even though these 
innovations can be of beneﬁ  t to other companies. The original focus of lead users is thus on their role as 
innovators not as launch customers for innovations. In contrast, the focus of lead markets is on the inter-
action between developers of innovations and users of innovations located in the same region.
Pilot customers are customers selected by companies that launch an innovation to be the ﬁ  rst users of 
that innovation. They often receive special incentives such as heavily reduced price tags in order to stim-
ulate the adoption of a new product. Pilot customers have to be followed by other market participants 
in order to constitute a lead market. For instance, British Airways and Air France were pilot customers 
of the supersonic jet airliner, the Concord. But since no other commercial airline adopted the Concord, 
there was no lead market.
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the innovation (similar to the marketing approach). 
In a case study on business software, they observe 
that over time the actual lead market shifts from the 
market which demands high performance to the 
market that is leading the widespread adoption.
6.2.6. Lead  market  factors
Based on Porter’s characterisation of idiosyncratic 
and anticipatory market conditions, Beise (2004) 
suggests a series of country-speciﬁ  c conditions that 
raise the chances of an international success of local 
innovations in the competition among different 
innovation speciﬁ   cations. These are grouped into 
ﬁ  ve lead market factors:
–   Demand anticipation: A country stays at the 
forefront of a global trend, leading the devel-
opment of innovations that correspond to the 
trend.
–   Price advantage: Domestic innovation designs 
become cheaper relative to foreign innovations.
–   Transfer: Mobile customers, multinational ﬁ  rms 
or network effects increase demand for domestic 
innovations abroad.
–   Export orientation: The market context ena-
bles domestic manufacturers to incorporate more 
foreign market preferences during the develop-
ment of innovations.
–   Competition: A high degree of domestic com-
petition reveals latent preferences and discovers 
superior designs and new applications.
By demand anticipation we have in mind that users 
at the forefront of a global trend experience the 
changes earlier. The US market played the role of 
lead market for so long simply because per capita 
income was much higher than in any other country. 
As incomes increased elsewhere, American products 
became popular worldwide.
Many global innovation success stories are associated 
with international price trends. When the price of a 
good (or a factor that is used to produce a good) falls 
worldwide, this product might become successful 
internationally. This price reduction effect is the main 
argument of Levitt’s (1983) famous ‘globalisation of 
markets’ hypothesis. He asserts that global producers 
‘attract customers who previously held local prefer-
ences and now capitulate to the attractions of lesser 
prices’. The price of one design decreases faster than 
that of the other when the lead market is larger in an 
early stage of the product life cycle, allowing manu-
facturers to exploit larger economies of scale. When 
economies of scale and learning effects are large, 
countries with a large internal market for a speciﬁ  c 
design have a lead market advantage. Scherer (1992) 
notes that when the fax machine was a market success 
in Japan, Japanese manufacturers were able to exploit 
economies of scale and lower the price to a level at 
which it became successful in Western countries.
Graph 6.4: Minitel and Internet penetration rates in France, the US and Germany
Source: ITU, Beise (2001).
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In addition, some countries are characterised by their 
ability to inﬂ  uence or increase the incentives in other 
countries to adopt the same innovation. This can be 
denoted as a transfer advantage.
A country is more likely to internationalise its local inno-
vation designs if local market conditions increase the 
exportability of innovation designs. Three factors can 
deliver this export advantage: the similarity of local mar-
ket conditions to foreign market conditions, domestic 
demand that is sensitive to the problems and needs of 
foreign countries, and local participants that put pres-
sure on companies to develop exportable products.
Last but not least, a high degree of competition raises 
the chances of local innovations becoming successful 
abroad as well (Nelson 1993; Porter 1990). In a coun-
try with a monopolistic producer or user, fewer alterna-
tive designs (or only one) are offered than in a country 
where several companies compete. Competitive mar-
kets are, therefore, more likely to discover latent needs 
and innovation designs preferred by consumers.
6.3. Lead  Markets 
and Public Intervention
The competitive advantages that arise from being a 
lead market have raised the interest of policy makers 
who wish to leverage such lead market advantages to 
increase the competitiveness of their economy. Though 
there is no ‘lead market policy’ as such in any country, 
public policies have consistently attempted to link the 
development of new technologies with an early and 
broad adoption of these technologies. Many of these 
policies have been inﬂ  uenced directly or indirectly by the 
literature reviewed above. This is particularly true for dif-
fusion-oriented technology policy that aims at accelerat-
ing the use of new production technologies, for policies 
that attempt to foster user-producer interaction in the 
development and diffusion of new technologies, such as 
cluster approaches and R&D co-operation schemes, or 
for mission-oriented technology policies that seek to cre-
ate speciﬁ  c technologies and stimulate their rapid use in 
domestic markets. Many of these policies have explicit or 
implicit links to the concept of lead markets, and most of 
them apply various demand-oriented policy instruments 
(i.e. target users of technologies instead of producers).
This section will discuss the potential role of public 
policy in the development of lead markets, the set 
of policy instruments, as well as problems possibly 
arising from policy interventions.
6.3.1.  Potential role for policy intervention
Traditionally, governments see their role in strength-
ening the stream of innovations generated in a coun-
try by supporting the creation of new knowledge and 
new technologies. This type of public intervention 
is well-founded on traditional market failure argu-
ments. Under-investment in R&D occurs due to the 
public good character of knowledge (which is espe-
cially true for basic research, see Nelson 1959) and 
the positive externalities of new technologies due to 
knowledge spillovers (which also applies to applied 
research, see Arrow 1962). Moreover, information 
asymmetries in ﬁ  nancial markets may lead to credit 
rationing for research projects. This provides further 
rationale for policy intervention to support innova-
tion activities (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Goodacre 
and Tonks 1995; also see chapter 5).
At ﬁ  rst glance, the literature seems to be supportive 
to the idea of government intervention to create lead 
markets. Even Porter (1990) concludes that public 
procurement can play an important role in helping 
a technology become successful. The fact that lag 
markets later adopt global innovations at identical or 
even higher penetration levels than the lead markets 
is sometimes thought to imply that lag markets are 
burdened by an initial barrier that, once overcome, 
leads to a vibrant, self-sustainable market. Demand 
creation is then seen as policy to overcome this initial 
barrier and thus change the odds of a country under-
going a transition from lag to lead market.
However, the lead-lag market pattern is not speciﬁ  -
cally associated with market failure because failure to 
anticipate global trends does not, in itself, constitute 
a market failure. Case studies suggest that being a 
lag market, or generating idiosyncratic innovations 
can be reasonably induced by local market idiosyn-
crasies which are difﬁ   cult to change. Well-known 
cases in point are the delay of the US steel industry 
to adopt the oxygen process in the 1950s and the 
failure of the French online service Minitel to become 
internationally successful. What certainly holds true 
is that markets in new technology are burdened by 
information asymmetries and uncertainty. But these 
problems affect all countries and generally do not 
explain the lead-lag market patterns.
The key issue here is whether policies in favour of 
supporting the emergence of lead markets address 
market failures or whether they are primarily guided 
by the policy goal to become a lead market in a cer-
tain technology, irrespective of any market imperfec-
tion. In particular, one has to ask whether being a lag 
market or adopting idiosyncratic innovations is asso-
ciated with any type of malfunctioning of markets.
Whereas the traditional market failures and the cor-
responding reasons for government intervention do 
not apply to lead markets, lagging behind in tech-
nology adoption is typically considered to be unde-
sirable. It therefore remains appropriate to analyse 
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how policymakers can contribute to developing 
framework conditions that stimulate the emergence 
of lead markets.
6.3.2.  Potential instruments to stimulate 
the emergence of a lead market
In addition to a mix of policies aimed at encourag-
ing innovation (which shall not be further discussed 
here; see also chapter 5), policies conducive to cre-
ating a lead market are often closely inter-linked 
with so-called demand-oriented innovation policies. 
These attempt to “induce innovations and/or speed 
up diffusion of innovations through increasing the 
demand for innovations, deﬁ   ning new functional 
requirement[s] for products and services or better 
articulating demand” (Edler 2006, 2). Instruments 
that are typically used by these policies are:
–   Subsidies for manufacturers of innovations in 
order to reduce the price of a new product (and 
thus increase demand for it);
–   Subsidies for users that lower their investment 
costs when adopting an innovation (e.g. tax 
credits);
–   Public procurement, i.e. the demand of public 
authorities and utilities for newly developed inno-
vative solutions that are ready for take-up (com-
mercial procurement) or demand for not yet 
commercially available solutions that need to be 
developed (pre-commercial procurement) (Edler, 
Hommen, Papadokou, Rigby, Rolfstam, Tsipouri 
and Ruhland 2006; Geroski 1990; Edquist, Hom-
men and Tsipouri 2000);
–   Regulation that favours a particular technical 
solution (for instance, the gas emission laws for 
automobile in the clean air act in the US were 
designed so that only vehicles with catalytic con-
verters could match them, excluding all other 
technical solutions favoured initially in Europe);
–   Setting standards for those parts of an innovative 
area that govern compatibility such as interfaces 
and protocols (Grindley 1995).
Building up on this set of demand-side innovation 
policy tools, lead market-relevant instruments may 
be summarised as follows (see Beise, Cleff, Rammer 
and Heneric 2002, 116ff):
–   Demand-creating instruments, such as user subsi-
dies, pre-commercial and commercial innovative 
public procurement that stimulate and aggregate 
the demand for innovative solutions, and regula-
tions that favour the use of particular technolo-
gies;
–   Demand-enabling policies, such as regulation 
that is open to new technical solutions, accept-
ance of new technologies by governmental agen-
cies (e.g. electronic signature);
–   Fast-follower approach to existing lead markets: 
innovations that are preferred in the lead mar-
ket can even be adopted earlier (e.g. the catalytic 
converter in Japan).
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of public 
policies that attempt to create lead markets or, more 
generally, on the relationship between national 
demand-side policies and the international success 
of innovations, is scarce. The empirical studies on 
the diffusion of innovations surveyed above do not 
include policy instruments, let alone compare dif-
ferent tools. Prominent examples that are given as 
proof for a successful demand-creating or articula-
tion policy such as the Airbus or the European cellu-
lar mobile phone system are mostly not as persuasive 
as one might think. Indeed, the demand preferences 
in these examples were formed by proﬁ  t-seeking 
companies, not by governments. For instance, the 
European GSM system was decisively shaped by the 
Nordic telecom companies that were already at that 
time exposed to domestic competition, whereas the 
politically motivated Franco-German proposal was 
not retained in the technical rounds of the standardi-
sation committee (Beise 2001). Even the success of 
airbus was accredited to its design, which responded 
to a speciﬁ  c market demand in Europe that Boeing 
or McDonald-Douglas did not cover, and not nec-
essarily to the political support for this company 
(Porter 1990). In other examples, through the use of 
pre-commercial procurement in the defence sector, 
public authorities have been successful in fostering 
the emergence of new lead markets (e.g. for GPS, the 
Internet). Experiences with demand-side policy often 
relate to personal safety, e.g. airbags (Mannering and 
Winston 1995), and environmental innovations such 
as unleaded gasoline (Stoneman and Battisti 1998), 
catalytic converters for motor vehicles (Jacob, Beise, 
Blazejczak, Edler, Haum, Jänicke, Löw, Petschow and 
Rennings 2005) and alternative energy generation 
(Beise and Rennings 2004).
6.3.3.  Limitations and potential risks 
of lead market oriented policies
As we have discussed earlier, the notion of lead mar-
kets does not carry obvious implications for policy. 
Nonetheless, policy markers may want to develop 
framework conditions conducive to the emergence 
of lead markets. Direct government interventions 
might improve a certain attribute of local demand 
but such interventions are at the same time prone 
to negatively affect other factors that constitute a 
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lead market. For example, favouring a preferred 
technology hampers competition among inno-
vation designs. Also, the dedication of a market 
to cost-cutting loosens when public subsidies are 
available. Finally, anticipation of global trends is 
hampered by a focus on the domestic market. The 
possible counterproductive effects of government 
intervention should be taken into account when 
considering the desirability of lead market policies. 
We will next discuss these limitations and potential 
risks in more detail.
6.3.3.1.  Competition in product markets
Lack of standardisation can hold back the adop-
tion of innovations. Setting of a standard in one 
market can reduce uncertainty in this market thus 
leading to early adoption. If, however, the govern-
ment intervenes in order to speed up the standardi-
sation process, the lead market role is weakened. 
One of the properties of the lead market is internal 
competition. Rivalry and the selection process of 
the market facilitate an economic solution that is 
more likely to be chosen worldwide. The reason for 
the success of the European cellular phone system 
GSM was not that there were no alternatives. The 
European cellular phone standard was shaped and 
selected by telecom companies that faced ﬁ  erce 
competition in their home markets (Beise 2001). 
The selection of a particular innovation design or a 
technology by the government or other non-com-
petitive agencies is normally a poor replacement 
for a competitive market solution. A lead market 
is characterised by smart, technically sophisticated, 
and proﬁ  t-oriented users who are in ﬁ  erce competi-
tion with each other.
In fact, government policies, frequently distort mar-
kets (Christensen 1997, 192). The risk of “backing 
the wrong horse” (Cowan 1991), that is, an inno-
vation that other countries eventually shun, is con-
siderable. In other countries, the choice of technol-
ogy is made by markets and even if factors such 
as technical uncertainty are lowered as a result of 
government intervention, following a state-guided 
choice might not be enough to ensure that a market 
is competitive. For instance, the Chinese authorities’ 
decision to build a high speed train connection is 
likely to be irrelevant in countries where the rail-
ways are privatised, because an investment decision 
of a private operator is based on proﬁ  tability, not 
technological feasibility. Economic failure of a pilot 
project is likely to have a negative effect on the glo-
bal appeal of a technology. As a consequence, it is 
recommended to create a functioning market wher-
ever possible and let the market choose proﬁ  table 
solutions which are most likely to be followed by 
other markets.
6.3.3.2.  Competition among innovation designs
Public intervention becomes even more problematic 
in the presence of internationally competing technol-
ogies. Public support programs for domestic indus-
tries might do more harm than good if they support 
an idiosyncratic innovation design that is not able 
to counter the competitive strength of the innova-
tion in the lead market, but keeps the domestic mar-
ket away from the coming global standard. Minitel 
actually held back Internet usage in France for a long 
time (DTI 1999, 28; OECD 1997). Local electronic 
manufacturers concentrated on the domestic tech-
nology while missing the world market potential for 
Internet servers and routers. In a situation when a 
strong lead market cannot be countered by public 
initiatives, a country is better off pursuing a fast fol-
lower strategy. Governmental policies and regulation 
could strengthen the orientation of local ﬁ  rms on the 
lead market. National technology policy can encour-
age cooperation between domestic ﬁ  rms and ﬁ  rms 
in the lead market. Regulation and public procure-
ment should be open to or even be biased towards 
technological designs popular in the lead market. 
An example for this strategy is the Japanese telecom 
operator NTT. After the Japanese mobile telephone 
standards failed to be successful outside Japan, the 
Japanese operator participated in the development 
of the third generation mobile system in Europe 
and was the ﬁ  rst to introduce the new joint stand-
ard in the Japanese market. This gave local mobile 
phone manufacturers a head start in commercialis-
ing the appropriate network technology and mobile 
phones.
6.3.3.3.  Cost effectiveness of innovations
Government-driven technology development typi-
cally focuses on achieving certain quality criteria for 
new technologies in order to achieve a mission (mili-
tary, space, health) while putting less emphasis on 
cost efﬁ  ciency. Rovizzi and Thompson (1992) argue 
on the basis of the model of Bös and Peters (1988) 
that public monopolies may offer products at a higher 
quality level than the socially optimal quality. This is 
because the cost of achieving higher levels of qual-
ity is not fully taken into account, since for example 
state-owned ﬁ  rms have bureaucratic structures that 
would not be present in cost optimisation. Advocates 
of demand-oriented innovation policies that mobi-
lise public procurement as an instrument to gener-
ate early demand for innovations might argue that 
willingness to pay a high price at an early stage of 
technology is an advantage of government agencies. 
While this eases market introduction, it may rule out 
cost-cutting efforts and efforts to design the innova-
tion in a highly cost-efﬁ  cient way from the begin-
ning. Consequently, this may restrict the acceptance 
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by private customers, who have a higher price elas-
ticity compared to public demand.
Today, examples of the US military as a crucial 
launch customer for new technologies that later lead 
to civilian applications are rather scarce and this tra-
ditional role of the military is generally contested as 
the requirements for military applications are rather 
dissimilar from those for civilian application (Mowery 
1998; Dertouzos, Lester and Solow 1989). An exam-
ple is plasma display technology in which the US 
military failed to support the spin-off of commercial 
applications (OTA 1995).
6.3.3.4.  Anticipation of global trends
Global trends create pressure for reform of social 
structures that have worked in the past but now are in 
need of change. Vested interests and fear of change 
tend to slow down the necessary adaptations. Lead 
markets are characterised by the opposite: an antici-
patory regime that not only welcomes change but 
even anticipates change and reacts early on. This can 
be the case because the trend is most advanced in 
the lead market country but also because the coun-
try is more sensitive to changes. For example, envi-
ronmental issues are considered as more important 
in some countries than in others, not necessarily in 
those with the most severe environmental problems. 
The attempted sinking of an oil storage platform by 
the oil company Shell in the North Sea in 1995, for 
instance, met strong resistance in Germany, leading 
to a “greening” of Shell’s German subsidiary and 
later Shell worldwide (Livesey 2001).
Governments could add to the idiosyncratic char-
acteristics of a market via regulations or subsidies. 
For example, if oil prices are increasing world-wide, 
subsidising gasoline will only serve to shift a coun-
try away from the global trend and slow down the 
response to high oil prices.
6.3.3.5. Restricted  exportability
Strong support by a national government can 
restrict exportability of innovations. National legisla-
tion and regulation tend to focus on domestic needs 
and the local environmental context. Policy typically 
promotes the adoption of technologies that ﬁ  t the 
domestic context best regardless of the beneﬁ  t for 
other countries. The telecommunications industry for 
example suffered for a long time from the idiosyn-
cratic conditions set by national carriers that made it 
difﬁ  cult to export equipment (Grupp 1990).
Other governments may interpret such adoption 
policies as an unfair strategic trade policy and may 
choose to counteract them by imposing restrictions 
on the domestic adoption of government-sponsored 
design, or sponsor their own design. For example 
the US and Japan resisted the adoption of European 
cellular phone systems for a long time. Faced with 
continuous technical isolation in the mobile phone 
industry, only Japan collaborated in the develop-
ment of the third generation standard.
6.3.4.  Towards a lead market oriented 
technology policy
Competitive advantage results from the commercial-
isation of new technologies, not from technological 
and scientiﬁ  c excellence alone. This does not neces-
sarily imply that government has a well-deﬁ  ned role 
in the commercialisation process. In fact, government 
intervention in the market in favour of the adoption 
of speciﬁ  c technologies might even increase the bar-
riers for a local innovation to become internationally 
successful. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lead 
markets are on average characterised by a lack of 
government intervention.
However, lead market models suggest that policy 
makers can improve upon the factors that render a 
Box 6.4: A special case: Lead markets for environmental technologies
Subsidies and regulations are often used in the area of environmental innovations. A market failure argu-
ment that points out the private underinvestment in environmentally friendly innovations has kept this 
area relatively free of trade controversies. It can be argued, however, that the motivation of some of the 
public support programmes is partly related to industrial policy and lead market creation as well (Beise 
and Rennings 2005). Recently, the interest in the role of public procurement in supporting the adop-
tion of a speciﬁ  c innovation design has risen (see Edquist, Hommen and Tsipouri 2000; Edler, Hommen, 
Papadokou, Rigby, Rolfstam, Tsipouri and Ruhland 2006). Public procurement is a considerable part 
of total demand, around 12 to 16 % in Europe (Edler 2006), and it can be used to push certain new 
technologies over the obstacles to their ﬁ  rst commercial adoption. While public procurement might 
be able to raise the domestic stimuli for innovations (Geroski 1990), the more important question is 
whether this raises the chances of domestic innovations being successful abroad and therefore the 
country becoming a lead market. This question is pertinent because it is conceivable that demand-side 
policies reduce the exportability of innovations and may lead to trade disputes.
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local market a lead market. Porter (1990) stresses that 
government speciﬁ  cation “should be set with an eye 
to what will be valued in other advanced nations”. 
By actively anticipating the requirements of foreign 
markets and reﬂ  ecting them in national regulations, 
idiosyncratic country-speciﬁ   c innovations can be 
avoided. The Swedish telecommunications carrier, 
for example, accepted the global orientation of its 
domestic supplier Ericsson, which develops telecom-
munications equipment for export markets (Bartlett 
and Goshal 1989, 25; Pehrsson 1996, 104).
The discussion of possible limitations and risks of 
public intervention in Section 6.3.3 above lead to 
the identiﬁ   cation of number of “success” factors 
that a lead market oriented policy should take into 
account. Accordingly, such a policy should try to:
–   Incorporate foreign market needs and prefer-
ences of customers from abroad;
–   Transfer domestic market preferences abroad;
–   Lower the cost of production to a level that is suf-
ﬁ  cient to make an innovation attractive in other 
countries;
–   Be neutral with regard to the choice of technol-
ogy, i.e. the policy should allow for competition 
between competing innovations;
–   Shift the country to the forefront of a global trend;
–   Be compatible with policies designed to support 
the innovation process, i.e. policies to protect 
intellectual property, correct for knowledge spill-
overs, or combat credit market imperfections.
The literature describes anticipatory market regimes 
very vaguely and considerable research needs to be 
done in order to formulate anticipatory policies. How-
ever, one could argue that whenever global trends can 
be identiﬁ  ed, governments can consider ways to shift 
the context of its local market towards the forefront 
of these trends instead of trying to ease or hold back 
the effect of the trends. Instead of focusing on how 
global trends that have negative effects can be slowed 
down or reversed, a lead market oriented policy takes 
the opposite road, embracing change and open-
ing up technical solutions for coping with change. 
Anticipating foreign markets’ needs can mean, for 
example, including them in national regulations and 
procurement. For instance, state-owned ﬁ  rms  and 
government agencies can demand that ﬁ  rms develop 
exportable innovations instead of demanding inno-
vations that ﬁ  t the national context best. Promoting 
the export orientation of domestic ﬁ  rms can mean 
sponsoring a design that takes account of demand 
preferences abroad. Global trends can also be utilized 
to support the lead market role of a country. If a fac-
tor price or the price of a complementary good such 
as infrastructure is marked by a global trend, a gov-
ernment can try to increase the domestic price level 
of the factor or the complementary good by raising 
speciﬁ  c taxes (in the case of an increasing trend) or 
decrease the price by lowering taxes or giving subsi-
dies (decreasing trend) and therefore push a country 
to the forefront of the trend.
A further lead market instrument is public procure-
ment. Simply favouring the procurement of innova-
tive technologies can lead to idiosyncratic innova-
tions. Instead, public procurement can follow export 
oriented principles. Similar to the argument of antici-
patory market context, it is essential to reﬂ  ect domes-
tic needs with international market conditions. This 
could include a public customer deliberately waiving 
requirements for speciﬁ  c quality or technical features 
that make it difﬁ   cult to export the same product. 
Instead of creating extreme or generally uneconomi-
cal requirements, technical speciﬁ  cations should be 
adapted to the quality demands of the world market, 
facilitating the innovations’ compatibility with the 
market context abroad.
Case studies point to an important transfer mech-
anism, namely policy diffusion (Kern et al. 2000, 
Jänicke 2005), as a means of stimulating the diffusion 
of a speciﬁ  c technology. If one country introduces a 
new regulation that induces innovations or spurs the 
adoption of a speciﬁ  c innovation design, this innova-
tion design will be adopted by users in other coun-
tries as well, if other countries introduce this same 
regulation. Despite the fact that countries differ in 
conditions such as the gravity of environmental prob-
lems, and require different policy instruments, they 
often adopt the same regulations used by another 
country, even down to the wording (Bennett 1991, 
222). Some countries “sacriﬁ  ce...autonomy to avoid 
unnecessary cross-national divergence” (Bennett 
1991, 227). As a result a country has a competitive 
advantage if it is more likely that policy makers fol-
low this country than other countries.
In the context of EU policies, the creation of an inter-
nal market and technology adoption at the European 
level provides the economies of scale necessary for 
an innovation to compete successfully against inno-
vations from the large national markets of the US 
and Japan. On the other hand, the high diversity 
of consumer preferences and market environments 
across the EU offers opportunities for experimenta-
tion, which will help to increase our understanding 
on what kind of policies, are the most effective.
6.3.5.  Policies for lag markets
In lag market industries, it is more appropriate to use 
instruments that support the fast following of a lead 
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market instead of trying to convert a lag market into 
a lead market. Fast follower strategies would include 
supporting the early adoption of the technological 
designs of the lead market. This avoids the burden of 
idiosyncratic local designs.
In the end the more important question for technol-
ogy policy might not be how to create lead markets 
but how to deal with a domestic lag market situa-
tion. It is interesting to note that Japan and Korea 
have often used a fast follower strategy toward the 
US market which paid off for them. A fast follower 
strategy means that governments and domestic 
companies are not focussing on the domestic mar-
ket needs but on the market needs of a country that 
is expected to be the global frontrunner. Embracing 
the lead market role of a foreign country ensures that 
domestic industry is confronted with the coming 
global innovations context at a very early time. For 
instance, the introduction of the US clean air act in 
Japan a year before it came into being in the US itself, 
gave the domestic auto industry an invaluable head 
start (Beise, Blazejczak, Edler, Jacob, Jänicke, Loew, 
Petschow and Rennings 2003). And after a history of 
modest exports in the mobile phone industry, Japan 
has engaged in close cooperation with the most 
advanced region to develop the next generation of 
mobile phone system, UMTS or WCDMA.
6.4. Conclusions
The lead markets approach may help to understand 
the factors behind the global success of innovations 
and new technologies, especially in the case of com-
peting innovation designs. It can be a powerful tool 
for innovation management in international ﬁ  rms 
that want to leverage market diversity for global 
innovations.
The lead markets approach is also relevant for gov-
ernments. It can assist them in designing a more 
effective technology policy to facilitate the potential 
global success of domestic companies’ innovation 
activities. In designing innovation policy (from fund-
ing programmes and public procurement to regula-
tion and standard setting) the following issues should 
be considered: incorporation of foreign market needs 
and preferences of customers from abroad, transfer-
ring domestic market preferences abroad, putting 
emphasis on lowering costs of production, allowing 
competition among different innovation designs, 
and addressing global trends.
It is thus a critical point for any policy that attempts 
to support the emergence of a lead market to antici-
pate global markets, develop an innovation design 
that responds to these upcoming global needs and 
introduce cost advantages high enough to persuade 
other countries to follow. Policies that attempt to 
create demand for a particular innovation or to pro-
mote the early adoption of a particular new tech-
nology have little in common with the concept of 
lead markets, and they may even hamper a coun-
try’s potential lead market role by backing the wrong 
horse.
In order to make the lead markets concept opera-
tional, the Commission has proposed in its recent 
Communication on Innovation  74 to, ﬁ  rstly  consult 
stakeholders, in particular Technology Platforms and 
the Europe INNOVA Innovation Panels, to identify 
possible areas where a combination of supply and 
demand side policies may help the emergence of 
innovation-friendly markets and, secondly, to launch 
pilot lead markets initiatives in the most promising 
areas in 2007. Based on this experience, the Com-
mission will prepare a comprehensive lead markets 
strategy.
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Chapter 7:
The competitiveness of the EU ICT sector
7.1. Introduction
Information and communication technologies have 
been playing an instrumental role in the fast trans-
formation of the economies in the last twenty years. 
At the same time and as much as they contributed 
to changes in the other sectors that use the goods 
and services that collectively constitute ICT, through 
their vigorous and fast expansion, the ICT produc-
ing sectors have contributed to the structural change 
of the economy as a whole. Thirdly, the ICT sectors 
are themselves the place of continuous technologi-
cal and structural change, in spite of the size that 
they have reached. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present an overview of recent developments of the 
EU ICT sector and its competitiveness and provide 
an outlook of challenges and opportunities in the 
medium term horizon.
The chapter is organised as follows. The sector 
and its sub-sectors are presented below. Section 2 
presents the composition of the sector in terms of 
manufacturing and services industries and the type 
of goods and services that they produce  75, followed 
by an analysis of the sector’s economic importance. 
Section three analyses the competitiveness of the 
EU ICT sector within the framework of increased 
globalisation, also discussing developments in intra-
ﬁ   rm trade, foreign direct investment, the interna-
tionalisation of R&D activities and the localisation of 
ICT production.
The ﬁ  nal part of this chapter is forward looking and 
attempts to analyse how the recent economic and 
technological developments in terms of digital con-
vergence and globalisation impacts on the competi-
tiveness of the EU ICT sector. The last part of that 
section elaborates on the consequent challenges for 
some selected segments of the EU ICT sector.
75   A formal deﬁ  nition of the sector in terms of industrial classiﬁ  cation is pro-
vided in the annex.
7.2. A  proﬁ  le of the ICT sector76
It is not always clear when discussions and analyses 
ICT refer to ICT as a product, a technology or a sec-
tor. One of the key characteristics of ICT as a product 
is its pervasiveness. ICT is an enabling technology 
and its products are used throughout the economy 
[Wintjes (2005)]. ICT is regarded as a general pur-
pose  technology with large spillover and network 
effects for the rest of the economy. The diffusion of 
new technologies such as ICT can change the exist-
ing type of goods and services and change the pro-
duction processes and costs by facilitating process 
and product innovation, the diffusion and uptake of 
ICT changes both supply and demand for products. 
On the international level, ICT can speed up globali-
sation in both the ICT sector itself, as ICT services 
can be transported without costs, but also by allow-
ing or facilitating the process of division of products 
into elements of products which can be produced in 
different locations according to comparative advan-
tages [Meijers et. al (2005), European Commission 
(2005B), Koellinger (2006)].
The deﬁ   nition of the ICT sector provided in the 
annex does not accurately reﬂ   ect the ongoing 
dynamic developments of the sector. A new clas-
siﬁ  cation from 2007 is being proposed which would 
76   This chapter uses data from different sources; EITO, Eurostat, OECD and 
Groningen Growth Development Centre (GGDC) and United Nations. 
The coverage of data varies over variables, countries and periods of time 
which is the reason why different aggregations of the Member States are 
presented in the chapter. Market data from EITO and trade data from 
United Nations provide the largest coverage over countries and contain 
also the most recent data. These data allow for presentations of EU-25. 
Industrial statistics are considerable less updated and also the coverage of 
data over variables and countries is less complete. The discussions of ﬁ  rm 
structure in the next section are based on Eurostat data from 2001 which 
is the most recent year which allows for analyses of ﬁ  rm size structure for 
EU-25. The most recent data for value added and employment in the ICT 
sector refers to 2003 and derives from OECD and GGDC. This data only 
covers 19 Member States. This data is used in the discussions of location 
and structure of the EU ICT sector and also in the comparisons with ICT 
sectors outside the EU. The discussions of the economic impacts of ICT 
are based on data from OECD and GGDC. Unfortunately, the data cover-
age only permits for a comparison of EU-15 with United States.
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take into account new developments both in terms 
of products and technologies.77 This chapter will 
discuss developments in the ICT sub sectors as 
presented in Table 7.1. The right column indicates 
some products that are produced by the ﬁ  rms in 
the sector.
The ICT sector is heterogeneous and complex; it 
comprises both manufacturing and service ﬁ  rms and 
many (especially the largest) ICT ﬁ  rms produce both 
goods and services, thus tearing down or at least blur-
ring the border between manufacturing and services 
ﬁ  rms.78 The heterogeneity is also apparent within ICT 
manufacturing and ICT services respectively. One 
aspect of the heterogeneity of ICT manufacturing is 
reﬂ  ected in the vast variety of goods being produced 
by the different industries. Firms in the ICT sector 
produce intermediate goods, investment goods and 
consumer goods.
77   The existing deﬁ  nition rests upon the consensus of the OECD countries in 
1998. The deﬁ  nition is basedon ISIC Rev. 3. Annex Table 7.1 in the annex 
presents the industries and their classiﬁ  cation according to both ISIC Rev. 
3. and NACE Rev.1.
78   Siemens and HP provide good examples of ﬁ  rms that offer both goods 
and services to their clients. See www.siemens.com and www.hp.com.
The complexity of the ICT sector can be illustrated 
by the inter-industry relationships between ﬁ  rms in 
the sector producing hardware, software and lately 
also contents. The increasing convergence of tech-
nologies allowing for example for bundled offering 
of Internet access, telephony and entertainment 
content is tearing down the walls between tradi-
tional market segments and changing old market 
structures.  79
The ICT sector is to a large extent knowledge-inten-
sive and is classiﬁ  ed as a high-technology industry.  80 
This classiﬁ  cation can however be questioned as there 
is a large variety of ICT products of different qualities. 
Rapid technological progress in the sector reduces 
life cycles for many ICT products which mature and 
become standardised after a short period of time. 
Production is often knowledge-intensive in the early 
stage of a product’s life cycle and dependent on 
79   See section four of this chapter for a more elaborated discussion of these 
developments.
80   The classiﬁ   cation of industries according to technology-intensities is 
based on R&D intensities (R&D expenditure relative value added). OECD 
(2005).  “Measuring Globalisation. OECD Economic Globalisation Indica-
tors.” OECD, Paris.
Table 7.1. ICT industries and ICT products
ICT manufacturing Type of products
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers
Typewriters, calculating machines, computers, 
printers, terminals
Insulated wire
Cables and ﬁ  bre optic cables for transmission 
of telecommunication and video
Electronic valves and tubes
Television and camera tubes, semiconductors, 
printed circuits
Telecommunications equipments
Telephones, telephones sets, routers, switchers, 
television cameras
Radio and TV receivers TVs and radios, VCRs, DVDs, CD players
Scientiﬁ  c instruments
Mathematical calculating instruments, 
oscilloscopes, radiation instruments 
ICT services Type of products
Telecommunications
Telephone communication, Internet provision, 
radio and TV provision
Computer and related activities
Hardware and software consultancy, 
data processing and database activities, 
maintenance and repair of computers
Source: See RAMON, Eurostat’s Classiﬁ  cation Server for a complete description of all the goods produced by the sector. A for-
mal deﬁ  nition of the sector according to industrial classiﬁ  cation and adopted by OECD and Eurostat is provided in the annex.
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_PUB_WELC 
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access to human capital and facilities for R&D and 
innovation. Mature and standardised products are 
mass-produced in locations where access to cheap 
labour is more important. The ICT sector is nonethe-
less more innovative than the average industry and 
ICT ﬁ  rms patent more than ﬁ  rms in other sectors of 
the economy [Wintjes (2006)].
7.2.1. ICT  market
Looking ﬁ  rst at the ICT sector from the demand side, 
the EU ICT market amounted to 600 billion euros in 
2005. Carrier services (ﬁ  xed data services and ﬁ  xed 
and mobile telephone services) accounted for the 
largest share of the market, 43% (see Graph 7.1). 
Even though the German market encountered the 
largest decline of all Member States in the beginning 
of the millennium, Germany is still the largest ICT 
market in EU. The ICT markets in the EU-15 countries 
accounted for 95% of the EU ICT market. The Euro-
pean ICT markets constitute around a third of the 
global ICT markets and the US and Japanese mar-
kets amount to 28 and 15% respectively leaving the 
remaining 24% of the total ICT market to the rest of 
the world.  81
As will be discussed later in this chapter, consumption 
of ICT within the EU widely exceeds EU production 
of ICT goods which implies a large trade deﬁ  cit. This 
is also the case, the trade deﬁ  cit in 2005 amounted 
to some 60 billion euros.
81  EITO (2006) p. 43.
7.2.2. Structure  and  location 
of the EU ICT sector
The remainder of this section will be devoted to a 
description of the sector from the supply side. Accord-
ing to the latest Eurostat statistics, the EU 25 ICT sec-
tor comprised approximately 600 000 enterprises in 
the year 2002, with 6.8 million persons employed 
and value added amounting to euros 450 billion. 
The ICT sector represented 3.4% of total European 
employment and value added by the ICT sector was 
equivalent to 4.5% of GDP. ICT services accounted 
for 70% of total ICT sector employment and 80% 
of ICT sector value added and for about 90% of the 
enterprises in the whole ICT sector.82
The ICT sector is heavily concentrated in most sub 
sectors. Large ﬁ  rms with more than 250 employees 
account for more than 60% of the employment and 
produce more than 70% of the value added in the 
sector.83 Manufacture of telecommunications equip-
ments is the most concentrated in ICT manufacturing 
and 80% of value added is produced by the larg-
est ﬁ  rms (more than 250 employees) who employed 
75% of all employees in the industry. Also the man-
82   Eurostat New Cronos (2006). These statistics are provisional since statis-
tics covering the ICT sector are unfortunately not available for all Member 
States after 2001 in Eurostat’s database New Cronos. The data for 2002 
and 2003 still contain many gaps for the different ICT subsectors and no 
aggregates for EU-25 are available. The EU-25 aggregates that are found in 
the annex table are not ofﬁ  cial but have just been calculated as sums of the 
individual Member States. The most recent updated and reliable statistics 
for the ICT sector are found in the database developed by the Groningen 
Growth Development Centre and will be used in the main text.
83  Eurostat New Cronos, 2001 ﬁ  gures. See also Wintjes, R. (forthcoming 2006).
Graph 7.1: The European ICT market 2005 by products
Source: EITO (2006). Market values (percentages) represent end user spending. Carrier services include ﬁ  xed and 
mobile telephone services and ﬁ  xed data services. ICT equipment includes server systems, PCs and printers, fax 
machines and audio and video conferencing, ofﬁ  ce equipment and data and telecommunications networks. Software 
products include software and software infrastructure. IT services include consulting, implementation, operations 
management and support services. The Graph above includes data for Bulgaria, Norway, Romania and Switzerland.
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ufacturing industries producing ofﬁ  ce  machinery, 
electronic valves and tubes and radio and TV receiv-
ers are heavily concentrated. The relatively high level 
of concentration can be explained by the existence 
of high sunk costs and economies of scale [e-Busi-
ness W@tch (2006)]. The concentration is less pro-
nounced in the industries producing scientiﬁ  c instru-
ments [European Commission (2005A)].
The services industry is considerably less concen-
trated than ICT manufacturing though there are 
large variations between ICT services industries. 
Telecommunications is the most heavily concen-
trated services sub sector where only 2% of the ﬁ  rms 
account for 95% of value added and 90% of the 
employees.  84 Old national former monopolies still 
have a large role in the telecommunications indus-
try though they are increasingly being challenged 
by new ﬁ  rms. The developments in the sector have 
been driven by market liberalisation and deregula-
tion in the 1990s followed by the entry of a large 
number of new network operators. Also the increas-
ing convergence of platforms and technologies has 
opened up borders between different markets and 
resulted in increased competition from ﬁ  rms previ-
ously acting in other markets. One example is the 
transmission of voice over Internet (VoIP) which has 
been driven by increased broadband penetration.  85
Computer services are considerable less concentrated 
than telecommunications services. Around 0.5% of 
the companies that employ more than 250 people 
produce around 45% of the value added and employ 
some 30% of the labour force in the industry. The 
lion share of value added (some 60%) is produced by 
SMEs. This industry hosts two thirds of all ICT ﬁ  rms 
and 90% of the ICT sector’s micro ﬁ  rms are found in 
this industry.  86
The most recent statistics for value added from OECD 
and GGDC for the ICT sector cover only 19 of the 
Member States According to Table 7.2 two thirds of 
the value added in the ICT sector is produced in the 
four largest countries: France, Germany, Italy and 
UK. Germany holds the largest share of ICT manu-
facturing production while the lion share of ICT serv-
ices production is held by UK ICT services ﬁ  rms. This 
means also that the largest share of total EU ICT pro-
duction takes place in UK since ICT services make out 
around 80% of total value added, 70% of employ-
ment and turnover and 90% of all enterprises in the 
ICT sector. Notable exceptions from this rule of ICT 
services dominance are Finland and Ireland where 
84  Eurostat New Cronos (2006).
85   The proposed new NACE classiﬁ  cation reﬂ  ects this increased complexity 
of the sector and will include not only different technologies for transmit-
ting voice but also means for transmitting different types of content.
86  Eurostat New Cronos.
ICT manufacturing holds the major share of the total 
ICT sector.  87
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden produce 
relatively more of ICT services than what the sizes 
of the countries suggest.  88 The telecommunications 
services industry occupies around two thirds of total 
ICT services value added in Belgium, Netherlands and 
Spain while computer services carry a larger weight of 
ICT services value added in Sweden. Some of the new 
Member States like the Czech Republic and Poland 
also have relatively large ICT service industries. Tel-
ecommunications services it relatively the largest 
industry in the Czech Republic while the computer 
services industry plays a larger role in Poland.
7.2.3.  Comparison of the industry 
composition with other regions
Comparisons of the EU ICT sector with some other 
countries are presented in Graphs 7.2 and 7.3 below. 
The Graphs present the size and composition of the 
ICT manufacturing and ICT services sectors respec-
tively in terms of average shares of total manufactur-
ing and market services value added between 2001 
and 2003 for 19 Member States, Australia, Canada, 
USA, Japan, Korea, Norway and Taiwan.  89
Graph 7.2 shows that both the composition and 
relative size of the ICT manufacturing industry vary 
over countries. ICT manufacturing industries in Ire-
land, Japan, Korea, Finland and Taiwan are relatively 
large with 15% or more of total manufacturing value 
added. On the lower part of the spectrum are Greece, 
Spain, Luxemburg, Australia and Portugal where less 
than 4% of total manufacturing value added accrues 
to ICT manufacturing.
Manufacturing of ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 
and manufacturing of electronic valves and tubes are 
relatively large South-East Asian manufacturing sub 
sectors. Especially Taiwan has a large production in 
those industries. Other relatively large producers in 
these industries are located in Ireland with, respec-
tively, 14 and 8% of the value added.
87   Manufacture of telecommunications equipment is the largest ICT manu-
facturing subsector in Finland making up for almost 90% of total ICT 
manufacturing value added in 2003 while manufacturing of electronic 
valves and tubes are the largest ICT manufacturing subsectors in Malta. 
Manufacturing of ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers and electronic valves 
and tubes are the largest ICT manufacturing subsectors in Ireland.
88   Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Data-
base, October 2005, www.ggdc.net.
89   An alternative would be to measure the size relative to the total economy. A pres-
entation along such lines could however be blurred by the fast that the size of 
the public sector varies substantially between countries depending on whether 
consumption of education, health care and other expenditures for social security 
or welfare purposes are paid through taxes or are part of private consumption. 
Measuring the ICT sector relative to total manufacturing and market services 
therefore yields a more appropriate comparison. Since differences between 
Member States are smaller than compared countries outside the EU, a compari-
son of EU-19 ICT sectors relative the total economies is found in the annex.
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Table 7.2: Location of EU ICT industries. Country share in EU19 ICT manufacturing 
and ICT services value added (%). Mean values 2001-2003
ICT Manufacturing     ICT Services
Austria 32
Belgium 24
Denmark 11
Finland 52
France 14 16
Germany 27 17
Greece 01
Ireland 52
Italy 10 12
Luxembourg* 00
Netherlands 45
Portugal 11
Spain 36
Sweden 23
UK 16 20
Czech Republic 23
Hungary 21
Poland 33
Slovak Republic 11
Total 100 100
Note: ICT services include postal services. See also DG Enterprise and Industry (2005). Industry and location. 
* Data for insulated wire, electronic valves and tubes and telecommunications equipment are not available.
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, http://www.ggdc.net.
Graph 7.2: Size and composition of ICT manufacturing. 
(Average shares of total manufacturing value added 2001-2003, percent)
Notes: * 2000-2002 averages. ** Data for radio and television receivers is not available. 
*** Data for insulated wire, electronic valves and tubes and telecommunications equipment are not available.
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005,  http://www.ggdc.net.
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The Netherlands has a relatively large production 
in the radio and television receivers, concentrating 
around a ﬁ  fth of total EU value added in this seg-
ment (Phillips effect). The EU telecommunication 
equipments industry is especially important in Fin-
land where some 25% of total EU value added in this 
industry is produced, with Nokia as the dominant 
player.
ICT services are relatively more important in the EU 
than in other parts of the world which can be seen 
in Graph 3. In eight Member States the ICT services 
share of total market services exceeds 10%. Two of 
the South-East Asian countries are found in the lower 
end of the spectrum. Telecommunications hold the 
largest shares of total ICT services value added in 
most countries while computer services are relatively 
more important in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, 
Ireland, Sweden and Slovakia.
Graphs 7.2 and 7.3 above imply that event though 
there remains a gap between the USA and the EU in 
terms of production of ICT manufacturing, production 
of EU ICT services is at least at par with US ICT services.
7.2.4.  Economic Impact of ICT
The impact of ICT on the growth of the rest of the 
economy is usually thought of as being determined 
by ICT investment, the technological progress in the 
production of ICT goods and services in ICT produc-
ing industries and ICT usage.
At the macro level, ICT investments increase labour 
productivity growth both by increasing the existing 
capital stock and by introducing new technologies in 
the production process.  90 Graph 7.4 below presents 
contributions of ICT capital to GDP per capita growth 
between 1995 and 2004. The largest contributions of 
ICT capital can be found in USA where 0.8 percent-
age points of GDP per capita growth can be attrib-
uted to ICT investments. ICT capital contribution for 
EU-15 amounted to 0.5 percentage points (or 32%) 
of GDP per capita growth of 1.54% between 1995 
and 2004. The individual Member States display var-
iations in GDP growth rates as well as in sources of 
growth.
Harbouring an ICT sector has proven to be important 
for growth since ICT production has been character-
ised by rapid technological progress and very strong 
demand. The technological progress has brought 
about falling relative prices which in combination 
with elastic demand leads to growing expenditure 
shares for ICT goods. 91 The economic importance for 
90   Pilat, D. (2006). “The Economic Impacts of ICT – Lessons Learned and Impli-
cations for Policy.” Annex to i2010 High Level Group. The Economic Impact 
of ICT: evidence and questions. European Commission, March 2006.
91   See for example the discussion in Pilat, D. (2003) and DeLong, J. B. & 
Summers, H. L. (2001).
Graph 7.3: Size and composition of ICT services. 
(Average shares of total market services value added 2001-2003, percent)
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, http://www.ggdc.net.
Note: Communications includes postal services. Market services are deﬁ  ned as NACE G-K.
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a sector to the whole economy can be measured in 
terms of how much the sector contributes to aggre-
gate labour productivity growth. The sector’s contri-
bution depends on the size of the sector and its pro-
ductivity growth. The higher share of the economy 
held by the sector and the higher its productivity 
growth, the larger is the effect of the sector’s pro-
ductivity growth on aggregate productivity growth.
Table 7.3 summarises contributions from three major 
industry groups to market economy labour produc-
tivity growth in EU-15 and USA.  92 Even though most 
of the difference in market economy labour produc-
tivity growth can be attributed to market services, 
the differences between EU and USA in contributions 
from the ICT producing industries is also striking: the 
contribution in USA is more than twice as large as in 
EU. The larger contribution from ICT production in 
the US is primarly due to the larger share of US ICT 
producing industries relative to total output, though 
higher productivity growth rates in ICT manufactur-
ing matter too.  93 Labour productivity growth in the 
EU15 ICT services is on par with the US ICT services.
The third channel for ICT impacts on the economy 
is through greater use of ICT throughout the econ-
92   Market economy labour productivity growth excludes labour productiv-
ity growth in the public sector. The reason for exclusion is the substantial 
measurement problems of for example value added in the public sector. 
Production industries exclude the ICT sector. Reallocation is a residual 
picking up the effects on labour productivity growth from changes in 
industry structure.
93  van Ark, B. & Inklaar, R. (2005).
omy. Firms and industries outside the ICT sector may 
increase their overall efﬁ  ciency by using ICT more 
intensively in their business models. By introduc-
ing ICT, a certain amount of input factors such as 
capital and labour can be more efﬁ  ciently combined 
and produce more output than before the introduc-
tion of ICT. In other words, total factor productivity 
growth may increase.  94 There may also be spill over 
effects of the use of ICT. In networks created or facili-
tated by ICT, beneﬁ  ts of ICT grow with the number 
of customers and ﬁ  rms connected to the networks. 
Wide industry adoption of ICT may therefore reduce 
transaction costs and give rise to a more efﬁ  cient 
matching of supply and demand in many markets 
for goods and services. These effects may give rise to 
a higher overall total factor productivity growth [Pilat 
et.al. (2002)]. Even though these effects are difﬁ  cult 
to measure, more and more ﬁ  rm-level studies show 
the positive impact of ICT use on ﬁ  rm performance 
[Pilat (2004)]. Australian experience shows that the 
use of computers has had a positive effect on total 
factor productivity growth in a number of industries 
and a number of studies on British ﬁ  rms have found 
signiﬁ   cant returns to ICT investment.  95 Similarly a 
recent Swedish study found that the use of comput-
ers, ICT applications, networks and conducting busi-
94   While labour productivity growth measures the part of growth in output 
that is not explained by greater use of labour to produce output, it does 
not take into account other factors of production such as capital. Total 
factor productivity growth measures aim to capture the increases also in 
for example capital, energy and knowledge.
95  Gretton et. al. (2004) and Clayton (2005).
Graph 7.4: Contributions of ICT capital to GDP per capita growth 1995-2004 
(percentage points)
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, http://www.ggdc.net 
and own calculations.
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ness over the Internet had a positive effect on ﬁ  rm-
level total factor productivity.  96
7.3. The  competitiveness 
of the EU ICT sector
High-technology industries such as ICT play an 
increasingly important role in international trade. 
The growth of trade in high technology outpaces the 
growth of trade in other manufacturing goods and 
constitutes around 25% of total OECD trade [OECD 
(2005)]. Another strong emerging trend of inter-
national trade is the trade in intermediate products 
which has grown substantially since the mid 1980s. It 
is one of the main features characterising the increas-
ing globalisation and is the result of new and more 
complex relationships between trade, foreign direct 
investment and international R&D activities.
These complex relationships are often the result of 
activities of multinational ﬁ  rms operating in differ-
ent parts of the world. Direct investment ﬂ  ows of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and vertical spe-
cialisation in different stages of production has led to 
rapidly growing trade in intermediate inputs. Firms 
have chosen different ways to organise this and 
while some import from other ﬁ  rms, part of the intra 
industry trade (IIT-trade) takes place between differ-
ent afﬁ  liated units of the same multi-national ﬁ  rm, 
intra-ﬁ   rm trade. The growth of this kind of trade 
reﬂ  ects multi-national ﬁ  rms’ search for more efﬁ  cient 
production. Statistics also reveal that intra-ﬁ  rm trade 
in the ICT sector is relatively high and accounts for 
68% of US ICT imports and 40% of US ICT exports 
in 2002 [OECD (2004)].
Investments and sourcing of production abroad 
are key elements in corporate competitive strate-
gies. Globalisation also encompasses the increasing 
internationalisation of R&D activities performed by 
96  Hagén, H-O & Zeed, J. (2005).
MNE’s afﬁ  liate ﬁ  rms in different parts of the world. 
The internationalisation of R&D activities are driven 
by two major motives; adjusting products to local 
foreign marks and accessing superior knowledge in 
locations with large supplies of science and technol-
ogy personnel and favourable systems of innovation 
[Meijers et. al.(2006)].
The globalisation of industry can thus be characterised 
by three main activities: international trade, foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and R&D activities [OECD 
(2004) and Meijers et. al (2006)]. The ICT sector is 
to a large extent contributing to the increased inter-
national specialisation by its production and services 
and is possibly the most internationalised industry 
sector [OECD (2004)]. The use of ICT has allowed for 
knowledge and information to be codiﬁ  ed, standard-
ised and digitalised enabling an in-depth specialisa-
tion and fragmentation of the production process. 
As a result the value-chain of production a product 
can be distributed over different countries according 
to comparative advantages in the production of the 
individual stages of production [Meijers et. al. (2006) 
and European Commission (2005B)].
7.3.1. Trade
A strong competitiveness position for an industry in 
any country ought to reﬂ  ect itself in large market 
shares on domestic markets and export markets. This 
can be measured in several ways.  97 Competitiveness 
is measured below by revealed comparative advan-
tages (RCA)  98 which relates the world market share 
for a certain industry to the world market share for 
total exports of the country [Balassa (1965)]. A value 
97   Maybe the most straightforward way is to measure the ICT manufactur-
ing industries’ shares of exports to a certain market. Measuring com-
petitiveness by shares of world exports favours however large countries. 
A possible explanation to that can perhaps be found in that size seems 
to matter. There might be several reasons for this. Large countries have 
more resources in terms of capital, labour and other factors of produc-
tion. Large countries also have larger domestic markets which mean that 
they are more able to exploit economies of scale.
98  See the annex for a deﬁ  nition of RCA.
Table 7.3. Industry contributions to market economy labour productivity growth 
2000-2003 (average annual percent)
EU15 USA
Industry labour productivity 
growth
1.1 3.6
ICT production 0.5 1.1
Production industries 0.6 0.9
Market services 0.1 2.0
Reallocation -0.1 -0.3
Source: van Ark, B. & Inklaar, R. (2005). “Catching Up or Getting Stuck? Europe’s Troubles to Exploit ICTs’ Productivity Poten-
tial.” Research Memorandum GD-79. Groningen Growth Development Center, University of Groningen. September 2005.
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of RCA above 1 indicates that a speciﬁ  c country, rela-
tive to the world, tends to be specialized in exports 
in the ICT industry.  99
Revealed Comparative Advantages for EU-25 and 
a number of other countries are presented in 
Graph 7.5. The Graph shows that the ICT manufac-
turing industries in the South-East Asian countries, 
especially those in Philippines, Malaysia and Singa-
pore are the most competitive. The high RCA for 
the Philippines ICT manufacturing derives mainly 
from production of semiconductors while Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand have a more diversiﬁ  ed ICT 
industry with signiﬁ  cant production of also comput-
ers.  100 The EU-25 ICT manufacturing industry had a 
RCA’s of 0.6 in both years indicating that on aver-
age the EU-25 is not specialized in exports of ICT 
goods.  101 Apart from the South-East Asian countries 
mentioned above, also Mexico and Japan were spe-
cialised in ICT exports in 2004. Japan managed to 
remain competitive despite the recession that hit 
the coutnry during the South-East Asian crisis. India 
is found at the lower part of the RCA spectrum. At 
ﬁ  rst sight it might look peculiar that the Indian ICT 
99   A problem with this measure is that countries with a relatively small 
manufacturing industry can turn out to have high RCA’s even though 
the ICT manufacturing industry only consists of a few ﬁ  rms. Examples of 
this are the South-East Asian countries, Philippines, Malaysia and Thai-
land but also Malta. The Maltese ICT manufacturing industry received the 
highest RCA. This is based on the existence of one large semiconductor 
ﬁ  rm, ST Microelectronics. Exports of semiconductors account for 60% 
of total manufacturing exports. European Commission (2006). European 
Economy, Issue 1, January 2006.
100   International labour ofﬁ  ce  (2005).  http://www.logos-net.net/ilo/150_
base/en/topic_n/t8_phi.htm.
101  The RCA measure is calculated on the basis of extra EU trade.
manufacturing industry is not more competitive. 
The growth of the Indian ICT sector during the last 
decade or so has been concentrated in ICT serv-
ices. Individual Member States that are specialised 
in ICT manufacturing are Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
  Ireland and Netherlands.  102
Before the statistics on trade in services are pre-
sented, a word of caution should be raised. The 
intangible nature of services and the increasing 
number and complexity of means of delivery make 
trade in services more difﬁ  cult to quantify than trade 
in goods. International trade in services require no 
physical package to cross borders, contains seldom 
any information on quantity and has no administra-
tive system based on customs duty collecting meas-
uring it. International services data, as opposed to 
goods trade data which rely predominantly on cus-
toms declarations, are collected through a variety of 
methods and sources such as business accounting 
and record-keeping systems, administrative sources, 
regular surveys of businesses as well as estimations 
by statistical agencies [Kirkegaard (2004)].  103 Statis-
tics on trade in services are thus less available and 
less reliable than statistics on trade in goods.
Bearing these reservations in mind,  the evidence 
suggests that EU seems to have comparative advan-
tages in ICT services. Total EU shares of OECD 
102  See the annex for individual Member States’ RCA’s.
103   An often cited example of the difﬁ  culty to measure trade in services is 
the discrepancies in exports reported by India and imports reported from 
other countries. Kirkegaard (2004) and OECD (2004) contain examples 
and discussions of this discrepancy.
Graph 7.5: RCA’s in the ICT manufacturing industries 1995 and 2004
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006).
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exports amounted to 70% of communication serv-
ices and 80% of computer and information services. 
The Irish and US ICT service industries occupied the 
largest market shares in 2002. Together with UK and 
Germany, these countries shares of OECD exports 
amounted to 55%.
EU-25 has a trade deﬁ   cit in ICT manufacturing 
while trade in ICT services shows a surplus [(Euro-
pean Commission 2005B)]. The trade balance for 
ICT manufacturing displayed a deﬁ  cit of 55 billion 
euros in 2004 while exports of ICT services exceeded 
imports of ICT services with 9 billion euros (Meijers 
et al. 2006).
Further investigation of the trade performance of ICT 
manufacturing shows that even though the trade def-
icit is relatively large, terms-of-trade for ICT manufac-
turing goods have increased ever since 1996 [Meijers 
et. al. (2006)]. Most of the poor performance of ICT 
manufacturing trade seems to be rooted in products 
or parts of products where low-cost producers have 
a comparative advantage even though European 
Commission (2005B) notes that EU does not seem 
to have comparative advantages in the production 
of semiconductors which is usually regarded as a 
high-technology product. USA and Japan have also 
lost market shares which mainly have been cap-
tured by low-cost producers in South-East Asia [CEPII 
(2004), European Commission (2005B), Meijers et. 
al. (2006)]. Most of these market shares have been 
captured by China and other low-cost producers in 
South-East Asia.
Even though Chinese producers have gained more 
market shares than other producers in the last years, 
China has still its comparative advantages in low-
technology industries and the Chinese compara-
tive “disadvantage” in high-technology goods has 
actually increased over the last ten years [Schaaper 
(2004)]. The specialisation in low-technology pro-
duction is also evident in the composition of Chinese 
ICT trade. China continues to import mainly elec-
tronic components (65% of imports in 2004) while 
the major part of ICT exports consist of computer & 
related equipment. In addition to satisfying domestic 
Chinese demand, electronic components are used to 
assemble computer & related, audio & video and 
telecommunications equipment and also consumer 
electronics. China has also signiﬁ  cant trade deﬁ  cits in 
trade with other high-technology ICT goods as inte-
grated circuits, semiconductors and scientiﬁ  c instru-
ments.104
Using disaggregated data on products Meijers et. al. 
(2006) show that EU-25 exported relatively expen-
104   http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,2340,en_2649_201185_
35833096_1_1_1_1,00.html.
sive exports and imported relatively cheap goods 
between 1996 and 2004. Most of the imported prod-
ucts were computers, electronic parts, radio- and 
TV-sets and other consumer electronic goods where 
production is relatively standardised and prices are 
more important than quality for competition. The EU 
ICT manufacturing industry seems to be successful in 
relatively high-quality ICT products and Meijers et. 
al. (2006) show that the EU-25 ICT manufacturing 
trade recorded a surplus in trade with relatively more 
qualitative goods. Goods where EU-25 has a com-
parative advantage are electronic apparatus (Ireland 
and Netherlands) and scientiﬁ   c instruments (Ger-
many and UK).  105 The export prices of EU-25 goods 
have risen quite substantially without an accompa-
nying equally large increase of the trade deﬁ  cit.  106 
It is therefore likely that there are more products 
where quality competition is important and where 
the EU-25 ICT manufacturing industry is success-
ful. Other ICT manufacturing industries where some 
EU-25 producers have comparative advantages can 
be found in the computer industry (Ireland and The 
Netherlands) and telecommunication equipments 
industry (Finland and Sweden).
The accession of the new Member States has resulted 
in an increased competitiveness of the ICT manufac-
turing industry as ICT producers in other countries 
have invested in these countries in order to take 
advantage of a relatively skilled labour force with 
considerably lower wages than in EU-15. Especially 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland have 
received large inﬂ  ows of FDI in both ICT manufactur-
ing and ICT services industries. Estonian ICT manufac-
turing have comparative advantages in production of 
insulated wire, telecommunications equipments and 
radio and TV receivers and the Hungarian ICT manu-
facturing industry is competitive also in producing 
computers. Czech ICT manufacturing industry has 
comparative advantages in production of computers 
and insulated wire.  107
The new member states’ comparative advantages 
are still found in labour-intensive production. In a 
not too distant future one can expect that factors 
such as relatively high stocks of human capital and 
the proximity to EUs R&D networks will contribute to 
an upgrading of product quality and sophistication 
of ICT services in the new member states, thus rein-
forcing EUs comparative advantages in knowledge-
intensive products.
It is obvious from the observations above that ICT 
products and parts of products cannot be regarded 
105  Meijers et. al. (2006), p. 142. See also table A5 in the annex.
106   Lack of data on a sufﬁ  ciently disaggregated level precluded Meijers et al 
from further analysis of this subject.
107  See table A5 in the annex.
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:138 16/03/07   9:07:07139
Chapter 7 — The competitiveness of the EU ICT sector
as homogenous and that not all ICT goods are high 
technology goods.  108 ICT goods are differentiated 
and products of different qualities command differ-
ent prices.  109 EU, USA and Japan have comparative 
advantages in goods or parts of products of relatively 
higher quality and prices than the emerging com-
petitors from South-East Asia [CEPII 2005, Meijers et. 
al. (2006)]. The increased modularity of production 
process allows for a slicing of the value chain accord-
ing to comparative advantages in different locations. 
Knowledge-intensive and relative expensive produc-
tion such as chip design takes place in Europe and 
USA and relatively cheaper labour-intensive mass 
production takes place in Asia. Software design and 
systems design are located in European facilities but 
software coding is done in for example India [Meijers 
et. al. (2006)]. The fragmentation of the value added 
chain is reﬂ  ected in the growing share of parts and 
components in world trade and has given rise to an 
increased re-organisation of production process at 
international level [CEPII (2004)].
In the beginning of a product’s life-cycle, R&D 
expenditures constitute a relatively large share of its 
value added. The products are produced on a rela-
tive limited scale in this early stage and economies of 
scale are not signiﬁ  cant in the production process. 
It is essential that the production of the product in 
this stage is located both close to the market and 
close to the supply of skilled labour, experts and spe-
cialised suppliers of key services for developing and 
marketing the product. External economies of scale 
are thus more important in this stage of the product 
cycle. Later in the life-cycle when products mature 
and production is characterised with high degrees of 
economies of scale cost deliberations become more 
important and the production can be re-located to 
low-cost countries. Transactions, communications 
and related costs become relatively smaller per unit 
of production when scale effects are present.
EU is more successful in trade in ICT services display-
ing a trade surplus which has kept growing since 
the mid 1990’s.110 Belgium, Ireland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and UK are specialised in trade 
with communication services. Belgium, Ireland and 
UK are also relatively more successful in trade with 
computer services displaying positive RTB’s.111 This 
specialisation is also based on the ability of EU to 
produce services with relatively high quality and 
108   OECD classiﬁ  es manufacturing industries according to their skill/technol-
ogy intensity. According to this classiﬁ  cation all ICT industries but the 
manufacture of insulated wire is classiﬁ  ed as high technology industries.
109   Goods are differentiated in both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal 
differentiation refers to different variants of goods at the same stage of 
production while vertical differentiation refers to differences due to differ-
ent stages of the production process.
110   International Monetary Fund (2005). Balance of Payment Statistics, and 
OECD (2006) International trade in services.
111  OECD (2006), International trade on services.
value added thus reinforcing the pattern that EU has 
comparative advantages in the production of knowl-
edge intensive goods and services of high quality. 
Especially the production of software requires much 
human capital. East European countries are rela-
tively well endowed with a high educated labour 
force with labour costs well below the EU-15 aver-
age. EU-15 software ﬁ  rms have reaped the beneﬁ  ts 
of this comparative advantage in Eastern Europe and 
invested in production facilities in the east European 
ICT sector. The trade effects of these investments are 
increasingly visible in Poland and the Czech Republic 
[Meijers et. al. (2006)].
While ICT and other manufacturing industries have 
imported (sourced) components from other parts 
of the world in many years, the international sourc-
ing of ICT services is a rather new phenomenon. The 
relatively recent upswing of international sourcing of 
ICT services has been driven by rapid technological 
innovation and diffusion of information technology 
as well as rapid price declines in telecommunica-
tion prices. Also freer trade following liberalisation of 
trade in services and labour cost savings, especially 
in labour intensive service production such as call-
centre type tasks and access to large pools of skilled 
English speaking labour outside the home country 
have contributed to these developments [Kirkegaard 
(2004)]. Therefore, services are now less constrained 
in terms of localisation than they used to be.
Re-locations of some ICT services to Asia from the EU 
and USA have received a lot of attention and spurred 
an often heated debate about the consequences for 
growth and employment in the EU and USA. The 
existing evidence and the discussion above indicates 
that most of the re-location of ICT services that has 
taken place applies to labour-intensive production 
such as call-centres and software coding while soft-
ware development is still predominantly located in 
the EU.112 This conclusion is reinforced by the obser-
vations that in-sourcing of knowledge-intensive ele-
ments of the value added chain from Asian ﬁ  rms to 
EU has taken place during the last years [Meijers et. 
al. (2006)].
7.3.2. FDI
Data on FDI by industry are scarce and often not 
very detailed. There is however some information 
for a limited number of countries for aggregates 
of manufacturing industries including ICT sectors 
[OECD (2004)]. The major recipients of FDI inﬂ  ows 
in OECD to machinery, computers, radio and televi-
sion and communications equipment industries in 
2001 were the Netherlands, UK and France. Japan, 
112  See for example the report by GAO (2004).
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UK, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg received large inﬂ  ows of FDI in the telecom-
munications services industry during the same year. 
China and Hong Kong accounted for around 10% of 
total worldwide FDI inﬂ  ows in 2002 thereby becom-
ing the largest host countries.
The analyses of FDI in Meijers et al. (2006) corrobo-
rate the ﬁ  ndings about ICT trade. The authors ﬁ  nd 
that FDI is most present in relatively less knowledge 
intensive sectors with scale-intensive production and 
that inward and outward FDI ﬂ  ows are relatively well 
balanced. Insufﬁ   cient coverage of data limits the 
analysis to a few EU countries and industries. Their 
analysis covers outward and inward FDI in the ofﬁ  ce 
and computer industry (ISIC30), radio, television 
and communication equipments industry (ISIC32), 
telecommunications services (ISIC 6420) and com-
puter and related services (ISIC 72) between 1999 
and 2002.
The largest outﬂ  ows of FDI appear in the ofﬁ  ce and 
computer industry, radio and TV receivers industry 
and the telecommunications equipment industries 
with the Dutch ICT manufacturing industry as the 
largest investor in foreign markets. Also French and 
German industries are active in investing in foreign 
locations. Telecommunications services is the third 
largest ICT industry with respect to outward FDI and 
the UK industry is more internationalised than other 
EU telecommunications industries measured this 
way while the computer services industries in France 
and the Netherlands engage relatively more than the 
other countries’ computer services in outward FDI 
[Meijers et. al. (2006)].
Outward FDI by manufacturers of radio, television 
and communication equipments as well as compu-
ter manufacturers appear to be driven by motives 
for locating production in low-cost locations. East-
ern Europe has received relatively high shares of 
this FDI. The inward FDI in these sectors seem to be 
motivated by producers outside EU-25 searching for 
access to more advanced input factors and favoura-
ble conditions in general for more knowledge intense 
production of elements of these products. Outward 
FDI by telecommunications services is mainly driven 
by market-seeking motives [Meijers et. al. (2005)]. 
As ﬂ  ows with the exception of more scale intensive 
production are relatively well balanced it seems that 
EU offers an attractive location for production and 
development of knowledge intensive production.
7.3.3. R&D
R&D in locations outside the home country is 
mainly driven by two motives. The ﬁ   rst motive is 
market oriented with the purpose of adjusting the 
products to the local needs and to provide devel-
opment services for customers. The foreign market 
must be large enough to justify these kinds of R&D 
facilities since the establishment of these facilities is 
often associated with large sunk costs. Asset seeking 
or search for superior knowledge and/or to locate 
R&D establishments where framework conditions 
for R&D are favourable is another strong motive for 
internationalisation of R&D. Internationalisation of 
R&D is however not costless. It is often associated 
with large sunk costs due to capital-intensive equip-
ment. Other important costs are associated with 
control and organisation of transfer and distribution 
of knowledge between various units and locations. 
Related costs are those associated with protection of 
vital knowledge for the innovating ﬁ  rm. Setting up 
foreign R&D may also incur costs if home based R&D 
loses scale advantages [Sanna-Randaccio & Veugel-
ers (2003)].
By analysing triadic patent data, Meijers et al. ﬁ  nd 
that most of the EU ICT research is located in EU 
and that no country invents more patent applica-
tions outside of the EU than inside.  113 Case stud-
ies of the R&D activities of ICT ﬁ  rms showed that 
the home country is the preferred location for R&D. 
Four European ﬁ  rms were analysed and the results 
showed that 75% of their research takes place 
within the EU. The increased internationalisation of 
R&D that takes place is mainly directed towards set-
ting up facilities in USA and Japan. The location of 
R&D in other countries research seems to be more 
market oriented as the locations outside the Triad 
yielded only a few ICT patents. Thus, the increas-
ing location of R&D facilities in China, India and 
Eastern Europe that has taken place during the last 
years is mainly driven by market seeking motives. 
The evidence suggests that ﬁ  rms prefer to carry out 
strategic R&D at home where costs of co-ordination 
and control are lower and where information about 
and access to skilled labour and systems of innova-
tion is easier. This said, the increasing human capi-
tal endowments and low labour costs in China and 
India can make it increasingly attractive in the near 
future to locate there other types of R&D, aimed 
at beneﬁ   ting from complementarities with their 
increasing share of production activities in ICT sec-
tors as well as seeking access to the national systems 
of innovation.
7.3.4. Location  of  production
The globalisation has changed the landscape of ICT 
production. Increasing shares of both ICT manufac-
turing and services production take place in Asian 
countries. This is not only the result of new compet-
113   Triadic patents are patens issued by the European Patent Ofﬁ  ce, the US 
Patent ofﬁ  ce and the Japanese patent ofﬁ  ce.
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ing Asian ﬁ  rms but also the result of relocation of 
ICT production that previously took place in USA 
and EU. The changing landscape reﬂ  ects changing 
comparative advantages and technological develop-
ments partly enabled by ICT which has facilitated a 
fragmentation of production processes allowing for 
a slicing of the value chain according to comparative 
advantages in different locations.
The changing location of ICT manufacturing pro-
duction over time is illustrated in Graph 7.6 below. 
EU-15, Japan and USA accounted for more than 
80% of world production in 1990. By 2002, their 
combined share had decreased with 25% (20 per-
centage points) to just above 60%.  114 The major 
parts of the shares lost by EU15, Japan and USA 
have been captured by China (12.2%) and other 
Asian countries most notably Korea (6.2%), Tai-
wan (4%), Malaysia (3.9%) and Singapore (3.7%) 
[OECD (2004)].
The analysis above has shown that most of the re-
location that has taken place refers to products or 
parts of products which are mature and standardised 
and where production is labour intensive and sub-
ject to high degrees of economies of scale. Relative 
knowledge intensive activities tend to be located in 
EU. Strategic R&D is located at home close to the 
114   The data is calculated in current US dollars and relative exchange rate 
changes will therefore have an effect on the shares of the different coun-
tries and regions.
production of knowledge intensive products. EU has 
comparative advantages in knowledge intensive pro-
duction due to better access to human capital and 
superior framework conditions for innovation and 
R&D.
Product cycles are however relatively short in ICT 
due to the rapid technological process in the sec-
tor. Products that may seem to be innovative today 
mature fast and can soon be mass produced in 
locations where unit cost is low and transportation 
costs as shares of total costs are negligible. Loca-
tions outside EU are an alternative for those prod-
ucts.
Meijers et. al. (2006) argue that degrees of knowl-
edge-intensity and economies of scale are main 
determinants of the localisation of ICT products. 
The less knowledge-intensive production and the 
higher the degree of economies of scale, the easier 
it is to re-locate products or parts of products to 
low-cost locations. For example is packaged soft-
ware under pressure to be re-located while, it is less 
likely that customised and own account software 
should be re-located. For knowledge-intensive IT 
services is proximity to the customers a strong com-
plementary reason for location in the EU. Low-cost 
locations such as India are not the strongest alterna-
tive for this kind of production. It is instead the large 
US market which also offers access to highly quali-
ﬁ   ed labour and favourable framework conditions 
for R&D that constitutes the strongest alternative 
Graph 7.6 Share of world ICT production accounted for by EU15, Japan, USA 
and other countries 1990 and 2002.
Source: OECD (2004) Information Technology Outlook 2004, OECD, Paris. Note: No data were available for Greece 
and Portugal in 1990. No data available for Luxembourg for any of the years. Largest shares held by other countries 
in 2001 were China, Korea, Taipei, Malaysia and Singapore.
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to location in the EU.  115 Large parts of telecommu-
nications services production are however subject 
to economies of scale and may be candidates for 
relocation to Asia.
High knowledge-intensity characteristics of products 
explains why EU is a preferred location for knowledge-
intensive manufacturing production of scientiﬁ  c instru-
ments and design of chips and other high-technology 
electronic components while the mass-production of 
chips has already to a large degree been re-located to 
low-cost locations.  116 The telecommunications equip-
ments industry provides an example of how the value 
added chain of products is divided between different 
locations. Strong competition in the mobile commu-
nications market have forced American and European 
ﬁ   rms to subcontract the manufacturing of mobile 
handsets to Asian producers while most of the R&D 
activities are located in the home countries. Produc-
tion of products in the later stages in the life cycles 
in the manufacturing industries ofﬁ  ce machinery and 
computers, radio and TV receivers and electronic 
valves and tubes is scale intensive and therefore can-
didates for a re-location to low-cost countries.
East European countries have appeared as a strong 
alternative to Asian location of ICT production as the 
East European countries have a relatively large supply 
of human capital at considerably lower wages than in 
EU-15. Especially successful have the ICT manufactur-
ing industries in Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland been and gained comparative advantages in 
the production of computers, insulated wire, telecom-
munications equipments and radio and TV receivers.
7.4.  Challenges for the future 
competitiveness of the EU ICT sector
This section provides a picture of recent techno-eco-
nomic developments triggered by digital conver-
gence and globalisation, and discusses their expected 
impact on the competitiveness of the ICT sector over 
the longer term.
7.4.1. Deﬁ  ning trends of ICT cycle in its 
deployment phase  117
Certain technologies emerge when certain economic 
and institutional conditions are met and in return, 
115   SAP is an example of a ﬁ  rm which has R&D facilities in both the EU and USA. 
According to the case study in Meijers et al. (2006), the US share of knowl-
edge-intensive activities may increase at the expense of SAP labs in the EU.
116   Table A3 in the annex shows that the EU-25 ICT manufacturing industry 
has higher market shares in the scientiﬁ  c instruments industry than in any 
other ICT manufacturing industry.
117   The broad theoretical framework we use is the concept of Techno-Economic 
Paradigm Shifts, a further development of the Kondratieff waves (Perez 
(2004)).
their adoption and deployment has a considerable 
impact on the economy and the society. In their 
deployment phase, it is the spread of new economic 
and social practices (whether in organizational struc-
tures or social interactions) that enable and sustain 
their production and use within a new socio-eco-
nomic paradigm.
A new technology thus becomes embedded into cur-
rent business operations as well as in new consumer 
goods and services, generating total factor produc-
tivity gains as well as consumer welfare. During this 
phase, the most important transformations tend to 
be institutional rather than technological.
There is little doubt that we are currently at the 
deployment phase of the information and commu-
nications technologies technological cycle.  118 It is 
considered as having begun with the microproces-
sor breakthrough and the general microprocessor 
expansion continues to form the backdrop to the 
technological developments, while bringing about 
institutional and societal innovations.  119
A much-used measure for the current rate of tech-
nological change is the average period during which 
speed or capacity doubles or, more or less equiva-
lently, the period when the device halves in price. 
For storage, networks, and computing power, these 
periods are around 12, 9, and 18 months, respec-
tively.  120 The consequent technological evolutions 
are nevertheless more than permanent progressions 
of computing power, as we enter the stage of digital 
convergence.
Although it was noted as early as the early 80s  121 
most observers agree that “real” digital convergence 
is taking off only now. EITO (2006) sees 2005 as 
Year One of the new scenario of global digital con-
vergence, as the new paradigm of availability of any 
content, anywhere on any platform, closer to the 
reality. In its recent analyses ISTAG  122 (2006) also 
subscribes to this vision. Digital convergence implies 
several constitutive features123:
118   See as well http://www.nicholasgcarr.com/digital_renderings/.
119   We understand here institution in the widest sense possible, including 
laws and customs of social interactions (North (1991)).
120   I.Foster, The Grid: A New Infrastructure for 21st Century Science, Physics 
Today, 2002
121   The idea of digital convergence emerged with the MIT’s Media Lab in 
1978, as an overlap of computing, printing, and broadcasting.
122   European Commission IST Advisory Group (ISTAG). ISTAG has been set 
up to advice the Commission on the overall strategy to be followed in 
carrying out the IST thematic priority and related activities of research as 
well as on the orientations with respect to the European Research Area by 
helping to stimulate the corresponding European research communities 
(http://cordis.europa.eu/istag.htm).
123   FP 6 project BREAD (BROADBAND in Europe for All: A Multidisciplinary 
Approach) - Second report on the multi-technological analysis of the 
‘broadband for all’ concept, focus on the listing of multitechnological 
key issues and practical roadmaps on how to tackle these issues (August 
2005); www.ist-bread.org.
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–   Convergence of services – the same contents sup-
plied over different platforms;
–   Convergence of networks – different services sup-
plied via the same network;
–   Convergence of terminals – multifunctional ter-
minals that can support different services (that 
might be supplied through different networks);
–   Convergence of market players – the same com-
panies supplies their products and services in dif-
ferent sectors;
–   Convergence of regulation – the same regulator 
and the same set of rules apply in different sectors.
From the strategic and competitiveness perspec-
tive, it is very important to distinguish neverthe-
less between two alternative ways of capturing the 
opportunities of the deepening of digital conver-
gence: the trend to ever increasing embeddeness of 
inter-communicating electronic components (Ambi-
ent Intelligence) and the socially driven trends based 
on Internet applications.
7.4.2. Generalisation  of  electronic 
components (embeddeness) as realisation 
of digital convergence
The major technological drivers of digital conver-
gence are embeddeness, itself driven by cost-effec-
tive computing, miniaturization, ubiquitous com-
munication, and advanced materials and sensing 
devices,  communication networks convergence, and 
the increasing standardisation and interconnectivity of 
various devices.
The European concept of Ambient Intelligence adds 
Intelligent User-friendly Interfaces to the above-
mentioned technological drivers. The objective of 
the AmI concept is to enable people and devices to 
interact with each other and with the environment 
[Punie (2005)]. The further main lines of develop-
ment are towards solving the software and hardware 
incompatibilities [O’Brien (2005)], reducing costs of 
embedded systems and increase their interconnec-
tion.  124
In 2000 already 98% of computing devices sold 
were embedded in products and were not apparent 
to the product’s users [Borrielllo and Want (2000)]. 
In 2002, electronics accounted for 20% of total value 
creation in the automotive industry, of which two-
thirds was generated by software-intensive systems. 
By 2015 electronics are expected to account for 35% 
124   Accenture found that in 2005 80% of consumers cite cost a major barrier 
to adoption and that 70% want someone else to aggregate the content, 
devices, and services used to run the digital home. (www.accenture.com).
to 40% of the total value created with each new car. 
Electronics and embedded software-intensive sys-
tems are expected to account for almost all (90%) 
of the future innovation in the automotive sector. 
Software-intensive Systems currently account for 
more than 70% of the cost of creating new hand-
held devices in telecommunication industries [ITEA 
(2005)].
In the consumer electronic industries, although the 
market is currently dominated by ﬂ  at screens, MP3 
devices and DVDs, mobility seems to drive the cur-
rent wave, through products like iPod (32 million 
sold in 2005  125) game consoles (28 million units sold 
in 2005, growing to 40 million in 200  126) or mobile 
video and TV broadcast devices.
The current shift in healthcare services from reactive 
to preventive treatment and from hospital to outpa-
tient care opens new opportunities for the develop-
ment of interconnected and mobile medical devices. 
However, today, while two out of three big compa-
nies producing medical imaging devices are Euro-
pean, the EU lags behind in terms of usage of ICT in 
the health sector.
7.4.3.  Social computing as exploitation 
of digital convergence
On the other hand, over the last few years, Internet 
has seen the emergence of a plethora of new appli-
cations facilitating social interaction, in particular 
self-publishing, direct participation and collabora-
tion, such as blogs and wikis  127, social networking 
websites, search engines, auction websites, games, 
VoIP and peer-to-peer services. These have facilitated 
creation and distribution of content with unprece-
dented speed and variety. Together, they are referred 
to as “web 2.0”, indicating the new paradigm which 
considers the web as an operative system, or “social 
computing”, because they open the possibility for 
innovative companies to exploit in a proﬁ  table way 
the connectivity of the Internet to support the net-
working of people and content.  128
The success of these applications and the leading 
ﬁ  rms operating in the corresponding service markets 
is based on using the shared knowledge of the pub-
lic.  129
125 http://theappleblog.com/2006.
126 http://news.softpedia.com.
127   Wikis are websites that rely on collaborative software to enable collective 
content production by different users. The primary example is www.wiki-
pedia.org, a free online encyclopaedia with 100.000 unpaid authors.
128   See Burgelman et al., (2005) for a more complete overview these 
trends.
129   Is the customers review that give much value to companies like Amazon 
and Netﬂ  ix. Google search algorithms are ﬁ  ne-tuned by the results of 
each search. The number of click on particular adds give valuable market-
ing information, etc. (Wired, July 2006.)
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More precisely, the common feature of these appli-
cations is that they enhance the community building 
capabilities of the Internet, enabling self-publishing, 
participation and collaboration [Blackman (2005)].
In this context, the user of these applications 
becomes a co-producer of the service provided, and 
thus, potentially, the whole of the user base becomes 
a source of content (Bloq, Wiki, Flickr), of taste/emo-
tion, therefore of marketing information (Amazon, 
Delicious), of goods (eBay), of contacts (myplace.
com), of relevance (Google pagerank), of reputa-
tion and feedback (eBay, Tripadvisor), of storage and 
server capacity (P2P), of connectivity (wiﬁ   sharing, 
mesh networks), of intelligence (business web 2).
Social computing is reinforcement, on an unprec-
edented scale, of the very strong network effects 
already exploited through the Internet, and appears 
to be accompanied by societal changes. The growth 
of the constituent applications has already had visible 
social and economic impacts: bloggers played a very 
inﬂ  uential role during the 2004 US presidential elec-
tions and 2005 French referendum on the EU consti-
tution; 740.000 Americans and 170,000 Europeans 
now rely on eBay as a source of income; in 2005 
Myspace.com (a social networking website which 
is the most viewed website of the Internet after 
Yahoo) was purchased for $580 million by Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation.
With regard to the ICT industry, these socially driven 
Internet based trends are a factor of structural 
change. They act on markets by lowering entry costs, 
they promote new business models largely relying 
on advertising as an effective source of revenue and 
they give rise to new players. Their inﬂ  uence is felt 
beyond the ICT industry as they provide new chan-
nels of delivery for traditional services.
7.4.4. Evolving  business  strategies 
in the context of emerging trends
Two tendencies are speciﬁ  c to the present transfor-
mation of ICT markets. First is the redistribution of 
value-added along the various segments of the ICT 
industry: equipment and software producers, net-
work operators, platform- and application-integra-
tors, and end users. The second is the integration 
of vertical chains and emergence of new horizontal 
markets, raising important challenges for the regula-
tion of competition.
The outstanding example is that of companies, pre-
dominantly US-based, which promote the applica-
tion platforms for the new socially driven trends. The 
most successful of these tend to integrate down-
stream and upstream segments of the value chain to 
gain market dominance for their own ﬁ  nal products. 
In doing so, their strategies shift from cooperation 
and mutual beneﬁ  t (e.g. advertisement brokerage to 
ﬁ  nance free content) to market consolidation (merg-
ers and alliances with Internet and telecom provid-
ers).
In many cases, this involves alliances with European 
companies, as for instance the several major alliances 
formed in the area of portals (Google with T-Mobile), 
instant messaging (Microsoft/MSN with Vodafone) 
etc. Through vertical integration, they raise barri-
ers to creative destruction in their original markets. 
These strategies allow them to surpass their original 
ambition of controlling Internet based service mar-
kets (search, instant messaging, e-mail, online pay-
ment), expanding into various areas of content pro-
duction such as digital TV, music, video, as well as 
in the areas of the digital home and network access 
[IDATE (2005)].
The new architecture is dynamic, with emerg-
ing trends pulling the realignment and redesign of 
the value chains. Success and competitiveness still 
belong to innovative companies acting in markets 
with high rates of entry and exit (“creative destruc-
tion”) or relying on rapid value accumulation based 
on high sunk costs, mostly R&D-related (“creative 
accumulation”).
Although an oversimpliﬁ  cation, it is useful to broadly 
associate the production of ambient intelligence 
with the innovative type of “creative accumulation”, 
given the prevalence of large established ﬁ  rms and 
the presence of corresponding barriers to entry for 
new innovators. Quite on the contrary, in the serv-
ice markets based on social computing, suppliers 
are natural candidates for the “creative destruction” 
type of innovation, with the technological ease of 
entry and a major role played by entrepreneurs and 
new ﬁ  rms in innovative activities.130
It is worth noting that Internet heavyweights such as 
Yahoo, Google and eBay originate131 from national 
markets with business environments more prone to 
the “creative destruction” type of innovation, as well 
as with a more vivid innovation culture, mostly from 
US. This is supported by the much higher rate of 
entry-exit of ﬁ  rms and higher dynamics of mergers 
and acquisitions132 than in Europe. The trade of ideas 
replaces the nurturing of R&D capabilities, while the 
risk is transferred to venture capitalists. This pinpoints 
130  For further discussion of innovation types, see Malerba (2002)
131   Or migrate, as it is the case of Skype, founded in Luxembourg, currently 
a subsidiary of eBay
132   Instead of developing their own R&D departments, big American compa-
nies tend to buy spin-offs already successful in new markets. In the last 12 
years, Cisco acquired 107 companies building up its proﬁ  le as one of the 
most valuable tech companies in the world. In 2005 News Corp bought 
of MySpace parent company and in 2006 the online karaoke player kSolo 
and News aggregator Newroo (etc).
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the role of innovation systems in deﬁ  ning the proﬁ  le 
of the ICT competitiveness.
This process is accompanied by permanent and 
active reallocation of lower value-added activities, 
particularly from manufacturing towards developing 
economies, as well as of mainly non-core R&D. This 
“specialisation”, including that involved in gener-
ating and leading emerging segments, has among 
its determinant factors the inner features of the 
national/local innovation systems,  133 and thus may 
continue in future to generate the distribution of 
competencies and market segments in a more glo-
balised world.
7.4.5. Policy  considerations  regarding 
the competitiveness of the EU ICT industry
ISTAG (2006) highlighted the EU’s main industrial 
and technological strengths in global markets. They 
are in:
–   Both traditional telecommunications, and IP-
infrastructure;
– Embedded  computing;
–   Micro- and nano-electronics and Microsystems;
–  “Smart” integrating systems; and,
– Multicultural  audiovisual  content.
Threats to EU competitiveness in ICT include those 
arising from:
–  Slow user uptake of new technologies;
–   Growing investments in emerging economies, 
leading to the reallocation of lower value-added 
activities;
–   Further expansion of US dominance in comput-
ing and the innovativeness of American ﬁ  rms; 
and,
–   Strong technological niches appropriated by Jap-
anese companies.
Given these threats, Europe can maintain and 
enhance its competitiveness through building upon 
133   The innovation systems literature distinguishes between the American 
model of innovation systems and the Continental European one. More 
precisely, the American model is characterised by 1) strong IPR and pat-
ent systems; 2) corporate governance systems dominated by outsiders, 
with innovations being ﬁ  nanced through ﬁ  nancial markets; 3) a ﬂ  exible 
and efﬁ  cient external labour market, allowing high rate of ventilation 
of human capital. The Continental European one is based on 1) open 
knowledge, with ﬁ  rms competitiveness based more on the retention of 
speciﬁ  c capabilities than on IPR protection; 2) corporate governance sys-
tems dominated by insiders; 3) efﬁ  cient internal labour markets designed 
to build up, inside the ﬁ  rm, the capabilities and competencies needed for 
innovative activities [Coriat and Weinstein (2004)].
its ability to develop frontier technologies and facili-
tating the demand for theses in potential leading 
markets, within the context of the European social 
model.
In the context of the Lisbon process, Member States 
are invited “to facilitate the spread and use of ICT and 
build a fully inclusive information society” (Guide-
line N°9), also by encouraging “the development of 
strong ICT and content industries”. However, in gen-
eral, in their National Reform Programmes (NRPs) 
Member States did not address directly the promo-
tion of the ICT industry, except as far as the regula-
tory framework is concerned. Other than this, the 
main areas for action are e-government, broadband 
infrastructure and digital literacy. Whilst the main 
objective of these measures may lie in other policy 
areas (for instance, modernising public administra-
tion, providing faster access to public services, social 
and territorial inclusion), they can also be seen as 
contributing to increase the demand of ICT prod-
ucts and services. Many NRPs refer to the EU i2010 
framework (ref. next paragraph), therefore recognis-
ing common objectives.  134
The Commission Communication 135 “i2010 – A Euro-
pean Information Society for growth and employ-
ment” encompasses a number of policy initiatives 
directed towards both the demand and supply side 
of ICT which could further strengthen the competi-
tiveness of the EU ICT sector.  136 The Communica-
tion outlines three priorities for Europe’s information 
society and media policies: completion of a single 
European information space, strengthening innova-
tion and investment in ICT research and achieving an 
inclusive European information society.
In the light of the discussion of digital convergence, 
of particular relevance is the ﬁ  rst priority of i2010, 
aiming at establishing a consistent system of rules 
for the information society and media. This cov-
ers the review of the e-communication regulatory 
framework, spectrum management, interoperability 
– particularly as concerns the management of dig-
ital rights, and security (e.g. responding to system 
attacks or failures, identity management, protection 
of privacy etc).
Concerning other microeconomic policies, R&D 
is key in ICT innovation and thus competitiveness. 
However, in terms of R&D intensity  137, the EU posi-
tion is worrying. R&D intensity in ICT sectors in the 
EU is less than half that in US and in Japan [CSTI 
134   See Annex of the Commission’s Annual Progress Report COM (2006) 30 
ﬁ  nal of 25.01.2006, Time to Move up a gear.
135  COM (2005) 229 ﬁ  nal of 1.06.2005.
136   “i2010 – A European Information Society for Growth and Employment” 
COM (2005) 229 ﬁ  nal.
137   Calculated as the ratio between R&D expenditures in the ICT business 
sector and the total production of ICT.
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(2005)]. Even though these numbers may hide meth-
odological limitations they show that, overall, the EU 
lags behind.  138 However, one characteristic feature 
of Europe is that the R&D investment is strongly con-
centrated in larger ﬁ  rms, and that the EU companies 
that invest in R&D do invest more in comparison 
with their non-EU counterparts. This explains why 
the activities developed with the need for high R&D 
sunk costs are seen as competitively advantageous 
for EU despite the lesser overall R&D effort  139.
Given the socially driven trends discussed earlier, it 
is suggested that the R&D effort would be more efﬁ  -
cient in Europe if it takes into account the speciﬁ  cities 
of European societies and their speciﬁ  c current and 
expected demands: inclusion, multilingual diversity, 
ageing population, highly-educated labour force, and 
speciﬁ   c values (such as environmental protection, 
consumer protection, privacy and security). Also, 
much will depend on its capacity to develop syner-
gies with the next wave of new technologies. Perez 
(2004) expects that the next technological wave will 
be driven by biotechnology, bioelectronics, nano-
technology and new materials, in which ICT sectors 
might ﬁ  nd opportunities for further development.
Finally, some adjustments and corrections to the 
innovation model might open new potential niches. 
For instance, on the content market, although the 
European cultural heritage and diversity of Europe 
constitutes a natural and strong competitive advan-
tage, today’s European online content sector is less 
than 3% of the total revenues from music, video and 
games [ISTAG (2006)]. The global online content 
market is dominated by the USA, in part because of 
the nature of the innovation model. So far, European 
groups have met with limited success in deriving suf-
ﬁ  cient competitive advantage from their contribution 
to standards like MPEG. Without dynamic innovative 
entrepreneurs that would promote European con-
tent, current strengths of EU ICT research and indus-
try such as those in image processing, representation 
and coding, semantics and knowledge management 
could be lost or result in their becoming “vehicles” 
for largely non-European content.
Another aspect relates to general business envi-
ronment. The success of embedded computing is 
essentially an asset of EU companies in several lead-
ing sectors such as the automotive industry, medi-
cal equipment, telecommunication equipment and 
some consumer electronics products (e.g. high-end 
audio and video systems). However, due to the preva-
lence of in-house research and production of embed-
ded systems in the sectors to which they apply, their 
138   For instance, ICT production in the USA does not include the defence 
sector, where a signiﬁ  cant part of research in ICT is carried out.
139  IPTS (2005) “The 2005 EU industrial R&D investment SCOREBOARD”.
success has a very limited direct impact on the ICT 
sector as such. Measures like the setting-up of Euro-
pean Technology Platforms, or networking through 
research programmes might be beneﬁ  cial for a more 
intense subcontracting of ICT activities towards the 
ICT sector.
Finally, the further competitiveness of the European 
telecommunication services sector will strongly 
depend on the evolution of the regulatory frame-
work and the type of innovation this will promote 
in the various segments of the telecommunications 
market. The single market, the strengths of EU indus-
try in telecommunication equipment and mobile and 
networked services as well as the widespread efforts 
aimed at promoting broadband access all support 
the notion that policies can play an important role in 
furthering the future competitiveness of the sector.
7.5. Summary  and  conclusions
The EU ICT manufacturing trade deﬁ  cit is caused by 
EU’s industries not being able to compete with rela-
tively homogenous and labour intensive goods. The 
improvement in terms-of-trade indicates that even 
though quantities of imports have increased quite 
substantially relative quantities of exports, export 
prices have risen relative to import prices. This implies 
that EU has comparative advantages in differentiated 
goods of higher quality goods commanding higher 
prices. Furthermore, the increased trade in interme-
diate goods which in large amounts take place as 
intra-ﬁ  rm trade indicates that some of the imports 
are used as intermediate products in ﬁ  nished goods 
of a relative high quality.
EU has comparative advantages in production of 
ICT services which has manifested itself through a 
trade surplus which has kept growing since the mid 
1990’s. Especially the ICT services industries in Bel-
gium, Ireland and UK are successful. The compara-
tive advantages are based on the ability of EU to pro-
duce services with relatively high quality and value 
added. This is especially true for the production of 
software which requires much human capital in the 
development process.
The increased globalisation has created possibilities 
to fragmentise production and locate production of 
elements of products in locations with comparative 
advantages for the different parts of the production 
process. As a consequence, chip design is made in 
Europe while mass production of chips takes place 
in South-East Asia; software development is carried 
out in European software labs while the coding of 
software is done in India. Proximity to the customers 
of specialised products such as customised software 
is yet another argument for location in the EU. The 
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evidence suggests that knowledge-intensive produc-
tion, product development and strategic R&D are 
still located in Europe while labour-intensive produc-
tion of mature standardised goods has been located 
to Asia.
This said, ICT producers in the new member states 
have shown that it is still possible to be competitive 
in EU with low-cost and scale intensive production 
such as insulated wire, radio and TV receivers and 
other consumer electronics as well as computers. It 
is however unlikely that this kind of production is 
competitive in the longer perspective. It is therefore 
necessary to further strengthen the links between 
systems of innovation of old and new member states 
and thereby reaping the full potential of the relatively 
high skilled labour force in the new Member States.
The analysis in the previous sections has shown 
that EU has comparative advantages in knowledge 
intensive production of high quality products. With 
regards to ICT services, EU is specialised particularly 
in IT services and software production. For ICT man-
ufacturing, EU comparative advantages are found in 
the production of scientiﬁ  c instruments, electronic 
products and telecommunications equipment of 
high quality. The answer to the challenge from low-
cost producers lies in further climbing up the quality 
ladder and a fast ﬂ  ow of new innovative products 
satisfying the growing demand for advanced goods 
and services. Achieving this objective will be easier 
if the right sector-speciﬁ  c and more general micro-
economic policies are in place. Such policies could 
include the ones ensuring the availabilities of e-skills 
required by the EU industry in the years to come, 
and the ones promoting the ICT uptake and usage 
by all sectors and in particular by SMEs.
At sectoral level, the Commission launched an ICT 
Task Force in June 2006 with a mandate to provide 
sector-speciﬁ  c policy recommendations concerning 
ICT uptake, IPR, innovation, SMEs and entrepreneur-
ship, skills and completing the single market. They 
would complement the i2010 initiative and the 
many measures that Member States have committed 
to implement in their National Reform Programmes 
in the areas of e-government, broadband infrastruc-
ture and digital literacy, which contribute, indirectly, 
to a faster and wider take up of ICT.
The links between innovation and standardisation 
discussed in chapter 6 of this report points to the 
importance standards have for fostering innovation 
activities in new innovative technology areas, espe-
cially those which require interoperability between 
different applications. The Commission should 
ensure that the EU ICT standards setting policy is 
optimised to respond to current and future societal 
and market needs.
Raising the R&D investments of the EU ICT sector will 
be crucial for its future competitiveness given the lags 
already existing vis-à-vis its main competitors. This is 
not so much a necessity for the larger EU enterprises 
of the sector as for the smaller ones and start ups. 
This points to the existence of a more systemic weak-
ness in generating – and ﬁ  nancing research in – small 
innovative ﬁ  rms which cannot be addressed by sec-
tor speciﬁ  c measures alone; it rather necessitates the 
horizontal policy responses reviewed in the chapter 
on the ﬁ  nancing of innovation.
As concerns the more general business environment, 
and for a fast moving sector such as ICT, the policies 
that matter most are those bearing on the framework 
conditions that determine change and innovation: 
R&D, education and lifelong learning, competition 
and market opening as well as less red tape, i.e. those 
composing the EU Strategy for Jobs and Growth.
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Annex Table 7.1: Deﬁ  nition of the ICT sector according to international industrial classiﬁ  cations.
Description ISIC Rev. 3. NACE Rev. 1.
Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment 3000 30.02
Manufacture of ofﬁ  ce machinery 3000 30.01
Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313 31.3
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components
321 32.1
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy
322 32.2
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
323 32.3
Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 331 33.3
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process 
control equipment
331 33.2
Wholesale of ofﬁ  ce machinery and equipment 5150 51.64
Telecommunications 642 64.2
Hardware consultancy 721 72.1
Software consultancy and supply 722 72.2
Data processing 723 72.3
Database activities 724 72.4
Maintenance and repair of ofﬁ  ce, accounting and computing 
machinery
725 72.5
Other computer related activities 729 72.6
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Annex Table 7.2: Some characteristics of the ICT manufacturing and service industries in EU. 2003 
or most recent year available
ICT Manufacturing ICT Services
Value 
added
€ million
Number 
of Persons 
employed
Number 
of 
enterprises
Turnover
€ million
Value 
added
€ million
Number 
of Persons 
employed
Number 
of
enterprises
Turnover
€ million
EU25  84 724
1 537 
180
63 183 335 303
314 
332
3 723 
118
521 638 767 135
Belgium 2 073 22 763 512 5 510 9 612 89 356 12 723 28 296
Czech R. 847 63 047 5 199 6 073 3 016 74 005 24 008 6 151
Denmark 1 094 16 558 597 2 989 3 192 43 793 6 983 9 174
Germany 21 873 339 439 7 144 79 861 65 073 634 518 46 392 155 328
Estonia 66 6 970 179 247 311 7 659 977 788
Greece n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Spain 2 187 53 802 3 158 9 614 24 314 28 3642 29 763 58 373
France 14 888 254 105 6 649 59 610 44 488 494 939 50 357 104 932
Ireland 2 862 26 100 190 19 503 2 547 26 542 3 644 7 244
Italy 8 402 171 153 14 359 27 434 40 383 508 014 92 870 106 200
Cyprus n.a n.a n.a n.a 403 4 977 310 620
Latvia 20 2 657 116 62 444 12 497 1 177 991
Lithuania 107 11 275 186 365 415 16 310 1 495 1 331
Luxembourg 63 1 625 12 146 926 6 385 1 174 2 816
Hungary 1 784 69 917 3 495 12 260 2 532 72 529 21 918 7 868
Malta 185 3 353 60 1 134 48 1 972 701 112
Netherlands 1 481 19 210 1 275 4 864 7 656 126 373 20 495 23 924
Austria 2 402 34 281 605 7 329 6 263 73 804 13 499 15 845
Poland 1 527 76 658 7 332 6 089 1 341 79 107 25 651 4 966
Portugal 703 16 994 490 3 633 4 044 47 764 4 419 11 492
Slovenia 289 11 812 672 901 424 12 858 2 153 1 599
Slovak R. 220 26 832 313 1 189 783 22 249 1 369 1 833
Finland 6 746 44 497 698 27 376 4 428 57 675 4 874 12 202
Sweden 1 425 61 195 1 809 15 026 10 291 150 433 29 751 28 927
UK 13 481 202 937 8 133 44 089 81 400 875 717 124 935 176 122
Source: EUROSTAT, New Cronos 2006.
Notes: No data is available for Cyprus or Greece. Data for Malta, Poland and Sweden refer to 2002. Data on employment, 
turnover and value added data for manufacturing in Luxembourg is only available for NACE 33.2. Manufacturing data for 
Denmark, Latvia and Sweden do not include NACE 31.3. Data on employment, turnover and value added in manufacturing 
for Netherlands do not include NACE 32.3. Employment data for Netherlands do not include NACE 30. Manufacturing data 
for Lithuania and Malta do not include NACE 33.3. ICT services data for Malta refer to 2002. German data for 51.43 refer to 
2002. Luxembourgian data for NACE 72 refers to 2002. Slovenian data for NACE 64.2 refers to 2002. Data for the Czech ICT 
services industry do not include 51.43. Data for the Danish, Irish, Maltese and Polish ICT services industries do not include 64.2. 
Data on employment and value added are nor available for NACE 64.2 in Netherlands. Data on employment for manufacturing 
in Malta and Slovenia do not include NACE 33.2. Employment data for manufacturing in Latvia does not include NACE 31.3. 
Employment data for manufacturing in Lithuania does not include NACE 33.3. Data on turnover for manufacturing in Latvia 
does not include NACE 33.2. Data on turnover in Maltese manufacturing does not include NACE 31.3. Data on turnover in 
the Estonian and Maltese ICT service industries do not include NACE 64.2. Data on value added in the Estonian and Polish ICT 
service industries do not include NACE 64.2.
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Annex Graph 7.1: Average shares of GDP for ICT manufacturing and ICT services 2001-2003
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, http://www.ggdc.net.
Note. Communications includes postal services.
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Annex Graph 7.2: ICT manufacturing export shares 1995 and 2004 (ExtraEU trade, percent)
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006)
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Annex Table 7.3: Export shares in ICT manufacturing industries 2004. (Extra-EU trade, percent)
Ofﬁ  ce 
machinery
Insulated 
wire
Electronic 
valves 
and tubes
Telecom 
equipment
Radio 
and TV 
receivers
Scientiﬁ  c 
instruments
Australia       0.3       0.3       0.1       0.3       0.2       0.5
Brazil       0.1       0.8       0.1       0.3       0.7       0.2
Canada       1.2       2.2       0.9       3.7       0.9       2.4
China     29.0     12.4       7.1     21.6     26.2       8.8
Hong Kong       0.2       0.0       0.5       0.0       0.0       0.1
Indonesia       0.9       1.4       0.3       0.7       1.3       0.1
Israel       0.3       0.2       0.5       2.0       0.5       1.1
Japan       8.6       7.3     15.5     12.3     12.5     16.7
Korea       7.2       3.7       9.0       9.8     15.2       3.6
Malaysia       6.7       1.6       8.7       3.1       5.3       1.5
Mexico       4.6     20.5       1.1       4.9       8.4       2.5
Norway       0.1       0.9       0.0       0.5       0.1       0.6
Philippines       2.1       2.7       2.3       0.7       0.3       0.1
ROW       0.3       6.5       0.3       0.8       0.5       1.5
Singapore       9.2       1.3     16.8       3.2       4.7       2.5
Switzerland       0.2       1.7       0.4       0.4       0.3       2.9
Taiwan       6.5       2.2     10.9       4.0       3.1       9.2
Thailand       2.8       1.7       2.5       2.3       1.4       0.2
Turkey       0.0       1.8       0.0       0.1       1.7       0.1
USA       9.4     13.3     13.5     11.3       3.6     22.0
EU25     10.3     17.5       9.5     18.1     13.0     23.3
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006)
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Annex Table 7.4: Revealed Comparative Advantages in EU-25 ICT manufacturing industries 2004.
Ofﬁ  ce 
machinery
Insulated 
wire
Electronic 
valves 
and tubes
Telecom 
equipment
Radio 
and TV 
receivers
Scientiﬁ  c 
instrument
ICT
Austria 0.3 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4
Belgium 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Czech Rep. 1.1 3.5 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.9
Denmark 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.3 1.2 0.6
Estonia 0.0 3.5 0.2 6.4 2.6 0.9 1.4
Finland 0.1 0.9 0.2 2.7 3.3 0.7 1.1
France 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.5
Germany 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.6
Greece 0.1 2.5 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.3
Hungary 1.2 3.2 0.4 2.0 5.1 0.8 1.8
Ireland 3.1 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.4
Italy 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3
Latvia 0.1 2.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3
Lithuania 0.3 5.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7
Luxembourg 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.4
Malta 0.3 0.2     10.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.0
Netherlands 2.5 0.5 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.4
Poland 0.1 3.4 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4
Portugal 0.4 3.7 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6
Slovakia 0.5 4.6 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.5
Slovenia 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.2
Spain 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3
Sweden 0.3 1.0 0.1 3.0 1.4 0.9 0.8
UK 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.9
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006). 
RCA for the ICT manufacturing industry in an individual country k relative to the total world is calculated as 
follows:140
World
ing manufactur
World
ICT
k
ing manufactur
k
ICT
k
ICT
X
X
X
X
RCA =
where X denotes exports.
Suppose that the ICT industry in country k, is the Japanese ICT manufacturing industry. If the industry’s 
share of world exports of ICT equipment is larger than the Japanese share of world exports of all goods, this 
indicates that the Japanese ICT producer is internationally competitive. In this case, RCAICT
k has a value larger 
than one.
140  See OECD (2002) and (2003) and J.M. Irogoyen (2003). “Indicators for tracking EU industries’ competitiveness”, Enterprise DG, January 20.
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Annex Graph 7.3: Revealed Comparative Advantages in the ICT manufacturing industries 1995 
and 2004. (Intra-EU trade included)
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006)
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Annex Graph 7.4: Export shares in the ICT manufacturing industries 1995 and 2004. 
(Percent. Intra-EU trade included) 
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2006)
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Annex Graph 7.5: Relative Trade Balances (RTB) in the ICT services industries 2003. 
(Intra-EU trade included for the individual EU countries)
Source: OECD. Statistics on International Trade in Services. (2006). Note. EU-25 is an aggregate estimated by Eurostat which 
excluded Intra-EU trade. EU-18 is the sum of the market shares for the individual Member States for which there are data avail-
able. Communication services includes postal and telecommunications.
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The measure relative trade balance which is used for ICT services, RTB is deﬁ  ned as
 
()
() ICT ICT
ICT ICT
M X
M X
RTB
+
−
=
where X and M denotes exports and imports respectively. The measure can take on values between minus 
one and one. A positive value indicates that the country is performing well. The higher value the more com-
petitive is the country’s ICT services sector.
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Chapter 8:
Competitiveness in 
the Pharmaceutical industry
8.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the competitive position and 
performance of the European pharmaceutical indus-
try. Since in this sector, US and Europe represent the 
main producers and the main markets, the analy-
sis will focus on comparing their performance and 
respective characteristics. Other regions and coun-
tries will also be reviewed when relevant.
8.2. Proﬁ  le of the industry
Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals represents 
between 0.7% (Luxembourg) and 2.3% (Slovak 
Republic) of GDP across OECD countries, with a 
mean of approximately 1.5%  141. At 1.9%, the US 
share is higher than the OECD average, whereas the 
EU-15 average is 1.4%. The worldwide market for 
pharmaceuticals has doubled in size since 1995, to 
€447, 3 billion (as of 2005).
The US market is not only by far the largest national 
pharmaceutical market, but has also grown impres-
sively during the last decade In recent years the 
US pharmaceutical market, measured by sales at 
ex-factory prices, has grown faster than European 
markets. The US market is currently twice as large 
as the EU-15 aggregate (see Table 8.1; Berndt, 
2001), and accounts for approximately 50% of the 
world market for pharmaceuticals (up from 31.2% 
in 1995). Europe held a 30% share of the global 
pharmaceutical market in 2003, while Japan’s share 
in 2005 was nearly 12% (see Table 8.1). China, 
Brazil and India are growing fast, gaining shares in 
the international market. Poland, Hungary and, to 
141   Data refers to 2003. Source: OECD. Analyses in sections 8.2 and 8.3 
rely on data from a wide set of sources, including IMS Health, OECD-
STAN, Eurostat, NBER-UN, GGDC. Only limited information is available 
about New Member States in most sources, therefore data for the EU-25 
aggregate are not presented. As for the analysis in Section 8.5, Malta and 
Cyprus are not included in the EU-25 aggregate, due to unavailability of 
data in the CERM database.
a lesser extent, the Czech Republic are among the 
fastest-growing national pharmaceutical markets in 
Europe.
Employment in the pharmaceutical industry is con-
siderably higher in the EU than in the US. In 2001, 
pharmaceutical ﬁ  rms based in the EU-15 countries 
employed 471,000 people, equivalent to 1.7% of 
total employment in manufacturing. 2003 ﬁ  gures 
for EU-25 are 576000, which is also 17% of employ-
ment in manufacturing. The corresponding ﬁ  gures 
for the US are 276,000 employees, and a 1.5%t share 
of manufacturing employment in 2001 (increased to 
1.7% in 2003). Although employment in the Euro-
pean pharmaceutical industry is higher than in the 
US, the US outperforms Europe and Japan in terms 
of both rates of growth and the incidence of phar-
maceutical production over total manufacturing (see 
Table 8.2). On average, from 1995 to 2003 the US 
production of pharmaceuticals has grown slightly 
faster than in Europe, and considerably faster than 
in Japan.
Table 8.3 shows pharmaceutical trade ﬂ  ows for the 
EU, the US, and Japan. Trade in pharmaceutical 
products has been increasing at fast rates both in the 
EU and in the US, and more slowly in Japan. Europe 
has experienced an increasingly positive trade bal-
ance, while the US trade balance turned negative in 
2002, mainly due to exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations and 
to re-importation ﬂ  ows from European subsidiaries 
of US multinationals. Japan has shown a constantly 
negative trade balance over the years. Finally, a pro-
gressively larger share of total EU trade is accounted 
for by intra-EU trade, pointing to increasing integra-
tion. The share of EU-15 exports in pharmaceuticals 
going to the US has increased in recent years, to the 
extent that the US has become the main destina-
tion of EU pharmaceutical exports. Also the share 
of pharmaceutical imports into the EU from the US 
has increased over time, reaching 55.9% of total EU 
imports in 2004.
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8.3. Productivity  and  cost 
competitiveness
Table 8.4 presents data on pharmaceutical labour 
productivity (value-added per employee, converted 
in 1997-PPP thousand US dollars) for the period 
1980-2003, together with average annual growth 
rates. The table shows that Europe lags behind the US 
in labour productivity and that the productivity gap 
with the US is much larger in pharmaceuticals than 
in overall manufacturing. In 2003, labour produc-
tivity in the European pharmaceutical industry was 
53.1% that of the US  142. Only in Ireland and Sweden 
value added by employee was higher than in the US. 
Moreover, most recent data show an upsurge of US 
productivity growth (6.4% versus 5.8% in EU-15), 
and that gap continues to widen.
Even though overall increase in productivity in 
EU-15 is lower than in the US, differences across 
European countries are signiﬁ   cant. From 1996 to 
2003 the best performers in terms of labour pro-
142   Calculating productivity on a per hour worked basis would reduce patially 
the EU-US productivity difference.
Table 8.1. The size and growth of main national pharmaceutical markets 
(€ million; growth rates are calculated in national currencies) (1)
Rank
Country
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2003 € mil +nc € mil +nc € mil +nc € mil +nc € mil +nc
1U S 124.261 18 163.439 14 197.351 17 208.970 12 194.061 11
- EU-15 72.094 8 79.962 10 90.100 10 (2) 96.825 8 103.142 8
2 Japan  50.246 7 62.606 3 59.744 4 55.736 1 52.092 3
3 Germany 17.135 5 18.112 6 19.904 10 21.445 8 23.288 8
4 France 16.574 5 18.066 9 19.402 7 20.117 4 21.352 6
5 Italy 10.445 8 11.961 15 13.430 12 14.089 5 14.742 4
6U K 10.434 11 12.091 7 13.148 11 14.446 11 14.528 11
7 Spain 6.556 16 7.692 16 8.342 10 9.144 10 10.205 12
8 Canada 5.274 11 6.843 13 7.899 17 8.476 15 8.827 11
9 China 4.290 n.a. 5.442 n.a. 6.316 n.a. 6.460 n.a. 6.576 n.a.
10 Mexico 4.440 n.a. 6.247 n.a. 7.318 n.a. 7.589 n.a. 6.450 n.a.
11 Brazil 5.882 n.a. 7.243 n.a. 6.015 n.a. 5.318 n.a. 4.782 n.a.
14 India 3.243 9 3.706 3 4.080 12 4.152 11 3.929 8
16 Netherlands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.983 n.a. 3.268 10 3.550 9
17 Belgium 2.530 8 2.715 7 2.860 6 3.039 7 3.329 10
18 Poland 2.128 16 2.744 22 3.249 8 3.205 4 3.174 13
19 Greece 1.324 20 1.519 19 1.803 20 2.274 26 2.740 21
20 Sweden 2.017 11 2.327 11 2.276 7 2.474 8 2.532 2
21 Switzerland 1.711 10 1.905 8 2.169 10 2.389 7 2.519 10
23 Austria 1.669 11 1.762 6 1.862 6 2.032 9 2.160 6
24 Portugal 1.571 13 1.698 8 1.847 9 1.991 8 2.064 4
28 Hungary 767 19 840 13 1.016 19 1.275 19 1.440 18
29 Finland 974 9 1.069 10 1.200 12 1.326 11 1.410 6
33 Denmark 865 8 952 10 1.044 10 1.180 13 1.243 5
34 South Africa 898 15 1.097 19 1.027 12 901 13 1.175 12
35 Norway 766 13 854 9 961 11 1.180 14 1.142 3
36 Czech Republic 690 5 793 11 878 6 1.059 9 1.139 11
(1)  Percentage increments are rounded to integer directly in the source.
(2)  Cleaning of the data for Netherlands.
Source: IMS Health - World Review (various issues, original data in USD).
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Table 8.2: Total production of pharmaceuticals in current € millions and as percentage of the value 
of total manufacturing production (in italics); Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) calculated 
in national currencies
Countries 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
CAGR in NC (1)
1990-1995 1995-2001
EU-15 (2) -- 88.251 126.891 135.313 -- -- -- 7,4%
-- 2,4% 2,6% 2,8% -- -- -- 0,07%
USA 43.779 60.750 125.338 141.156 133.977 123.121 7,3% 8,0%
1,9% 2,2% 2,6% 3,0% 3,1% 3,3% 0,06% 0,14%
Japan 33.981 54.832 72.529 70.068 64.261 60.498 1,5% 2,0%
1,9% 2,2% 2,4% 2,6% 2,8% 2,8% 0,06% 0,08%
France 15.699 21.721 27.707 30.508 31.763 -- 5,4% 5,9%
2,8% 3,4% 3,5% 3,7% 3,9% -- 0,12% 0,05%
Germany 12.974 18.035 22.893 24.304 -- -- 4,7% 5,9%
1,4% 1,7% 1,8% 1,9% -- -- 0,04% 0,03%
United  8.739 12.189 19.144 20.822 22.382 20.667 10,0% 4,2%
Kingdom 2,1% 2,6% 2,8% 3,1% 3,5% 3,5% 0,11% 0,08%
Italy 15.770 12.210 17.747 18.090 21.298 -- 1,5% 5,1%
2,7% 2,2% 2,4% 2,4% 2,8% -- -0,11% 0,04%
Korea 4.708 8.943 12.311 11.740 12.568 10.977 16,3% 7,0%
2,2% 2,3% 2,1% 2,1% 2,2% 2,1% 0,03% -0,03%
Spain 5.305 6.263 7.981 9.126 9.219 -- 8,3% 6,8%
2,3% 2,4% 2,2% 2,4% 2,4% -- 0,01% 0,00%
Belgium 1.880 3.668 6.212 7.398 -- -- 12,0% 13,3%
1,6% 2,6% 3,5% 4,1% -- -- 0,19% 0,26%
Canada 2.679 2.885 5.435 6.536 -- -- 5,3% 9,8%
1,3% 1,2% 1,2% 1,5% -- -- -0,01% 0,04%
Netherlands 1.988 3.575 6.214 6.505 7.366 -- 10,2% 11,3%
1,5% 2,1% 2,9% 3,1% 3,5% -- 0,14% 0,16%
Sweden 1.898 3.411 5.726 5.963 6.870 -- 17,3% 9,6%
1,7% 3,0% 3,4% 3,8% 4,5% -- 0,26% 0,14%
Ireland 626 1.736 4.821 5.028 5.885 -- 23,9% 18,7%
2,4% 4,2% 5,1% 5,1% 5,9% -- 0,35% 0,16%
Denmark 1.068 1.923 3.746 3.873 4.032 4.050 10,8% 12,6%
2,3% 3,3% 5,4% 5,4% 5,5% 5,6% 0,20% 0,35%
Australia (3) 1.327 2.185 3.250 -- -- -- 12,3% 8,6%
1,3% 1,9% 2,3% -- -- -- 0,13% 0,11%
Austria 1.177 1.728 2.572 1.988 2.252 -- 5,8% 3,1%
1,7% 2,0% 2,4% 1,8% 2,0% -- 0,06% -0,03%
Poland ( 4) -- 937 1.165 1.538 -- -- -- 11,8%
-- 1,3% 1,1% 1,3% -- -- -- 0,00%
Hungary -- 700 1.024 1.223 1.308 -- 7,5% 18,1%
-- 3,2% 2,1% 2,3% 2,4% -- 0,64% -0,15%
Portugal 584 781 1.045 998 -- -- 7,7% 4,5%
1,3% 1,5% 1,6% 1,5% -- -- 0,03% -0,01%
Norway 347 529 1.085 985 1.094 -- 9,7% 10,3%
0,9% 1,2% 1,8% 1,6% 1,7% -- 0,06% 0,06%
Finland 451 468 611 710 -- -- 4,0% 8,0%
0,7% 0,7% 0,6% 0,7% -- -- -0,01% 0,00%
Greece -- 543 473 -- -- -- -- -0,8%
-- 1,6% 1,1% -- -- -- -- -0,10%
(1)  Compound Annual Growth Rate for absolute ﬁ  gures (in national currencies, euro used for the EU aggregate); annual average change for percentage 
ﬁ  gures (italics).
(2)  Does not include Greece in 2001.
(3)  1999 instead of 2000.
(4)  1996 instead of 1995.
Source: OECD – STAN.
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Table 8.3 International trade in pharmaceutical products (€ millions)
1991 1995 2000 2004
EU exports
intra EU15 12.150 19.736 38.993 81.978
extra EU15 10.324 17.207 39.731 56.927
NAC 430 1.269 2.976 4.691
US 1.604 2.692 11.045 21.152
Switzerland 932 1.884 4.583 7.841
Japan 1.418 2.337 3.224 3.468
Canada 292 437 1.331 2.668
Rest of the world 5.647 8.589 16.572 17.109
Total 22.473 36.944 78.724 138.905
EU imports
intra EU15 12.150 19.736 21.017 81.978
extra EU15 5.120 8.452 9.689 29.974
Total 17.270 28.189 30.706 111.953
Trade balance extra EU15 5.203 8.755 9.472 26.953
Trade balance EU15-US -52 -228 -120 4.383
US exports
EU25 1.668 2.995 3.936 17.048
EU15 1.656 2.919 3.835 16.769
NAC 13 75 101 279
Switzerland 86 243 217 1.094
Japan 672 849 821 1.214
Canada 430 745 880 2.421
Rest
Of the world
937 1.314 1.706 3.592
Total 3.793 6.146 7.560 25.368
US imports
Total 2.494 4.283 5.629 28.436
Trade Balance US 1.300 1.863 1.931 -3.068
Japan exports
EU25 340 674 723 1.333
Source: Author’s elaborations on the NBER-UN World Trade database (1986-2000) and Comtrade-UN (2001-2004) database.
Note: Data for exports are based on imports of partner countries to achieve consistency.
ductivity growth rates were Ireland (9.1%), Sweden 
(9.1%), Denmark (8.4%), France (7.4%), UK (6.8%), 
and Belgium (6.8%), each of which had a labour 
productivity growth rate higher than the US. These 
countries have experienced the highest productiv-
ity levels among EU countries. However, their con-
tribution to aggregate EU productivity remains low, 
due to a scale effect. Interestingly enough, much 
of the productivity increase in Ireland and Sweden 
is accounted for by local afﬁ  liates of foreign-based 
ﬁ  rms  143. This evidence, coupled with well established 
empirical ﬁ   ndings that foreign-owned subsidiaries 
are more productive than local ﬁ  rms, suggests that 
the good performances of Nordic countries can be 
explained in part by location decisions of large multi-
143   In Ireland, between 70% and 80% of value added in the manufacturing 
sector was generated by ﬁ  rms under foreign control. In France, Sweden 
and the Netherlands this ratio was between 25% and 30%. In other coun-
tries, it was below 20%. Labour productivity (value added per employee) of 
foreign afﬁ  liates in the manufacturing sector was greater than the national 
average in all countries for which data are available (OECD, 2005).
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national companies, mainly American, which export 
their organizational and business model, character-
ized by high capital intensity and high labour pro-
ductivity.
However, labour is less expensive in Europe than in 
the US. In 2003, labour cost per employee was 30% 
lower in EU-15 than in the US while in 1995, the gap 
was signiﬁ  cantly narrower (10%).
Table 8.5 shows the pattern of capital  144 per 
employee relative to the US for the EU-15 countries 
for the period 1981-2003. The largest three, namely 
Germany, France and UK, are included in the aggre-
gate EU-3. For the most recent period, we refer to an 
aggregate consisting of 10 countries (EU-10): Aus-
144   Expressed in standard efﬁ   ciency units (built following the perpetual 
inventory method described in the sidebar “Growth decomposition and 
TFP”) and converted to PPP USD by using PPP rates for Gross Fixed Capi-
tal Formation (source: OECD).
tria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden.
Table 8.5 shows that capital deepening in the US 
happened at consistently faster rates than the EU 
average throughout the period, with a few excep-
tions (e.g., France and Belgium). Also, in 2003 capi-
tal per employee in the US was 56.6% higher than 
in the EU-10 aggregate. In addition, the growth rate 
of capital per employee was 2.1 percentage points 
higher (in the period 1996-2003). From 1990 to 
2003 the US capital stock almost doubled in real 
terms.
All in all, the US seems to be headed toward a highly 
capital intensive production model, as are the small 
Northern EU members. Other European countries 
are specialized in low value-added activities, with low 
capital intensity. France seems to follow a relatively 
well balanced path of capital accumulation, while the 
Table 8.4: Real Value Added per Employee in the Pharmaceutical Industry – Labour productivity 
(1997-PPP thousand USD)
Value
1980
Annual 
Growth
1981-
1985
Value
1985
Annual 
Growth
1986-
1990
Value
1990
Annual 
Growth
1991-
1995
Value
1995
Annual 
Growth
1996-
2001
Value
2001
Annual 
Growth
1996-
2003
Value
2003 (1)
Austria 30,3 2,0% 33,6 10,5% 56,6 6,2% 77,3 -0,7% 74,3 4,2% 108,1
Belgium -- -- -- -- -- -- 115,9 8,1% 188,0 6,8% 199,4
Germany 39,3 1,9% 43,2 2,4% 48,7 6,8% 68,5 4,6% 90,2 4,0% 94,0
Denmark 49,0 0,5% 50,3 1,6% 54,6 8,2% 82,2 11,9% 167,6 8,4% 160,4
Spain 48,6 0,0% 48,5 6,8% 68,3 3,6% 81,7 2,2% 93,2 1,3% 90,9
Finland 54,1 2,4% 61,1 -0,3% 60,1 -0,3% 59,3 4,5% 77,5 4,2% 83,2
France 31,0 9,0% 48,6 8,9% 75,9 7,5% 110,3 7,4% 171,5 7,4% 199,1
UK  40,3 4,3% 49,9 6,9% 70,3 5,0% 90,1 9,9% 163,1 6,8% 154,8
Greece (2) -- -- -- -- -- -- 22,3 1,2% 23,7 -- --
Ireland -- -- -- -- 70,6 12,8% 133,8 4,9% 179,7 9,1% 276,5
Italy 41,8 9,7% 68,1 4,0% 83,2 0,4% 85,0 4,6% 112,4 3,7% 114,7
Netherlands (3) -- -- -- -5,6% 52,9 12,5% 98,8 5,4% 136,6 2,8% 123,7
Sweden 40,7 5,6% 53,8 5,8% 71,7 12,5% 134,3 6,7% 201,0 9,1% 278,8
EU-8 (4) 38,8 5,5% 51,1 5,3% 66,7 5,3% 87,1 6,7% 130,0 5,8% 139,0
EU-15 (5) -- -- -- -- -- -- 88,7 6,4% 130,3 5,7% 140,0
US 71,0 9,0% 111,2 4,7% 141,0 2,1% 156,5 5,3% 215,2 6,4% 261,9
(1)  Values for 2003 have been obtained as projections from Eurostat survey data (except for Denmark and the US).
(2)  Read 2000 instead of 2001.
(3)  Read 1987-1990 instead of 1986-1990.
(4)  The EU-8 aggregate includes: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Italy and Sweden.
(5)  Excluding Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal.
Source: our computations on OECD – STAN, OECD - Main Economic Indicators, Eurostat and GGDC (for all, last data available).
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UK has a sizeable capital stock but its current capital 
deepening rate is probably too low. Finally, Germany 
and Italy are characterized by low capital intensity.
It is possible to use traditional growth accounting 
techniques to estimate the contribution of each fac-
tor to valued-added growth and to the growth of 
labour productivity. Results are summarized in Table 
8.6 and Table 8.7.
From 1996 to 2003 the annual rate of growth of pro-
duction in the EU-10  145 amounted to 7.17%, slightly 
lower than the US rate (7.8%). Given the similar 
growth rates for labour (1.23% in EU-10 vs. 1.55% in 
US), overall productivity growth rates for the EU-10 
and the US are quite similar (5.94% versus 6.43%).
Productivity growth in the US was mostly the out-
come of a signiﬁ  cant process of capital deepening 
(2.6% average growth from 1996 to 2003), while 
the most important component of the EU-10 aggre-
145   The EU-10 aggregate as deﬁ  ned in the previous section includes the fol-
lowing countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, UK, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden.
gate was total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
(5.0% average growth in 1996-2003), accounting 
for 83.8% of labour productivity growth. Capital 
deepening in Europe increased at a modest rate of 
1.0%.
Again, the EU-15 aggregate conceals very different 
situations among countries: in 1996-2003 Belgium, 
France, UK, Ireland and Sweden experienced signiﬁ  -
cant productivity gains, associated with both high 
capital deepening and high TFP growth. The high 
value of TFP growth for these countries can be con-
sidered the payoff resulting from previous capital 
investments.
The analysis of value added growth and its decom-
position into labour, capital and TFP growth for 
the US reveals a slowdown in US labour productiv-
ity growth, together with a similar reduction in TFP 
growth between the early 1980s and the middle 
1990s. In the middle 1990s, the US pharmaceutical 
industry dramatically increased its investments, as 
indicated by rates of capital deepening higher than 
Table 8.5: Capital per Employee in the Pharmaceutical Industry (1997-PPP thousand USD, 
beginning of period values)
Value
1981
Annual 
Growth
1982-
1985
Value
1985
Annual 
Growth
1986-
1990
Value
1990
Annual 
Growth
1991-
1995
Value
1995
Annual 
Growth
1996-
2001
Value
2001
Annual 
Growth
1996-
2003
Value
2003 (1)
Austria 51,5 -2,3% 47,1 7,6% 68,8 2,3% 77,0 3,6% 95,4 3,8% 104,4
Belgium -- -- -- -- -- -- 35,2 11,5% 70,1 8,9% 72,0
Germany 28,7 4,3% 34,2 2,7% 39,2 6,0% 52,9 3,3% 64,4 2,7% 65,6
Finland 82,4 -0,5% 80,6 -2,8% 70,2 -1,8% 64,1 -0,9% 60,8 2,3% 76,8
France 18,4 7,1% 24,4 8,5% 37,3 8,2% 56,2 4,1% 71,8 4,5% 80,5
UK 53,4 4,6% 64,3 3,5% 76,7 3,7% 92,4 2,7% 108,6 1,7% 106,1
Ireland -- -- -- -- -- -- 147,1 -5,7% 104,2 -3,4% 111,6
Italy -- -- -- -- -- -- 92,7 -0,2% 91,7 0,1% 93,8
Netherlands (2) -- -- -- 10,5% 54,6 4,0% 66,8 -0,2% 66,2 2,2% 79,9
Sweden -- -- -- -- -- -- 103,6 3,2% 125,3 2,2% 123,2
EU-3 (3) 33,6 4,5% 40,2 4,0% 49,1 5,5% 64,7 3,0% 77,6 2,6% 79,7
EU-10 (4) -- -- -- -- -- -- 72,0 2,3% 82,6 2,1% 85,3
USA 41,1 7,4% 55,3 4,4% 69,0 6,4% 95,2 3,2% 115,2 4,2% 133,6
(1)  Values for 2003 have been obtained as projections from Eurostat survey data (except for Denmark and the US).
(2)  Read 1987-1990 instead of 1986-1990.
(3)  The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and UK.
(4)  The EU-10 aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden.
Source: authors’ calculations on OECD – STAN, OECD Main Economic Indicators, Eurostat and GGDC (for all, last data available).
am612950Int.indd   Sec1:162 16/03/07   9:07:161
6
3
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
 
8
 
—
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
P
h
a
r
m
a
c
e
u
t
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
Table 8.6: Value added growth and its decomposition into labour, capital and TFP growth; 1982-2003 (%) (1)
1982-1990 1991-1995 1996-2001 1996-2003 (2)
produc-
tion
labour capital TFP
produc-
tion
labour capital TFP
produc-
tion
labour capital TFP
produc-
tion
labour capital TFP
Y ˙ L ˙ K ˙ A ˙ Y ˙ L ˙ K ˙ A ˙ Y ˙ L ˙ K ˙ A ˙ Y ˙ L ˙ K ˙ A ˙
Austria 10,24 3,47 6,68 5,34 7,35 1,12 3,38 5,21 -0,87 -0,21 3,35 -2,02 4,66 0,46 4,27 2,64
Belgium -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,49 3,42 14,88 2,05 10,41 3,63 12,55 2,07
Germany 3,57 1,04 4,48 1,54 5,51 -1,33 4,67 5,17 5,61 1,04 4,32 3,65 1,04 4,32 3,65 4,62
Finland 2,97 3,54 1,76 0,49 0,23 0,52 -1,28 0,67 4,99 0,51 -0,37 4,96 3,59 -0,66 1,59 3,30
France 10,56 1,83 9,71 5,88 7,30 -0,17 8,02 4,19 7,57 0,21 4,28 5,40 7,50 0,11 4,60 5,21
UK 6,72 0,12 4,13 5,09 3,86 -1,09 2,65 3,56 8,56 -1,33 1,36 8,76 6,34 -0,42 1,31 6,11
Ireland -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 13,41 8,49 2,75 9,54 15,52 6,44 2,99 11,78
Italy -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6,15 1,50 1,33 4,73 5,16 1,42 1,56 3,67
Netherlands -- -- -- -- 11,89 -0,59 3,44 10,69 7,28 1,88 1,73 5,50 4,05 1,23 3,47 2,06
Sweden -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 11,13 4,41 7,57 4,71 12,87 3,74 5,91 7,75
EU-3 (3) 6,48 0,98 5,20 4,12 5,63 -0,95 4,58 4,65 7,21 0,18 3,21 5,84 6,56 0,74 3,35 4,79
EU-10 (4) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7,56 0,98 3,28 5,40 7,17 1,23 3,36 4,98
USA 7,63 0,87 6,63 3,98 5,03 2,94 9,38 -1,71 7,75 2,44 5,61 3,37 7,98 1,55 5,78 3,81
(1)  See sidebar “Growth Decomposition and TFP” for a description of the methodology applied to decompose the growth of output.
(2)  Values for 2003 have been obtained as projections from Eurostat survey data (except for Denmark and the US).
(3)  The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and UK.
(4)  The EU-10 aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden.
Source: Authors’ computations on OECD – STAN, OECD - Main Economic Indicators and GGDC (for all, last data available).
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Table 8.7: Factors contribution to value added growth and to labour productivity growth; 1996-2003 (1) (2)
value 
added
labour 
contri-
bution
labour 
share
capital 
contri-
bution
capital 
share
TFP
labour 
pro-
duc-
tivity 
growth
Capital 
deep-
ening
TFP
Y ˙ (1 – α) L ˙ (1 – α) αK ˙ α A ˙ Y ˙ – L˙ α(K ˙ – L ˙) A ˙
Austria 4,66 0,15 0,55 1,87 0,45 2,64 4,20 1,55 2,64
Belgium 10,41 1,54 0,44 6,80 0,56 2,07 6,78 4,71 2,07
Germany 5,72 1,20 0,70 1,33 0,30 3,19 3,95 0,77 3,19
Finland 3,59 -0,37 0,51 0,66 0,49 3,30 4,25 0,95 3,30
France 7,50 0,05 0,51 2,25 0,49 5,21 7,39 2,18 5,21
UK 6,34 -0,32 0,58 0,55 0,42 6,11 6,76 0,66 6,11
Ireland 15,52 1,16 0,17 2,57 0,83 11,78 9,08 -2,70 11,78
Italy 5,16 0,79 0,55 0,70 0,45 3,67 3,74 0,07 3,67
Netherlands 4,05 0,47 0,50 1,51 0,50 2,06 2,82 0,75 2,06
Sweden 12,87 1,31 0,34 3,80 0,66 7,75 9,13 1,38 7,75
EU-3 (3) 6,56 0,43 0,60 1,33 0,40 4,79 5,82 1,02 4,79
EU-10 (4) 7,17 0,66 0,54 1,54 0,46 4,98 5,94 0,96 4,98
USA 7,98 0,61 0,38 3,56 0,62 3,81 6,43 2,62 3,81
(1) See sidebar “Growth Decomposition and TFP” for a description of the methodology applied to decompose the growth of output.
(2) Values for 2003 have been obtained as projections from Eurostat survey data (except for Denmark and the US).
(3) The EU-3 aggregate includes Germany, France and UK.
(4) The EU-10 aggregate includes: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden.
Source: authors’ computations on OECD – STAN, OECD - Main Economic Indicators, Eurostat and GGDC (for all, last data available).
historical average. This process was accompanied by 
a similar increase in labour growth.
The slowdown in TFP growth experienced by the US 
pharmaceutical sector in the last decade suggests 
that the current business model has some potential 
fragility. This slowdown has resulted from various 
factors: an upsurge since the middle 1990s in the 
level of investment, delay in the production of meas-
urable output from past R&D, and a slowdown in 
market growth rates for new innovative products.
Investments in R&D and in R&D General Purpose 
Technologies constitute an important share of US 
ﬁ   xed capital formation in pharmaceuticals (see 
GCP, 2000)  146. As is well known (David, 1990), 
ﬁ  rms require time to implement the organizational 
changes needed to derive maximum gain from gen-
eral-purpose innovation. In the transition period we 
observe an increase of inputs, capital and labour, 
while an increase in output is possible only at the 
146    See also Table III.2 in the present report: the R&D ratio in the US during the 
period 1991-1995 was 1 per cent higher than in surrounding periods.
end of a transition period, thereby inducing lower 
TFP growth during the transition stage. The recent 
upturns in both trend labour productivity growth 
and trend TFP growth in US pharmaceuticals seems 
to support this interpretation. It can be expected 
that both will continue to display sustained rates of 
growth in the coming years, when the full effects of 
investments in GPTs will unfold (see Gordon 2000).
In the long run, productivity as well as the rate and 
direction of pharmaceutical innovation in both Europe 
and the US will be critically affected by the interplay 
between technological and demand dynamics, espe-
cially in relation to cost containment measures adopted 
by both public and private reimbursement programs.
8.4. R&D  and  Innovation 
The empirical literature aimed at measuring techno-
logical change has proposed a wide set of measures 
and indicators, the most prominent of which are the 
number of patents and of patent citations.
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Patents are a unique source of information about 
innovative activities, particularly in the pharma-
ceutical industry, where they play a prominent 
role in protecting returns from R&D (see Cohen et 
al, 2000).
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 represent all pharmaceutical 
and biotechnological patents granted from 1974 
to 2003 by the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Ofﬁ  ce (USPTO) to inventors and institutions 
located in the US, Japan, and the main European 
countries  147.
The data indicate that the US is the main locus of 
innovative activities, and that its lead has grown over 
time.
Table 8.8 shows that the majority of patents in bio-
technology and pharmaceuticals are held by inven-
147    Pharmaceutical patents have been identiﬁ   ed based on the Interna-
tional Patent Classiﬁ  cation. Speciﬁ  cally, we have selected patents in 
classes A61K (preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes) and 
A01N (preservation of bodies of humans or animals or parts thereof). 
As far as the biotechnology patents are concerned, we have selected 
the US Patent Classes 424 (Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body-Treating 
Compositions); 435 (Chemistry, Molecular Biology and Microbiol-
ogy); 514 (Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body-Treating Compositions); 800 
(Multicellular Living Organisms and Unmodiﬁ   ed Parts Thereof and 
Related Processes).
tors located in the US  148. The number of pharmaceu-
tical patents held by US-based inventors increased by 
7 percentage points between 1984-1993 and 1994-
2003. The increase is even more striking if we weight 
each patent by its importance, as approximated by 
the number of citations it receives (see Table 8.9). 
Canada, Denmark and Sweden are the only other 
countries that have experienced an increase in 
the number of pharmaceutical patents granted to 
locally-based inventors between those two periods, 
although the increase is much lower than in the US.
Interestingly, the share of EU-25 inventors is higher than 
the share of EU-25 institutional assignees. The opposite is 
true for the US, even if the imbalance is gradually disap-
pearing. In other words, there are more European inven-
tors involved into research assigned to US organizations 
and performing their research in the US than vice-versa, 
although the globalisation of R&D activities is gradu-
ally eroding this disparity. A large share of the patents is 
obtained through research undertaken by US inventors.
148   Patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁ  ce might “overesti-
mate” the patenting performance of US scientists and research organiza-
tions as compared to foreign ones. Dernis and Khan (2004) estimate that the 
share of USPTO patents of US companies in 1999 (52.6%) is well above their 
share of EPO patents (27.8%) and triadic patent families (34%). However, 
this problem may be attenuated by comparing patent shares over time and 
by using multiple indicators of innovation and R&D performances.
Table 8.8: Shares of USPTO-granted pharmaceutical patents by countries based on the nationality 
of the assignee (A) and location of the inventor (I)
1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003
Assignee Inventor I-A Assignee Inventor I-A Assignee Inventor I-A
France 5,97% 6,05% 0,08% 5,39% 5,28% -0,11% 5,71% 5,79% 0,08%
Germany 11,63% 11,57% -0,06% 10,28% 10,45% 0,18% 7,13% 7,25% 0,12%
Sweden 0,81% 0,87% 0,06% 0,68% 0,67% -0,01% 1,15% 1,09% -0,06%
Denmark 0,31% 0,31% 0,00% 0,50% 0,54% 0,04% 0,82% 0,83% 0,01%
Italy 1,86% 2,05% 0,19% 2,29% 2,49% 0,21% 1,44% 1,76% 0,33%
Spain 0,12% 0,16% 0,04% 0,25% 0,29% 0,04% 0,30% 0,38% 0,08%
UK 5,53% 7,34% 1,82% 4,68% 6,41% 1,73% 3,86% 5,14% 1,28%
Other EU-25 2,02% 2,50% 0,48% 3,24% 3,08% -0,16% 2,66% 2,54% -0,12%
EU-25 28,26% 30,85% 2,59% 27,30% 29,22% 1,93% 23,07% 24,79% 1,72%
USA 59,02% 52,28% -6,74% 55,16% 50,79% -4,37% 60,06% 57,29% -2,76%
Canada 0,74% 1,30% 0,56% 1,07% 1,39% 0,32% 2,53% 2,64% 0,11%
Japan 9,29% 9,44% 0,15% 13,41% 13,55% 0,13% 9,15% 9,32% 0,17%
Switzerland 1,60% 4,29% 2,69% 1,31% 2,91% 1,60% 1,35% 1,42% 0,08%
Other 1,10% 1,84% 0,74% 1,76% 2,14% 0,39% 3,85% 4,53% 0,68%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: authors’ computations on USPTO data (granted patents only)
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In recent years, the number of patents in pharmaceu-
ticals and biotechnology granted by the Chinese pat-
ent ofﬁ  ce has increased. The same applies to US pat-
ents granted to Chinese inventors (see Table 8.10). 
These increases indicate a process of accumulation 
of scientiﬁ   c and technological capabilities. India’s 
recent performance in biopharmaceutical innova-
tion, as reﬂ  ected in patents granted, is similar to that 
of China. If these trends persist, China and India will 
strengthen their positions, becoming attractive and 
competitive destinations of foreign direct outward 
investment by multinational corporations.
Table 8.9: Shares of patent citations of USPTO-granted pharmaceutical patents by countries based 
on the nationality of the assignee (A) and location of the inventor (I)
1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003
Assignee Inventor I-A Assignee Inventor I-A Assignee Inventor I-A
France 5,11% 5,11% 0,00% 4,06% 4,14% 0,07% 4,23% 4,56% 0,33%
Germany 8,46% 8,23% -0,23% 6,61% 6,75% 0,14% 4,90% 5,14% 0,24%
Sweden 1,28% 1,22% -0,06% 0,82% 0,77% -0,05% 1,05% 1,01% -0,04%
Denmark 0,38% 0,39% 0,00% 0,50% 0,57% 0,07% 0,48% 0,47% 0,00%
Italy 1,04% 1,27% 0,23% 1,28% 1,40% 0,12% 0,89% 1,30% 0,41%
Spain 0,05% 0,07% 0,02% 0,11% 0,14% 0,03% 0,20% 0,24% 0,04%
UK 5,34% 6,94% 1,60% 3,66% 5,44% 1,78% 3,57% 4,61% 1,04%
Other EU-25 1,92% 2,28% 0,36% 2,38% 2,12% -0,27% 2,16% 1,73% -0,42%
EU-25 23,57% 25,50% 1,92% 19,43% 21,33% 1,90% 17,47% 19,06% 1,59%
USA 63,71% 59,33% -4,38% 67,12% 63,52% -3,60% 70,39% 68,13% -2,26%
Canada 1,20% 1,69% 0,50% 1,31% 1,80% 0,49% 2,31% 2,38% 0,07%
Japan 9,26% 8,99% -0,27% 9,55% 9,64% 0,09% 6,00% 6,07% 0,07%
Switzerland 1,24% 2,85% 1,61% 1,14% 2,00% 0,85% 1,19% 1,31% 0,12%
Other 1,02% 1,64% 0,62% 1,44% 1,70% 0,26% 2,64% 3,05% 0,41%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: authors’ computations on USPTO data (granted patents only)
Table 8.10: Patents in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, selected patent ofﬁ  ces 
in developing countries (1995-2004)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China no. 133 324 338 516 778 2284 2537 1820 2898 4826
% change - 143,6 4,3 52,7 50,8 193,6 11,1 -28,3 59,2 66,5
Russia no. 1091 896 1569 1624 1944 1624 1084 1719 2259 2126
% change - -17,9 75,1 3,5 19,7 -16,5 -33,3 58,6 31,4 -5,9
Brazil no. 83 145 380 759 2452 3590 2584 2502 1931 3265
% change - 74,7 162,1 99,7 223,1 46,4 -28,0 -3,2 -22,8 69,1
South Africa no. 1392 1635 1640 1706 1604 631 548 1463 1663 1828
% change - 17,5 0,3 4,0 -6,0 -60,7 -13,2 167,0 13,7 9,9
Israel no. 1037 1012 599 839 1079 887 1425 1468 814 902
% change - -2,4 -40,8 40,1 28,6 -17,8 60,7 3,0 -44,6 10,8
India no. 69 84 201 114 195 213 202 226 325 -
% change - 21,7 139,3 -43,3 71,1 9,2 -5,2 11,9 43,8 -
Source: our computations on ATA database.
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Table 8.11 presents statistics on co-invented patents, 
as a proxy of the extent of internationalisation of the 
innovation process in the life sciences.
Results in Table 8.11 show that R&D in pharmaceuti-
cals and biotechnology is becoming increasingly glo-
balise (i.e., the share of co-invented patents involving 
inventors located in a single region is decreasing), 
while the US research system occupies a prominent 
position in the international network of division of 
innovative labour.
The US dominance appears even stronger when we 
consider patent citations data. In fact, Table 8.12 sug-
gests that on average patents assigned to US institu-
tions have a much greater impact on future innova-
tive activity. US biopharmaceutical patents received 
5.56 citations on average between 1994 and 2003, 
far more than European (2.92) and Japanese (2.07) 
ones. Furthermore, the largest share (almost half) of 
the European and Japanese citations go to US pat-
ents, although this ﬁ  nding must be interpreted with 
caution, since we are considering data on patents 
granted by the USPTO. Nevertheless, the trends in 
pattern of citations of the EU citing US and JP citing 
US reveal an increasing importance of US research 
for inventors located in Europe and Japan.
Table 8.13 shows the evolution of R&D collabora-
tions since 1991, by location of the company that 
originated/developed the innovation. The table 
shows the dominance of US institutions in the inter-
national network of R&D agreements, with EU insti-
tutions playing a subordinate role, as reﬂ  ected in the 
much smaller number of agreements in which they 
are involved. The secondary role of the EU in phar-
maceutical R&D is also conﬁ  rmed by the relatively 
low number of intra-EU agreements.
Table 8.11: The internationalisation of R&D activities: co-invented patents
1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003
USA
Patent count 8.943 14.860 36.271
Mean number of inventors 1,78 2,22 2,93
Share of co-invented patents 51,72% 64,58% 76,25%
of which: (1)
US-US 95,09% 92,39% 87,73%
US-EU 2,77% 4,52% 7,86%
US-JP 0,82% 1,56% 1,46%
EU-25
Patent count 5.238 8.525 15.904
Mean number of inventors 2,81 3,36 3,65
Share of co-invented patents 78,64% 84,14% 85,61%
of which: (1)
EU-EU 92,81% 88,78% 77,45%
EU-US 3,11% 6,05% 15,98%
EU-JP 0,22% 0,53% 1,15%
Japan
Patent count 1.582 3.845 5.678
Mean number of inventors 4,05 4,20 4,28
Share of co-invented patents 92,35% 93,55% 91,72%
of which: (1)
JP-JP 96,78% 94,75% 89,34%
JP-US 2,60% 4,17% 7,76%
JP-EU 0,62% 1,06% 3,01%
(1)  Percentage do not sum to 100 because the inventors of a patent may have located in more than two countries.
Source: authors’ computations on USPTO data (granted patents only).
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The US has pioneered a new organizational arrange-
ment within the pharmaceutical industry, based on 
a division of labour between small and large compa-
nies. Europe, in comparison, has been less effective 
in encouraging the growth of new technology sup-
pliers and innovation specialists. European pharma-
ceutical producers have tended to rely on sources of 
research capabilities and innovation located in the 
US, which has made it even harder to establish a 
European industry of technology suppliers.
These characteristics of the sectoral innovation system 
are even more visible in Table 8.14 which shows the 
number and percentage of collaborative agreements 
signed by public research organizations (“PROs”), 
dedicated biotechnology ﬁ  rms (“DBFs”) and estab-
lished companies (“ECs”) in North America, Europe, 
and the rest of the world, as well as the change in 
these ﬁ  gures between 1991 and 2004.
DBFs play a central role in the US innovation sys-
tem, both as initiators and developers of new R&D 
projects. Their importance increased during the 
1990s, to the extent that DBFs, complemented 
by PROs, currently initiate the largest share of col-
laborative R&D projects in the US. DBFs have also 
grown signiﬁ  cantly in Europe since the early 1990s, 
but there are two marked differences with the US. 
First, the share of projects initiated and developed by 
DBFs is greater in the US than in the EU-25. Second, 
US DBFs differ from their European counterparts in 
participating actively in development. On the other 
hand, established ﬁ  rms play a much greater role in 
the EU, both as originators but also, especially, as 
developers of collaborative R&D projects.
Table 8.12:The internationalisation of R&D activities: patent citations
1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003
USA
Patent count 8.943 14.860 36.271
Number of citations (1) 6.680 40.332 201.510
Mean number of citations 0,75 2,71 5,56
of which: (2)
US -> US 74,70% 73,00% 74,70%
US -> EU 18,29% 18,51% 18,82%
US -> JP 5,09% 7,06% 6,77%
EU-25
Patent count 5.238 8.525 1.5904
Number of citations (1) 3.153 15.004 46.396
Mean number of citations 0,60 1,76 2,92
of which: (2)
EU -> EU 55,25% 51,18% 43,64%
EU -> US 36,12% 38,83% 49,11%
EU -> JP 5,49% 7,96% 7,49%
Japan
Patent count 1.582 3.845 5.678
Number of citations (1) 959 5.833 11.746
Mean number of citations 0,61 1,52 2,07
of which: (2)
JP -> JP 40,88% 36,57% 35,96%
JP -> US 33,99% 37,68% 42,23%
JP -> EU 23,46% 23,90% 22,26%
(1)  Only backward citations to pharmaceutical patents are considered 
(2)  Percentage do not sum to 100 because the inventors of a patent may have located in more than two countries.
Source: our computations on USPTO data (granted patents only).
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8.5. Industry  Structure 
and Competition
This section investigates the relationship between 
industrial performance and certain distinctive fea-
tures of different national pharmaceutical markets, 
including industry structure, intensity of competition 
as measured by ﬁ  rm and product turnover, entry of 
new molecules, and generic products.
On the one hand, a competitive environment facili-
tates efﬁ  cient resource allocation and can spur the 
invention of new or improved products, services, 
or processes. The resulting innovation can boost 
national economic growth and living standards (see 
FTC, 2003).
On the other hand, competition is not necessar-
ily conducive to rapid technological progress. In 
particular, ﬁ   rms will invest in R&D only if they 
can expect some form of transient ex post mar-
ket power allowing a positive return on their 
investment. In addition, market power also helps 
to reduce uncertainty, associated with excessive 
Table 8.13:Collaborative R&D projects, by nationality of originator and developer, 1991-2004
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
o
r
nationality of the developer
1991-1997 total USA EU-25 Other
USA
840 541 64,4% 157 18,7% 142 16,9%
77,2% 78,3% 49,7% 76,2% 14,4% 74,3% 13,1%
EU-25
165 95 57,6% 42 25,5% 28 17,0%
15,2% 13,7% 8,7% 20,4% 3,9% 14,7% 2,6%
Other
83 55 66,3% 7 8,4% 21 25,3%
7,6% 8,0% 5,1% 3,4% 0,6% 11,0% 1,9%
Total 1088 691 63,5% 206 18,9% 191 17,6%
1998-2004 total USA EU-25 Other
USA
940 658 70,0% 141 15,0% 141 15,0%
66,4% 74,9% 46,5% 45,2% 10,0% 62,4% 10,0%
EU-25
305 124 40,7% 138 45,2% 43 14,1%
21,5% 14,1% 8,8% 44,2% 9,7% 19,0% 3,0%
Other
171 96 56,1% 33 19,3% 42 24,6%
12,1% 10,9% 6,8% 10,6% 2,3% 18,6% 3,0%
Total 1416 878 62,0% 312 22,0% 226 16,0%
Source: author’s computations on ATA database.
Reading key
number of projects as % of originator’s projects (total by row)
as % of developer’s projects (total by column)
as % of total projects originated/developed in the 
period
Source: authors’ computations on ATA database.
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Table 8.14: Number of collaborative R&D Projects, by nationality and institution: 
temporal evolution (1)
Regions
public research 
organizations
dedicated biotech ﬁ  rms established companies
projects origi-
nated
projects 
developed
projects 
originated
projects 
developed
projects 
originated
projects 
developed
num % num % num % num % num % num %
1991-1997
USA 242 28,8% 4 0,6% 495 58,9% 374 54,1% 103 12,3% 313 45,3%
EU-25 54 32,7% 0 0,0% 72 43,6% 63 30,6% 39 23,6% 143 69,4%
Other 41 49,4% 1 0,5% 25 30,1% 46 24,1% 17 20,5% 144 75,4%
1998-2004
USA 218 23,2% 8 0,9% 638 67,9% 561 63,9% 84 8,9% 309 35,2%
EU-25 65 21,3% 3 1,0% 191 62,6% 134 42,9% 49 16,1% 175 56,1%
Other 49 28,7% 4 1,8% 96 56,1% 110 48,7% 26 15,2% 112 49,6%
(1)  Percentages are calculated on the total number of projects originated and developed by institutional type in each country.
Source: our computations on ATA database.
rivalry, which tends to undermine the incentive to 
invest.
Table 8.15 reports price ratios for all pharmaceuti-
cal products, including brand-names and generics. 
(Prices have been converted into US dollars using 
both exchange rates and purchasing power parities 
or PPP.) The average prices of branded drugs in the 
US are almost double the corresponding prices in 
EU countries. EU average price for branded drugs is 
56.2% of the US level. However, generic drug prices 
in the EU-15 countries are 95.6% their US counter-
parts.
After the price data are adjusted for PPP, it becomes 
clear that average prices of branded products in the 
EU-15 are 49.9% of the US prices, whereas generic 
prices in EU-15 are 81.7% the US price. More than 
half of the molecules included in the sample are 
priced higher in the US than in any country of the 
EU-15.
Price differences between the US and EU-15 are 
accounted for entirely by differences in prices for 
branded drugs. In fact, prices of generic drugs in the 
US are substantially aligned with prices in EU-15. In 
a few countries, such as Germany, generic prices are 
even higher than in the US.
Price at entry for branded drugs is 43.4% higher in 
the US than average price in the market. The cor-
responding price gap in the EU-15 is 28.2%, and in 
Japan just 3.9% (see Table 8.16). US generic prod-
ucts, by contrast, are priced at 60.3% of the average 
prices in the market.
These price differentials between the US and Europe 
reﬂ  ect radical differences in the extent of market reg-
ulation149. Prices for branded drugs in countries with 
free or semi-regulated prices – such as the US and, 
to a lesser extent, UK and Germany – are higher than 
in countries where more direct forms of price regu-
lation are in place, such as Italy and France. At the 
same time, the relatively unregulated markets tend 
to experience ﬁ  erce price competition after patent 
expiry, since higher prices of branded drugs repre-
sent a strong incentive for generic entry and price 
competition à la Bertrand (Pammolli et al, 2002; 
Magazzini et al. 2004). In fact, generic penetration in 
terms of volume is much higher in the USA (33.67% 
of the market in 2004) and UK (31.01 %) than in the 
average EU-15 (13.8 %) and Japan (2.55 %).
The possibility to command substantially higher mar-
ket prices for new and branded drugs can act as a 
powerful incentive for R&D and capital investments 
that can explain, to a certain extent at least, the 
different trends characterising the EU and US phar-
maceutical industries. There appears to be a trade-
off between demand and technological dynamics 
and the sustainability of health expenditures, with 
149   For an in-depth analysis of institutional aspects of national pharmaceuti-
cal markets, see OECS (2001).
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Table 8.15: Median of the ratio between average molecule prices per SU, 2004 (US = 100)
Exchange rate Parity Purchase Power (1)
Country All products Generics Branded All products Generics Branded
Austria 70,55 201,01 54,59 64,19 183,29 49,76
Belgium 62,99 136,99 49,54 55,69 121,62 43,78
Canada 69,17 102,66 60,71 73,94 109,92 64,97
China 16,58 12,56 20,33 77,35 58,79 94,70
Czech Rep. 41,24 51,71 34,44 72,06 90,33 60,47
Denmark 64,27 104,05 52,70 47,14 76,32 38,65
Estonia 46,60 85,58 35,29 88,42 162,48 66,93
Finland 66,26 160,71 51,64 54,75 132,84 42,64
France 66,50 138,00 55,25 57,38 117,48 47,51
Germany 75,86 141,14 60,08 67,00 123,07 53,03
Greece 45,23 58,36 36,92 49,72 64,30 40,64
Hungary 49,57 89,88 39,80 77,15 140,03 61,90
India 15,00 12,30 11,67 23,40 19,23 18,18
Ireland 58,93 109,18 47,58 49,52 91,89 39,85
Italy 59,34 103,94 46,71 57,82 104,14 45,46
Japan 71,23 94,10 52,00 57,32 73,04 41,76
Latvia 42,41 81,22 34,33 93,49 178,43 75,85
Lithuania 43,33 49,70 36,02 86,65 99,41 71,93
Luxembourg 61,66 144,60 46,06 59,90 143,64 44,76
Netherlands 66,09 111,26 55,08 54,26 91,33 45,22
Poland 43,80 48,94 37,37 83,14 91,95 70,93
Portugal 53,37 142,93 42,25 60,85 162,43 48,01
Slovak Rep. 41,21 51,81 33,65 79,55 100,00 64,98
Slovenia 65,41 144,33 49,51 86,94 191,45 66,00
Spain 48,36 107,01 40,37 47,94 106,21 40,03
Sweden 67,19 105,75 54,92 51,50 81,06 42,10
UK 68,63 100,55 57,01 55,62 81,51 46,00
EU-15 68,56 95,60 56,18 60,52 81,73 49,91
EU-25 64,42 94,05 53,72 61,85 83,79 50,90
(1)  Parity Purchase Power from OECD, “National accounts and historical statistics” (last data available on line).
Source: authors’ computations on CERM Data base.
Europe putting more emphasis than the US on cost 
containment through its Social Security price and 
reimbursement regulations.
Price convergence is taking place in Europe, as a 
combined effect of regulation at the level of single 
member states, parallel trade, and external reference 
pricing. Graph 8.1 shows that EU price convergence 
was more rapid in the second half of the 1990s as a 
result of the process of EU monetary convergence. 
Starting from 2000, we identify the emergence of 
two clubs: the core EU countries (France, Italy, Ben-
elux, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, UK, Ireland) with a 
15% average price gap; and a low-price club which 
includes the 10 new member states as well as Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, with average prices almost 
40% lower than the EU-15 level.
Interestingly, Germany is an outlier with an average 
price 15% higher that EU-15 average.
Overall, the US market is more concentrated than all 
the most important EU markets (Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain, but not the UK), as well as Japan, 
China and India (see Table 8.17). On average, the 
three leading products in each of 100 different thera-
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Table 8.16: Ratio between drug price at launch and the mean price of branded drugs 
in the market. Average on all ATC4 markets, 1994-2004 
Branded Generics
Austria 1,220 0,836
Belgium 1,181 0,659
Finland 1,253 0,855
France 1,339 0,769
Germany 1,061 0,735
Italy 1,248 0,827
Japan 1,039 0,820
Portugal 1,162 0,777
Spain 1,550 0,703
Sweden 1,437 0,793
UK 1,410 0,873
USA 1,434 0,603
EU 15 (1) 1,282 0,776
(1)  Weighted average of available countries
Source: authors’ computations on CERM database.
Graph 8.1: Price convergence in EU25, median prices, 1994-2004 (EU-15 average price = 1)
Source: our computations on CERM database.
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peutic categories account for 85.6% of total market 
share in the US, as compared with a total market 
share of 76.5% in the EU-25. It is clear that Euro-
pean markets are much more fragmented than the 
US market. The US market is as concentrated as the 
European one in terms of volume, while it is the most 
concentrated in terms of sales. To a large extent, the 
high concentration of the US market is due to the 
“premium price” that best-in-class products can 
command. Indeed, the relative price of the market 
leader in the US is 44% higher than the market aver-
age price – more than in Europe (22%) and Japan 
(15%). Notably, the skewness of relative prices distri-
bution boosts the concentration level of the US mar-
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ket. Contrary to many other high-tech industries, the 
pharmaceutical industry remains fairly fragmented. 
In all countries, pharmaceutical industry concentra-
tion at the corporate level is lower than at the market 
level, since the pharmaceutical industry is composed 
of several independent sub-markets (Sutton, 1998).
Higher concentration in the US market does not 
imply less competition. On the contrary, ﬁ  rm turno-
ver in the US is almost double that of the EU-15 and 
EU-25.
The “premium price” for new innovative drugs tends 
to induce higher levels of industrial concentration in 
the US. The lower turnover of EU markets translates 
into a higher persistency and a lower contestability 
of the leading products. The US average persistency 
of the leading product is slightly less than 6 years, 
while in the EU it is almost 10 years and in Japan 
more than 15 years.
As shown in Table 8.18, the US market has the high-
est product turnover. The US rate is 59.5% higher 
than EU-15, and 38.8% higher than Japan. The 
most striking difference is found in product exit rate, 
which is on average 77.2% higher in the US than in 
the EU-15, and 40.7 higher than in Japan. Product 
entry rates are 51.3% higher in the US than in the 
EU-15, and 38.8% higher than in Japan. Therefore, 
the process of creative destruction is much more 
intense in the US market than in European or Japa-
nese markets.
Table 8.17: Average market concentration (sales and volumes) and relative prices of the ﬁ  rst three 
products on the market, top 100 ATC4 classes, 1994-2004
C1(S) C1(Q) P1 C2(S) C2(Q) P2 C3(S) C3(Q) P3
EU-15 41,18 34,17 1,22 63,83 56,05 1,15 76,53 70,49 1,09
Japan 39,77 34,61 1,15 62,74 54,75 1,15 78,25 69,36 1,13
United States 49,72 34,63 1,44 74,96 59,48 1,26 85,56 70,74 1,21
India 21,98 21,80 1,01 37,06 38,10 0,97 47,21 47,96 0,98
Germany 29,97 22,94 1,31 47,42 38,49 1,23 58,87 50,95 1,16
China 36,15 19,20 1,88 56,78 32,31 1,76 67,62 39,95 1,69
Italy 36,68 33,49 1,10 57,57 54,07 1,06 71,49 67,14 1,06
France 39,01 31,21 1,25 64,88 54,45 1,19 78,18 71,16 1,10
Spain 40,36 32,62 1,24 62,37 52,72 1,18 75,94 67,92 1,12
Canada 42,03 32,68 1,29 65,71 54,51 1,21 79,35 69,12 1,15
Latvia 45,07 35,23 1,28 68,63 63,24 1,09 82,96 79,67 1,04
Czech Rep. 46,26 40,80 1,13 72,70 66,68 1,09 86,77 83,83 1,04
Portugal 46,73 39,65 1,18 70,41 61,34 1,15 84,32 79,63 1,06
Belgium 48,33 42,24 1,14 76,64 70,27 1,09 92,24 86,65 1,06
Austria 48,43 41,12 1,18 74,19 66,51 1,12 87,70 82,03 1,07
Netherlands 48,56 37,60 1,29 72,35 58,42 1,24 86,24 76,38 1,13
Luxemburg 49,54 39,93 1,24 76,49 68,20 1,12 89,91 83,20 1,08
Slovak Rep. 50,02 42,52 1,18 76,77 72,70 1,06 90,69 90,27 1,00
Poland 50,16 39,71 1,26 76,55 68,63 1,12 89,29 85,30 1,05
Ireland 51,19 43,77 1,17 77,50 72,42 1,07 91,76 87,10 1,05
Lithuania 51,53 44,06 1,17 77,37 72,95 1,06 90,67 88,95 1,02
Finland 52,30 45,58 1,15 78,95 73,26 1,08 92,65 89,54 1,03
Greece 52,73 43,08 1,22 78,00 69,76 1,12 88,90 83,08 1,07
Denmark 53,50 45,22 1,18 80,34 75,33 1,07 93,07 91,05 1,02
Sweden 53,68 44,70 1,20 79,70 75,51 1,06 91,60 89,95 1,02
Estonia 54,71 45,13 1,21 80,74 75,51 1,07 93,32 91,67 1,02
Hungary 54,85 52,29 1,05 84,04 82,19 1,02 96,11 95,72 1,00
United Kingdom 55,69 48,34 1,15 79,61 75,16 1,06 90,20 87,75 1,03
Slovenia 61,25 54,13 1,13 88,25 84,98 1,04 97,89 97,47 1,00
Source: authors’ computations on CERM database
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Table 8.18: Product turnover as a share of existing products (top 100 ATC4 classes, 1995-2004)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 average
Product entry rate (%)
USA 12,15 16,64 18,81 15,30 15,45 9,05 14,13 29,05 11,00 12,29 15,39
Japan 8,46 24,59 8,69 11,28 8,11 9,63 8,60 9,46 15,02 7,87 11,17
EU-15 9,12 9,53 9,15 11,78 11,07 10,62 9,41 9,98 10,28 10,71 10,17
EU-25 9,30 9,54 9,33 11,91 11,11 10,67 9,46 10,00 10,31 10,65 10,23
Product exit rate (%)
USA 13,39 7,51 7,44 6,25 8,38 13,43 6,87 7,61 6,09 6,37 8,33
Japan 5,49 4,88 6,52 5,66 7,09 7,45 5,38 7,06 5,41 4,24 5,92
EU-15 6,72 4,92 4,51 4,29 4,60 4,03 3,87 4,04 4,66 5,39 4,70
EU-25 6,71 4,92 4,57 4,38 4,64 4,15 4,11 4,17 4,68 5,58 4,79
Product turnover (%)
USA 25,54 24,14 26,25 21,55 23,84 22,47 21,00 36,66 17,10 18,66 23,72
Japan 13,94 29,47 15,21 16,94 15,20 17,08 13,98 16,52 20,44 12,11 17,09
EU-15 15,84 14,44 13,66 16,07 15,67 14,65 13,28 14,02 14,94 16,10 14,87
EU-25 16,01 14,46 13,91 16,29 15,76 14,82 13,57 14,17 15,00 16,23 15,02
Product net entry (%)
USA -1,24 9,13 11,37 9,05 7,07 -4,38 7,26 21,44 4,91 5,92 7,05
Japan 2,97 19,71 2,17 5,62 1,02 2,18 3,22 2,40 9,61 3,63 5,25
EU-15 2,40 4,61 4,64 7,49 6,47 6,59 5,54 5,94 5,62 5,32 5,46
EU-25 2,59 4,62 4,76 7,53 6,47 6,52 5,35 5,83 5,63 5,07 5,44
Source: our computations on CERM database
All in all, the US market for pharmaceuticals is both 
more concentrated and more volatile than markets 
in Europe. In other words, the higher concentration 
of the US market does not mean that it is less com-
petitive. On the contrary, the US market is highly 
contestable; product turnover is much more fre-
quent than in the EU and Japan; and competition 
from generic producers is substantial. US market 
behaviour is consistent with that of a market char-
acterized by Schumpeterian competition, where 
innovators can gain temporary quasi-monopoly 
proﬁ   ts, which in turn spur innovation efforts by 
competitors that quickly leads to more innovative 
products and a high turnover of market shares. 
Dynamic competition is less evident in the EU as a 
whole, and especially in certain continental Euro-
pean countries. As documented extensively in Gam-
bardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli (GCP, 2000), there 
is too little market-based competition in some of 
the European countries, resulting in a less-efﬁ  cient 
industry, as reﬂ  ected in productivity indicators and 
market performance.
8.6. Summary  and  conclusions
The US is not only by far the largest national phar-
maceutical market, but has also grown rapidly since 
the middle 1990s. Firms based in North America 
(mainly the US) signiﬁ  cantly increased their share of 
total world sales from 34% in 1989 to 47% in 2005. 
The US market is almost twice the size of the EU-15 
market in terms of revenue.
Even though employment in the European pharma-
ceutical industry is higher than in the US, the US out-
performs Europe and Japan in terms of both value 
of pharmaceutical production and its incidence over 
total manufacturing. Between 1995 and 2001, US 
production grew at an average annual rate of 8.0%, 
as compared to an increase of 7.4% for the EU-15.
Trade openness has increased signiﬁ  cantly over the 
last ten years. Moreover, from 1998 to 2003 local 
corporations lost market shares in all major national 
markets. However, US corporations have maintained 
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their market shares in the US, while increasing their 
penetration in Europe by 3.6%.
The integration of the European market is a priority if 
the European pharmaceutical industry to enhance its 
competitiveness. In fact, even as the globalisation of 
the industry reduces the advantages resulting from 
larger domestic markets, the presence in Europe of 
barriers to trade and cross-border circulation of tech-
nological competences and factors of production 
gives US companies a signiﬁ  cant size advantage.
Labour is less expensive in Europe than in the US. In 
2003, labour cost per employee was 30% lower in 
EU-15 than in the US. In 1995, the gap was signiﬁ  -
cantly narrower (10%).
However, Europe lags behind the US in labour pro-
ductivity in pharmaceuticals. The productivity gap 
with the US is much larger in pharmaceuticals than in 
overall manufacturing. In 2003, labour productivity 
in the European pharmaceutical industry was 53.1% 
that of the US. Value added per employee in the US is 
higher than in Europe, with the exception of Ireland 
and Sweden. Overall productivity growth is lower in 
Europe, although certain countries have experienced 
higher labour productivity growth rates than the US 
(e.g., Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, France, UK, and 
Belgium between 1996 and 2003). To a consider-
able extent, productivity gains in Europe stem from 
increased US foreign direct investment.
The European pharmaceutical industry is more 
labour-intensive than its US counterpart. Capital 
deepening in the US has happened at consistently 
faster rates than in the EU, as demonstrated by the 
ratio of capital per employee between 1981 and 
2003 (France is one of the few exceptions). In 2003 
capital per employee in the US was 56.6% higher 
than in the EU-10 aggregate. From 1990 to 2003 the 
US capital stock, measured in real terms, has almost 
doubled.
Productivity growth in the US was mostly the out-
come of a signiﬁ  cant process of capital deepening 
(2.6% average growth from 1996 to 2003), while 
the most important component in Europe was total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth (5.0% average 
growth in 1996-2003), accounting for 83.8% of 
labour productivity growth. Capital deepening in 
Europe increased at a modest rate of 1.0%.
Since 2000, the US has consolidated its central role 
as a locus of innovation in pharmaceuticals. US ﬁ  rms 
hold the majority of biopharmaceutical patents, and 
that dominant position continues to expand. From 
the period 1984-1993 to the period 1994-2003, 
the share of biopharmaceutical patents held by US 
inventors has risen by approximately 7 per cent 
(from 50.8% to 57.3%). The share of EU-25 inven-
tors is higher than the share of EU-25 institutional 
assignees. The opposite is true for the US, even if the 
imbalance is gradually disappearing. In other words, 
there are more European inventors involved into the 
research assigned to US organizations and perform-
ing research in the US than vice-versa, although the 
globalisation of R&D activities is gradually eroding 
this disparity.
US ﬁ  rms play a pivotal role in the global division of 
innovative labour in pharmaceuticals, as shown by 
the shares of co-invented patents at the international 
level. US dominance is even more pronounced when 
looking at patent citations data.
The internal structure of the US national innovation 
system is a powerful source of competitive advan-
tage and industrial leadership. In the US the biotech 
sector play a vital role integrating explorations of 
new research opportunities with clinical and market 
development.
China and India are accumulating scientiﬁ  c and tech-
nological capabilities in the life sciences and in phar-
maceuticals. This pattern poses a serious challenge 
to the European industry, which might be displaced 
in the long run by economies with lower labour costs 
and greater potential in terms of both market size 
and scientiﬁ  c capabilities.
The US market for pharmaceuticals is both more con-
centrated and more volatile than markets in Europe. 
In other words, the higher concentration of the US 
market does not mean that it is less competitive. On 
the contrary, the US market is highly contestable; 
product turnover is much more frequent than in the 
EU and Japan; and competition from generic produc-
ers is substantial. US market behaviour is consistent 
with that of a market characterized by Schumpet-
erian competition, where innovators can gain tem-
porary quasi-monopoly proﬁ  ts, which in turn spur 
innovation efforts by competitors that quickly leads 
to more innovative products and a high turnover of 
market shares. Dynamic competition is less evident 
in the EU as a whole, and especially in certain conti-
nental European countries.
In sum, Europe is lagging behind the US in its ability 
to generate, organise, and sustain innovation proc-
esses and productivity growth in pharmaceuticals. 
Moreover, a disproportionate share of pharmaceuti-
cal R&D is performed in the US, with negative conse-
quences in terms of both high value-added employ-
ment and complementary investments in clinical 
research.
Cost containment policies on behalf of European 
Social Security institutions can explain to a certain 
extent the different dynamics characterising the EU 
pharmaceutical industry vis-à-vis the US. However, 
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these cannot be fully explained by sector-speciﬁ  c 
factors. They are also the consequence of Europe’s 
relative lack of dynamism in reforming its labour and 
capital markets, education systems, public spending, 
and regimes of market regulation. This is, for exam-
ple, illustrated by the relative lack of dynamism of 
young technology-dedicated ﬁ  rms in generating and 
developing R&D projects.
Given the shortcomings in European competitive-
ness attributed at least partially to the distortions 
created by national pricing and reimbursement 
decisions, the Commission has taken the initiative 
to address some of the pressing issues by creating 
the Pharmaceutical Forum. It was established by Vice 
President Verheugen and Commissioner Kyprianou 
in June 2005 and brings together for the ﬁ  rst time 
senior decision makers in Member States, industry 
and other stakeholders. Based on previous work, the 
G10 Medicines process, it will take forward the three 
topics “Information to Patients, Relative Effectiveness 
of Medicines and Pricing/Reimbursement”.
In particular the two latter issues have been the 
source of market distortions in the Single Market for 
pharmaceuticals in the EU since national pricing/
reimbursement decisions and the diverging require-
ments to measure relative effectiveness have had 
negative spill-over effects on other Members States 
with different systems and have often caused unfore-
seen ramiﬁ  cations for the EU market as a whole.
The objective of the Forum is to ﬁ  nd a way forward 
which will strike a balance between the public health 
objective of patients’ access to new medicines at 
affordable costs and the need to create a predictable 
environment for business with economic rewards for 
innovators. Finding the right balance and creating 
an environment conducive to innovation will foster 
the competitiveness of the industry.
Based on the deliberations in this framework, con-
crete actions will have to follow at EU and particu-
larly at Member States’ level in order to regenerate 
Europe as a world centre of pharmaceutical innova-
tion.
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Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to EU-25
Production index: The production index is actu-
ally an index of ﬁ  nal production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by 
combining the indexes of production and number of 
persons employed. Therefore, this indicator meas-
ures ﬁ  nal production per person.
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the produc-
tion index and the index of wages and salaries and 
measures labour cost per unit of production. It is 
deﬁ  ned (Eurostat) as “the total remuneration, in cash 
or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll 
(including homeworkers), in return for work done dur-
ing the accounting period, regardless of whether it is 
paid on the basis of working time, output or piecework 
and whether it is paid regularly … wages and sala-
ries do not include social contributions payable by the 
employer”.
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sec-
tor “i”, as (Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-25 
exports and imports of products of sector “i” to and 
from the rest of the World.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): this 
is the indicator used in the Pocketbook. For sector “i” 
it is deﬁ  ned as follows:
¦
¦
=
i
i XW
i W
i
i EU
i EU
i X
X
X
RCA
,
,
,
,
where:
X = exports
i = sector
W = World
ANNEX 1:
Sectoral competitiveness indicators
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Table 1: EU-25 production index annual growth rate (%)
NACE Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 
2001-
2005
D Manufacturing 3,2 0,1 4,5 3,7 1,6 5,3 0,1 -0,7 0,5 2,5 1,2 0,7
DA15 Food products and beverages 2,1 1,3 3,3 0,9 1,7 1,1 1,6 2,4 1,1 1,2 2,2 1,7
DA16 Tobacco products -7,4 9,8 -1,3 1,6 -5,1 -6,1 -3,0 -0,2 -5,7 -5,9 -5,2 -4,0
DB17 Textiles -1,6 -3,5 3,8 -1,9 -4,7 1,4 -3,9 -4,6 -3,3 -4,4 -4,8 -4,2
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -2,1 -5,4 -3,7 -2,6 -10,0 -5,5 -3,3 -12,0 -5,8 -5,6 -9,3 -7,2
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 1,0 -3,3 1,1 -5,5 -3,9 -3,3 -4,1 -7,8 -7,8 -11,4 -8,2 -7,9
DD20 Wood and of products of wood and cork -0,9 -3,5 4,4 3,1 2,6 5,5 -3,0 0,3 1,3 3,2 0,5 0,4
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -0,7 -2,0 5,1 0,7 2,3 3,3 -2,2 3,2 2,0 3,4 -0,8 1,1
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -1,0 0,0 3,8 5,0 3,3 2,0 -1,6 -0,4 -0,7 2,2 -0,1 -0,1
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1,7 0,0 -1,3 2,1 -5,9 2,4 0,1 -1,2 1,5 3,6 0,9 1,0
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products 3,5 2,5 6,4 3,2 4,6 5,2 2,8 5,3 2,1 1,1 2,1 2,7
DH25 Rubber and plastic products 3,0 -0,8 5,8 4,4 2,5 4,8 -0,7 0,2 1,8 1,9 0,4 0,7
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2,0 -2,7 3,0 2,3 2,3 3,8 -0,9 -2,0 0,7 1,8 0,1 -0,1
DJ27 Basic metals 2,3 -2,2 6,4 0,9 -3,2 6,5 -1,6 -0,5 0,1 3,8 -1,8 0,0
DJ28 Fabricated metal products 6,6 -1,1 4,1 4,7 0,6 5,8 0,7 -0,1 0,3 2,9 1,3 1,0
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 7,8 0,3 3,0 2,8 -2,5 5,7 1,4 -1,3 -0,8 3,7 3,5 1,3
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 23,2 7,2 5,5 12,6 8,9 17,7 -2,3 -16,8 -0,3 -0,8 2,2 -3,9
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 2,2 -0,3 4,9 5,0 3,2 7,8 1,5 -3,8 -0,9 3,5 1,9 0,4
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
7,2 4,0 6,9 9,1 11,5 24,3 -9,6 -10,9 1,0 12,3 3,6 -1,1
DL33
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks
4,3 0,2 2,4 3,8 1,3 10,3 4,5 -0,7 2,2 2,0 2,0 2,0
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5,9 2,8 8,1 11,2 3,6 7,8 1,9 1,0 2,3 5,2 1,7 2,4
DM35 Other transport equipment -3,1 1,2 8,5 4,1 5,7 0,4 3,5 -6,2 2,8 2,6 3,5 1,2
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0,5 -1,5 1,4 4,7 2,5 2,5 -0,4 -4,9 -2,5 0,6 0,0 -1,5
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,1 6,7 -0,2 7,5 2,5 4,1
Source: Eurostat
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Table 2: EU-25 number of persons employed annual growth rate (%)
NACE Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 
2001-2005
D Manufacturing -1,4 -0,8 0,6 -1,1 -0,5 -0,3 -2,3 -1,8 -1,7 -1,1 -1,4
DA15 Food products and beverages 0,0 -0,3 0,8 -0,6 -0,9 -0,6 -0,7 -0,1 -1,3 0,2 -0,5
DA16 Tobacco products -4,4 -4,3 -3,0 -4,7 -4,2 -4,3 -4,0 -4,4 -1,1 -2,9 -3,3
DB17 Textiles -6,3 -2,8 -2,1 -5,2 -4,4 -2,8 -5,3 -7,3 -5,3 -3,6 -4,9
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur n.a. -3,5 -2,2 -4,6 -6,9 -5,0 -7,1 -6,4 -6,8 -9,6 -7,0
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage n.a. -2,4 -4,2 -7,5 -5,9 -2,0 -3,3 -5,6 -8,8 -7,4 -5,5
DD20 Wood and of products of wood and cork -1,4 -0,2 1,1 0,7 0,6 -0,5 -2,3 -2,2 -0,9 0,4 -1,1
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -2,1 -1,3 0,8 -2,7 -1,2 -1,4 -1,8 -1,5 -0,9 -2,1 -1,5
DE22
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded 
media
0,1 0,2 1,5 1,6 0,4 -0,1 -2,0 -2,4 -1,2 -1,9 -1,5
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -1,0 -4,4 -6,6 0,5 -1,9 -2,2 -2,2 -1,9 -2,0 -0,9 -1,9
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products -1,6 -1,3 -1,1 -1,6 -1,4 -0,2 -0,2 -1,0 -3,0 -1,3 -1,2
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -1,0 1,9 3,5 -0,3 2,1 0,7 -0,3 0,9 -0,1 -0,5 0,1
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -2,9 -2,0 0,7 -1,6 -0,5 -1,0 -2,1 -2,5 -2,1 -1,4 -1,8
DJ27 Basic metals -1,9 -2,5 -0,6 -2,8 -3,5 -2,1 -3,7 -2,8 -2,6 -1,0 -2,4
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0,4 0,1 2,2 1,0 1,3 1,0 -1,6 -0,8 0,5 0,6 -0,1
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1,4 -0,6 0,5 -2,2 -1,1 0,2 -1,7 -2,3 -1,9 0,2 -1,1
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -2,9 1,0 3,2 2,3 1,1 -1,8 -11,0 -7,1 -5,7 -2,2 -5,6
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -1,9 -0,8 3,6 -0,5 0,9 1,1 -3,2 -2,8 -0,7 -1,4 -1,4
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
-1,2 -2,2 1,7 0,5 5,8 1,0 -8,7 -6,0 -3,8 -2,3 -4,0
DL33
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks
0,2 -0,4 -0,9 -1,7 -0,5 3,1 -1,1 -1,1 0,9 0,0 0,3
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0,7 1,2 3,0 0,5 2,3 1,2 -1,0 0,8 0,5 -1,5 0,0
DM35 Other transport equipment -3,6 -3,0 -1,4 -1,6 -2,0 0,5 -2,0 -2,8 -1,8 -0,4 -1,3
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0,6 -0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,6 0,2 -3,6 0,4 -2,0 -1,5 -1,3
DN37 Recycling 9,2 3,9 5,1 1,9 3,1 7,9 3,3 3,6 5,5 1,5 4,3
Source: Eurostat
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Table 3: EU-25 number of hours worked annual growth rate (%)
NACE Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 2001-
2005
D Manufacturing -1,6 -3,0 -2,2 -1,1 -1,4 -1,9
DA15 Food products and beverages -1,5 -1,8 -1,9 -1,2 -1,0 -1,5
DA16 Tobacco products -0,1 -6,4 -8,5 -1,0 -1,8 -3,6
DB17 Textiles -3,3 -4,7 -6,2 -4,0 -6,1 -4,9
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -6,4 -7,4 -7,2 -5,0 -7,4 -6,7
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage -3,5 -7,7 -7,7 -7,6 -7,8 -6,9
DD20 Wood and of products of wood and cork -2,4 -3,7 -2,6 -0,2 -0,2 -1,8
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -1,2 -2,9 0,0 -1,8 -1,9 -1,6
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -0,5 -3,4 -1,5 -2,6 -1,6 -1,9
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -3,4 -1,0 -2,6 -1,0 -3,1 -2,2
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products -1,8 -1,0 -1,3 -1,6 -2,4 -1,6
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -2,0 -0,1 -0,4 0,4 -0,8 -0,6
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -3,0 -2,9 -2,9 -1,3 -1,8 -2,4
DJ27 Basic metals -3,0 -3,5 -4,4 -0,9 -1,9 -2,8
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0,2 -2,3 -1,8 0,1 0,0 -0,8
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -1,5 -2,8 -2,6 -0,3 -0,4 -1,5
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -2,5 -11,5 -6,4 -4,8 -3,7 -5,8
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -1,3 -2,9 -1,7 -0,7 -0,8 -1,5
DL32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus -2,8 -7,9 -5,7 -2,1 -2,2 -4,2
DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1,8 -1,8 -1,6 0,4 -0,3 -0,3
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -0,5 -1,9 0,7 1,3 -0,5 -0,2
DM35 Other transport equipment -0,8 -2,5 -2,7 -1,9 -0,5 -1,7
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0,7 -4,4 -2,7 -1,2 -1,9 -2,2
DN37 Recycling 4,2 3,0 -0,7 2,5 3,5 2,5
Source: Eurostat
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Table 4: EU-25 labour productivity (per person employed) annual growth rate (%)
NACE Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 
2001-2005
D Manufacturing 1,5 5,3 3,1 2,8 5,8 0,4 1,6 2,3 4,2 2,3 2,2
DA15 Food products and beverages 1,3 3,6 0,1 2,4 2,0 2,2 3,1 1,2 2,5 2,0 2,2
DA16 Tobacco products 14,8 3,1 4,7 -0,4 -2,1 1,3 3,9 -1,4 -4,8 -2,3 -0,7
DB17 Textiles 2,9 6,8 0,3 0,5 6,1 -1,1 0,8 4,3 0,9 -1,2 0,7
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur n.a. -0,2 -0,3 -5,6 1,4 1,7 -5,3 0,6 1,4 0,4 -0,3
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage n.a. 3,6 -1,3 3,9 2,7 -2,1 -4,7 -2,3 -2,8 -0,9 -2,6
DD20 Wood and of products of wood and cork -2,2 4,6 1,9 1,8 4,9 -2,5 2,6 3,6 4,1 0,1 1,6
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0,2 6,5 -0,1 5,1 4,5 -0,8 5,1 3,6 4,4 1,3 2,7
DE22
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded 
media
0,0 3,6 3,5 1,6 1,6 -1,5 1,6 1,8 3,4 1,9 1,4
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0,9 3,2 9,3 -6,3 4,5 2,4 1,0 3,5 5,7 1,9 2,9
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products 4,2 7,8 4,3 6,3 6,8 3,0 5,5 3,2 4,2 3,5 3,9
DH25 Rubber and plastic products 0,2 3,8 0,9 2,8 2,7 -1,4 0,5 0,9 2,0 1,0 0,6
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0,2 5,0 1,6 3,9 4,4 0,0 0,1 3,3 3,9 1,4 1,7
DJ27 Basic metals -0,3 9,1 1,5 -0,4 10,3 0,5 3,3 2,9 6,6 -0,8 2,5
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -0,7 4,1 2,5 -0,4 4,4 -0,4 1,5 1,1 2,4 0,7 1,1
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,7 3,7 2,2 -0,3 6,8 1,2 0,5 1,6 5,7 3,3 2,4
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 10,3 4,5 9,2 6,4 16,4 -0,4 -6,5 7,3 5,2 4,4 1,9
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1,6 5,8 1,4 3,7 6,8 0,4 -0,6 2,0 4,3 3,3 1,8
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
5,2 9,3 7,3 10,9 17,5 -10,5 -2,5 7,4 16,8 6,0 3,0
DL33
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks
0,0 2,8 4,7 3,1 10,8 1,3 0,3 3,3 1,1 2,0 1,6
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2,1 6,8 8,0 3,1 5,4 0,7 2,0 1,5 4,7 3,2 2,4
DM35 Other transport equipment 5,1 11,8 5,5 7,5 2,5 3,0 -4,3 5,8 4,5 3,9 2,5
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0,9 1,5 4,3 2,9 1,9 -0,6 -1,4 -2,9 2,6 1,5 -0,2
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -3,5 3,2 -3,6 1,9 1,0 -0,2
Source: Eurostat
a
m
6
1
2
9
5
0
I
n
t
.
i
n
d
d
 
 
 
S
e
c
1
:
1
8
3
1
6
/
0
3
/
0
7
 
 
 
9
:
0
7
:
2
51
8
4
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
2
0
0
6
Table 5: EU-25 Unit Labour Cost annual growth rate (%)
NACE Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
D Manufacturing -3,5 -1,1 0,6 -2,1 2,5 1,5 0,5 -1,1 0,0 0,7
DA15 Food products and beverages -1,8 0,7 0,4 0,8 1,6 0,0 2,0 -0,2 -1,1 0,5
DA16 Tobacco products n.a. n.a. 8,7 10,6 4,5 0,1 6,6 11,8 7,3 6,0
DB17 Textiles -2,5 3,5 5,1 -0,1 2,8 3,6 2,0 3,0 3,0 2,8
DB18 Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur 2,6 2,8 10,0 4,1 1,4 10,8 2,1 5,2 8,7 5,6
DC19 Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 0,5 7,2 4,3 5,5 7,1 8,2 6,2 12,0 8,6 8,4
DD20 Wood and of products of wood and cork -3,7 -0,6 -0,5 -3,2 4,1 -0,3 -1,1 -0,7 1,6 0,7
DE21 Pulp, paper and paper products -3,5 0,7 -0,7 -0,7 4,5 -2,5 -1,7 -1,9 2,0 0,1
DE22 Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media n.a. n.a. 0,1 1,6 4,9 1,1 -0,4 -1,8 1,3 1,0
DF23 Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0,1 -5,7 6,6 0,0 2,8 3,5 1,9 1,1 2,5 2,4
DG24 Chemicals and chemical products -6,1 -2,4 -3,9 -2,4 -0,4 -2,6 0,7 -0,9 -0,8 -0,8
DH25 Rubber and plastic products -3,3 -0,7 0,8 -0,6 3,4 1,1 0,6 1,1 0,4 1,3
DI26 Other non-metallic mineral products -3,2 -0,8 -0,7 -1,9 1,9 2,9 -0,1 -1,3 1,0 0,9
DJ27 Basic metals -4,0 1,3 3,7 -4,9 -1,5 -0,7 0,0 -2,3 4,3 -0,1
DJ28 Fabricated metal products -2,8 -1,4 2,3 -2,4 2,8 1,2 0,8 -0,6 0,2 0,9
DK29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -2,1 0,3 4,5 -2,6 1,6 1,7 2,2 -1,0 -1,5 0,6
DL30 Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers n.a. n.a. -8,0 -15,2 5,0 6,9 -5,3 -6,4 -2,6 -0,6
DL31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. -5,8 -1,3 -1,7 -4,0 1,8 4,5 0,0 -1,8 -0,8 0,7
DL32
Radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus
-5,7 -2,9 -5,2 -13,2 15,4 7,4 -5,4 -11,9 -4,4 -0,2
DL33
Medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks
-2,0 -2,5 0,0 -5,4 1,4 1,9 -0,3 1,1 1,3 1,1
DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -4,9 -5,6 1,3 -2,9 1,7 1,4 1,3 -2,4 -0,4 0,3
DM35 Other transport equipment n.a. n.a. -3,0 1,9 1,9 9,9 -0,8 -2,9 0,1 1,5
DN36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -1,4 -3,3 -0,2 -1,0 3,0 5,0 1,4 -1,2 0,1 1,6
DN37 Recycling n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,3 -2,1 8,1 -2,0 3,3 2,4
Source: calculated from Eurostat data
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Table 6: EU-25 Relative trade balance (X-M)/(X+M)
Product 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0,09 0,09 0,07 0,09 0,07 0,07
Textiles -0,10 -0,08 -0,08 -0,07 -0,07 -0,10
Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur -0,49 -0,50 -0,47 -0,48 -0,50 -0,52
Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage -0,13 -0,12 -0,13 -0,16 -0,20 -0,20
Wood and of products of wood and cork -0,20 -0,19 -0,14 -0,07 -0,09 -0,11
Pulp, paper and paper products 0,14 0,11 0,15 0,21 0,24 0,17
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 0,27 0,26 0,30 0,31 0,32 0,31
Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0,07 -0,06 -0,13 -0,12 -0,09 -0,07
Chemicals and chemical products 0,21 0,22 0,23 0,25 0,25 0,25
Rubber and plastic products 0,03 0,04 0,06 0,09 0,09 0,10
Other non-metallic mineral products 0,40 0,36 0,34 0,36 0,34 0,30
Basic metals -0,18 -0,20 -0,19 -0,18 -0,18 -0,19
Fabricated metal products 0,21 0,15 0,18 0,22 0,20 0,21
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0,31 0,29 0,33 0,37 0,37 0,40
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers -0,47 -0,44 -0,41 -0,42 -0,44 -0,45
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0,04 -0,01 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,08
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus -0,14 -0,18 -0,16 -0,18 -0,20 -0,19
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks -0,04 -0,04 -0,02 0,04 0,06 0,12
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0,28 0,36 0,40 0,42 0,41 0,40
Other transport equipment 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,01 -0,02 -0,01
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -0,05 -0,06 -0,04 -0,06 -0,10 -0,13
Source: calculated from COMEXT
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Table 7: EU-25 Revealed Comparative Advantage index
Product 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Food products, beverages and tobacco 1,12 1,08 1,14 1,10 1,13 1,17 1,06 1,09 1,07 1,07
Textiles 0,73 0,72 0,73 0,74 0,73 0,72 0,71 0,68 0,69 0,71
Wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur 0,59 0,62 0,58 0,54 0,55 0,54 0,54 0,53 0,53 0,54
Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 1,10 1,17 1,13 1,09 1,13 1,21 1,14 1,10 1,08 1,09
Wood and of products of wood and cork 0,49 0,49 0,55 0,62 0,58 0,65 0,69 0,74 0,77 0,75
Pulp, paper and paper products 0,95 1,01 1,05 1,00 1,02 1,03 1,01 1,10 1,13 1,16
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media 1,43 1,47 1,46 1,45 1,46 1,47 1,30 1,35 1,46 1,45
Coke, reﬁ  ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1,28 1,13 1,30 0,93 0,94 0,92 1,11 1,04 1,05 1,00
Chemicals and chemical products 1,27 1,29 1,33 1,39 1,45 1,47 1,44 1,53 1,45 1,42
Rubber and plastic products 0,91 0,90 0,93 0,91 0,91 0,91 0,89 0,89 0,93 0,95
Other non-metallic mineral products 1,57 1,54 1,55 1,56 1,56 1,54 1,47 1,41 1,41 1,39
Basic metals 0,82 0,86 0,84 0,76 0,74 0,86 0,81 0,78 0,73 0,76
Fabricated metal products 1,17 1,16 1,14 1,13 1,15 1,09 1,08 1,07 1,10 1,12
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,50 1,49 1,51 1,51 1,51 1,45 1,46 1,48 1,48 1,49
Ofﬁ  ce machinery and computers 0,46 0,42 0,43 0,45 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,45 0,44 0,41
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0,95 0,96 0,97 0,98 0,96 0,93 0,95 0,91 0,94 0,96
Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0,51 0,56 0,53 0,59 0,59 0,62 0,56 0,47 0,48 0,49
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 1,03 1,02 1,05 1,06 1,08 1,08 1,09 1,20 1,14 1,13
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0,98 0,96 0,98 0,93 0,88 0,96 0,99 0,99 1,09 1,12
Other transport equipment 1,42 1,33 1,17 1,25 1,34 1,35 1,28 1,35 1,24 1,22
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1,09 1,07 1,10 1,04 1,04 1,07 1,03 1,00 0,94 0,87
Source: calculated from COMTRADE data
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ANNEX 2:
List of background studies to the European 
Competitiveness Report 2006
Some parts of the European Competitiveness Report 
2006 are based on, or use, material prepared by a 
consortium led by WIFO, the Austrian Institute for 
Economic Research:
 –    Chapter 3 – Liberalisation of European Energy 
markets: challenges and policy options is based 
on “Liberalisation of European Energy markets: 
challenges and policy options”, by Machiel 
Mulder, Victoria Shestalova, Mark Lijesen and 
Gijsbert Zwart, from the Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), (2006).
 –    Chapter 4 – The Regulatory Environment in the 
Context of the Strategy for Growth and Jobs, 
uses material from “The Regulatory Envi-
ronment in the Context of the Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs”, by Mari Kangasniemi and 
Ana Rincon-Aznar, National Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (NIESR), (2006).
 –    Chapter 5 – The Financing of Innovation, uses 
matterial from “The Financing of Innovation”, 
by Michael Peneder, from WIFO (2006).
 –    Chapter 6 – The “Lead Markets” approach to Inno-
vation policy, is based on “The Concept of “Lead 
Markets”: A Literature Overview”, by Rian Beise-
Zee and Christian Rammer, Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW), (2006).
Finally, Chapter 8 – Competitiveness in the Pharma-
ceutical industry, is based on “Industrial Competitive-
ness in Pharmaceuticals: A European Perspective”, by 
Fabio Pammolli, IMT, Institute for Advanced Studies, 
Lucca, University of Florence, CERM and Massimo 
Riccaboni, University of Florence, CERM (2006).
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